European passive plant program: A design for the 21st century

In 1994, a group of European utilities initiated, together with Westinghouse and its industrial partner GENESI (an Italian consortium including ANSALDO and FIAT), a program designated EPP (European Passive Plant) to evaluate Westinghouse passive nuclear plant technology for application in Europe. The following major tasks were accomplished: (1) the impacts of the European utility requirements (EUR) on the Westinghouse nuclear island design were evaluated; and (2) a 1000 MWe passive plant reference design (EP1000) was established which conforms to the EUR and is expected to be licensable in Europe. With respect to safety systems and containment, the reference plant design closely follows that of the Westinghouse simplified pressurized water reactor (SPWR) design, while the AP600 plant design has been taken as the basis for the EP1000 reference design in the auxiliary system design areas. However, the EP1000 design also includes features required to meet the EUR, as well as key European licensing requirements.     

Basic concept of a near future BWR

This paper shows a basic concept of a near future boiling water reactor (BWR) aiming at evolutional safety and cost savings with minimum change from the current advanced BWR (ABWR). The plant output is uprated to 1500 MWe from 1356 MWe. This power uprate can bring about potential of 11% cost saving per MWe base. Safety improvement as a next generation large reactor is also achieved.

The advanced reinforced concrete containment vessel (ARCCV) is used for the containment vessel to improve safety for severe accidents. The peak pressure of the containment at severe accidents can be kept close to the design pressure. The advanced passive containment cooling system (APCS) is also provided and can accomplish no primary containment vessel (PCV) venting.

The advanced emergency core cooling system (AECCS) consists of four divisions in the front line. The advanced passive cooling system (APCS) is also provided. The combination of the four divisional emergency core cooling system (ECCS) and the passive safety system improves the plant performance in probabilistic safety assessment (PSA).

This plant concept is designed based on the heritage of the current ABWR. No more major research and development (R&D) are necessary. Therefore, construction and operation is possible in the early 2010s.     

“华龙一号”反应堆堆芯与安全设计研究

“华龙一号”是我国自主设计研发的具有完整知识产权的第三代百万千瓦级压水堆核电技术。本文介绍了“华龙一号”的产生历程，系统论述了“华龙一号”反应堆堆芯与安全设计特点，包括“华龙一号”研发过程中开展的堆芯核设计、热工水力设计、安全设计、设计验证及“华龙一号”持续开展的设计改进与优化等内容，通过采用新的设计理念和设计技术，全面提高了“华龙一号”作为三代核电技术的经济性、灵活性和安全性。      

福岛条件下AP1000核电厂事故前期研究

假设AP1000核电厂发生类似福岛核事故的初因事件,利用RELAP5/MOD3.3程序对事故早期的一、二回路系统和非能动安全系统进行模拟计算,得到了反应堆冷却剂系统压力、堆芯冷却剂温度、非能动安全系统流量等重要参数的瞬态变化。分析表明：在非能动余热排出系统完好的情况下,反应堆系统能顺利进入热停堆状态;如果非能动余热排出系统1根换热管发生双端断裂,则反应堆系统将会在5 h内发生严重事故。     

Different variations of a passive safety containment for a BWR with active and passive safety systems

The paper presents probable variations of passive safety boiling water reactor (BWR). In order to improve safety and economy of passive safety BWR, the authors thought of use of a kind of improved Mark III type containment. The paper presents the basic configuration of the passive safety BWR that has an improved Mark III type containment. We tentatively call this passive safety BWR advanced safer BWR⁺ (ASBWR⁺) and the containment Mark X containment in the paper. One of the merits of the Mark X containment is double containment function against fission products (FP) release. Another merit is very low peak pressure at severe accidents without active cooling systems. The third merit is coolability by natural circulation of outside air. Therefore, the Mark X containment is very suitable for passive safety BWRs. It does not need a reactor building (R/B) as the secondary containment, because it is a double containment by itself. The Mark X containment is a general concept and also useful for half-passive safety BWRs that have both active and passive safety systems. In those examples, active safety systems and passive safety systems function independently and constitute in-depth hybrid safety (IDHS). The concept of the IDHS is also presented in the paper.     

Two types of a passive safety containment for a near future BWR with active and passive safety systems

The paper presents two types of a passive safety containment for a near future BWR. They are named Mark S and Mark X containment. One of their common merits is very low peak pressure at severe accidents without venting the containment atmosphere to the environment. The PCV pressure can be moderated within the design pressure. Another merit is the capability to submerge the PCV and the RPV above the core level. The third merit is robustness against external events such as a large commercial airplane crash. Both the containments have a passive cooling core catcher that has radial cooling channels. The Mark S containment is made of reinforced concrete and applicable to a large power BWR up to 1830 MWe. The Mark X containment has the steel secondary containment and can be cooled by natural circulation of outside air. It can accommodate a medium power BWR up to 1380 MWe. In both cases the plants have active and passive safety systems constituting in-depth hybrid safety (IDHS). The IDHS provides not only hardware diversity between active and passive safety systems but also more importantly diversity of the ultimate heat sinks between the atmosphere and the sea water. Although the plant concept discussed in the paper uses well-established technology, plant performance including economy is innovatively and evolutionally improved. Nothing is new in the hardware but everything is new in the performance.     

Safety evaluation of the inherent and passive safety features of the smart design

SMART (system-integrated modular advanced reactor) is a 330 MWt advanced integral PWR, which is under development at KAERI for seawater desalination and electricity generation. The conceptual design of the SMART desalination plant produces 40,000 m³/day of potable water and generates about 90 MW of electricity, which are assessed as sufficient for a population of about 100,000. The SMART enhances safety by adopting the inherent safety design features such as the elimination of large break loss of coolant accidents, substantially large negative moderator temperature coefficients, etc. In addition, the safety goals of the SMART are achieved through the adoption of passive engineered safety systems such as an emergency core cooling system, passive residual heat removal system, safeguard vessel, and reactor and containment overpressure protection systems. This paper describes the design concept of the major safety systems of the SMART and presents the results of the safety analyses using a MARS/SMR code for the major limiting accidents including transient behaviors due to desalination system disturbances. The analysis results employing conservative initial/boundary conditions and assumptions show that the safety systems of the SMART conceptual design adequately remove the core decay heat and mitigate the consequences of the limiting accidents, and thus secure the plant to a safe condition.     

非能动系统可靠性分析方法在AP1000非能动ERVC系统中的应用

由于核电厂安全水平要求的逐渐提高,越来越多的非能动系统被用于先进反应堆堆型中,但对这些非能动系统可靠性评价的工作还处于初级阶段。本文根据非能动系统可靠性评价流程,通过RELAP5热工水力学程序模拟非能动系统物理过程,对AP1000反应堆压力容器外部冷却（ERVC）系统进行了可靠性评价。通过计算得到了压力容器下封头温度等参数的累积密度分布曲线,根据不同的成功准则即可获得AP1000 ERVC系统的可靠性。该非能动系统可靠性评价结果可用于核电厂PSA模型中,以更好地指导核电厂设计及提高核电厂的安全性。     

Quantitative dynamic reliability evaluation of AP1000 passive safety systems by using FMEA and GO-FLOW methodology

The passive safety systems utilized in advanced pressurized water reactor (PWR) design such as AP1000 should be more reliable than that of active safety systems of conventional PWR by less possible opportunities of hardware failures and human errors (less human intervention). The objectives of present study are to evaluate the dynamic reliability of AP1000 plant in order to check the effectiveness of passive safety systems by comparing the reliability-related issues with that of active safety systems in the event of the big accidents. How should the dynamic reliability of passive safety systems properly evaluated? And then what will be the comparison of reliability results of AP1000 passive safety systems with the active safety systems of conventional PWR.

For this purpose, a single loop model of AP1000 passive core cooling system (PXS) and passive containment cooling system (PCCS) are assumed separately for quantitative reliability evaluation. The transient behaviors of these passive safety systems are taken under the large break loss-of-coolant accident in the cold leg. The analysis is made by utilizing the qualitative method failure mode and effect analysis in order to identify the potential failure mode and success-oriented reliability analysis tool called GO-FLOW for quantitative reliability evaluation. The GO-FLOW analysis has been conducted separately for PXS and PCCS systems under the same accident. The analysis results show that reliability of AP1000 passive safety systems (PXS and PCCS) is increased due to redundancies and diversity of passive safety subsystems and components, and four stages automatic depressurization system is the key subsystem for successful actuation of PXS and PCCS system. The reliability results of PCCS system of AP1000 are more reliable than that of the containment spray system of conventional PWR. And also GO-FLOW method can be utilized for reliability evaluation of passive safety systems.     

BWR 90-the advanced BWR of the 1990s

The future global role of nuclear power will be determined by its ability to provide economical and safe energy. Nuclear power, like any other substantial contributor to the world's energy needs, must be generated at an acceptable cost and with negligible environmental effects. Besides, it must achieve and maintain a socially reasonable level of public acceptance, which in turn is not necessarily governed by rational assessments of the true safety and environmental impact of nuclear power. The ABB Atom approach to this situation can best be characterized as a ‘cautious evolution'; for the next decade the company will largely base its offerings to the market on its ‘evolutionary' light water reactor design, the BWR 90. This design builds closely on the experience from successful construction and operation of its predecessor, the BWR 75 design. In 1995 and 1996, plants of this design achieved an average load factor greater than the 87% set by EUR; the two BWR units at Olkiluoto in Finland are among the very best performing plants in the world, with an average load factor of 94% over the last 7 years. The continued LWR design development focuses on meeting requirements from utilities as well as new regulatory requirements. A particular emphasis is put on the consequences of severe accidents; there shall be no large releases to the environment. Other design improvements involve: all-digital I and C systems and enhanced human factors engineering to improve work environment for operators, optimization of buildings and containment design to decrease construction time and costs, and selection of materials as well as maintenance and operating procedures to even further reduce occupational radiation exposures. Probabilistic safety assessments and life-cycle cost evaluations have become major tools in the design optimization work. The BWR 90 was offered to Finland in the early 1990s, and will now as the first BWR design be reviewed by a number of European utilities with respect to its conformance to the European Utility Requirements (EUR); a specific EUR Volume 3 for the BWR 90 will be the final result. The paper describes some of the unique characteristics of the BWR 90, with emphasis on the features that are most important for achieving improved economy and enhanced safety.     

Exact Solutions of Two Point Time Correlations on Point Reactor Kinetics with Gaussian Reactivity Fluctuations

Station blackout is reported to be a sequence that would likely be a significant contributor to the accident risk at a boiling water reactor (BWR). The occurrence frequency of station blackout is evaluated in probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) to be 6×10^?6 per reactor year at Limerick and less than 10^?7 per reactor year at BWR in Japan.

This report describes an analytical study of thermal-hydraulic and radionuclide behavior during a postulated severe accident of station blackout at a reference BWR plant. The analytical approach was shown in both of hand calculation and the THALES/ART code calculation to better understand wide physical and chemical phenomena in the processes of severe accidents.

We evaluated timing of key events, core cooling and core temperature, reactor vessel failure, debris temperature, containment pressure, and release and deposition of radionuclide in the containment. The THALES and CORCON models on the chemical reactions in the core-concrete interaction lead to great differences in the increasing rate of containment pressure and the release rate of fission products from the core debris.     

Developing and modeling of the “Laguna Verde” BWR CRDA benchmark

Reactivity initiated accidents (RIA) and design basis transients are one of the most important aspects related to nuclear power reactor safety. These events are re-evaluated whenever core alterations (modifications) are made as part of the nuclear safety analysis performed to a new design. These modifications usually include, but are not limited to, power upgrades, longer cycles, new fuel assembly and control rod designs, etc. The results obtained are compared with pre-established bounding analysis values to see if the new core design fulfills the requirements of safety constraints imposed on the design. The control rod drop accident (CRDA) is the design basis transient for the reactivity events of BWR technology. The CRDA is a very localized event depending on the control rod insertion position and the fuel assemblies surrounding the control rod falling from the core. A numerical benchmark was developed based on the CRDA RIA design basis accident to further asses the performance of coupled 3D neutron kinetics/thermal-hydraulics codes. The CRDA in a BWR is a mostly neutronic driven event. This benchmark is based on a real operating nuclear power plant — unit 1 of the Laguna Verde (LV1) nuclear power plant (NPP). The definition of the benchmark is presented briefly together with the benchmark specifications. Some of the cross-sections were modified in order to make the maximum control rod worth greater than one dollar. The transient is initiated at steady-state by dropping the control rod with maximum worth at full speed. The “Laguna Verde” (LV1) BWR CRDA transient benchmark is calculated using two coupled codes: TRAC-BF1/NEM and TRAC-BF1/ENTRÉE. Neutron kinetics and thermal hydraulics models were developed for both codes. Comparison of the obtained results is presented along with some discussion of the sensitivity of results to some modeling assumptions.     

核电厂安全运行对策研究

以核电厂事故为例叙述了核电厂安全运行对策研究的重要性 ;介绍了代表新一代先进反应堆的非能动安全系统设计原则和针对人因差错应采取的管理和培训对策。     

先进堆非能动余热排出系统应对全厂断电事故的能力分析

采用RELAP5/MOD程序对先进堆全厂断电事故进行分析计算,论证非能动余热排出系统对事故的缓解能力.分析表明,先进堆在发生全厂断电事故后,完全能够依靠非能动余热排出系统导出堆芯余热,保证反应堆的安全;先进堆非能动余热排出系统的设计总体上是成功的.     

Future directions in boiling water reactor design

The Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) is being developed by an international team of BWR manufacturers to respond to worldwide utility needs in the 1990s. Major objectives of the ABWR program are design simplification; improved safety and reliability; reduced construction, fuel and operating costs; improved maneuverability; and reduced occupational exposure and radwaste.The ABWR incorporates the best proved features from BWR designs in Europe, Japan, and the United States and application of leading edge technology. Key features of the ABWR are internal recirculation pumps; fine-motion, electro-hydraulic control rod drives; digital control and instrumentation; multiplexed, fiber optic cabling network; pressure suppression containment with horizontal vents; cylindrical reinforced concrete containment; structural integration of the containment and reactor building; severe accident capability; state-of-the-art fuel; advanced turbine/generator with 52 in. last stage buckets; and advanced radwaste technology.The ABWR is being developed as the next generation Japan standard BWR under the guidance and leadership of the Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc. and a group of Japanese BWR utilities. During 1987, the Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc. announced its decision to proceed with two ABWR units at its Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station, with commercial operation of the first unit in 1996 and the second unit in 1998. The units will be supplied by a joint venture of General Electric, Hitachi and Toshiba, with General Electric selected to supply the nuclear steam supply systems, fuel and turbine/generators. In the United States it is being adapted to the needs of U.S. utilities through the Electric Power Research Institute's Advanced LWR Requirements Program, and is being reviewed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission for certification as a preapproved U.S. Standard BWR under the U.S. Department of Energy's ALWR Design Verification Program. These cooperative Japanese and U.S. Programs are expected to establish the ABWR as a world class BWR for the 1990s.International cooperative efforts are also underway aimed at development of a simplified BWR employing natural circulation and passive safety systems. This BWR concept, while only in the conceptual design stage, shows significant technical and economic promise.     

非能动核电站主给水丧失事故仿真研究

AP1000非能动安全系统是一种新型的安全系统,无论从原理上还是系统布置上均与第2代核电站有区别,AP1000目前尚未实际运行,所以,其设计原理还需进一步深入地论证和分析。本文应用JTopmeret、THEATRe建模软件对AP1000非能动余热排出系统(PRHRS)、堆芯补水箱(CMT)系统进行仿真,验证在主给水丧失事故条件下PRHRS、CMT系统运行的可行性和应急堆芯冷却的有效性。结果表明:在事故条件下,PRHRS、CMT系统能够及时、有效地排出堆芯衰变热,保证堆芯的安全。此结论对AP1000电站的实际运行有一定的参考作用。     

非能动压水堆核电厂乏燃料池风险评价

以非能动压水堆核电厂为研究对象,对可能引起乏燃料损伤的内部事件进行了风险评价。采用PSA软件RiskSpectrum建立事件树和故障树模型,进行乏燃料损伤频率（FDF）定量化。结果表明：在所有工况下总的FDF为2.05×10^-9/(堆•年),远小于堆芯的损伤频率（约2.41×10^-7/(堆•年)）;即使在放射性完全释放的假设下,乏燃料损伤导致的大量放射性释放频率仍较堆芯损伤导致的大量放射性释放频率（约2.38×10^-8/(堆•年)）低1个量级;由于非能动压水堆核电厂有多重预防缓解措施以应对乏燃料池（SFP）事故,SFP风险远低于堆芯风险,可实现核安全导则的安全目标。     

AP1000与二代压水堆核电厂的严重事故预防与缓解策略比较

根据压水堆核电厂严重事故发生机理,基于高压堆熔、压力容器失效以及安全壳失效三个关键阶段,针对AP1000和二代核电厂进行比较,在系统结构设计上分析两者在严重事故预防与缓解策略方面的异同,最后对我国在役核电厂的严重事故预防与缓解提出建议。     

AP1000与二代压水堆核电厂的严重事故预防与缓解策略比较

根据压水堆核电厂严重事故发生机理,基于高压堆熔、压力容器失效以及安全壳失效三个关键阶段,针对AP1000和二代核电厂进行比较,在系统结构设计上分析两者在严重事故预防与缓解策略方面的异同,最后对我国在役核电厂的严重事故预防与缓解提出建议。     

The advanced high-temperature reactor: High-temperature fuel, liquid salt coolant, liquid-metal-reactor plant

The Advanced High-Temperature Reactor is a new reactor concept that combines four existing technologies in a new way: (1) coated-particle graphite-matrix nuclear fuels (traditionally used for helium-cooled reactors), (2) Brayton power cycles, (3) passive safety systems and plant designs from liquid-metal-cooled fast reactors, and (4) low-pressure liquid-salt coolants with boiling points far above the maximum coolant temperature. The new combination of technologies enables the design of a large [2400- to 4000-MW(t)] high-temperature reactor, with reactor-coolant exit temperatures between 700 and 1000°C (depending upon goals) and passive safety systems for economic production of electricity or hydrogen. The AHTR [2400-MW(t)] capital costs have been estimated to be 49 to 61% per kilowatt (electric) relative to modular gas-cooled [600-MW(t)] and modular liquid-metal-cooled reactors [1000-MW(t)], assuming a single AHTR and multiple modular units with the same total electrical output. Because of the similar fuel, core design, and power cycles, about 70% of the required research is shared with that for high-temperature gas-cooled reactors.