Challenging the notion of a thematic preference in young children.

Many researchers have argued that early cognitive development is characterized by a conceptual preference for thematic over taxonomic relations. However, more recent research indicates that infants and toddlers may not favor thematic relations. To resolve this discrepancy, the conceptual preferences of children ranging from 2 to 4 years of age were examined, using a forced-choice task including a target (e.g., a carrot), a thematic alternative (e.g., a rabbit), and a taxonomic alternative (e.g., a tomato). The effects of age, experimenter's instructions, hierarchical level (basic vs. superordinate), and stimulus medium (pictures vs. objects) were examined systematically. Children revealed no pervasive preference for either thematic or taxonomic relations. This challenges the notion of a developmental shift in conceptual preferences and suggests a more continuous trajectory in early conceptual development. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Semantic constraints on word learning: proper names and adjectives

4 experiments examined 3- and 4-year-olds' interpretations of novel words applied to familial objects in the sentence frame, "This Y is X," where X is a novel word, and Y is a familiar basic-level count noun (e.g., "dog," "cup"). These novel words are ambiguous and could be interpreted either as proper names (e.g., "Fred") or as adjectives/mass nouns (e.g., "red"/"lead"). The experiments addressed 2 questions. First, do children appreciate that the words can be construed either as proper names referring to individuals or as adjectives/mass nouns referring to salient properties/material kinds? The results showed that children could easily make either interpretation. Second, what factors affect children's tendency to make either a proper name or an adjective/mass noun interpretation? In the experiments, children learned the novel words for a range of animals and artifacts. Most children who learned the words for typical pets (e.g., a bird) made proper name interpretations, as did the majority of those who learned the words for certain non-pet animals (e.g., a caterpillar) described as possessed by someone, but only about half of those who learned the words for such non-pet animals not so described. Very few children who learned the words for either simple (e.g., a shoe) or complex (e.g., a boat) artifacts made proper name interpretations. The results provide clear evidence of the role of semantic information in constraining children's interpretation of a novel word, and they help to refine an understanding of what counts as a nameable individual for preschoolers.     

Preschoolers' default assumptions about word meaning: Proper names designate unique individuals.

Ninty 4-year olds took part in this experiment. Children heard a novel word (e.g., "X") uttered in an ambiguous sentence frame (e.g., "This Y is X", where "Y" was a basic-level count noun, such as "dog") and applied to either 1 or 2 drawings of familiar animals. This word could be construed either as a proper name (e.g., "This dog is Fred") or as an adjective (e.g., "This dog is red"). Children were more likely to interpret the words as a proper name (and less likely to interpret it as an adjective) if it was applied to 1 than if it was applied to 2 objects. Children thus made a default assumption that, in order to be a proper name, a word should be applied to only 1 individual. However, children overrode this default assumption if sufficient contextual information (from additional syntactic cues) indicated that they should do so. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Development of object categories and inclusion relations: Preschoolers' hypotheses about word meanings.

Parents' strategies for labeling objects differ for categories at different hierarchical levels. Whereas basic-level terms (e.g., chair and dog) are used to name single objects, superordinate labels (e.g., furniture and animal) are used (a) to refer to groups of objects and (b) to state the inclusion relation among levels explicitly. Two studies tested 3- and 5-year-old children's ability to use these different strategies to interpret new words. A puppet taught children new words using labeling strategies modeled after those used by parents. In both studies, children interpreted labels for single objects at the basic level. The multiple-referent strategy (Study 1) and the inclusion strategy (Study 2), however, led children to interpret novel words at the superordinate level. The information in parents' labeling strategies seems to help children to solve the problem of inducing the meanings of novel words. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Thematic relations in adults' concepts.

Concepts can be organized by their members' similarities, forming a kind (e.g., animal), or by their external relations within scenes or events (e.g., cake and candles). This latter type of relation, known as the thematic relation, is frequently found to be the basis of children's but not adults' classification. However, 10 experiments found that when thematic relations are meaningful and salient, they have significant influence on adults' category construction (sorting), inductive reasoning, and verification of category membership. The authors conclude that concepts function closely with knowledge of scenes and events and that this knowledge has a role in adults' conceptual representations. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Decoupling object detection and categorization.

We investigated whether there exists a behavioral dependency between object detection and categorization. Previous work (Grill-Spector & Kanwisher, 2005) suggests that object detection and basic-level categorization may be the very same perceptual mechanism: As objects are parsed from the background they are categorized at the basic level. In the current study, we decouple object detection from categorization by manipulating the between-category contrast of the categorization decision. With a superordinate-level contrast with people as one of the target categories (e.g., cars vs. people), which replicates Grill-Spector and Kanwisher, we found that success at object detection depended on success at basic-level categorization and vice versa. But with a basic-level contrast (e.g., cars vs. boats) or superordinate-level contrast without people as a target category (e.g., dog vs. boat), success at object detection did not depend on success at basic-level categorization. Successful object detection could occur without successful basic-level categorization. Object detection and basic-level categorization do not seem to occur within the same early stage of visual processing. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The ABCs of deception: Do young children understand deception in the same way as adults?

Most research suggests that it is not until age 4 that children understand deception as a means of creating a false belief. Yet children could have failed on these tasks because of either (1) conceptual problems (an inability to understand that deception is a means of creating false belief), or (2) pragmatic problems (an inability to articulate an understanding of false beliefs) and task complexity (an inability to follow the narrative or make appropriate inferences). Three experiments were conducted to determine why children might fail deception tasks, and results indicated that (1) children were no better at understanding deception whether they were "active deceivers" or observers of a deceptive act, and (2) children's difficulty appeared to be associated with a conceptual deficiency (e.g., they could leave clues that would lead another to a possible belief but not a false belief). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Predicting the intent to purchase unfamiliar and familiar cheeses: the effects of attitudes, expected liking and food neophobia

Five studies argue against claims that preschoolers understand a biological germ theory of illness. In Studies 1-3, participants were read stories in which characters develop symptoms (e.g., a bellyache) caused by germs, poisons, or events (e.g., eating too much candy) and were asked whether another character could catch the symptoms from the first. Few children made judgments in terms of germs as part of an underlying causal process linking the origin of a symptom to its subsequent transmission. Some children may have reasoned simply that certain kinds of symptoms are likely to be contagious. Studies 4 and 5 undermined the claim that preschoolers understand germs to be uniquely biological causal agents. Young children did not attribute properties to germs as they did for animate beings or for plants. It is suggested that children undergo conceptual reorganization in constructing a Western adult understanding of germs.     

Dog versus collie: Vocabulary in speech to young children.

Adult speech to children was recorded during interactions between 2 nursery school teachers and their 2–4 yr old students and between mothers and their 18–30 mo old children. Nouns in 4 general categories were rated for taxonomic level: subordinate (e.g., collie), basic level (e.g., dog), or superordinate (e.g., animal). Basic level nouns were the most frequently used. A further study was conducted to determine whether heavy reliance on basic level vocabulary in speech to children represents a simplification strategy. 80 undergraduates wrote stories about sets of pictures as they would tell the stories to either a child or an adult listener. Ss produced significantly more basic level nouns than subordinate or superordinate nouns for child listeners only, suggesting the use of a simplification strategy. In addition, the proportion of all items labeled at the subordinate level that were also labeled at the basic level was significantly higher in stories for a child listener than in stories for an adult listener. Data suggest that speakers may tend to orient a child listener to the basic level of categorization even when using words at other taxonomic levels. (11 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

On facts and conceptual systems: Young children's integration of their understandings of germs and contagion.

Five studies argue against claims that preschoolers understand a biological germ theory of illness. In Studies 1–3, participants were read stories in which characters develop symptoms (e.g., a bellyache) caused by germs, poisons, or events (e.g., eating too much candy) and were asked whether another character could catch the symptoms from the first. Few children made judgments in terms of germs as part of an underlying causal process linking the origin of a symptom to its subsequent transmission. Some children may have reasoned simply that certain kinds of symptoms are likely to be contagious. Studies 4 and 5 undermined the claim that preschoolers understand germs to be uniquely biological causal agents. Young children did not attribute properties to germs as they did for animate beings or for plants. It is suggested that children undergo conceptual reorganization in constructing a Western adult understanding of germs. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The role of comparison in the extension of novel adjectives.

Previous research has documented that basic-level object categories provide an initial foundation for mapping adjectives to object properties. Children ranging from 21 months to 3 years can successfully extend a novel adjective (e.g., transparent) to other objects sharing a salient property if the objects are all members of the same basic-level category; if the objects are members of different basic-level categories, they fail to extend adjectives systematically (R. S. Klibanoff & S. R. Waxman, 2000a; S. R. Waxman & D. B. Markow, 1998). The present study proposed that the process of comparison is instrumental in children's ability to move beyond this foundation. To promote comparison, 2 target objects were introduced to 3-year-olds. In Experiment 1, the targets had contrastive properties (e.g., 1 transparent and 1 opaque object); in Experiment 2, the targets had consistent properties (e.g., 2 transparent objects). The results of both experiments illustrate that comparison—a general psychological process—operates in conjunction with naming to support the extension of novel adjectives to properties of objects from diverse basic-level categories. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Object categorization: Reversals and explanations of the basic-level advantage.

People are generally faster and more accurate to name or categorize objects at the basic level (e.g., dog) relative to more general (animal) or specific (collie) levels, an effect replicated in Experiment 1 for categorization of object pictures. To some, this pattern suggests a dual-process mechanism, in which objects first activate basic-level categories directly and later engage more general or specific categories through the spread of activation in a processing hierarchy. This account is, however, challenged by data from Experiment 2 showing that neuropsychological patients with impairments of conceptual knowledge categorize more accurately at superordinate levels than at the basic level--suggesting that knowledge about an object's general nature does not depend on prior basic-level categorization. The authors consider how a parallel distributed processing theory of conceptual knowledge can reconcile the apparent discrepancy. This theory predicts that if healthy individuals are encouraged to make rapid categorization responses, the usual basic > general advantage should also reverse, a prediction tested and confirmed in Experiment 3. Implications for theories of visual object recognition are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Learning mathematics from procedural instruction: Externally imposed goals influence what is learned.

Do externally imposed achievement goals influence what children learn from procedural instruction? Third- and 4th-grade children's goals were manipulated toward either learning or performance. All children were then taught a procedure for solving mathematical equivalence problems (e.g., a?+?b?+?c?=?a?+?_). Children who were given learning goals were initially more likely to gain conceptual knowledge from the procedural lesson than were children who were given performance goals. After a 2-week period, however, children who were given performance goals exhibited the same conceptual gains as children who were given learning goals. Both initially and after the 2-week period, children who were given either goal were more likely to extend their knowledge beyond the taught procedure than were children who were not given goals. External sources such as teachers and parents may have the potential to foster children's learning by shaping children's goals. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Effects of orientation on the identification of rotated objects depend on the level of identity

Matching names and rotated line drawings of objects showed effects of object orientation that depended on name level. Large effects, in the same range as object naming, were found for rotations between 0 degrees and 120 degrees from upright with subordinate names (e.g., collie), whereas nonsignificant effects were found with superordinate (e.g., animal) and basic names (e.g., dog). These results support image normalization, after contact with orientation-invariant representations, that provide basic-level identity. They consequently fail to support theories of object recognition in which rotated object images are normalized to the upright position before contact with long-term object representations.     

Infants' expectations about object label reference.

Examined whether infants at the early stages of lexical development were sensitive to the word-category linkage. In Exp 1, 39 16- to 19-mo-old infants were requested to match a target with either a basic-level or a thematic match, with or without a novel label. Stimuli were presented using the preferential looking paradigm. Infants in the Novel Label condition looked significantly longer at the basic-level match than infants in the No Label condition. In Exp 2, Ss were presented with a target, followed by a basic-level match and a superordinate-level match with or without a novel label. Again, infants in the Novel Label condition looked significantly longer at the basic-level match than infants in the No Label condition. Taken together, these findings indicate that infants initially assume that novel words label basic-level categories and thereby do honor the word-category linkage. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A theory-based approach to teaching young children about health: A recipe for understanding.

The theory–theory account of conceptual development posits that children's concepts are integrated into theories. Concept-learning studies have documented the central role that theories play in children's learning of experimenter-defined categories but have yet to extensively examine complex, real-world concepts, such as health. The present study examined whether providing young children with coherent and causally related information in a theory-based lesson would facilitate their learning about the concept of health. This study used a pretest/lesson/posttest design, plus a 5-month follow-up. Children were randomly assigned to 1 of 3 conditions: theory (i.e., 20 children received a theory-based lesson), nontheory (i.e., 20 children received a nontheory-based lesson), and control (i.e., 20 children received no lesson). Overall, the results showed that children in the theory condition had a more accurate conception of health than children in the nontheory and control conditions, suggesting the importance of theories in children's learning of complex, real-world concepts. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Children's attributions of intentions to an invisible agent.

Children ages 3-9 years were informed that an invisible agent (Princess Alice) would help them play a forced-choice game by "telling them, somehow, when they chose the wrong box," whereas a matched control group of children were not given this supernatural prime. On 2 unexpected event trials, an experimenter triggered a simulated unexpected event (i.e., a light turning on/off; a picture falling), and children's behavioral response to these events (i.e., moving their hand to the opposite box) was coded. Results showed a significant Age Group × Experimental Condition interaction; the only children to reliably alter their behavior in response to the unexpected events were the oldest children (M = 7 years 4 months), who were primed with the invisible agent concept. For children's posttest verbal explanations, also, only these children saw the unexpected events as being referential and declarative (e.g., "Princess Alice did it because I chose the wrong box"). Together, these data suggest that children may not regularly begin to see communicative signs as embedded in unexpected events until they are around 7 years of age. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Animism in childhood thinking: A new look at an old question.

48 preschool-aged children's knowledge of the distinctions between animate and inanimate objects was assessed by showing them stimulus films of animate and inanimate objects that moved in different ways. Responses gathered included attributions of animate or inanimate properties, justifications for attribution choices and accuracy in labeling objects as alive or not. Results indicate that 5-yr-olds and some 4-yr-olds performed near the levels of 16 college-aged adults, whereas 3-yr-olds did not, although the animate–inanimate distinction did mediate their behavior. A generalized "animistic" attitude was not found: rather, developmental changes appeared to accrue from increasing precision about the specific properties that do and do not distinguish animate from inanimate objects. (19 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Influence of thematic relations on the comprehension of modifier–noun combinations.

To comprehend a nonpredicating combination involving a modifier (e.g., mountain) and a head noun (e.g., stream), one must specify a thematic relation (e.g., a stream in the mountains) that links the 2 constituent concepts. The authors investigated the influence of thematic relations on the comprehension of nonpredicating combinations. Experiments 1 and 3 demonstrated that people use information about what relations the constituents typically instantiate during conceptual combination. More specifically, a combination is easier to interpret when it uses a frequent relation of the modifier than when it uses a less frequent relation. The results of Experiment 2 indicated that these results are not an artifact of the individual component words. The authors propose a model of conceptual combination called the competition among relations in nominals (CARIN) model in which ease of comprehension depends both on the frequency of the to-be-selected relation and on the frequency of the alternatives. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)