Mind, brain, and self in psychoanalysis: Therapeutic implications of the mind-body relation.

Theoretical and empirical findings regarding the mind-body relation and its integration within a concept of the self-as-person lead to certain therapeutic implications and applications. The mind-set of the analyst or psychotherapist regarding the integration of mind-body can have important reverberations, which can dictate decisions for therapeutic intervention and management. Implications for conceptualizing technical modifications in analytic therapy are suggested. Conceptualization of mind and brain operating as an integrated and functional unity contribute to better understanding aspects of mental functioning that remain beyond the reach of conscious awareness and direct therapeutic processing. Particular attention is paid to the issue of combining medications clinically with psychotherapy and psychoanalysis. Future integration of psychoanalysis with advancing trends in therapeutic intervention and with rapidly expanding neurobiological understanding of mental actions as related to brain activity may require a deepening awareness of complexities of the mind-body relation and a more analytically meaningful resolution of the problem. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Folk psychology of mental activities.

A central aspect of people's beliefs about the mind is that mental activities—for example, thinking, reasoning, and problem solving—are interrelated, with some activities being kinds or parts of others. In common-sense psychology, reasoning is a kind of thinking and reasoning is part of problem solving. People's conceptions of these mental kinds and parts can furnish clues to the ordinary meaning of these terms and to the differences between folk and scientific psychology. In this article, we use a new technique for deriving partial orders to analyze subjects' decisions about whether one mental activity is a kind or part of another. The resulting taxonomies and partonomies differ from those of common object categories in exhibiting a converse relation in this domain: One mental activity is a part of another if the second is a kind of the first. The derived taxonomies and partonomies also allow us to predict results from further experiments that examine subjects' memory for these activities, their ratings of the activities' importance, and their judgments about whether there could be "possible minds" that possess some of the activities but not others. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

What psychology is about.

Considers that the goal of psychology, i.e., understanding the mind, must be approached gradually, but kept in sight, for forgetting this may result in psychologists becoming mere technicians. As a biological science psychology (including social psychology) must eschew vitalism, regarding mind as the capacity for thought and thought as an activity of the brain. Psychology cannot emulate the humanities, which also provide knowledge of man. Certain aspects of thought are discussed. It is argued that (a) free will is a biologically evident phenomenon in higher animals; (b) creativity is a function of "the unconscious," but there is no conscious in the corresponding sense; and (c) thought is inveterately attracted by the unsolved or insoluble problem and even by outright contradiction. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Near-death experiences: Out of body and out of mind?

Comments on the original article, "Implications of near-death experiences for a post-materialist psychology," by B. Greyson (see record 2010-03251-005). Greyson (2010) has argued that complex consciousness (i.e., near-death experiences, or NDEs) under conditions such as cardiac arrest and general anesthesia challenge “materialist reductionism” and require a revised psychology anchored in 21st-century quantum physics that includes consciousness in its conceptual formulation. Unfortunately, Greyson fails to specify how quantum mechanics or a holistic approach can (a) enlighten our understanding of NDEs and (b) pave a foundation for a “new scientific conceptualization of the interface between mind and brain (Greyson, 2010, p. 43).” We agree with Greyson that NDEs are fascinating phenomena, and we further recognize that quantum mechanics undergirds chemistry, and so surely plays some as-yet- undefined role in mental processes. However, we sharply disagree that it is necessary to “expand models of the mind” on the basis of quantum mechanics “before we can progress in our understanding of consciousness and the brain (Greyson, 2010, p. 43).” We do not wish to duel with Greyson regarding if and when the brain is “completely disabled” during NDEs, but instead argue that the future is bright for understanding NDEs in terms of the everyday workings of the brain, and suggest important avenues of inquiry. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Folk psychology or semantic entailment? Comment on Rips and Conrad (1989).

L. J. Rips and F. G. Conrad (see record 1989-24843-001) reported a puzzling but consistent result from a series of experiments designed to study folk beliefs about the mind. For example, subjects accept both "Dreaming is a kind of experiencing" and "Experiencing is a part of dreaming." Because this pattern is not observed for objects—"A hammer is a kind of tool" is acceptable, but "A tool is part of a hammer" is not—Rips and Conrad suggested that their results provide clues to differences between folk and scientific psychology. An alternative interpretation developed here holds that their results are not peculiar to terms denoting mental processes and shed no new light on folk theories of the mind; instead, they are quite general and follow from treating verbs as if they were nouns. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Stupidity or worms": Do intestinal worms impair mental performance?

The title of a 1930s article asked the question, "Stupidity or Hookworm?" In this article, the authors discuss research that attempts to answer the question of whether intestinal worms—namely, hookworm, whipworm, and roundworm—harm the mental performance of their hosts. After introducing the biology and epidemiology of intestinal worms, the authors present the historical background to the problem. They review research from the 1910s through the 1990s; there is evidence that high intensities of worms can affect mental performance, but not all dewormed children show improved performance. They discuss the mechanisms of how worms might affect the mind. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Beliefs about mental illness as a functon of psychiatric status and psychiatric hospitalization.

Beliefs about mental illness were assessed among psychiatric inpatients at a VA hospital, the mental health staff responsible for their treatment, and a group of medical and surgical (control) patients. Results indicated that: (a) Psychiatric and nonpsychiatric patients generally hold similar opinions regarding mental illness. Severely disturbed psychiatric patients, however, view mental illness in more moralistic terms than do "normals." (b) Psychiatric hospitalization is generally accompanied by a change in the patient's beliefs concerning mental illness, toward those held by the staff. (c) Psychiatric patients whose beliefs about mental illness are most strikingly influenced by the staff tend to respond most favorably to treatment, as measured by length of hospital stay and gains in self-esteem during the 1st month of treatment. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Basic behavioral science research for mental health: Thought and communication.

The key to human intelligent behavior lies in the capacity for thinking, reasoning, and problem solving and an inability to communicate through language. These abilities are often seriously impaired in people with mental disorders, and their language may reveal delusions and scattered, incoherent thoughts as well as "word" salad and idiosyncratic words. Depressed and anxious individuals often reveal self defeating thoughts and inappropriate reasoning, such as regarding minor slip-ups as catastrophes and dwellling on the negative aspects of experiences that are generally positive. Cognitive research seeks to understand how thinking, reasoning, and using language develop and function nomally, how they are represented in the brain, and how they can break down in aging, brain injury, and various mental disorders. Aspects of this research inform the work of therapists as they challenge irrational beliefs and dysfunctional reasoning, encourage clients to re-evaluate their problems, and aid people in overcoming the aftereffects of brain injury and disease. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Self-deception: A postmodern reflection.

The traditional perspective on self-deception, which assumes that the mind can be simultaneously involved in contradictory stories and that there is an integrated understanding of the "truth" somewhere inside, is apparent in most contemporary theories of psychology. A critique of the phenomenon from a postmodern perspective raises questions regarding these assumptions. Ideas from evolutionary biology and research concerning hypnotically induced amnesia are used to support the thesis that self-deception is more a cultural phenomenon maintained by the observer, than a natural phenomenon situated in the individual mind. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Psychic retreats or psychic pits?: Unbearable states of mind and technological addiction.

New technologies are highly interactive. They promote imaginative involvement and allow the experience of different self-states, such as those involving withdrawal or “psychic retreat”. According to Steiner, psychic retreats are areas of the mind populated by imagination and ideas which are poorly aligned with reality. Psychic retreats are not necessarily pathological in themselves—for instance, they can be used positively for counteracting anxiety or enhancing creativeness. However, with technological addiction there is a misuse of psychic retreat: here the total absorption with computer applications serves to hide painful or unbearable states of mind, and to protect the patient from overwhelming feelings through segregating self-states with a disconnection in their representations. Therefore, in clinical work with individuals suffering from technological addiction exploring the use of psychic retreats can serve as an aid to both diagnosis and treatment. Where the dysfunctional use of new technologies constitutes a temporary withdrawal from a specific painful event, this can have the function of protecting the individual from inner conflict; in the most serious cases however, technological addiction is grounded in more chronic and pathological dissociative mechanisms, and serves to prevent the mind from reactivating traumatic states connected to childhood experience of emotional neglect or abuse. While it is likely that the first condition can be positively handled with appropriate identification and treatment, the latter is much more difficult to deal with, particularly where the addictive behavior hides the weakness of the self, and psychic retreats are pervasively used to protect the patient from mental breakdown. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Not a page-turner, but a very intellectually-challenging book.

Reviews the book, How the mind works by S. Pinker (1998). How the mind works provides an excellent example of what I consider a very good, thought-provoking scientific book. It is true that I often put the book down, sometimes for long periods. But during those down times I still continued to read, in the sense described earlier. That is, I continued to consider the thoughts and issues raised by Pinker, often discussing them with colleagues, in an attempt to decide for myself where I stood on the issues. I found that I agreed with some of Pinker's views while disagreeing with others. However, I will not recount my opinions here, because I expect a different reader would have very different opinions for the reasons described above. Instead, I will highlight the characteristics of Pinker's book that make it such a non-page-turner. In my view, the strengths of the book are rooted in three characteristics: (a) the perspective, (b) the subject matter, and (c) the writing style. The combination of interesting and relevant issues, an engaging writing style, and a strong stance on every issue make the book very challenging intellectually. I was not comfortable moving on to some new issue before I had formed an opinion on the previous one. Often this required me to talk with colleagues and at the end of the title. Perhaps it would not reflect the extend the debate beyond the book and into the faculty conviction with which Pinker holds his opinions, but it lounge. At other times it pushed me to simply take some would better reflect the challenge to readers to form their time to reflect on the issues. Perhaps the highest accolade own opinions. that can be given to a scientific book is that it forces one to think and form opinions. How the mind works is clearly deserving of that accolade. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Metarepresentation in action: 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds' developing theories of mind in parent–child conversations.

Using a cross-sectional natural language database, the authors investigated the parent–child conversations of 36 three-, 4-, and 5-year-olds to explore 2 issues regarding the development of metarepresentation. First, children's uses of explicit contrastives (ECs), utterances that explicitly contrast 2 differing mental states, were explored. Four-year-olds and, to a greater extent, 5-year-olds were found to reliably use ECs. Second, parents' responses to children's uses of "I don't know" and implicit contrastives (e.g., contradictions) were examined to determine whether parents took these opportunities to highlight the representational nature of mental states. All children regularly elicited mentalistic responses from their parents and, in some cases, these parental responses were positively related to children's production of mental talk. Findings are discussed in terms of how theory of mind development may be guided by scaffolding processes. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Personality Evaluation in the Selection of Graduate Students in Clinical Psychology.

Examined the opinions of clinical psychologists regarding the selection of graduate clinical students to include some type of formal personality evaluation, in addition to the usual academic considerations. In view of the strong feelings often expressed on both sides of this question, it was felt that a questionnaire sampling the opinions of clinical psychologists regarding it would be of professional interest and possibly of some assistance to graduate departments attempting to cope with the problem.. Brief questionnaires were sent to a randomly selected sample of 100 members of Division 12 (Clinical) of the APA. In reply to the question: "Should a formal personality evaluation be used as a criterion for selecting applicants for graduate study in clinical psychology?" 84% of those responding checked "Yes," and 16% checked "No." In assessing how extensive such an evaluation should be, the following alternatives or combinations of them were provided: thorough personality analysis, screening for obvious handicapping problems, and screening for possession of professionally "desirable" characteristics. 20% selected the first alternative, 27% chose the second, 11% checked the third, 27% combined the second and third, 2% marked the first and third, 4% indicated all three, and 9% did not reply to this question. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Dualism redux in recent neuroscience: "Theory of mind" and "embodied simulation" hypotheses in light of historical debates about perception, cognition, and mind.

How do we, as humans, take in the feelings and thoughts of other people? Theory-of-Mind (ToM) and Embodied Simulation (ES) approaches hypothesize divergent neural and behavioral mechanisms underlying intersubjectivity. ToM investigators assert that humans take in the belief states and intentions of another person by holding "a theory of mind" that cognitively posits the other person's mental contents, with some experiments identifying the right temporo-parietal junction as a specific ToM brain region. ES theorists hypothesize that humans perceive the other's state of mind by simulating his/her actions, emotions, and goals in the "mirror neuron system" in the brain. A historical review suggests these understandings rely on opposing, dualist models of cognition and perception. William James's intervention on this earlier debate is informative in anticipating recent findings in low-level sensory neuroscience. Of specific interest are studies showing that intersubjectivity and low-level sensory attentional filtering are both processed in the same cortical area (the temporo-parietal junction) suggesting that the ability to entertain other minds may be related to the ability to perceive salient stimuli during attention-demanding tasks. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Effect of xinmaitong capsule on damage of lipid peroxidation in coronary heart disease patients with myocardial ischemia

The authors show the results of the "Curricular Evaluation Program" of University of S?o Paulo Medical School pertaining to the year of 1996. This program (PAC-II) is based on teachers' opinions regarding the subjects taught (1st to 4th grades) and hospital intern courses. The opinions collected concerning such programs were definitely favorable. Most of the teachers considered the programs to be either good or very good. It was also identified that the hospital intern courses were a little more valued than the other courses taught in the first four grades.     

How does the mind work? Memorial address in honor of Jerzy Konorski.

Discusses the career of Jerzy Konorski and ways in which his work was continually and consistently directed toward an examination of how the mind operates. Konorski's early training as a physician, his work in Pavlov's laboratory, his interest in the work of Charles Sherrington, and his experience as director of the Nencki Institute of Experimental Biology in Warsaw are examined. In the beginning, Konorski was a behaviorist, but later he showed an unabashed interest in "mental life." Eventually his work became known in the US; he made several visits here and even received grants from the National Institutes of Health. Emphasis is placed on how the work of Konorski and his "school" interdigitates with learning theory and research in this and certain other Western countries. (45 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Continuity and change in personality.

Examines the stability and resistance to change of "cognitive constructions about ourselves and the world" and cognitive styles in problem solving. The mind is presented as creating and maintaining a "perception of continuity even in the face of perpetual observed changes in actual behavior." Questions are raised regarding correlations between new cognitive style measures, IQ (as measured by WISC), and RT. (21 ref.) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Social representation of labels associated to mental illness

The social context linked to deinstitutionalization brought the authors to study the impact of labels placed on people having undergone psychiatry. The objective of this research is to better understand the subtleties made by the public concerning the following terms: the mentally ill person (malade mental), the ex-psychiatric patient (ex-patient psychiatrique) and the person suffering from a mental health problem (personne souffrant d'un problème de santé mentale). Data collected from 255 francophone residents from the Montréal area show that the expression "ex-psychiatric patient" is less stigmatizing than the expressions "mentally ill person" or "person suffering from a mental health problem" (PSMHP), as it refers to a past event that is over and done with. The expression "mentally ill person" emphasizes the chronic nature of the health problem suffered by the individual, where as the PSMHP focuses on the person's potential for recovery. The expression "ex-psychiatric patient" points to the capacity to function normally in society.     

Jungian metapsychology and neurobiological theory

This paper deals with brain research and depth psychology. Because brain research is becoming significantly more sophisticated and increasingly able to assay the neurobiology of subjective (i.e., mental) events in vivo, it is suggested that any school of depth psychology will probably not survive as a mainstream treatment modality if its theory and practice is found to be in frank variance with the findings of the modern neurosciences. Jung's psychology is compared to Freud's and shown to be reasonably consonant with such findings. Historical highlights of Jung's non-reductive way of conceptualizing and working are presented and put in the context of more recent scientifically defensible concepts (emergence, supervenience, complexity theory) from the fields of both philosophy of science and philosophy of mind. These concepts postulate a hierarchical model of reality which permits an exploration of the mind/brain relationship without resorting to reductionism or dualism. A sense of the present struggle is conveyed between the proponents of these and more traditional scientific concepts. Finally, the nature of mind/brain confluence is elucidated by examples from the areas of learning, memory and the capacity to symbolize in order to illustrate how clinical practices and observations familiar to experience depth therapists and also in agreement with Jungian theory are compatible with neuroscientific findings. A research suggestion is offered.     

Ontology recapitulates philology: The mythic nature of anxiety.

Argues that "anxiety" is a member of a class of "mental state" words, a class of words that appears to be independent and uninfluenced by empirical events or rational argument. The etymology suggests that anxiety was illicitly transformed from an earlier form that denoted the recognition of a proximal event to a "mental state," a condition of the mind. The transformations are explained by means of a 4 stage linguistic process: recognition of a proximal event, the employment of a distal metaphor, the submerging of the metaphor through the employment of dispositional forms, and the final construction of dispositions as substantives. The argument implies that conceptual categories used by psychologists are formed out of the linguistic forms available to them. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)