Rents in the European power sector due to carbon trading

The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) has imposed a price on the allowances for CO₂ emissions of electricity companies. Integrating this allowance price into the price of electricity earns a rent for companies who have received these allowances for free. During Phase I, 2005–2007, rents corresponding to the aggregate value of allocated allowances amounted to roughly € 13 billion per year. However, due to the specific price-setting mechanism in electricity markets true rents were considerably higher. This is due to the fact that companies also that have not received any allowances gain additional infra-marginal rents to the extent that their variable costs are below the new market price after inclusion of the allowance price. Producers with low carbon emissions and low marginal costs thus also benefit substantially from carbon pricing. This paper develops a methodology to determine the specific interaction of the imposition of such a CO₂ constraint and the price-setting mechanism in the electricity sector under the assumption of marginal cost pricing in a liberalized European electricity market. The article thus provides an empirical estimate of the true total rents of power producers during Phase I of the EU-ETS (2005–2007). The EU ETS generated in Phase I additional rents in excess of € 19 billion per year for electricity producers. These transfers are distributed very unevenly between different electricity producers. In a second step, the paper assesses the impact of switching from free allocation to an auctioning of allowances in 2013. We show that such a switch to auctioning will continue to create additional infra-marginal rents for certain producers and will leave the electricity sector as a whole better off than before the introduction of the EU ETS.     

Joint electricity and carbon market for Northeast Asia energy interconnection

Decarbonization of the electricity sector is crucial to mitigate the impacts of climate change and global warming over the coming decades. The key challenges for achieving this goal are carbon emission trading and electricity sector regulation, which are also the major components of the carbon and electricity markets, respectively. In this paper, a joint electricity and carbon market model is proposed to investigate the relationships between electricity price, carbon price, and electricity generation capacity, thereby identifying pathways toward a renewable energy transition under the transactional energy interconnection framework. The proposed model is a dynamically iterative optimization model consisting of upper- level and lower-level models. The upper-level model optimizes power generation and obtains the electricity price, which drives the lower-level model to update the carbon price and electricity generation capacity. The proposed model is verified using the Northeast Asia power grid. The results show that increasing carbon price will result in increased electricity price, along with further increases in renewable energy generation capacity in the following period. This increase in renewable energy generation will reduce reliance on carbon-emitting energy sources, and hence the carbon price will decline. Moreover, the interconnection among zones in the Northeast Asia power grid will enable reasonable allocation of zonal power generation. Carbon capture and storage (CCS) will be an effective technology to reduce the carbon emissions and further realize the emission reduction targets in 2030-2050. It eases the stress of realizing the energy transition because of the less urgency to install additional renewable energy capacity.     

Market and welfare effects of renewable portfolio standards in United States electricity markets

This study analyzes the market and welfare effects of the introduction of Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) while considering the empirically relevant (a) interaction of compliance with voluntary green power markets, (b) differences in consumer preferences, and (c) imperfect competition among electricity suppliers. The study accounts for both the supply and demand effects of RPS — i.e., increased costs and a higher consumer valuation for regular power. Our analysis shows that the regular power price always increases after the introduction of RPS, while the effect of RPS on the equilibrium price of green power, the quantities of regular and green power, the welfare of consumers, and suppliers' profits is case-specific and dependent on the relative magnitude of the cost and utility effects, the strength of consumer preference for green power, the suppliers' costs before RPS, the impact of RPS on green power costs, and the degree of competition among power suppliers. While the introduction of RPS aims at increasing the use of green energy in electricity production, our analysis shows that the introduction of the policy can end up reducing the total quantity of green power used. Intriguingly, this adverse policy impact will occur under seemingly optimal conditions for the green power sector; i.e., a high consumer valuation of green energy and/or low cost difference between the green power and its conventional counterpart. Finally, the analysis shows that the policy design can play a key role in determining the incidence of RPS, while the identification of the winners and losers of the policy can provide insights on the political economy of RPS and the positions held by different groups in policy negotiations.     

Electricity prices and generator behaviour in gross pool electricity markets

Electricity market liberalisation has become common practice internationally. The justification for this process has been to enhance competition in a market traditionally characterised by statutory monopolies in an attempt to reduce costs to end-users. This paper endeavours to see whether a pool market achieves this goal of increasing competition and reducing electricity prices. Here the electricity market is set up as a sealed bid second price auction. Theory predicts that such markets should result with firms bidding their marginal cost, thereby resulting in an efficient outcome and lower costs to consumers. The Irish electricity system with a gross pool market experiences among the highest electricity prices in Europe. Thus, we analyse the Irish pool system econometrically in order to test if the high electricity prices seen there are due to participants bidding outside of market rules or out of line with theory. Overall we do not find any evidence that the interaction between generator and the pool in the Irish electricity market is not efficient. Thus, the pool element of the market structure does not explain the high electricity prices experienced in Ireland.     

Generation adequacy and transmission interconnection in regional electricity markets

The power system capacity adequacy has public good features that cannot be entirely solved by electricity markets. Regulatory intervention is then necessary and established methods have been used to assess adequacy and help regulators to fix this market failure. In regional electricity markets, transmission interconnections play an important role in contributing to adequacy. However, the adequacy problem and related policy are typically considered at a national level. This paper presents a simple model to study how the interconnection capacity interacts with generation adequacy. First results indicate that increasing interconnection capacity between systems improves adequacy up to a certain level; further increases do not procure additional adequacy improvements. Furthermore, besides adequacy improvement, increasing transmission capacity under asymmetric adequacy criteria or national system characteristics could create several concerns about externalities. These results imply that regional coordination of national adequacy policies is essential to internalise adequacy of cross-border effects.     

Wind power and CO2 emissions in the Irish market

This paper presents an empirical analysis of the displacement of CO₂ emissions associated with wind generation in the Irish electricity market between December 2013 and May 2017. We find that the average marginal effect of an additional MWh of wind generation corresponds to a reduction in CO₂ emissions of 0.401 tonnes in Ireland (All-Island system) and 0.459 tonnes when accounting also for the emissions offset in Great Britain. We also find that, for each given demand level, the amount of emissions displaced by wind varies with the wind level. In particular, overall the amount of total (domestic plus external) CO₂ emissions offset by a MWh of wind generation increases as the wind generation level increases, a result which suggests that as wind generation capacity increases the effectiveness of wind in displacing CO₂ may be retained. However, when accounting exclusively for the effects of wind generation on domestic emissions, we observe that the effectiveness of wind in displacing emissions may decrease as the amount of wind generation increases further. As the effects of CO₂ as a GHG are independent of the location where it is emitted, our work also highlights that accounting for reductions in emissions due to a reduction of imports from, or an increase in exports to, interconnected markets is crucial in this type of analysis due to the potential for underestimating the effects of wind on emissions savings when only national emissions are accounted for. The Irish government has a target for 40% of total electricity generation to be produced by renewable energy sources by 2020 which, according to institutional reports, may entail an additional 25% to 35% increase in wind generation capacity from the present levels. Accordingly, our findings are particularly relevant for policy making since they do not support one of the arguments against further investment in wind, namely that the corresponding environmental benefits in the form of emissions savings are reduced.     

The value of information in explicit cross-border capacity auction regimes in electricity markets

We study two electricity markets connected by a fixed amount of cross-border capacity. The total amount of capacity is known to all electricity traders and allocated via an auction. The capacity allocated to each bidder in the auction remains private information. We assume that traders are faced with a demand function reflecting the relationship between electricity transmitted between the markets and the spot price difference. Therefore, traders act like Bayesian–Cournot oligopolists in exercising their transmission rights when presented with incomplete information about the competitors’ capacities. Our analysis breaks down the welfare effect into three different components: Cournot behavior, capacity constraints, and incomplete information. We find that social welfare increases with the level of information with which traders are endowed.     

Estimating the electricity prices,generation costs and CO2 emissions of large scale wind energy exports from Ireland to Great Britain

The share of wind generation in the Irish and British electricity markets is set to increase by 2020 due to renewable energy (RE) targets. The United Kingdom (UK) and Ireland have set ambitious targets which require 30% and 40% of electricity demand to come from RE, mainly wind, by 2020, respectively. Ireland has sufficient indigenous onshore wind energy resources to exceed the RE target, while the UK faces uncertainty in achieving its target. A possible solution for the UK is to import RE directly from large scale onshore and offshore wind energy projects in Ireland; this possibility has recently been explored by both governments but is currently on hold. Thus, the aim of this paper is to estimate the effects of large scale wind energy in the Irish and British electricity markets in terms of wholesale system marginal prices, total generation costs and CO₂ emissions. The results indicate when the large scale Irish-based wind energy projects are connected directly to the UK there is a decrease of 0.6% and 2% in the Irish and British wholesale system marginal prices under the UK National Grid slow progression scenario, respectively.     

全国碳市场背景下电力行业碳价传导机制研究

电力行业作为典型的能源密集型行业,是全世界各地碳市场的重点管控对象。本文对国内外电力市场、碳市场及碳价传导的问题进行了研究,发现欧洲、美国的电力市场更趋近于买方市场,碳价对终端电价的影响较小。而由于中国电力体制的特殊性,电价由政府主管部门进行管控,因而在政府不通过行政手段调节碳成本传递机制的情况下,碳成本将无法向发电企业下游传导,使得发电企业暴露在碳成本波动的风险下。同时,在对碳成本传导机制研究的基础上给出了具体建议。     

Did residential electricity rates fall after retail competition? A dynamic panel analysis

A key selling point for the restructuring of electricity markets was the promise of lower prices. There is not much consensus in earlier studies on the effects of electricity deregulation in the U.S., particularly for residential customers. Part of the reason for not finding a consistent link with deregulation and lower prices was that the removal of transitional price caps led to higher prices. In addition, the timing of the removal of price caps coincided with rising fuel prices, which were passed on to consumers in a competitive market. Using a dynamic panel model, we analyze the effect of participation rates, fuel costs, market size, a rate cap and switch to competition for 16 states and the District of Columbia. We find that an increase in participation rates, price controls, a larger market, and high shares of hydro in electricity generation lower retail prices, while increases in natural gas and coal prices increase rates. We also find that retail competition makes the market more efficient by lowering the markup of retail prices over wholesale costs. The effects of a competitive retail electricity market are mixed across states, but generally appear to lower prices in states with high participation rates.     

The long-term life cycle private and external costs of high coal usage in the US

Using four times as much coal in 2050 for electricity production need not degrade air quality or increase greenhouse gas emissions. Current SO_x and NO_x emissions from the power sector could be reduced from 12 to less than 1 and from 5 to 2 million tons annually, respectively, using advanced technology. While direct CO₂ emissions from new power plants could be reduced by over 87%, life cycle emissions could increase by over 25% due to the additional coal that is required to be mined and transported to compensate for the energy penalty of the carbon capture and storage technology. Strict environmental controls push capital costs of pulverized coal (PC) and integrated coal gasification combined cycle (IGCC) plants to $1500–1700/kW and $1600–2000/kW, respectively. Adding carbon capture and storage (CCS) increases costs to $2400–2700/kW and $2100–3000/kW (2005 dollars), respectively. Adding CCS reduces the 40–43% efficiency of the ultra-supercritical PC plant to 31–34%; adding CCS reduces the 32–38% efficiency of the GE IGCC plant to 27–33%. For IGCC, PC, and natural gas combined cycle (NGCC) plants, the carbon dioxide tax would have to be $53, $74, and $61, respectively, to make electricity from a plant with CCS cheaper. Capturing and storing 90% of the CO₂ emissions increases life cycle costs from 5.4 to 11.6 cents/kWh. This analysis shows that 90% CCS removal efficiency, although being a large improvement over current electricity generation emissions, results in life cycle emissions that are large enough that additional effort is required to achieve significant economy-wide reductions in the US for this large increase in electricity generation using either coal or natural gas.     

Welfare implications of capacity payments in a price-capped electricity sector: A case study of the Texas market (ERCOT)

The aim of this paper is to analyze the welfare consequences of introducing capacity compensation payments in restructured and liberalized electricity markets. For that purpose, we set up a two-stage framework in which two kinds of electricity generators, peak load and base load generators, choose their capacity investment levels first and then compete on the basis of bids in a centralized market to sell electricity to consumers. We use data from the Texas ERCOT to evaluate consumers' welfare. We find that the introduction of capacity payments has two countervailing effects. On the one hand, it increases the wholesale electricity price. On the other hand, it reduces price volatility and increases the reliability of the system. We find that capacity payments are more beneficial for consumers in a perfectly competitive market than in the presence of certain degree of market power.     

The role of storage in a competitive electricity market and the effects of climate change

This paper uses a new model of a competitive electricity market to investigate the role of storage in markets dominated by hydro generation. Competition among generators leads to an endogenous shadow price of stored water, which facilitates the efficient intra-day and inter-season substitution of fuel. Overall welfare depends on storage capacity, the cost structure of non-hydro generators, and the characteristics of water inflows. If climate change reduces the long-run average level of inflows or leads to the introduction of a carbon tax then overall welfare will fall and the profitability of generators will rise. The welfare benefits from additional storage capacity will increase if climate change makes long-term inflows less predictable or leads to the introduction of a carbon tax. They will decrease if average inflows fall or the predictable seasonal cycle in inflows becomes less pronounced.     

Transmission capacities and competition in Western European electricity market

The integration of national electricity markets into a single European one is expected to reduce the ability of dominant players to exercise market power. This paper investigates whether or not existing transmission capacities of cross-border interconnectors are sufficient to achieve this result and create vigorous competition in the market. A model with two decision levels is used. On the first level profit maximizing generators play Cournot game against each other. On the last level the system operator clears the market and determines flows in the network to maximize social welfare subject to a set of physical constraints. As each strategic generator anticipates her impact on equilibrium prices and congestion in the system, her optimization problem is subject to equilibrium constraints from the system operator's problem.The analysis demonstrates that interconnector capacities in Western Europe are insufficient for integration alone to reduce the exercise of market power. I compare several possible competition-enhancing policies: expansion of interconnectors and different scenarios of national markets’ restructuring. I show that although increase of line capacity is a useful tool to stimulate competition in an integrated market, it is not a substitute for the restructuring of large players.     

Climate change and electricity consumption—Witnessing increasing or decreasing use and costs?

Climate change affects the need for heating and cooling. This paper examines the impact of gradually warming climate on the need for heating and cooling with an econometric multivariate regression model for five countries in Europe along the south–north line. The predicted changes in electricity demand are then used to analyze how climate change impacts the cost of electricity use, including carbon costs. Our main findings are, that in Central and North Europe, the decrease in heating due to climate warming, dominates and thus costs will decrease for both users of electricity and in carbon markets. In Southern Europe climate warming, and the consequential increase in cooling and electricity demand, overcomes the decreased need for heating. Therefore costs also increase. The main contributors are the role of electricity in heating and cooling, and the climatic zone.     

Behavioral aspects of regulation: A discussion on switching and demand response in Turkish electricity market

Electricity sector has been transformed from state-owned monopolistic utilities to competitive markets with an aim to promote incentives for improving efficiency, reducing costs and increasing service quality to customers. One of the cardinal assumptions of the liberalized and competitive electricity markets is the rational actor, and decision-makers are assumed to make the best decisions that maximize their utility. However, a vast literature on behavioral economics has shown the weakness of economic theory in explaining and predicting individuals’ decision-making behavior. This issue is quite important for competition in electricity markets in which consumers’ preferences have a significant role. Despite its importance, this issue has almost been neglected in Turkey, which has taken major steps in electricity sector restructuring. Therefore, this paper aims to examine switching and demand response behavior in Turkish electricity market by using multiple correspondence and panel data analysis, and findings are discussed in light of the neoclassical and behavioral economics literature. Analyses’ results show that consumers’ switching and demand response behavior is consistent with the neoclassical literature to some extent; however, behavioral factors are also affecting consumers’ decisions. Furthermore, there are systemic problems that hinder effective functioning of the electricity market and restrict competition.     

Economic analysis of energy interconnection between Europe and China with 100% renewable energy generation

The economic benefits of interconnecting the power grids of Europe (EU) and China (CN) were assessed considering 100% reliance on renewable energy (RE). Four different scenarios, energy storage without interconnection, installing additional renewable energy sources without interconnection, energy storage with interconnection, and installing additional RE sources with interconnection, were considered for the economic benefit analysis. A comparative study of these four scenarios was conducted to identify the best option for achieving hourly power balance. Further, sensitivity analysis was carried out to demonstrate the robustness of the results. Electricity interconnection between CN and EU decreases the annual additional costs by more than 30% when compared to the absence of interconnection, which demonstrates the necessity and benefits of CN-EU electricity interconnection.     

Electric vehicles in imperfect electricity markets: The case of Germany

We use a game-theoretic model to analyze the impacts of a hypothetical fleet of plug-in electric vehicles on the imperfectly competitive German electricity market. Electric vehicles bring both additional demand and additional storage capacity to the market. We determine the effects on prices, welfare, and electricity generation for various cases with different players in charge of vehicle operations. Vehicle loading increases generator profits, but decreases consumer surplus in the power market. If excess vehicle batteries can be used for storage, welfare results are reversed: generating firms suffer from the price-smoothing effect of additional storage, whereas power consumers benefit despite increasing overall demand. Strategic players tend to under-utilize the storage capacity of the vehicle fleet, which may have negative welfare implications. In contrast, we find a market power-mitigating effect of electric vehicle recharging on oligopolistic generators. Overall, electric vehicles are unlikely to be a relevant source of market power in Germany in the foreseeable future.     

How competitive are EU electricity markets? An assessment of ETS Phase II

This paper studies the interactions between electricity and carbon allowance prices in the year-ahead energy markets of France, Germany, United Kingdom and the Nordic countries, during Phase II of the EU ETS. VAR and Granger-causality methods are used to analyze causal interfaces, whereas the volatility of electricity prices is studied with basic and asymmetric AR-GARCH models. Among the main results, the marginal rate at which carbon prices feed into electricity prices is shown to be ca. 135% in the EEX and Nord Pool markets, where electricity and carbon prices display bidirectional causality, and 109% in the UK. Therefore, generators in these markets internalized the cost of freely allotted emission allowances into their electricity prices considerably more than the proportionate increase in costs justified by effective carbon intensity. Moreover, electricity prices in France are found to Granger-cause the carbon price. This study also shows how European electricity prices are deeply linked to coal prices among other factors, both in terms of levels and volatility, regardless of the underlying fuel mix, and that coal was marginally more profitable than gas for electricity generation. EU policies aimed at increasing the carbon price are likely to be crucial in limiting the externalities involved in the transition to a low-carbon system.