Social‐based reputation‐aware data forwarding for improved multicast delivery in the presence of selfish nodes in DTNs

Delay/disruption tolerant networks (DTNs) are potentially applicable in the challenged scenarios like post‐disaster environments. In such networks, data forwarding generally relies on the mutual cooperation of the nodes. However, in reality, despite the availability of necessary resources for data forwarding, a node could misbehave by dropping messages received from other nodes with whom it has no strong social ties. Such a node is called a socially selfish node, which would cause a poor delivery ratio in the network. In this paper, we aim to address the problem of multicast data forwarding in the presence of such selfish nodes, by means of efficient relay selection in DTNs. First, we define a realistic reputation model, in contrast to existing models, to define the socially selfish/misbehaving nodes in the network. Further, a game‐theoretic analysis is carried out that implies data forwarding cost is also an influential parameter in handling selfishness/misbehavior. Subsequently, the problem is formulated as a constrained optimization problem, which is NP hard. Therefore, a heuristic is proposed by combining the reputation of a node and the cost of message forwarding to appropriately identify relay nodes, thus improve the performance of the multicast message delivery in the network. We utilize a social metric, centrality to minimize the message forwarding cost in terms of the number of relay nodes. Finally, the comparative performance evaluation in ONE simulator with practical scenarios shows the superiority of the proposed scheme over the other prominent schemes.     

E2EACK: an end-to-end acknowledgment-based scheme against collusion black hole and slander attacks in MANETs

Mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) rely on the benevolence of nodes within the network to forward packets from a source node to a destination node. This network construction allows for the forwarding nodes, whether they are selfish or malicious, to drop packets hindering end-to-end communication. In this paper, a new scheme is proposed against collusion black hole and slander attacks in MANETs, named E2EACK. A novel method is used to detect collusion attacks due to collusive malicious nodes which cooperate in the route discovery, but refuse to forward data packets and do not disclose the misbehavior of each other. Contrary to existing methods that detect only collusion black hole attacks, the E2EACK also detects slander attacks and framing attacks. Moreover, the E2EACK uses ACKnowledgment packet to detect malicious nodes on the path and Message Authentication Code (MAC) to authenticate the sender of each data packet. Analytical and simulation results show that the proposed scheme considerably decreases the routing overhead and increases the packet delivery ratio compared to the existing methods.     

A Relaying Incentive Scheme for Multihop Cellular Networks Based on Coalition Game with Externalities

Cooperative multihop communication can greatly increase network throughput, yet packet forwarding may involve opportunity and energy cost for relays. Thus one of the primary problems in the implementation of multihop transmission is how to foster cooperation among selfish nodes. Existing researches mainly adopt price and monetary stimulating. We propose instead a self-enforcing incentive scheme free of monetary remunerating for asymmetric cellar network. The incentive comprises double compensation, namely, global stimulating policy among coalitions (Inter-BEA) and local allocating rule within each coalition (Intra-BEA). We validate effectiveness of the proposed BEA scheme based on coalition game theory. Theoretical analysis and numerical simulation show that our techniques can provide enough motivation for nodes to relay for own profits, and thus enlarge system coverage.     

ReIDD: reliability-aware intelligent data dissemination protocol for broadcast storm problem in vehicular ad hoc networks

Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) have emerged as fast growing networks with aims to provide safety, and comfort to the onboard passengers. But, in this environment reliable data dissemination to the destination nodes is one of the biggest challenges as there may be a congestion in the network due to blind flooding of messages to their final destination, called as broadcast storm which may lead to the performance degradation with respect to the metric such as-message delivery, reliability and response time. To address this issue, in this paper, we propose a reliability-aware intelligent data dissemination protocol for broadcast storm problem in VANETs. We have solved the above specified problem using game theory concepts in which players, strategy space and decisions with respect to the current state of the system. To reduce the message overhead with respect to the communication cost among the players of the game, in the proposed scheme, messages are routed to the next destination by selecting the most reliable path in an intelligent manner. A coalition game is formulated among the vehicles by considering vehicles as the players in the game. Each player in the game has an initial payoff value based upon the parameters such as-communication range, storage requirements, and computation power. Based upon the payoff value of the players in the game, different coalitions/clusters are formulated among the players in the proposed scheme. Then, the players send the messages to the other vehicles/players within the same coalition which increases the reliability of transmission. In the proposed scheme, messages are unicasted to their final destination in an intelligent manner. Different algorithms are designed for coalition formation, maintenance, and reliability-aware data dissemination. The performance of the proposed scheme is evaluated using various evaluation metrics such as-service time, packet delivery ration, and throughput. The results obtained prove the effectiveness of the proposed scheme as compared to the other state-of-the-art existing schemes.     

ICARUS: hybrId inCentive mechAnism for coopeRation stimUlation in ad hoc networkS

Mobile ad hoc networks rely on the cooperation of nodes for routing and forwarding. However, individual nodes may not always be willing to cooperate. In order thus to stimulate cooperation in ad hoc networks, several incentive mechanisms have been developed. In this paper we propose a new hybrid incentive mechanism, called ICARUS, which is an extension of DARWIN, a well-known reputation-based mechanism, combining advantages of both reputation-based and credit-based mechanisms. The objective of ICARUS is to detect and punish selfish nodes efficiently and at the same time motivate nodes to cooperate by rewarding the packet forwarding. Furthermore, ICARUS ensures fairness for distant nodes and prevents selfish nodes from corrupting the system using false information. The proposed scheme’s performance is tested through extended series of simulations and is compared with DARWIN. We show that ICARUS detects and isolates selfish nodes much faster, while at the same time improves the Quality of Service (QoS) received by non-selfish nodes, including distant ones.     

An evolutionary bargaining‐based approach for incentivized cooperation in opportunistic networks

Opportunistic networking enables users to communicate in an environment where connectivity is intermittent or unstable. However, such networking scheme assumes that mobile nodes voluntary cooperate, which cannot be guaranteed. Some nodes can simply exhibit selfish behavior and thus diminish the effectiveness of the approach. In this paper, a game scenario is formulated in which the nodes try to convince each other to participate in packets forwarding. Each node is considered as a player in this game. When a node comes in the communication range of another, a bargaining game starts between them as part of the message forwarding process. Both players try to have a mutual agreement on a price for message forwarding. We present a new incentive mechanism called evolutionary bargaining‐based incentive scheme (EBIS) to motivate selfish nodes to cooperate in data forwarding. In EBIS, a node negotiates with other nodes to obtain an agreeable amount of credit for its forwarding service. Nodes apply a sequential bargaining game and then adapt their strategies using an evolutionary model to maximize the probability of reaching an agreement. Unlike classical bargaining games, nodes in our model are boundedly rational. In addition, we use the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) concept to determine the adaptive strategies for the nodes. The comparison of EBIS with a benchmarked model demonstrates that EBIS performs better in terms of packet delivery ratio and average latency.     

Byzantine robust trust establishment for mobile ad hoc networks

In a mobile ad hoc network (MANET), the nodes act both as traffic sources and as relays that forward packets from other nodes along multi-hop routes to the destination. Such networks are suited to situations in which a wireless infrastructure is unavailable, infeasible, or prohibitively expensive. However, the lack of a secure, trusted infrastructure in such networks make secure and reliable packet delivery very challenging. A given node acting as a relay may exhibit Byzantine behavior with respect to packet forwarding, i.e., arbitrary, deviant behavior, which disrupts packet transmission in the network. For example, a Byzantine node may arbitrarily choose to drop or misroute a certain percentage of the packets that are passed to it for forwarding to the next hop. In earlier work, we proposed a trust establishment framework, called Hermes, which enables a given node to determine the “trustworthiness” of other nodes with respect to reliable packet delivery by combining first-hand trust information obtained independently of other nodes and second-hand trust information obtained via recommendations from other nodes. A deficiency of the Hermes scheme is that a node can fail to detect certain types of Byzantine behavior, such as packet misforwarding directed at a particular source node. In this paper, we propose new mechanisms to make Hermes robust to Byzantine behavior and introduce a punishment policy that discourages selfish node behavior. We present simulation results that demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed scheme in a variety of scenarios involving Byzantine nodes that are malicious both with respect to packet forwarding and trust propagation.     

Co-operation Enforcing Reputation-Based Detection Techniques and Frameworks for Handling Selfish Node Behaviour in MANETs: A Review

In Mobile Ad hoc Network, co-operation between mobile nodes is inevitable for enabling reliable network connectivity due to the absence of pre-deployed infrastructure. In such a network, mobile nodes spend significant amount of energy for detecting routes and forwarding packets in order to enforce co-operation. The energy drain of mobile nodes due to the above fact induces them to refuse forwarding of packets for their neighbouring nodes in order to participate in the network. The mobile nodes that forward their own packets but drop the packets received from neighbours are known as selfish nodes. Detecting selfish nodes is one of the most challenging issues that need to be addressed for enforcing co-operation. The core objective of this research work is to essentially identify and highlights various reputation-based selfish node mitigation approaches available in the literature with their merits and limitations. This paper presents context-aware reputation-based selfish node mitigation approaches that are classified into three categories viz., History-based reputation mechanism, Condition probability-based reputation mechanism and Futuristic probability-based reputation mechanism. This paper further presents a review on a number of selfish node mitigation frameworks and also aims in emphasizing the role of statistical reliability co-efficient that could aid in effective and efficient mitigation of selfish nodes.     

Network Coding for Overhead Reduction in Delay Tolerant Networks

Employing Network Coding (NC) in routing protocols for Delay Tolerant Networks (DTNs) is a challenging issue during the last years due to its potential beneficial effect on improving relevant critical metrics. This paper proposes an effective NC scheme intended for sparse DTNs comprising nodes of limited storage capacity. The scheme employs a memory management algorithm that makes optimal use of the limited storage capacity and focuses on unicast sessions where source and intermediate nodes combine only packets belonging to the same generation and destined for the same destination node. Upon having received a sufficient number of linearly independent packets resulting in a matrix of full rank, the destination nodes can apply network decoding to retrieve the information intended for them. The proposed scheme is fully distributed since the network nodes make decisions based on information collected solely from their own buffers. Combined either with Epidemic or probabilistic routing protocols, the scheme manages to drastically reduce the overhead created per source packet.     

Pricing for enabling forwarding in self-configuring ad hoc networks

The assumption that all nodes cooperate to relay packets for each other may not be realistic for commercial wireless ad hoc networks. An autonomous (selfish) node in a wireless network has two disincentives for forwarding for others: energy expenditure (real cost) and possible delays for its own data (opportunity cost). We introduce a mechanism that "fosters cooperation through bribery" in the context of forwarding in ad hoc networks. Using a microeconomic framework based on game theory, we design and analyze a pricing algorithm that encourages forwarding among autonomous nodes by reimbursing forwarding. Taking a joint network-centric and user-centric approach, the revenue maximizing network and utility (measured in bits-per-Joule) maximizing nodes interact through prices for channel use, reimbursements for forwarding, transmitter power control, as well as forwarding and destination preferences. In a three-node (two-sources, one-access-point) network, the network converges to an architecture that induces forwarding only when the network geometries are such that forwarding is likely to increase individual benefits (network revenue and node utilities). For other geometries, the network converges to architectures that do not favor forwarding. We then generalize to a multinode network, where it is seen that the nodes' willingness to forward decrease for large ratios of the average internodal distance to the smallest distance between the access point and any source node. Pricing with reimbursement generally improves the network aggregate utility (or aggregate bits-per-Joule), as well as utilities and revenue compared with the corresponding pricing algorithm without reimbursement.     

Dynamic DTN Routing Strategies Based on Knowledge

This paper presents a novel based-knowledge dynamic routing model with rate allocation for delay-tolerant networks (DTNs). The objectives are how to embody knowledge about destination offered by joint nodes and how to apply knowledge about destination to transfer data when the instantaneous end-to-end paths do not exist in DTNs. The first problem is addressed through a rate allocation model. For rate allocation, taking into account the dynamic feature of rate control as well as the selfish nature of joint nodes, we design a non-cooperative differential game model to offer efficient rate allocation scheme with the constraint of limited bandwidth, and obtain a feedback Nash equilibrium solution of the game. In this study, knowledge is valued information and provides advisable solutions to problems. For the second problem, assuming that the obtained value function in rate allocation model is the available knowledge about destination of joint node; with this assumption, a polynomial time routing algorithm is proposed to describe the procedure of the routing model.     

Satisfactory content delivery scheme for QoS provisioning in delay tolerant networks

We deal in this article with the content forwarding problem in delay tolerant networks (DTNs). We first formulate the content delivery interaction as a noncooperative satisfaction game. On one hand, the source node seeks to ensure a delivery probability above some given threshold. On the other hand, the relay nodes seek to maximize their own payoffs. The source node offers a reward (virtual coins) to the relay, which caches and forwards the file to the final destination. Each relay has to solve the dilemma of accepting/rejecting to cache the source's file. Cooperation incurs energy cost due to caching, carrying, and forwarding the source's file. Yet when a relay accepts to cooperate, it may receive some reward if it succeeds to be the first relay to forward the content to the destination. Otherwise, the relay may receive some penalty in the form of a constant regret; the latter parameter is introduced to make incentive for cooperation. Next, we introduce the concept of satisfaction equilibrium (SE) as a solution concept to the induced game. Now, the source node is solely interested in reaching a file delivery probability greater than some given threshold, while the relays behave rationally to maximize their respective payoffs. Full characterizations of the SEs for both pure and mixed strategies are derived. Furthermore, we propose two learning algorithms allowing the players (source/relays) to reach the SE strategies. Finally, extensive numerical investigations and some learning simulations are carried out to illustrate the behavior of the interacting nodes and to give some insightful thoughts on how to fine‐tune the network setting.     

A Diversity-based Selfish Node Detection Algorithm for Socially Aware Networking

Because mobile devices only have the limited resource in socially aware networking, some network nodes are unwilling to sacrifice their resource to forward messages to others for free, thus forming selfish nodes. However selfish nodes will cause dropping in the message delivery rate and affect the network performance, so this paper has proposed a diversity-based selfish node detection algorithm (DSNDA). Firstly, it mainly applies the node forwarding willingness mechanism to detect whether the node is selfish. If the node has the inadequate resource, that is, it cannot forward any messages for others; then it will be selfish. If the node’s resource is enough and the node has forwarded messages to other nodes, it indicates that the node is not selfish. Otherwise, DSNDA algorithm will use reputation mechanism to check the node further. If the node has broken faith, it indicates that the node is selfish. On the contrary the message confirmation mechanism will be employed to make the final check on the node. If a message does not be received or discarded after the node’s receiving it, which proves that it has selfish behaviour. If not, the node is normal. It can be proved by the simulation experiment and results that the DSNDA algorithm has significantly improved the delivery rate of messages, comparing with other algorithms. At the same time, reducing the network delay, thus verifying the feasibility of DSNDA.

     

基于博弈理论的无线自组织网增强协作模型研究

为了解决无线自组织网络中转发节点因自身能量与存储空间限制而拒绝协作的自私性问题,该文从分析数据包源节点与转发节点的收益与开销特性出发,基于虚拟货币的奖励机制,结合博弈理论提出无线自组织网络增强协作模型。该模型将网络协作问题转化为数据包转发路径中多转发节点与源节点收益的博弈均衡问题,在保障双方利益的基础上提出最优的激励方式,促进通信协作的进行。另外,为最大化网络生存时间与避免拥塞,该模型对转发节点的电量与存储空间状态做了相应的约束。     

OMH—Suppressing Selfish Behavior in Ad hoc Networks with One More Hop

In ad hoc networks, wireless nodes rely on each other to transmit data over multi-hops by forwarding packets. A selfish node may decide not to forward packets for other nodes to save its own resource but still use the network to send and receive data. Such a selfish behavior can degrade network performance significantly. Most existing work took observation, reputation and token based mechanisms. However observation based mechanism suffers from mobility and collusion; reputation and token based mechanisms suffer from system complexity and efficiency. In this paper, we propose One More Hop (OMH) protocol which suppresses selfish behavior from a totally new angle. Basing on the fact that the selfish but rational nodes still want to receive and send packets, if a node can not determine whether a packet is destined for it or not, it can not drop the packet. With modified routing protocol and cryptographic techniques, OMH achieves this design target. It is robust and efficient. The simulation shows that OMH works well under different network situations.     

基于自私行为分析的超密集D2D中继选择算法

在超密集D2D通信中,目前的中继选择方案主要假定中继设备具有主动意愿参与数据转发,但部分理性中继设备出于自身考虑,可能会存在时延或拒绝转发的自私行为,进而影响用户体验效果.从中继设备自私行为角度出发,提出了D2D通信中自私中继设备识别方法,进而提出了基于自私行为分析的超密集D2D中继选择算法.首先,定义了联合兴趣度、转...     

An incentive energy-efficient routing for data gathering in wireless cooperative networks

Because of energy-constraint, it is an attractive problem to select energy-efficient paths from source nodes to sink for data gathering in wireless ad hoc networks. Cooperative communication is a promising mechanism to reduce transmit energy in such kind of case. One of the fundamental assumptions for cooperative communication is that each node should be unselfish, responsible, and willing to forwarding data he has received. However, in energy-constrained environment, because of limited energy, each node hates participating in data transmission without any incentive and tries to avoid forwarding data (this behavior is selfish). In this paper, a utility function is proposed to stimulate nodes to behave unselfishly. We prove that it is a Nash Equilibrium when nodes work in an unselfish manner. Also, we show that the selection of forwarding nodes and relay nodes for data transmission is a NP-hard problem even when nodes behave unselfishly. A heuristic algorithm (Algorithm for Node Selection Problem, ANSP) is provided to solve this selection problem. We also prove the convergence of this algorithm. The analysis shows that this algorithm can reach the approximate performance ratio of 2?(1+α), where α is the maximal ratio of two power consumptions on two adjacent links in the network. The numerical results show that in a 100 node network, if nodes behave unselfishly, they will obtain a better utility, and more energy will be saved. The average saved energy when each node takes a selfish behavior, is 52.5% less than the average when nodes behave in an unselfish manner.     

Data forwarding incentive mechanism based on auction model in mobile social network

Abstract:A data forwarding incentive mechanism based on auction model in mobile social network was proposed.In this incentive mechanism,the first-price sealed auction mode was extended,the transaction mode of virtual currency payment was adopted,and the procedure of data forwarding between nodes was abstracted into the auction transaction model.Based on the node's resource state,the virtual currency and the data property,the evaluation function of data forwarding transaction was given,and then the node gives the corresponding price according to the evaluation function and game strategy.Through the game analysis,the Nash equilibrium solution of AMIM was found,and the lowest bidder,of which the bid price was lower than the evaluation of data forwarding request node would been selected as the service provider for this data forwarding.In this incentive mechanism,the rational mobile nodes were enforced to voluntarily participate in data forwarding cooperation to maximize their own interests.The simulation experiment shows that AMIM mechanism can effectively reduce the energy consumption and improve the success rate and efficiency of data forwarding in the whole network system.     

Reputation based selfishness prevention techniques for mobile ad-hoc networks

Mobile ad-hoc networks require nodes to cooperate in the relaying of data from source to destination. However, due to their limited resources, selfish nodes may be unwilling to forward packets, which can deteriorate the multi-hop connectivity. Different reputation-based protocols have been proposed to cope with selfishness in mobile ad-hoc networks. These protocols utilize the watchdog detection mechanism to observe the correct relaying of packets, and to compile information about potential selfish nodes. This information is used to prevent the participation of selfish nodes in the establishment of multi-hop routes. Despite its wide use, watchdog tends to overestimate the selfish behavior of nodes due to the effects of radio transmission errors or packet collisions that can be mistaken for intentional packet drops. As a result, the availability of valid multi-hop routes is reduced, and the overall performance deteriorates. This paper proposes and evaluates three detection techniques that improve the ability of selfishness prevention protocols to detect selfish nodes and to increase the number of valid routes.     

自私性机会网络中激励感知的内容分发的研究

提出了一种网络服务商A类节点与B类节点可以达到共赢的互惠激励机制RIS;分析了在该激励机制下,各个理性节点如何选择存储内容从而最大化自己的收益,并探讨了节点维护网络拓扑信息的范围与节点选择决策的关系。最后使用MIT trace数据集仿真分析了在每个节点试图最大化自己收益时整个机会网络的内容分发性能。仿真结果表明,在部署了所设计的共赢激励机制后,与无激励机制相比,每个频道的平均接收率提高了18%,平均接收时延减少了4.83天,同时B类节点为每个订阅内容的付费也得到降低。随着节点维护的网络拓扑信息范围的扩大,该激励机制能不断提高网络的分发性能。