Reasoning about preferences in argumentation frameworks

The abstract nature of Dung's seminal theory of argumentation accounts for its widespread application as a general framework for various species of non-monotonic reasoning, and, more generally, reasoning in the presence of conflict. A Dung argumentation framework is instantiated by arguments and a binary conflict based attack relation, defined by some underlying logical theory. The justified arguments under different extensional semantics are then evaluated, and the claims of these arguments define the inferences of the underlying theory. To determine a unique set of justified arguments often requires a preference relation on arguments to determine the success of attacks between arguments. However, preference information is often itself defeasible, conflicting and so subject to argumentation. Hence, in this paper we extend Dung's theory to accommodate arguments that claim preferences between other arguments, thus incorporating meta-level argumentation based reasoning about preferences in the object level. We then define and study application of the full range of Dung's extensional semantics to the extended framework, and study special classes of the extended framework. The extended theory preserves the abstract nature of Dung's approach, thus aiming at a general framework for non-monotonic formalisms that accommodate defeasible reasoning about as well as with preference information. We illustrate by formalising argument based logic programming with defeasible priorities in the extended theory.     

On Resolving Conflicts Between Arguments

Argument systems are based on the idea that one can construct arguments for propositions—structured reasons justifying the belief in a proposition. Using defeasible rules, arguments need not be valid in all circumstances, therefore, it might be possible to construct an argument for a proposition as well as its negation. When arguments support conflicting propositions, one of the arguments must be defeated, which raises the question of which (sub‐) arguments can be subject to defeat. In legal argumentation, metarules determine the valid arguments by considering the last defeasible rule of each argument involved in a conflict. Since it is easier to evaluate arguments using their last rules, can a conflict be resolved by considering only the last defeasible rules of the arguments involved? We propose a new argument system where, instead of deriving a defeat relation between arguments, arguments for the defeat of defeasible rules are constructed. This system allows us to determine a set of valid (undefeated) arguments in linear time using an algorithm based on a JTMS, allows conflicts to be resolved using only the last rules of the arguments, allows us to establish a relation with Default Logic, and allows closure properties such as cumulativity to be proved. We propose an extension of the argument system based on a proposal for reasoning by cases in default logic.     

An argumentation framework in default logic

This article presents a formal theory about nontrivial reasoning with inconsistent information, applicable, among other things, to defeasible reasoning. The theory, which is inspired by a formal analysis of legal argument, is based on the idea that inconsistency tolerant reasoning is more than revising an unstructural set of premises; rather it should be regarded as constructing and comparing arguments for incompatible conclusions. This point of view gives rise to two important observations, both pointing at some flaws of other theories. The first is that arguments should be compared as they are constructed, viz. step-by-step, while the second observation is that a knowledge representation language is needed with a defeasible conditional, since the material implication gives rise to arguments which are not constructed in actual reasoning. Accordingly, a nonmonotonic logic, default logic, is chosen as the formalism underlying the argumentation framework. The general structure of the framework allows for any standard for comparing pairs of arguments; in this study two such standards are investigated, based on specificity and on orderings of the premises.     

A modular translation from defeasible nets to defeasible logics

Abstract

The sceptical inheritance nets introduced in Horty et al. [Proceedings of AAAI-87 (1987):358-363] are translated into a version of Nute's defeasible logic. Moreover this translation is modular in the sense of Thomason and Horty [Non-Monotonic Reasoning. Springer-Verlag (1989):234]. Apart from the importance of relating two nonmonotonic reasoning formalisms, this result shows that the reasoning mechanisms underlying defeasible logic and defeasible nets are the same. Yet they were invented independently and set in totally different contexts. This is perhaps some evidence that the underlying nonmonotonic reasoning mechanism is mainly correct. We also observe that since defeasible logics can contain both absolute and defeasible rules, they provided a uniform setting for considering nets which contain both strict and defeasible arcs.     

A theory of defeasible reasoning

Reasoning can lead not only to the adoption of beliefs, but also to the retraction of beliefs. In philosophy, this is described by saying that reasoning is defeasible. My ultimate objective is the construction of a general theory of reasoning and its implementation in an automated reasoner capable of both deductive and defeasible reasoning. the resulting system is named “OSCAR.” This article addresses some of the theoretical underpinnings of OSCAR. This article extends my earlier theory in two directions. First, it addresses the question of what the criteria of adequacy should be for a defeasible reasoner. Second, it extends the theory to accommodate reasons of varying strengths.     

Argument construction and reinstatement in logics for defeasible reasoning

This paper points out some problems with two recent logical systems – one due to Prakken and Sartor, the other due to Kowalski and Toni – designedfor the representation of defeasible arguments in general, but with a specialemphasis on legal reasoning.     

OSCAR: a general theory of rationality

Abstract

The enterprise is the construction of a general theory of rationality, and its implementation in an automated reasoning system named OSCAR. The paper describes a general architecture for rational thought. This includes both theoretical reasoning and practical reasoning, and builds in important interconnections between them. It is urged that a sophisticated reasoner must be an introspective reasoner, capable of monitoring its own reasoning and reasoning about it. An introspective reasoner is built on top of a non-introspective reasoner that represents the system's default reasoning strategies. The introspective reasoner engages in practical reasoning about reasoning in order to override these default strategies. The paper concludes with a discussion of some aspects of the default reasoner, including the manner in which reasoning is interest driven, and the structure of defeasible reasoning.     

Artificial argument assistants for defeasible argumentation

The present paper discusses experimental argument assistance tools. In contrast with automated reasoning tools, the objective is not to replace reasoning, but to guide the user's production of arguments. Two systems are presented, and based on . The focus is on defeasible argumentation with an eye on the law. Argument assistants for defeasible argumentation naturally correspond to a view of the application of law as dialectical theory construction. The experiments provide insights into the design of argument assistants, and show the pros and cons of different ways of representing argumentative data. The development of the argumentation theories underlying the systems has culminated in the logical system that formalizes the interpretation of prima facie justified assumptions. introduces an innovative use of conditionals expressing support and attack. This allows the expression of warrants for support and attack, making it a transparent and flexible system of defeasible argumentation.     

Abstract argumentation

In this paper we explore the thesis that the role of argumentation in practical reasoning in general and legal reasoning in particular is to justify the use of defeasible rules to derive a conclusion in preference to the use of other defeasible rules to derive a conflicting conclusion. The defeasibility of rules is expressed by means of non-provability claims as additional conditions of the rules.We outline an abstract approach to defeasible reasoning and argumentation which includes many existing formalisms, including default logic, extended logic programming, non-monotonic modal logic and auto-epistemic logic, as special cases. We show, in particular, that the admissibility semantics for all these formalisms has a natural argumentation-theoretic interpretation and proof procedure, which seem to correspond well with informal argumentation.In the admissibility semantics there is only one way for one argument to attack another, namely by undermining one of its non-provability claims. In this paper, we show how other kinds of attack between arguments, specifically how rebuttal and priority attacks, can be reduced to the undermining of non-provability claims.     

The epistemic basis of defeasible reasoning

This article argues that: (i) Defeasible reasoning is the use of distinctive procedures for belief revision when new evidence or new authoritative judgment is interpolated into a system of beliefs about an application domain. (ii) These procedures can be explicated and implemented using standard higher-order logic combined with epistemic assumptions about the system of beliefs. The procedures mentioned in (i) depend on the explication in (ii), which is largely described in terms of a Prolog program, EVID, which implements a system for interactive, defeasible reasoning when combined with an application knowledge base. It is shown that defeasible reasoning depends on a meta-level Closed World Assumption applied to the relationship between supporting evidence and a defeasible conclusion based on this evidence. Thesis (i) is then further defended by showing that the EVID explication of defeasible reasoning has sufficient representational power to cover a wide variety of practical applications of defeasible reasoning, especially in the context of decision making.     

Why Non-Monotonic Logic is Inadequate to Represent Balancing Arguments

This paper analyses the logical structure of the balancing of conflicting normative arguments, and asks whether non-monotonic logic is adequate to represent this type of legal or practical reasoning. Norm conflicts are often regarded as a field of application for non-monotonic logics. This paper argues, however, that the balancing of normative arguments consists of an act of judgement, not a logical inference, and that models of deductive as well as of defeasible reasoning do not give an adequate account of its structure. Moreover, it argues that as far as the argumentation consists in logical inferences, deductive logic suffices for reconstructing the argumentation from the internal point of view of someone making normative judgements.     

DR-Prolog: A System for Defeasible Reasoning with Rules and Ontologies on the Semantic Web

Nonmonotonic rule systems are expected to play an important role in the layered development of the semantic Web. Defeasible reasoning is a direction in nonmonotonic reasoning that is based on the use of rules that may be defeated by other rules. It is a simple, but often more efficient approach than other nonmonotonic rule systems for reasoning with incomplete and inconsistent information. This paper reports on the implementation of a system for defeasible reasoning on the Web. The system 1) is syntactically compatible with RuleML, 2) features strict and defeasible rules, priorities, and two kinds of negation, 3) is based on a translation to logic programming with declarative semantics, 4) is flexible and adaptable to different intuitions within defeasible reasoning, and 5) can reason with rules, RDF, RDF Schema, and (parts of) OWL ontologies     

t-DeLP: an argumentation-based Temporal Defeasible Logic Programming framework

The aim of this paper is to propose an argumentation-based defeasible logic, called t-DeLP, that focuses on forward temporal reasoning for causal inference. We extend the language of the DeLP logical framework by associating temporal parameters to literals. A temporal logic program is a set of basic temporal facts and (strict or defeasible) durative rules. Facts and rules combine into durative arguments representing temporal processes. As usual, a dialectical procedure determines which arguments are undefeated, and hence which literals are warranted, or defeasibly follow from the program. t-DeLP, though, slightly differs from DeLP in order to accommodate temporal aspects, like the persistence of facts. The output of a t-DeLP program is a set of warranted literals, which is first shown to be non-contradictory and be closed under sub-arguments. This basic framework is then modified to deal with programs whose strict rules encode mutex constraints. The resulting framework is shown to satisfy stronger logical properties like indirect consistency and closure.     

On a rule-based interpretation of default conditionals

In nonmonotonic reasoning, a default conditional α→β has most often been informally interpreted as a defeasible version of a classical conditional, usually the material conditional. There is however an alternative interpretation, in which a default is regarded essentially as a rule, leading from premises to conclusion. In this paper, we present a family of logics, based on this alternative interpretation. A general semantic framework under this rule-based interpretation is developed, and associated proof theories for a family of weak conditional logics is specified. Nonmonotonic inference is easily defined in these logics. Interestingly, the logics presented here are weaker than the commonly-accepted base conditional approach for defeasible reasoning. However, this approach resolves problems that have been associated with previous approaches.      

Extending abstract argumentation systems theory

In this paper, we extend the theory of abstract argumentation systems proposed by Vreeswijk (1997). This framework stands at a high abstraction level and provides a general model for argumentation activity. However, the theory reveals an inherent limitation in that the premises of the argumentation process are assumed to be indefeasible, and this introduces the need of an implicit constraint on the strength of the arguments, in order to preserve correctness. In many application contexts the information available to start reasoning is not guaranteed to be completely reliable, therefore it is natural to assume that premises can be discarded during the argumentation process. We extend the theory by admitting that premises can be defeated and relaxing the implicit assumption about their strength.Besides fixing the technical problems related to this hidden assumption (e.g., ensuring that warranted arguments are compatible), our proposal provides an integrated model for belief revision and defeasible reasoning, confirming the suitability of argumentation as a general model for the activity of intelligent reasoning in presence of various kinds of uncertainty.     

ANGLE: An autonomous, normative and guidable agent with changing knowledge

Some emerging computing systems (especially autonomic computing systems) raise several challenges to autonomous agents, including (1) how to reflect the dynamics of business requirements, (2) how to coordinate with external agents with sufficient level of security and predictability, and (3) how to perform reasoning with dynamic and incomplete knowledge, including both informational knowledge (observations) and motivational knowledge (for example, policy rules and contract rules). On the basis of defeasible logic and argumentation, this paper proposes an autonomous, normative and guidable agent model, called ANGLE, to cope with these challenges. This agent is established by combining beliefs-desires-intentions (BDI) architecture with policy-based method and the mechanism of contract-based coordination. Its architecture, knowledge representation, as well as reasoning and decision-making, are presented in this paper. ANGLE is characteristic of the following three aspects. First, both its motivational knowledge and informational knowledge are changeable, and allowed to be incomplete, inconsistent/conflicting. Second, its knowledge is represented in terms of extended defeasible logic with modal operators. Different from the existing defeasible theories, its theories (including belief theory, goal theory and intention theory) are dynamic (called dynamic theories), reflecting the variations of observations and external motivational knowledge. Third, its reasoning and decision-making are based on argumentation. Due to the dynamics of underlying theories, argument construction is not a monotonic process, which is different from the existing argumentation framework where arguments are constructed incrementally.     

Defeasible reasoning: A discussion of some intuitions

In this article, we discuss some issues related to the intuitions of defeasible reasoning, in particular floating conclusions, reinstatement, and zombie paths. Defeasible logic serves as the formal basis for our analysis. We also make some comments on the comparison between defeasible logics and the well‐founded semantics of extended logic programs with priorities. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Int J Int Syst 21: 545–558, 2006.     

Towards a Formal Account of Reasoning about Evidence: Argumentation Schemes and Generalisations

This paper studies the modelling of legal reasoning about evidence within general theories of defeasible reasoning and argumentation. In particular, Wigmore's method for charting evidence and its use by modern legal evidence scholars is studied in order to give a formal underpinning in terms of logics for defeasible argumentation. Two notions turn out to be crucial, viz. argumentation schemes and empirical generalisations.     

Defeasible Logic on an Embedded Microcontroller

Defeasible logic is a system of reasoning in which rules have exceptions, and when rules conflict, the one that applies most specifically to the situation wins out. This paper reports a successful application of defeasible logic to the implementation of an embedded control system. The system was programmed in d-Prolog (a defeasible extension of Prolog), and the inferences were compiled into a truth table that was encoded on a low-end PIC microcontroller.Advantages of defeasible logic include conciseness and correct handling of the passage of time. It is distinct from fuzzy logic and probabilistic logic, addressing a different set of problems.