Simulating greenhouse gas (GHG) allowance cost and GHG emission reduction in Western Europe

 Due to the growing concern for global warming, the EU25 have implemented the European Union Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS). In the first trading period (2005–2007), part of the targeted GHG emission reductions presumably will have to result from a switch from coal fired electricity generation to gas fired electricity generation. It is possible to calculate the allowance cost necessary to switch a certain coal fired plant with a certain gas fired plant in the merit order. The allowance cost obtained is a so called switching point. When comparing historic European Union Allowance (EUA) prices (2005) with the corresponding historic switching points, the EUA prices were found high enough to cause a certain switch in the summer season. This finding leads to the use of switching points in establishing allowance cost profiles for several scenarios. A variable gas price profile is used in the simulation tool E-Simulate to simulate electricity generation and related GHG emissions in an eight zonal model representing Western Europe. Several GHG allowance cost profile scenarios are examined. For each scenario, electricity generation in the considered countries is clarified. The focus however lies on the GHG emission reduction potentials. These potentials are addressed for each scenario.     

Nonlinearity in cap-and-trade systems: The EUA price and its fundamentals

In this paper we examine the nonlinear relation between the EUA price and its fundamentals, such as energy prices, macroeconomic risk factors and weather conditions. By estimating a Markov regime-switching model, we find that the relation between the EUA price and its fundamentals varies over time. In particular, we are able to identify a low and a high volatility regime, both showing a strong impact of the fundamentals on the EUA price. The most important EUA price drivers are changes on the stock market and energy prices. The gas price and a broad European equity index affect the EUA price positively in both regimes, while the coal price and the oil price have a significant, but also positive impact only during the high and the low volatility regime, respectively. The high volatility regime is predominant in phases when economic activities are on a decrease or when institutional changes harm the confidence in the stringency of the EU ETS. This holds during the recession of 2008 and 2009, as well as during 2011 and 2012 when the debt crisis impaired the European economic outlook.     

Price drivers and structural breaks in European carbon prices 2005–2007

This article aims at characterizing the daily price fundamentals of European Union Allowances (EUAs) traded since 2005 as part of the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). The presence of two structural changes on April 2006 following the disclosure of 2005 verified emissions and on October 2006 following the European Commission announcement of stricter Phase II allocation allows to isolate distinct fundamentals evolving overtime. The results extend previous literature by showing that EUA spot prices react not only to energy prices with forecast errors, but also to unanticipated temperatures changes during colder events. Besides, the sub-period decomposition of the pilot phase gives a better grasp of institutional and market events that drive allowance price changes.     

An emerging equilibrium in the EU emissions trading scheme

The European Union's Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) is the key policy instrument of the European Commission's Climate Change Program aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions to eight percent below 1990 levels by 2012. A critically important element of the EU ETS is the establishment of a market determined price for EU allowances. This article examines the extent to which several theoretically founded factors including, economic growth, energy prices and weather conditions determine the expected prices of the European Union CO₂ allowances during the 2005 through to the 2009 period. The novel aspect of our study is that we examine heavily traded futures instruments that have an expiry date in Phase 2 of the EU ETS. Our study adopts both static and recursive versions of the Johansen multivariate cointegration likelihood ratio test as well as a variation on this test with a view to controlling for time varying volatility effects. Our results are indicative of a new pricing regime emerging in Phase 2 and point to a maturing market driven by the fundamentals. These results are valuable both for traders of EU allowances and for those policy makers seeking to improve the design of the European Union ETS.     

The impact of the European Union emission trading scheme on the electricity-generation sector

In order to comply with their commitments under the Kyoto Protocol, France and Germany participate in the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) which predominantly concerns the electricity-generation sectors. In this paper we ask whether the EU ETS provides the appropriate economic incentives to produce an efficient system in line with the Kyoto commitments. If so, electricity producers in the countries concerned should include the price of carbon in their cost functions. After identifying different sub-periods of the EU ETS during its pilot phase (2005–2007), we model the prices of various electricity contracts in France and Germany and look at the volatility of electricity prices around their fundamentals while evaluating the correlation between electricity prices in the two countries. We find that electricity producers in both countries were constrained to include the carbon price in their cost functions during the first two years of the EU ETS. Over this period, German electricity producers were more constrained than their French counterparts, and the inclusion of the carbon price in the electricity-generation cost function was much more stable in Germany than in France. We also find evidence of fuel switching in electricity generation in Germany after the collapse of the carbon market. Furthermore, the European market for emission allowances has greatly contributed to the partial alignment of the wholesale price of electricity in France to that in Germany.     

Causalities between CO2, electricity,and other energy variables during phase I and phase II of the EU ETS

The topic of this article is the analysis of the interplay between daily carbon, electricity and gas price data with the European Union Emission Trading System (EU ETS) for CO₂ emissions. In a first step we have performed Granger causality tests for Phase I of the EU ETS (January 2005 until December 2007) and the first year of Phase II of the EU ETS (2008). The analysis includes both spot and forward markets—given the close interactions between the two sets of markets. The results show that during Phase I coal and gas prices, through the clean dark and spark spread, impacted CO₂ futures prices, which in return Granger caused electricity prices. During the first year of the Phase II, the short-run rent capture theory (in which electricity prices Granger cause CO₂ prices) prevailed. On the basis of the qualitative results of the Granger causality tests we obtained the formulation testable equations for quantitative analysis. Standard OLS regressions yielded statistically robust and theoretically coherent results.     

Implications of the EU Emissions Trading System for the South-East Europe Regional Electricity Market

As part of its climate policy, the European Union (EU) aims to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions levels by 20% by the year 2020 compared to 1990 levels. Although the EU is projected to reach this goal, its achievement of objectives under its Emissions Trading System (ETS) may be delayed by carbon leakage, which is defined as a situation in which the reduction in emissions in the ETS region is partially offset by an increase in carbon emissions in the non-ETS regions. We study the interaction between emissions and hydropower availability in order to estimate the magnitude of carbon leakage in the South-East Europe Regional Electricity Market (SEE-REM) via a bottom-up partial equilibrium framework. We find that 6.3% to 40.5% of the emissions reduction achieved in the ETS part of SEE-REM could be leaked to the non-ETS part depending on the price of allowances. Somewhat surprisingly, greater hydropower availability may increase emissions in the ETS part of SEE-REM. However, carbon leakage might be limited by demand response to higher electricity prices in the non-ETS area of SEE-REM. Such carbon leakage can affect both the competitiveness of producers in ETS member countries on the periphery of the ETS and the achievement of EU targets for CO₂ emissions reduction. Meanwhile, higher non-ETS electricity prices imply that the current policy can have undesirable outcomes for consumers in non-ETS countries, while non-ETS producers would experience an increase in their profits due to higher power prices as well as exports. The presence of carbon leakage in SEE-REM suggests that current EU policy might become more effective when it is expanded to cover more countries in the future.     

The long-term impact of the market stability reserve on the EU emission trading system

To provide a strong price signal for greenhouse gas emissions abatement, Europe decided to strengthen the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) by implementing a market stability reserve (MSR) that includes a cancellation policy and to increase the linear reduction factor from 1.74% to 2.2% after 2020. Results of a detailed long-term investment model, formulated as a large-scale mixed complementary problem, show that this strengthened EU ETS may quadruple EUA prices and may decrease cumulative CO₂ emissions with 21.3 GtCO₂ compared to the cumulative cap before the strengthening (52.2 GtCO₂). Around 40% of this decrease (8.3 GtCO₂) is due to the increased linear reduction factor and 60% due to the cancellation policy (13 GtCO₂). Without the increased linear reduction factor, the MSR's cancellation policy would decrease emissions by only 4.1 GtCO₂, indicating their complementarity. A sensitivity analysis on key model assumptions and parameters reveals that the impact of the MSR is, however, strongly dependent on other policies (e.g., renewable energy targets, nuclear, lignite and coal phase-outs) and cost evolutions of abatement options (e.g., investment cost reductions for wind and solar power). This renders the effective CO₂ emissions cap highly uncertain. In our simulation results, cancellation volumes range between 5.6 and 17.8 GtCO₂, which is to be compared with our central estimate of 13 GtCO₂. We calculate the required linear reduction factors to achieve these CO₂ emission reductions without an MSR, which would remove all uncertainty on the cumulative CO₂ emissions and interference with other complementary climate or energy policies.     

The initial impact of EU ETS verification events on stock prices

This paper studies the impact of verified emissions publications in the European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) on the market value of participating companies. Using event study methodology on a unique sample of 368 listed companies, we show that verified emissions only resulted in statistically significant market responses when the carbon price was high and allowance scarcity was anticipated. The cross-section analysis of abnormal returns surrounding the publication of verified emissions shows that share prices decrease when actual emissions relative to allocated emissions increase. This negative relationship between allocation shortfalls and firm value is only significant for firms that are either carbon-intensive, compared to sector peers, or are less likely to pass through carbon-related costs in their product prices. The results suggest that although the EU ETS has been deemed unsuccessful so far due to over-allocation and low carbon price, shareholders initially perceived allowance holdings as value relevant. Our results highlight that a significant carbon market price and addressing pass-through costing are essential for successful future reforms of the EU ETS and other analogous carbon cap-and-trade systems implemented or planned worldwide.     

EUA and sCER phase II price drivers: Unveiling the reasons for the existence of the EUA–sCER spread

This article studies the price relationships between EU emissions allowances (EUAs) – valid under the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) – and secondary Certified Emissions Reductions (sCERs)—established from primary CERs generated through the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Given the price differences between EUAs and sCERs, financial and industrial operators may benefit from arbitrage strategies by buying sCERs and selling EUAs (i.e. selling the EUA–sCER spread) to cover their compliance position as industrial operators are allowed to use sCERs towards compliance with their emissions cap within the European system up to 13.4%. Our central results show that the spread is mainly driven by EUA prices and market microstructure variables and less importantly, as we would expect, by emissions-related fundamental drivers. This might be justified by the fact that the EU ETS remains the greatest source of CER demand to date.     

What happens to the relationship between EU allowances prices and stock market indices in Europe?

The stock market may reflect the economic conditions of an economy and a positive economic situation is expected to improve the companies' profits, which makes company shares more attractive since the expected dividends to shareholders will be larger. Theoretically, higher economic activity leads to higher energy demand and, consequently, higher carbon emissions, which give rise to higher EU allowances (EUA) prices. Therefore, the stock market and EUA prices seem to be connected, with causality going from the stock markets to EUA prices. This paper formally tests for it, showing that the causality effectively runs from the stock market to the European Climate Exchange market. Furthermore, the paper studies the effects of the evolution of European stock markets on the EUA spot prices.     

Cost pass-through of the EU emissions allowances: Examining the European petroleum markets

This paper explores the ability of European refineries to pass-through costs associated with the introduction of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). A sequence of vector error correction models (VECM) has been estimated within a multinational setting which covers 14 EU Member States. Using weekly data at the country level, this paper finds an influence of prices for European Union Allowances (EUAs) on unleaded petrol retail prices during the trial phase of the EU ETS from 2005 to 2007. The country-specific long-run elasticities of petrol prices with respect to the EUA prices are between 0.01 and 0.09. Given that these elasticities are of the same order of magnitude as the share of carbon allowances costs in total production costs in the refining industry, the estimates are consistent with the full pass-through potential. The variance decomposition analysis shows furthermore that a significant fraction of petrol price changes in Austria, Germany, France and Spain can be explained by changes in allowances prices (between 10% and 20%).     

Factors affecting the carbon allowance market in the US

The US carbon allowance market has different characteristic and price determination process from the EU ETS market, since emitting installations voluntarily participate in emission trading scheme. This paper examines factors affecting the US carbon allowance market. An autoregressive distributed lag model is used to examine the short- and long-run relationships between the US carbon allowance market and its determinant factors. In the long-run, the price of coal is a main factor in the determination of carbon allowance trading. In the short-run, on the other hand, the changes in crude oil and natural gas prices as well as coal price have significant effects on carbon allowance market.     

A game theoretic model of the Northwestern European electricity market—market power and the environment

This paper develops a static computational game theoretic model. Illustrative results for the liberalising European electricity market are given to demonstrate the type of economic and environmental results that can be generated with the model. The model is empirically calibrated to eight Northwestern European countries, namely Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. Different market structures are compared, depending on the ability of firms to exercise market power, ranging from perfect competition without market power to strategic competition where large firms exercise market power. In addition, a market power reduction policy is studied where the near-monopolies in France and Belgium are demerged into smaller firms. To analyse environmental impacts, a fixed greenhouse gas emission reduction target is introduced under different market structures. The results indicate that the effects of liberalisation depend on the resulting market structure, but that a reduction in market power of large producers may be beneficial for both the consumer (i.e. lower prices) and the environment (i.e. lower greenhouse gas permit price and lower acidifying and smog emissions).     

Rents in the European power sector due to carbon trading

The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) has imposed a price on the allowances for CO₂ emissions of electricity companies. Integrating this allowance price into the price of electricity earns a rent for companies who have received these allowances for free. During Phase I, 2005–2007, rents corresponding to the aggregate value of allocated allowances amounted to roughly € 13 billion per year. However, due to the specific price-setting mechanism in electricity markets true rents were considerably higher. This is due to the fact that companies also that have not received any allowances gain additional infra-marginal rents to the extent that their variable costs are below the new market price after inclusion of the allowance price. Producers with low carbon emissions and low marginal costs thus also benefit substantially from carbon pricing. This paper develops a methodology to determine the specific interaction of the imposition of such a CO₂ constraint and the price-setting mechanism in the electricity sector under the assumption of marginal cost pricing in a liberalized European electricity market. The article thus provides an empirical estimate of the true total rents of power producers during Phase I of the EU-ETS (2005–2007). The EU ETS generated in Phase I additional rents in excess of € 19 billion per year for electricity producers. These transfers are distributed very unevenly between different electricity producers. In a second step, the paper assesses the impact of switching from free allocation to an auctioning of allowances in 2013. We show that such a switch to auctioning will continue to create additional infra-marginal rents for certain producers and will leave the electricity sector as a whole better off than before the introduction of the EU ETS.     

How competitive are EU electricity markets? An assessment of ETS Phase II

This paper studies the interactions between electricity and carbon allowance prices in the year-ahead energy markets of France, Germany, United Kingdom and the Nordic countries, during Phase II of the EU ETS. VAR and Granger-causality methods are used to analyze causal interfaces, whereas the volatility of electricity prices is studied with basic and asymmetric AR-GARCH models. Among the main results, the marginal rate at which carbon prices feed into electricity prices is shown to be ca. 135% in the EEX and Nord Pool markets, where electricity and carbon prices display bidirectional causality, and 109% in the UK. Therefore, generators in these markets internalized the cost of freely allotted emission allowances into their electricity prices considerably more than the proportionate increase in costs justified by effective carbon intensity. Moreover, electricity prices in France are found to Granger-cause the carbon price. This study also shows how European electricity prices are deeply linked to coal prices among other factors, both in terms of levels and volatility, regardless of the underlying fuel mix, and that coal was marginally more profitable than gas for electricity generation. EU policies aimed at increasing the carbon price are likely to be crucial in limiting the externalities involved in the transition to a low-carbon system.     

Intra- and extra-union flexibility in meeting the European Union's emission reduction targets

The EU has proposed four flexibility mechanisms for the regulation of greenhouse gas emissions in the period 2013–2020: (1) the Emissions Trade Scheme (ETS), a permit market between selected companies; (2) trade in non-ETS allotments between Member States; (3) the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) to purchase offsets in developing countries; and (4) trade in CDM warrants between Member States. This paper shows that aggregate abatement costs fall as flexibility increases. However, limited flexibility creates rents so that increasing flexibility raises costs in some Member States. Costs are reduced more by the CDM than by non-ETS trade. The CDM warrants market reduces costs by a small amount only; market power is a real issue. However, the warrants market is obsolete in case there is non-ETS trade. The CDM leads to price convergence between the ETS and non-ETS market. There would be one price for carbon in the European Union if the proposed limits on CDM access are relaxed slightly.     

Techno-economic evaluation of medium scale power to hydrogen to combined heat and power generation systems

The European Hydrogen Strategy and the new « Fit for 55 » package indicate the urgent need for the alignment of policy with the European Green Deal and European Union (EU) climate law for the decarbonization of the energy system and the use of hydrogen towards 2030 and 2050. The increasing carbon prices in EU Emission Trading System (ETS) as well as the lack of dispatchable thermal power generation as part of the Coal exit are expected to enhance the role of Combined Heat and Power (CHP) in the future energy system. In the present work, the use of renewable hydrogen for the decarbonization of CHP plants is investigated for various fossil fuel substitution ratios and the impact of the overall efficiency, the reduction of direct emissions and the carbon footprint of heat and power generation are reported. The analysis provides insights on efficient and decarbonized cogeneration linking the power with the heat sector via renewable hydrogen production and use. The levelized cost of hydrogen production as well as the levelized cost of electricity in the power to hydrogen to combined heat and power system are analyzed for various natural gas substitution scenarios as well as current and future projections of EU ETS carbon prices.     

Abuse of dominance and antitrust enforcement in the German electricity market

In 2008, the European Commission investigated E.ON, a large and vertically integrated electricity company, for the alleged abuse of a joint dominant position by strategically withholding generation capacity in the German wholesale electricity market. The case was settled after E.ON agreed to divest 5 GW generation capacity as well as its extra-high voltage network. We analyze the effect of these divestitures on wholesale electricity prices. Our identification strategy is based on the observation that energy suppliers have more market power during peak periods when demand is high. Therefore, a decrease in market power should lead to convergence between peak and off-peak prices, after controlling for different demand and supply conditions as well as the change in generation mix due to the expansion of renewable technologies. Using daily electricity prices for the 2006–2012 period, we find economically and statistically significant convergence effects after the settlement of the case. In a richer specification, we show that the price reductions appear to be mostly due to the divestiture of gas and coal plants, which is consistent with merit-order considerations. Additional cross-country analyses support our results.     

Trader types and volatility of emission allowance prices. Evidence from EU ETS Phase I

This paper studies the relation between the trading activity of market participants and the volatility of the European Emission Allowance price during Phase I of the European Union Emission Trading System (EU ETS). We focus on the contrasting roles of different trader types.We find evidence of a positive and significant trading activity–volatility relation, which appears to be stronger when accounting for trader type. The positive relation can be mainly attributed to energy providers. In contrast, industrial companies seem to have traded more frequently when volatility levels were lower. Finally, the non-liable players, represented by financial intermediaries, appear to have acted as a flexible counterparty, trading more with the energy sector when volatility was higher, and more with the industrial firms when volatility was lower. We discuss possible explanations for these contrasted positions.Understanding the trading activity–volatility link is relevant for evaluating the efficiency of the EU ETS. Although the relation is generally positive, many players remained often inactive and traded mostly when volatility levels were lower. Policies targeting the engagement of less active players could lead to a smoother incorporation of information into prices and to an increase in market efficiency.