Prima facie obviousness of pharmaceutical patents implications for enantiomers

Innovator pharmaceutical companies file primary patents to protect new molecular entities (NME) and secondary patents to protect NMEs in various forms. “Non-obviousness” is the most critical criterion for patentability of both. A showing of “prima facie obviousness” shifts the onus to the patentee to prove that the claimed invention is non-obvious. This paper presents a framework to analyze the non-obviousness of the claims. More particularly it explains why the enantiomers are always prima facie obvious and how to overcome the same. The utility of the framework is demonstrated by analyzing the non-obviousness of Levofloxacin and other enantiomers.     

The origin and features of information referenced in pharmaceutical patents

50 pharmaceutical patents granted to firms, residing in US, GB, DE and HU each, were surveyed and the average numbers of scientific as well as patent itemsReferenced by the inventors were calculated. The sum of impact factors of the journals referenced (Total Weighted Impact) was calculated by scientific fields. About 50–60 per cent of scientific information referred to in the patents was found to originate from Life Sciences journals. It was found that 10 per cent of the journals referenced contained 55 per cent of the papers.Paper presented at the Fourth International Conference on Bibliometrics, Informetrics and Scientometrics in Berlin (Germany), September 11–15, 1993.     

Launch of a product and patents: evidence from the US cardiovascular pharmaceutical sector

ABSTRACT

Recent literature on the role of patents in shaping competition between incumbents and new entrants shows mixed evidence, as patents can discourage entry into markets but may also encourage potential entrants by increasing profitability from research and development. The increasing use of patents as strategic weapons motivates this investigation of the impact of innovation on competition. In a case study of US pharmaceutical cardiovascular submarkets over the period 1988–1998, we use a panel probit model to study the impact of a firm’s patents and rivals’ patents in the firm’s decision to launch new products. Our results show that the number of a firm’s lagged patents encourages the firm’s entry with new products, while rivals’ initial stock of patents discourages entry, but more recent patents promote entry by opening new technological opportunities.