A personal encounter with psychology (1937-2002).

An undergraduate assistantship with Maslow, research with S. Asch, and an indirect exposure to E. Nagel's philosophy of science encouraged H. H. Kendler to become involved with methodological issues in psychology. Graduate training with K. Spence led to an active research career that was initially immersed in the latent learning controversy and later, with the collaboration of his wife T. Kendler, in the extension of the Hull-Spence model of cognitive development. Methodological concerns from a variety of sources encouraged Kendler to express his ideas on the methodology and history of psychology as well as its role in ethical and social policy issues. A productive symbiotic relationship is created from the interaction of democracy, natural-science psychology, and moral pluralism. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Dewey's integrated logic of science, ethics, and practice.

H. H. Kendler (see record 1994-09190-001), in his article on psychology and the ethics of social policy, argues in part that ethical imperatives cannot be inferred from empirical data. J. Dewey's (1929 [1958], 1938) instrumentalism and logic of inquiry are presented as solutions to the trifurcation of theoretical science, ethics, and practical science. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The ideology of logic in contemporary psychology.

Comments on the article "Psychology and Phenomenology: A Clarification" by H. H. Kendler (see record 2005-05480-003). In this article, Kendler sought to resolve the methodological issue that divides much of contemporary psychology--namely, the difference between natural science and human science in their respective views of psychological life. Whereas Kendler provided an evocative historical account of conflicts over how psychology has interpreted consciousness, the force of his analysis depends on the extent to which the proverbial "is/ought" distinction, invoked any time the question of "science" is at stake, can have any meaningful purchase in the face of a radical phenomenology like that of Martin Heidegger. Regrettably, Kendler's position in the end eclipses any intention to clarify our understanding of the relationship between "natural" and "human" science. The consequence of his article will not likely resolve the controversy he put before us, but if it does nothing more than provoke further discussion, Kendler will have provided our profession with an opportunity to understand more fully this business we call psychology. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The American Psychological Association's response to Brown v. Board of Education: The case of Kenneth B. Clark.

In 1954, in Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court struck down the "separate but equal" doctrine of the Plessy v. Ferguson decision (1896) that was the foundation of school segregation in 17 states and the District of Columbia. Brown is arguably the most important Supreme Court decision of the 20th century in terms of its influence on American history. Moreover, it has a special significance for psychology because it marked the first time that psychological research was cited in a Supreme Court decision and because social science data were seen as paramount in the Court's decision to end school segregation. This article describes psychologist Kenneth B. Clark's role in that case and the response of the American Psychological Association to scientific psychology's moment in a great spotlight. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Kenneth B. Clark in the patterns of American culture.

Kenneth B. Clark is most well-remembered as the social scientist cited by the U.S. Supreme Court in footnote 11 of its decision in Brown v. Board of Education in 1954. His presence in that decision came to symbolize the role that social science could play in changing social policy and public attitudes. As an African American social scientist who was prominent during a time of great turmoil over racial issues in the United States, Clark also became a "participant-symbol" in America's discussion of race. Clark contributed to this discussion in the three books he wrote for the general public: Prejudice and Your Child (Clark, 1955), Dark Ghetto (Clark, 1965), and Pathos of Power (Clark, 1974). In this article, the author discusses how these works document Clark's growing pessimism about the prospects for improving race relations. In addition, Clark's place in contemporary American debates about Brown v. Board of Education and the persistence of racial equality is considered. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Values and Science: Reply.

Responds to Kendler (2004), Johnson (2004), and Zuriff (2004) who directed a number of criticisms against the authors' original article (see record 2003-03405-003) examining the psychological data and policy debates surrounding affirmative action. Kendler and Zuriff both chided the authors for interjecting values into the realm of science. The authors, however, state that both seriously misread the argument, imagining that they talked about "morality" when they did not. The authors claim to hold the same view as Kendler and Zuriff about the dichotomy between data and values and revisit portions of their argument further questioned. To Johnson, they state that the issues are not as clear cut as he has suggested. The authors do, however, reevaluate their original article in light of his criticisms. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Political goals versus scientific truths: A response to Jackson (2003).

Three fundamental issues separate Jackson's (2003) methodological views from mine. One, whereas he believes an absolute moral view can prevail in a democracy, I assume moral pluralism is an inevitable byproduct of an open society. Two, Jackson feels that psychology can identify a correct moral position, whereas I postulate natural science psychology is only capable of revealing the empirical consequences of competing social policies and their moral implications. Three, Jackson espouses a politically active psychology that from my perspective is antithetical to a democratic and scientific ethic. In sum, Jackson's coupling of science with political advocacy will lead to a mistrust of psychology that will deny a democracy the opportunity to base its social policies on reliable psychological information. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"The place of facts in a world of values: Subject and object in a postmodern world": Errata.

Reports an error in the original article by R. J. Smith (Journal of Philosophical and Theoretical Psychology, 2001[Fall], 21[2], 153-172). On pages 160, 161, 166, and 167 the subject to object relationship was reported at "S/O". The corrected representation is "S?O". (The following abstract of this article originally appeared in record 2002-10964-004.) The value-fact or subject-object split (S-O) recently defended by H. H. Kendler (1999) as necessary for a scientific psychology to establish facts, was rejected by Gestalt psychology as reducing the person to object status. The Gestalt solution correlating principles of perceptual organization with corresponding features of the object world (S/O) has however answered poorly to the vast cultural differences found in values. Communal/dialectical psychology in agreement with a postmodern worldview, treats facts as intrinsically value-laden social constructions mediated by a society's particular social relations (S?O) Examples of fact ambiguity are illustrated, and S?O is recommended as ontologically preferable for psychology as social science and for turn-of-the-millenium psycho-ecology. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Psychology and the naturalistic ethics of social policy.

H. H. Kendler (see record 1994-09190-001), in his article on psychology and the ethics of social policy, argues in part that ethical imperatives cannot be inferred from empirical data. This argument is challenged with reference to the behaviorist position of ethical naturalism. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The place of facts in a world of values: Subject and object in a postmodern world.

The value-fact or subject-object split (S-0) recently defended by H. H. Kendler (1999) as necessary for a scientific psychology to establish facts, was rejected by Gestalt psychology as reducing the person to object status. The Gestalt solution correlating principles of perceptual organization with corresponding features of the object world (S/0) has however answered poorly to the vast cultural differences found in values. Communal/dialectical psychology in agreement with a postmodern worldview, treats facts as intrinsically value-laden social constructions mediated by a society's particular social relations (S?0). Examples of fact ambiguity are illustrated, and S?0 is recommended as ontologically preferable for psychology as social science and for turn-of-the-millenium psycho-ecology. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Beyond the naturalistic fallacy.

Comments on H. H. Kendler's (see record 1999-11644-004) article on the role of value in the world of psychology. Kendler maintained that the American Psychological Association has made unwarranted moves from neutral facts to support for morally loaded policies (e.g., regarding abortion) and cautioned that this kind of behavior could undermine public trust in psychologists as scientist. However, Kendler failed to acknowledge the extent to which his overall position rests on a denial of the possibility of ethical knowledge—not just for psychologists, but for scientists and ethicists alike. In turn, this failure contributed to a distorted presentation of W. K?hler's (1938) work on values and its relation to Nazism. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Bias and obfuscation in Kendler's (2005) "clarification."

Comments on the article "Psychology and Phenomenology: A Clarification" by H. H. Kendler (see record 2005-05480-003). In this article, Kendler misrepresented contemporary existential-humanistic psychology and conventional (or natural) scientific psychology. With regard to the former, he presented a confused, unwittingly biased, and all-too-stereotypic picture. Aside from failing to cite virtually any contemporary existential-humanistic theorists (with the possible exceptions of Polkinghorne and Smith), he profoundly mischaracterized the phenomenological perspective on which existential-humanistic principles are based (e.g., see Cain & Seeman, 2002, Giorgi, 1970, and Schneider, Bugental, & Pierson, 2002, for an elaboration). To cite but a few problems to which Kendler (2005) fell victim, I consider first his characterization of phenomenological philosophy and psychology as "purely subjective" and "free of any scientific consideration or interpretation" (p. 318). With regard to Kendler's (2005, p. 322) characterization of conventional (or natural scientific) psychological inquiry as "objective" and amoral, there are several problems. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Clarifications with respect to psychology and phenomenology.

Comments on the article "Psychology and Phenomenology: A Clarification" by H. H. Kendler (see record 2005-05480-003). The comment author discusses the original article from three perspectives: the issue of subjectivity in phenomenology that he raised, the relevance of American phenomenological psychology to the topic to which Kendler oddly made no reference, and the promotion of and reservations about the "naturalization" of phenomenology in relation to psychology. Kendler advocated the "moral pluralism" of democracy. A similar position of advocacy for "methodological pluralism" is required (cf. Farber, 1967, p. 6). Recognition and respectful consideration of other methodologies in psychology advance the discipline and safeguard against intellectual parochialism and prejudice. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The triumph of the segregationists? A historiographical inquiry into psychology and the Brown litigation.

Psychologists testified at the trials of Brown v. Board of Education and helped write briefs that were submitted to the Supreme Court on appeal. Psychologists were once proud of what they did in Brown but are now seen as liberal reformers who masked their political wishes in the guise of social science. The argument that psychologists involved with Brown were social reformers rather than objective scientists dates to the segregationist critique of Brown. The author traces the history of the critique of the Brown psychologists from its segregationist origins to its acceptance by mainstream social scientific and historical scholars. The author concludes that the critique is based on a misreading of what the Brown psychologists did during the litigation. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A clarification of Heidegger's phenomenology.

Comments on the article "Psychology and Phenomenology: A Clarification" by H. H. Kendler (see record 2005-05480-003). This article calls for clarifications regarding its characterization of Heideggerian phenomenology. Kendler drew on his admittedly "limited understanding" (p. 322) of Heidegger and rested his critique upon a critical confusion that pervaded his presentation--a confusion of the ontological and ontic dimensions of Heidegger's work. In his depiction of authenticity as an objective set of values that form "a universal ethical system that is right for all humanity" (Kendler, 2005, p. 321), Kendler made the mistake of taking an ontological structure to instead prescribe an ontically particular way of living these structures out. Beyond the confusion of ontological structure with ontic particulars, Kendler's (2005) characterization of phenomenological inquiry as "naive" calls for a response. Indeed, whether one agrees with the epistemology of the co-constitution of phenomena or not, the epistemological rigor with which phenomenological psychologists consider approach--a term which "denote[s] the ways a science's basic presuppositions are intimately interrelated with the content it takes up and the methods it evolves" (von Eckartsberg, 1998, p. 4)--belies this charge (see also Giorgi, 1970, 1985; Giorgi & Giorgi, 2003). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Functions of APA: An Exchange of Letters.

At the Chicago meeting of the American Psychological Association (APA) Council, Howard Kendler read from a letter of Arthur Melton inviting a group of the members of the Division of Experimental Psychology to meet with him to give careful thought to the APA. In his letter Melton stated that, "the character of APA has taken a sharp turn toward the AMA-type professional society or guild and away from the scientific and professional society that is concerned with the advancement of a body of knowledge and its technological applications." McKeachie responded to the Melton statement on the floor of Council. Because the issues raised are so crucial to the future of APA, Melton expanded his remarks into an open letter to Melton. In the letter Melton discussed APA's contributions to the science of psychology. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Phenomenology depends on human nature.

Comments on the article "Psychology and Phenomenology: A Clarification" by H. H. Kendler (see record 2005-05480-003). Kendler contrasted objective phenomena going on in the mind with phenomenological convictions. He concluded, on the basis of a thoughtful analysis, that scientific psychology cannot validate moral principles, which have to be agreed upon by discussion among educated members of a democratic community. He recommended psychological research on the consequences of social policies that may facilitate humans' decisions. I argue that research on the nature of phenomenological convictions is useful as well, enabling human beings to amend their strategies when reasoning about moral values. Scientific psychology can contribute to moral reasoning not only by examining social consequences of certain policies but also by highlighting the very process, starting from phenomenological convictions and ending in moral values within a community. Thus, psychological research contributes to the reflection of how members of a community exert their freedom and may give them the opportunity to enhance their reasoning and negotiation procedures. Scholars have to be humble and admit that the limit to this enhancement lies in the limitations of human reasoning. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Fifty Years On: Brown v. Board of Education and American Psychology, 1954-2004 An Introduction.

Introduces the current issue of the American Psychologist, which examines the ramifications of the Brown vs. Board of Education decision and its sequelae over the last 50 years, with a special focus on the mixed role of psychological research and practice. Despite the great strides toward a more just society since May 17, 1954, inequities remain in schooling, in social relations, and in economic opportunity. How will history judge American psychology 50 years from now vis-a-vis the possibilities it helped create via Brown? The articles in this special issue suggest several important directions of research and action our field will need to take if the verdict of history is to be a positive one. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Why psychologists don't think like philosophers.

H. H. Kendler (see record 1994-09190-001), in his article on psychology and the ethics of social policy, argues in part that ethical imperatives cannot be inferred from empirical data. This argument is cited in opposition to what is purported to be the position of the American Psychological Association on the abortion issue. It is suggested that PhD candidates in psychology be well versed in the philosophical issues and debates that are the foundation for the formation of ethical principles. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)