Automatic and controlled components of judgment and decision making.

The categorization of inductive reasoning into largely automatic processes (heuristic reasoning) and controlled analytical processes (rule-based reasoning) put forward by dual-process approaches of judgment under uncertainty (e.g., K. E. Stanovich & R. F. West, 2000) has been primarily a matter of assumption with a scarcity of direct empirical findings supporting it. The present authors use the process dissociation procedure (L. L. Jacoby, 1991) to provide convergent evidence validating a dual-process perspective to judgment under uncertainty based on the independent contributions of heuristic and rule-based reasoning. Process dissociations based on experimental manipulation of variables were derived from the most relevant theoretical properties typically used to contrast the two forms of reasoning. These include processing goals (Experiment 1), cognitive resources (Experiment 2), priming (Experiment 3), and formal training (Experiment 4); the results consistently support the author's perspective. They conclude that judgment under uncertainty is neither an automatic nor a controlled process but that it reflects both processes, with each making independent contributions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

If you say thee uh you are describing something hard: The on-line attribution of disfluency during reference comprehension.

Eye-tracking and gating experiments examined reference comprehension with fluent (Click on the red. . .) and disfluent (Click on [pause] thee uh red . . .) instructions while listeners viewed displays with 2 familiar (e.g., ice cream cones) and 2 unfamiliar objects (e.g., squiggly shapes). Disfluent instructions made unfamiliar objects more expected, which influenced listeners' on-line hypotheses from the onset of the color word. The unfamiliarity bias was sharply reduced by instructions that the speaker had object agnosia, and thus difficulty naming familiar objects (Experiment 2), but was not affected by intermittent sources of speaker distraction (beeps and construction noises; Experiments 3). The authors conclude that listeners can make situation-specific inferences about likely sources of disfluency, but there are some limitations to these attributions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Ease of access to list items in short-term memory depends on the order of the recognition probes.

We report data from 4 experiments using a recognition design with multiple probes to be matched to specific study positions. Items could be accessed rapidly, independent of set size, when the test order matched the study order (forward condition). When the order of testing was random, backward, or in a prelearned irregular sequence (reordered conditions), the classic Sternberg result was obtained: Response times were slow and increased linearly with set size. A number of explanations for forward-condition facilitation were ruled out, such as the predictability of the study order (Experiment 2), the predictability of the probe order (Experiment 1), the covariation of study and test orders (Experiments 1, 2, and 4), processes of probe encoding and perception that did not rely on STM access (Experiments 1, 2, and 4), specific support of the forward condition by articulatory processes (Experiment 3), or condition-dependent strategic differences (Experiment 4). More detailed analyses demonstrated that fast forward responses could not be accounted for by the effects of input position and output position that modulated random responses, effects that did account for the slower responses of the reordered conditions (Experiments 1, 3, and 4). A final analysis of probe-to-probe transitions as a function of encoding distance revealed a sizeable single-step benefit in the random condition. We concluded that STM representations were serial rather than spatial and that forward probes benefited from their serial adjacency. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Categorization processes in mental comparisons.

Five experiments explore categorization and category-based congruity effects in mental comparisons. The first 4 experiments concentrate on categorization of infinite-set small items. The experiments vary the additional items presented and whether those items appear once (Experiments 1-2) or repeatedly (Experiments 3-4). Additional items include other small items (Experiment 1), relatively large items (Experiments 2-4), and items involving nonsize dimensions (Experiment 4). The critical small items show a complete congruity effect only in Experiments 1 and 3. Results suggest that categorization of infinite-set items may be based on range information alone (Experiment 1) but that multiple categorizations based on multiple ranges (Experiment 2) may require attentional effort. Results implicate categorization as a central process in mental comparison, despite differences in ease of categorization across paradigm. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Lexical Information Drives Perceptual Learning of Distorted Speech: Evidence From the Comprehension of Noise-Vocoded Sentences.

Speech comprehension is resistant to acoustic distortion in the input, reflecting listeners' ability to adjust perceptual processes to match the speech input. For noise-vocoded sentences, a manipulation that removes spectral detail from speech, listeners' reporting improved from near 0% to 70% correct over 30 sentences (Experiment 1). Learning was enhanced if listeners heard distorted sentences while they knew the identity of the undistorted target (Experiments 2 and 3). Learning was absent when listeners were trained with nonword sentences (Experiments 4 and 5), although the meaning of the training sentences did not affect learning (Experiment 5). Perceptual learning of noise-vocoded speech depends on higher level information, consistent with top-down, lexically driven learning. Similar processes may facilitate comprehension of speech in an unfamiliar accent or following cochlear implantation. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A Multinomial Model of Event-Based Prospective Memory.

Prospective memory is remembering to perform an action in the future. The authors introduce the 1st formal model of event-based prospective memory, namely, a multinomial model that includes 2 separate parameters related to prospective memory processes. The 1st measures preparatory attentional processes, and the 2nd measures retrospective memory processes. The model was validated in 4 experiments. Manipulations of instructions to place importance on either the prospective memory task or the background task (Experiments 1 and 2) and manipulations of distinctiveness of prospective memory targets (Experiment 2) had expected effects on model parameters, as did a manipulation of the difficulty of prospective memory target encoding (Experiments 3 and 4). An alternative model was also evaluated. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Stereotype formation: Biased by association.

We propose that biases in attitude and stereotype formation might arise as a result of learned differences in the extent to which social groups have previously been predictive of behavioral or physical properties. Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrate that differences in the experienced predictiveness of groups with respect to evaluatively neutral information influence the extent to which participants later form attitudes and stereotypes about those groups. In contrast, Experiment 3 shows no influence of predictiveness when using a procedure designed to emphasize the use of higher level reasoning processes, a finding consistent with the idea that the root of the predictiveness bias is not in reasoning. Experiments 4 and 5 demonstrate that the predictiveness bias in formation of group beliefs does not depend on participants making global evaluations of groups. These results are discussed in relation to the associative mechanisms proposed by Mackintosh (1975) to explain similar phenomena in animal conditioning and associative learning. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Focal/nonfocal cue effects in prospective memory: Monitoring difficulty or different retrieval processes?

We investigated whether focal/nonfocal effects (e.g., Einstein et al., 2005) in prospective memory (PM) are explained by cue differences in monitoring difficulty. In Experiment 1, we show that syllable cues (used in Einstein et al., 2005) are more difficult to monitor for than are word cues; however, initial-letter cues (in words) are similar in monitoring difficulty to word cues (Experiments 2a and 2b). Accordingly, in Experiments 3 and 4, we designated either an initial letter or a particular word as a PM cue in the context of a lexical decision task, a task that presumably directs attention to focal processing of words but not initial letters. We found that the nonfocal condition was more likely than the focal condition to produce costs to the lexical decision task (task interference). Furthermore, when task interference was minimal or absent, focal PM performance remained relatively high, whereas nonfocal PM performance was near floor (Experiment 4). Collectively, these results suggest that qualitatively different retrieval processes can support prospective remembering for focal versus nonfocal cues. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Concreteness-dependent associative priming: Separate lexical organization for concrete and abstract words.

Four experiments used associated, unrelated, and neutral ({blank}–word) pairs that varied on prime and target concreteness. In Experiment 1, associated targets were named faster than neutral targets when primes and targets were homogeneous for concreteness (i.e., concrete–concrete or abstract–abstract), but not when they were heterogeneous (i.e., concrete–abstract or abstract–concrete). Experiments 2 and 3, using lexical decision, showed priming for all pairs irrespective of prime and target concreteness. In Experiment 4, the prime was presented for 16.7 ms, followed immediately by a 168-ms random letter mask. Lexical decision times showed priming similar to that in Experiment 1. If priming in Experiments 1 and 4 reflected lexical processes, whereas priming in Experiments 2 and 3 entailed postlexical processes, then lexical processes may be functionally distinct for concrete versus abstract words. These findings are more consistent with dual-coding than common-coding explanations of concreteness. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Effects of repetition priming on recognition memory: Testing a perceptual fluency-disfluency model.

Five experiments explored the effects of immediate repetition priming on episodic recognition (the "Jacoby-Whitehouse effect") as measured with forced-choice testing. These experiments confirmed key predictions of a model adapted from D. E. Huber and R. C. O'Reilly's (2003) dynamic neural network of perception. In this model, short prime durations pre-activate primed items, enhancing perceptual fluency and familiarity, whereas long prime durations result in habituation, causing perceptual disfluency and less familiarity. Short duration primes produced a recognition preference for primed words (Experiments 1, 2, and 5), whereas long duration primes produced a preference against primed words (Experiments 3, 4, and 5). Experiment 2 found prime duration effects even when participants accurately identified short duration primes. A cued-recall task included in Experiments 3, 4, and 5 found priming effects only for recognition trials that were followed by cued-recall failure. These results suggest that priming can enhance as well as lower familiarity, without affecting recollection. Experiment 4 provided a manipulation check on this procedure through a delay manipulation that preferentially affected recognition followed by cued-recall success. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The magic spell of language: Linguistic categories and their perceptual consequences.

Language is a tool that directs attention to different aspects of reality. Using participants from the same linguistic community, the authors demonstrate in 4 studies that metasemantic features of linguistic categories influence basic perceptual processes. More specifically, the hypothesis that abstract versus concrete language leads to a more global versus local perceptual focus was supported across 4 experiments, in which participants used (Experiment 1) or were primed either supraliminally (Experiments 2 and 3) or subliminally (Experiment 4) with abstract (adjectives) or concrete (verbs) terms. Participants were shown to display a global versus specific perceptual focus (Experiments 1 and 4), more versus less inclusiveness of categorization (Experiments 2 and 3), and incorporation of more rather than less contextual information (Experiment 3). The implications of this new perspective toward the language-perception interface are discussed in the context of the general linguistic relativity debate. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Reasoning about necessity and possibility: A test of the mental model theory of deduction.

This article examined syllogistic reasoning in college students that differs from previous research in 2 significant ways: (a) Participants were asked to decide whether conclusions were possible as well as necessary, and (b) every possible combination of syllogistic premises and conclusions was presented for evaluation with both single-premise (Experiment 1) and double-premise (Experiment 2) problems. Participants more frequently endorsed conclusions as possible than as necessary, and differences in response to the 2 forms of instruction conformed to several predictions derived from the mental model theory of deduction. Findings of Experiments 2 and 3 showed that some fallacies are consistently endorsed and others consistently resisted when people are asked to judge whether conclusions that are only possible follow necessarily. This finding was accounted for by the computational implementation of the model theory: Fallacies are made when the first mental model of the premises considered supports the conclusion presented. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Logic, beliefs, and instruction: A test of the default interventionist account of belief bias.

According to dual-process accounts of thinking, belief-based responses on reasoning tasks are generated as default but can be intervened upon in favor of logical responding, given sufficient time, effort, or cognitive resource. In this article, we present the results of 5 experiments in which participants were instructed to evaluate the conclusions of logical arguments on the basis of either their logical validity or their believability. Contrary to the predictions arising from these accounts, the logical status of the presented conclusion had a greater impact on judgments concerning its believability than did the believability of the conclusion on judgments about whether it followed logically. This finding was observed when instructional set was presented as a between-participants factor (Experiment 1), when instruction was indicated prior to problem presentation by a cue (Experiment 2), and when the cue appeared simultaneously with conclusion presentation (Experiments 3 and 4). The finding also extended to a range of simple and more complex argument forms (Experiment 5). In these latter experiments, belief-based judgments took significantly longer than those made under logical instructions. We discuss the implications of these findings for default interventionist accounts of belief bias. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Facilitating children's proportional reasoning: A model of reasoning processes and effects of intervention on strategy change.

In this study, 140 fourth graders were asked to solve proportion problems about juice-mixing situations both before and after an intervention that used a manipulative model or other materials in 3 experiments. Using a manipulative model based on children's prior knowledge about crowdedness and equal distribution was effective in letting children discover a unit strategy, which was useful for solving proportion problems. The model was more effective for those who had an appropriate representation but could not correctly compare juice concentrations than it was for those who didn't have the representation. On the basis of this study, different approaches appear to be necessary to facilitate children's proportional reasoning, depending on the reasoning process (representation or comparison) with which children are having difficulty. Interventions on the basis of the process model and learning that builds on intuitive knowledge are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Representations as mediators of adolescent deductive reasoning

In Experiment 1, preadolescents, middle adolescents, and late adolescents were presented 3 deductive reasoning tasks. With some important exceptions, conditional reasoning improved with age on problems containing permission conditional relations, and reasoning fallacies increased with age on problems containing causal conditional relations. The results of Experiments 2a and 2b indicated that problem type (i.e., permission or causal) does not mediate the activation of conditional reasoning skills. Rather, valid conditional inferences are more common on problems for which plausible alternative antecedents can be generated than on problems for which alternative antecedent generation is difficult. Conditional rules for which alternative antecedent generation is difficult may be misrepresented as biconditionals, resulting in biconditional rather than conditional reasoning.     

Measuring psychological uncertainty: Verbal versus numeric methods.

The authors argue that alternatives to the traditional numeric methods of measuring people's uncertainty may prove to hold important advantages under some conditions. In 3 experiments, the authors compared verbal measures involving responses such as very likely, and numeric measures involving responses such as 80% chance. The verbal measures were found to show more sensitivity to various manipulations affecting psychological uncertainty (Experiment 1), to be better predictors of individual preferences among options with unknown outcomes (Experiment 2), and to be better predictors of behavioral intentions (Experiment 3). Results suggest that numeric measures tend to elicit deliberate and rule-based reasoning from respondents, whereas verbal measures allow for more associative and intuitive thinking. Given that there may be many types of situations in which human decisions and behaviors are not based on deliberate and rule-based thinking, numeric measures may misrepresent how individuals think about uncertainty in those situations. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Recognition and lexical decision without detection: Unconscious perception?

Stimulus detection and concurrent measures of stimulus recognition were compared to establish whether perception occurs in the absence of detection. The target stimuli were familiar words (Experiments 1 and 2), nonwords (Experiment 3), or both words and nonwords (Experiment 4). On each trial, either a stimulus or a blank field was presented. Ss first decided whether a stimulus had been presented and then made either a forced-choice recognition decision (Experiments 1, 2, and 3) or a lexical decision (Experiment 4). Both words and nonwords were recognized and discriminated following correct decisions (i.e., hits). However, in the absence of stimulus detection (i.e., misses), only words were recognized or discriminated. These qualitatively different patterns of results following hits and misses for words and nonwords suggest that stimulus detection may provide an adequate measure of conscious awareness. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Latent inhibition in human adults without masking.

Latent inhibition refers to attenuated responding to Cue X observed when the X-outcome pairings are preceded by X-alone presentations. It has proven difficult to obtain in human adults unless the preexposure (X-alone) presentations are embedded within a masking (i.e., distracting) task. The authors hypothesized that the difficulty in obtaining latent inhibition with unmasked tasks is related to the usual training procedures, in which the preexposure and conditioning experiences are separated by a set of instructions. Experiment 1 reports latent inhibition without masking in a task in which preexposure and conditioning occur without interruption. Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrate that this attenuation in responding to target Cue X does not pass a summation test for conditioned inhibition and is context specific, thereby confirming that it is latent inhibition. Experiments 3 and 4 confirm that introducing instructions between preexposure and conditioning disrupts latent inhibition. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Limited attention and cue order consistency affect predictive learning: A test of similarity measures.

The authors empirically tested the similarity metrics underlying 2 predictive-learning theories: J. K. Kruschke's (1992) attention learning covering map and J. M. Pearce's (1987, 1994) configural models. In Experiment 1, participants concurrently learned 3 types of discriminations: simple (A- vs. B+), common cue (XC- vs. XD+), and compound (YE- vs. ZF+). Accuracy was ordered: simple > compound > common cue. Neither model anticipated this ordering. In Experiment 2, cue order in 2-element configurations was either inconsistent (e.g., YE and EY) as in Experiment 1 or consistent (e.g., EY throughout). Although accuracy differences were smaller under consistent ordering, the relative difficulty of the tasks was the same as in Experiment 1. In Experiment 3, common cue and compound discriminations were tested in different participants to determine whether the ordering of difficulty in Experiments 1 and 2 was caused by differential generalization mediated by the number of elements; the ordering was the same as in Experiments 1 and 2. These results suggest the need for differential attention to event presence and absence and to mechanisms that incorporate limited attentional capacity. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Thinking backward: Some curable and incurable consequences of cognitive busyness.

Social interaction imposes a variety of attentional demands on those who attempt it. Such cognitively busy persons often fail to use contextual information to correct the impressions they form of others. The 4 experiments reported here examined the corrigibility of this effect. Although formerly busy perceivers were able to correct their mistaken impressions retroactively (Experiment 1), such retroactive correction was not inevitable (Experiment 2). In addition, when perceivers were able to correct their original impressions retroactively, they were still unable to correct subsequent inferences that had been biased by those original impressions (Experiments 3 and 4). As such, perceivers were occasionally able to overcome the primary, but not the subsidiary, effects of cognitive busyness. The results are discussed in terms of the metastasis of false knowledge. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)