Grouped locations and object-based attention: Comment on Egly, Driver, and Rafal (1994).

Recently, R. Egly et al (see record 1994-34191-001) provided evidence for an object-based component of visual orienting in a simple cued reaction time task. However, the effects of objects on visual attention can be due to selection from either of 2 very different types of representations: (1) a truly object-based representation that codes for object structure or (2) a grouped array representation that codes for groups of spatial locations. Are Egly et al's results due to selection from an object-based representation or from a grouped array representation? This question was addressed by using a variant of Egly et al's task. The findings replicated those of Egly et al and demonstrated that the selection in this task is mediated through a grouped array representation. The implications of these results for studies of attentional selection are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Occlusion, symmetry, and object-based attention: Comment on Behrmann, Zemel, and Mozer (1998).

The validity of M. Behrmann, R. Zemel, and A Mozer's (see record 1998-04674-001) finding that object-based attention can be directed toward occluded objects is examined in 3 experiments. In A Behrmann et al.'s original study, participants made speeded judgments of whether the numbers of bumps attached to 2 arms of an X shape were the same or different. The 2 sets of bumps belonged either to a single object, 2 different objects, or 2 separated parts of an occluded object. Unfortunately, this objecthood manipulation was confounded by the symmetry of the stimuli. Experiment 1 replicated M. Behrmann et al.'s main results using identical stimuli. Experiments 2a and 2b dissociated objecthood from symmetry. The results suggest that the effects of object-based attention found by A Behrmann et al. are largely due to symmetry. The stimuli used in M. Behrmann et al. are not appropriate for examining the relation between object-based attention and occlusion. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Source ROCs are (typically) curvilinear: Comment on Yonelinas (1999).

On the basis of his assumption that recollection is a threshold process, A. P. Yonelinas (see record 1999-00904-014; 1999) predicted linear source-identification receiver operating characteristics (ROCs) and recently reported data that were consistent with this prediction. In this article, the authors present data showing curvilinear source-idcntification ROCs across various encoding and test conditions. On the basis of the source-monitoring framework (e.g., M. K. Johnson, S. Hashtroudi, & D. S. Lindsay, 1993), the authors argue that curvilinearity of source-identification ROCs is a result of differences in the qualitative characteristics of memories rather than simply the influence of undifferentiated familiarity as the dual-process model might suggest. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Misconceptions about Freud's seduction theory: Comment on Gleaves and Hernandez (1999).

D. H. Gleaves and E. Hernandez (see record 1999-01068-004) write in relation to the seduction theory that "recent writers now argue that... Freud never made discoveries of sexual abuse" (p. 332) and that "the assertion that Freud did not make discoveries of abuse is unwarranted" (p. 324). In this article an outline of the case that Freud had no adequate grounds for his 1896 claims of having uncovered infantile "sexual scenes" is given. Some of the more important misconceptions and erroneous arguments in Gleaves and Hernandez's article are then examined. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Confidence in protection: Comment on Goldberg et al. (1999).

S. Goldberg, J. E. Grusec, and J. M. Jenkins (see record 1999-15264-001) presented a provocative and compelling argument for a narrow definition of infant–mother attachment that is true to J. Bowlby's (1969) original theory. In particular, S. Goldberg et al. emphasized protection as the central feature of attachment and considered the importance of such a narrow definition for empirical precision in studies of the interactional antecedents of attachment. This comment considers a number of questions raised by S. Goldberg et al.'s article, including practical, theoretical, and developmental issues stemming from an attachment-as-protection perspective. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Social identity, the pursuit of possible selves, and psychological adjustment: Comment on Cameron (1999).

This article comments on J. E. Cameron's (1999) (see record 1999-03790-001) empirical examination of the relationship between aspects of social identity, the notion of possible selves, and the psychological adjustment of college students. The theoretical implications of Cameron's study, the application of the findings to real-world phenomena, and recommendations for future research are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The contextual change paradox is still unresolved: Comment on Bouton, Nelson, and Rosas (1999).

According to the contextual change theory of memory loss, spontaneous forgetting reflects a retrieval impairment due to subtle and unprogrammed shifts in environmental cues over a retention interval. However, Riccio, Richardson, and Ebner (1984) noted an apparent paradox in this model; specifically, laboratory studies inducing explicit shifts in contextual cues found less disruption of performance as retention intervals increased. Bouton, Nelson, and Rosas (see record 1999-10106-001) critiqued several of the claims made by Riccio et al. and concluded that the contextual cue theory is still a valid account of spontaneous forgetting. In this comment, the authors address the 3 major criticisms offered by Bouton et al., point out an inconsistency in their argument, and conclude that the original paradox still poses problems for the contextual change theory of forgetting. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

False memories and statistical design theory: Comment on Miller and Wolford (1999) and Roediger and McDermott (1999).

In an analysis of H. L. Roediger and K. B. McDermott's (see record 1995-42833-001) false-memory paradigm, M. B. Miller and G. L. Wolford (see record 1999-13930-007) argued that falsely recognized items occur because a bias toward calling such items "old" is created by their membership in a studied category. This interpretation was contested by Roediger and McDermott (see record 2000-15248-006). The authors of this article approach this issue as a statistical decision problem and observe that an explanation of false memory based on stored strengths and one based on decision process can have identical implications for data. Problems with equivalent formal models of this type can frequently be resolved by looking at the effects of other variables on the fitted estimates. The authors illustrate this analysis by examining the effects of presentation duration on the parameter estimates produced by models that instantiate the 2 explanations. Although the question remains open, the storage-based interpretation was found to be somewhat more plausible. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Representing the task in Bayesian reasoning: Comment on Lovett and Schunn (1999).

The RCCL model (M. C. Lovett and C. D. Schunn, 1999; see record 1999-05245-001) produces predictions that are non-novel or that do not truly spring from its principles. However, it offers the valuable insight that learning processes may affect the selection of both representations and strategies within those representations, and points the way to possible theoretical progress on implicit and explicit control. The authors' account of base-rate neglect under direct experience is compared with RCCL, and it is concluded that learning-based models allow for tests that are not fostered by representation-based models. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The collective construction of collective efficacy: Comment on Paskevich, Brawley, Dorsch, and Widmeyer (1999).

The most instructive aspect of the article by D. M. Paskevich, L. R. Brawley, K. D. Dorsch, and W. N. Widmeyer (1999) (see record 1999-03790-005) is not what it tells us about collective efficacy but what it tells us about the process by which psychological concepts are socially constructed. Collective efficacy is not an entity whose true nature remains undiscovered. It is an abstraction whose definition remains socially unconstructed. Recognition of this fact is the first step toward understanding collective efficacy. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Splitting versus sharing focal attention: Comment on Castiello and Umiltà (1992).

A popular metaphor for visual attention is that of a spotlight that enhances perceptual processing within its beam. Many studies on the orienting of visual attention have addressed whether the beam is a unified structure or whether it can be split between noncontiguous locations in space. Although most of the evidence favors the unified model, U. Castiello and C. Umiltà (see record 1992-41663-001) claimed recently to have results that could most easily be accounted for by a model of visual attention in which resources can be allocated flexibly to independent locations in space. It is argued that Castiello and Umiltà used only indirect empirical evidence to support their position and that their results are not inconsistent with the unified model. Two studies are reported in which important aspects of Castiello and Umiltà's experiments were maintained and a probe procedure was implemented to assess directly if attention was split between 2 spatial locations or if a unified focus of attention was expanded to incorporate the 2 locations. The results clearly supported the latter position. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Broad and narrow perspectives in grief theory: Comment on Bonanno and Kaltman (1999).

G. A. Bonanno and S. Kaltman's (1999) concentration on the grief work hypothesis in their review of perspectives on bereavement is only 1 aspect required for a comprehensive theory of grief, which should cover the following: the origin and adaptive significance of grief; the mechanism that initiates the grief response; the mechanism that leads to the resolution of grief; and sources of individual variation. Bonanno and Kaltman's replacement for grief work also emphasized cognitive restructuring, which can be contrasted with 2 alternative mechanisms, forgetting and engaging in new activities and relationships. M. S. Stroebe and H. A. W. Schur's (1994) dual process model, which involves cognitive restructuring and engaging in new activities, provides a broader alternative to grief work than that advocated by Bonanno and Kaltman. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Spatial negative priming without mismatching: Comment on Park and Kanwisher (1994).

In spatial selective attention tasks, response time to locate a target is often longer when the target appears in a location that was recently occupied by an ignored distractor. It has been assumed that this "negative priming" effect occurs because internal representations associated with the distractor are inhibited during selection of the prime display target. In contrast, J. Park and N. Kanwisher (1994) have argued recently that spatial negative priming arises from mismatches between properties of the ignored distractor and subsequent probe target. In this article, 3 separate experiments demonstrate that negative priming can occur when the prime distractor and probe target are identical. Such effects are contrary to Park and Kanwisher's (1994) mismatching account of negative priming but congenial with an object-based inhibition mechanism of selection. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Questioning premorbid dissociative symptomatology in dissociative identity disorder: Comment on Gleaves, Hernandez and Warner (1999).

Comments on an article by D. H. Gleaves et al (see record 1999-03012-003) which purported to refute the sociocognitive model (SCM) of dissociative identity disorder by showing that many of the symptoms associated with dissociative identity disorder are displayed by patients before entering therapy or prior to diagnosis. The present authors argue that Gleaves et al's results do not refute the SCM and are in fact supportive of that model. The present authors also argue that the Gleaves et al study suffers from several deficiencies, including a misunderstanding of the SCM and its predictions concerning iatrogenesis, deficiencies in the manner in which the survey was conducted, and a failure to note some disturbing trends in the results that were obtained. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Recognition memory ROCs and the dual-process signal-detection model: Comment on Glanzer, Kim, Hilford, and Adams (1999).

An examination of recognition memory receiver-operating characteristics (ROCs) showed that large increases in accuracy often do not affect the observed asymmetry of the ROC. However, M. Glanzer, K. Kim, A. Hilford, and J. Adams (see record 1999-00904-013) reported several experiments showing that changes in accuracy do sometimes influence the asymmetry of the function. Although the observed dissociations between accuracy and asymmetry are consistent with the predictions of the dual-process signal-detection model (A. P. Yonelinas, 1994), they argued that the shape of the observed ROCs deviated from that predicted by the model and implied that the data were more consistent with an unequal-variance signal-detection model. However, they did not directly test the dual-process model; rather, they conducted two indirect assessments and inferred that the original model must be inaccurate. In this article, the author directly fit the dual-process and the unequal-variance signal-detection models to Glanzer et al.'s observed data and showed that both models provided an accurate account of the ROCs, capturing more than 99.9% of the variance of the average ROCs.… (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Cost-effectiveness of psychotherapy for child aggression: First, is there cost effectiveness? Comment on Shechtman and Ben-David (1999).

Prevention programs and interventions to reduce aggression in children can be evaluated in terms of costs of treatment versus long-term economic and social benefits. The group psychotherapy approach by Z. Shechtman and M. Ben-David (see record 1999-01744-003) is quite brief and seems to demonstrate short-term reductions in aggressive behavior. If effective, this approach could be cost-beneficial. But its enduring efficacy is unclear, and the potential iatrogenic effects of placing aggressive children with other aggressive children make this approach risky. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Does a prosocial-selfish distinction help explain the biological affects? Comment on Buck (1999).

R. Buck (1999) argued that a conceptual distinction between prosocial and selfish motivation is necessary to understand the biological affects (consciously experienced feelings and desires having an innate neurochemical basis). However, at a biological level of analysis, a prosocial-selfish distinction is doubtful empirically and conceptually. For this reason, Buck's proposed typology of biological affects is unclear. Moreover, a prosocial-selfish distinction is not necessary to explain hemispheric differences in brain activity associated with affect. In contrast, an approach-withdrawal distinction explains some data uniquely well, although numerous exceptions imply that simple models are inadequate. To extend hemispheric models of experienced emotion, a prosocial-selfish distinction is unlikely to be explanatory, whereas an alternative account based on a distinction between verbal and nonverbal working memory may be useful. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Selective attention and distractor frequency in naming performance: Comment on Dhooge and Hartsuiker (2010).

E. Dhooge and R. J. Hartsuiker (2010) reported experiments showing that picture naming takes longer with low- than high-frequency distractor words, replicating M. Miozzo and A. Caramazza (2003). In addition, they showed that this distractor-frequency effect disappears when distractors are masked or preexposed. These findings were taken to refute models like WEAVER++ (A. Roelofs, 2003) in which words are selected by competition. However, Dhooge and Hartsuiker do not take into account that according to this model, picture-word interference taps not only into word production but also into attentional processes. Here, the authors indicate that WEAVER++ contains an attentional mechanism that accounts for the distractor-frequency effect (A. Roelofs, 2005). Moreover, the authors demonstrate that the model accounts for the influence of masking and preexposure, and does so in a simpler way than the response exclusion through self-monitoring account advanced by Dhooge and Hartsuiker. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

The investigation of exposure and cognitive therapy: Comment on Tarrier et al. (1999).

This article outlines concerns relating to the N. Tarrier et al. (1999) investigation (see record 1999-00242-002) comparing imaginal exposure and cognitive therapy. Specifically, the authors offer N. Tarrier et al. the opportunity to operationally define and clarify the claim that more patients treated by imaginal exposure "worsened" during treatment. Equally, in light of N. Tarrier et al.'s low effect sizes in relation to past research the authors also highlight the need to utilize accountable treatment integrity checks. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)