Conditions for the Acceptance of Deontic Conditionals.

Recent psychological research has investigated how people assess the probability of an indicative conditional. Most people give the conditional probability of q given p as the probability of if p then q. Asking about the probability of an indicative conditional, one is in effect asking about its acceptability. But on what basis are deontic conditionals judged to be acceptable or unacceptable? Using a decision theoretic analysis, we argue that a deontic conditional, of the form if p then must q or if p then may q, will be judged acceptable to the extent that the p & q possibility is preferred to the p & not-q possibility. Two experiments are reported in which this prediction was upheld. There was also evidence that the pragmatic suitability of permission rules is partly determined by evaluations of the not-p & q possibility. Implications of these results for theories of deontic reasoning are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The negated conditional: A litmus test for the suppositional conditional?

Under the suppositional account of conditionals, when people think about a conditional assertion, "if p then q," they engage in a mental simulation in which they imagine p holds and evaluate the probability that q holds under this supposition. One implication of this account is that belief in a conditional equates to conditional probability [P(q/p)]. In this paper, the authors examine a further implication of this analysis with respect to the wide-scope negation of conditional assertions, "it is not the case that if p then q." Under the suppositional account, nothing categorically follows from the negation of a conditional, other than a second conditional, "if p then not-q." In contrast, according to the mental model theory, a negated conditional is consistent only with the determinate state of affairs, p and not-q. In 4 experiments, the authors compare the contrasting predictions that arise from each of these accounts. The findings are consistent with the suppositional theory but are incongruent with the mental model theory of conditionals. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Consequential Conditionals: Invited and Suppressed Inferences From Valued Outcomes.

Consequential conditionals are defined as "if P then Q" statements, where P is an action, and Q a predicted outcome of this action, which is either desirable or undesirable to the agent. Experiment 1 shows that desirable (viz. undesirable) outcomes invite an inference to the truth (viz. falsity) of their antecedent. Experiment 2 shows that the more extreme the outcome is, the stronger the invited inference is. Experiment 3 shows that modus ponens from premises "If A then C, A" can be suppressed with the introduction of a consequential conditional, "If C then Q," where Q is an undesirable outcome. Experiment 4 shows that the more undesirable Q is, the larger the suppression is. The authors discuss how these results can enrich current approaches of conditional inference on the basis of mental models, complementary necessary conditions, and conditional probabilities. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"The meaning(s) of conditionals: Conditional probabilities, mental models, and personal utilities": Correction to Oberauer and Wilhelm (2003).

Reports an error in "The meaning(s) of conditionals: Conditional probabilities, mental models, and personal utilities" by Klaus Oberauer and Oliver Wilhelm (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 2003[Jul], Vol 29[4], 680-693). On page 684, Table 4, all correlations should have been identified as having a p2003-06626-018.) Five experiments were conducted to test the hypothesis that people understand conditional statements ("if p then q") as indicating a high conditional probability P(q|p). Participants estimated the probability that a given conditional is true (Experiments 1A, 1B, and 3) or judged whether a conditional was true or false (Experiments 2 and 4) given information about the frequencies of the relevant truth table cases. Judgments were strongly influenced by the ratio of pq to p?q cases, supporting the conditional probability account. In Experiments 1A, 1B, and 3, judgments were also affected by the frequency of pq cases, consistent with a version of mental model theory. Experiments 3 and 4 extended the results to thematic conditionals and showed that the pragmatic utility associated with believing a statement also affected the degree of belief in conditionals but not in logically equivalent quantified statements. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Conditionals: A theory of meaning, pragmatics, and inference.

The authors outline a theory of conditionals of the form If A then C and If A then possibly C. The 2 sorts of conditional have separate core meanings that refer to sets of possibilities. Knowledge, pragmatics, and semantics can modulate these meanings. Modulation can add information about temporal and other relations between antecedent and consequent. It can also prevent the construction of possibilities to yield 10 distinct sets of possibilities to which conditionals can refer. The mental representation of a conditional normally makes explicit only the possibilities in which its antecedent is true, yielding other possibilities implicitly. Reasoners tend to focus on the explicit possibilities. The theory predicts the major phenomena of understanding and reasoning with conditionals. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Patients' attitudes toward advance directives and end-of-life treatment decisions

Much of the patient education about advance directives described in the literature involves explaining the purpose of advance directives to patients and guiding them through the process of issuing a directive. However, well over half of the subjects in this study claimed to know enough about the directives to issue one, and almost all subjects expressed a preference for issuing directives when healthy. Although health care agencies that wish to adhere to the PSDA must continue to ask all patients if they have issued an advance directive, aggressive patient education programs that press hospitalized patients to consider issuing an advance directive may be perceived by patients as coercive and uncaring. Patient education may be more likely to achieve the goals of the PSDA if it is provided before hospitalization and if patients are encouraged to discuss their care preferences with family members who would be in a position to speak for them at the end of life. Further study of the few patients who choose to issue an advance directive would be informative. When and why they chose to issue the directive should be explored. Patients who report issuing an advance directive but do not provide their physician or hospital with a copy of the directive upon admission should also be studied to determine if this represents a desire not to activate the directive during the current admission or simply confusion about the disposition of this document. Finally, most studies of advance directives have been cross-sectional. Longitudinal study of patients who issue advance directives are needed to determine the effectiveness of these documents in influencing the end-of-life treatment that patients receive.     

Counterfactual and Semifactual Conditionals Prime Alternative Possibilities.

The authors examined in 3 experiments the comprehension of counterfactuals, such as "If it had rained, the plants would have bloomed," and semifactuals, such as "Even if it had rained, the plants would have bloomed," compared with indicative conditionals, "If it rained, the plants bloomed." The first experiment showed that people read the negative conjunction, "not p and not q" faster when it was primed by a counterfactual than when it was primed by an indicative conditional. They read the affirmative conjunction, "p and q" equally quickly when it was primed by either conditional. The 2nd experiment showed that people read the negated-antecedent conjunction, "not p and q" faster when it was primed by a semifactual conditional. The 3rd experiment corroborated these results in a direct comparison of counterfactuals and semifactuals. The authors discuss the implications of the results for the mental representations of different conditionals. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Are phonological representations of printed and spoken language isomorphic? Evidence from the restrictions on unattested onsets.

Are the phonological representations of printed and spoken words isomorphic? This question is addressed by investigating the restrictions on onsets. Cross-linguistic research suggests that onsets of rising sonority are preferred to sonority plateaus, which, in turn, are preferred to sonority falls (e.g., bnif, bdif, lbif). Of interest is whether these grammatical preferences constrain the recognition of auditory and printed words by speakers of English--a language in which such onsets are unattested. Five experiments compare phonological lexical decision responses to nonwords, including unattested onsets, through either aural or visual presentation. Results suggest that both hearers and readers are sensitive to the phonotactics of unattested onsets. However, the phonotactic generalizations of hearers and readers differ on their scope and source. Hearers differentiated all three types of onsets (e.g., bnif, bdif, and lbif), and their behavior implicated both grammatical and statistical constraints. In contrast, readers were able to differentiate only those structures similar to attested English onsets from dissimilar structures (i.e., bnif vs. bdif or lbif), and their preferences reflected statistical knowledge alone. These findings suggest that the phonological representations informing lexical decision to spoken and printed words are not isomorphic. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Just enough to be dangerous: The rest of what you need to know about development.

Examines the roots of popular development approaches and contrasts them with an alternative set of principles and practices that resonate more deeply with both what is known about individual learning and what is required by organizations that need to adapt quickly. New models which focus on the fundamentals of learning are presented. It is concluded that organizations are under pressure to stay abreast of change, to do more with less, and to become more agile and versatile. It is argued that in order to keep pace, an organization's approach to development must undergo a revolution also. To meet these demands, they must shift their focus from tools, programs, and events of development to the goal of continuous learning that is integrated with people's daily work lives. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Cognitive representation of mundane social events.

Many aspects of an everyday experience can be predicted on the basis of a prototypic schema concerning the events that typically occur in the type of situation at hand. Others are unrelated to any previously formed schema and therefore cannot be predicted. How are schema-related and schema-unrelated events integrated into mental representations of new experiences? Three experiments supported the hypothesis that when people encounter events that exemplify a prototypic schema, they usually do not copy instantiations of schema-defining events into the representation they form. This happens only when a schema-unrelated event is encountered that requires knowledge of an instantiating event to reconstruct the point in the overall sequence at which it occurred. Predictions that distinguished the model from alternative formulations of event memory were confirmed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Conditional reasoning with inducements and advice

In an earlier study of conditional reasoning, Newstead et al. [Newstead, S.E., Ellis, C.E., Evans, J.St.B.T., Dennis, I., (1997). Conditional reasoning with realistic material. Thinking and Reasoning 3, 49-96] found that people drew more inferences from conditionals framed as inducements (threats and promises) than from conditionals phrased as advice (tips and warnings). The present study was designed to test the hypothesis that this difference arose from the fact that the speaker of an inducement is normally seen to have control over the consequent event whereas the giver of advice does not. In the experiment reported here, inducement and advice conditionals were constructed in brief contexts such that in either case the speaker could be seen to have high or low control. Participants drew many more conditional inferences of all kinds for high control than for low control conditionals in either context. A second finding of interest was that participants drew many more forward (antecedent to consequent) inferences than backward inferences with these kinds of realistic conditionals.     

Event memory: Temporal-order judgments of personal life experiences.

Three experiments with undergraduate subjects investigated the mental representations that people form when they recall and chronologically order their personal experiences. Subjects in each study first recalled five events that occurred to them in two general periods of their life (e.g., high school and college). Later, they saw pairs of these events and judged the order in which they occurred. It typically took less time to compare events that occurred in different time periods than events that occurred in the same period. However, response times depended on the serial positions of the compared events in each time period, and the distance between them, in ways that varied over the three experiments. These effects were interpreted in terms of a model of event memory and judgment proposed by Wyer, Shoben, Fuhrman, and Bodenhausen (1985). Specifically, subjects appear to organize the events they are asked to recall into categories defined by the periods of life in which they occurred and assign temporal codes to these categories. However, they do not perform a more detailed temporal coding of the events they recall unless a coherent temporal representation of these events is difficult to construct. A direct comparison between judgments of personal experiences and judgments of others' experiences suggested that people may make more detailed temporal coding of others' experiences than they do of their own. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Inflation of conditional predictions.

The authors report 7 experiments indicating that conditional predictions--the assessed probability that a certain outcome will occur given a certain condition--tend to be markedly inflated. The results suggest that this inflation derives in part from backward activation in which the target outcome highlights aspects of the condition that are consistent with that outcome, thus supporting the plausibility of that outcome. One consequence of this process is that alternative outcomes are not conceived to compete as fully as they should. Another consequence is that prediction inflation is resistant to manipulations that induce participants to consider alternative outcomes to the target outcome. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Processing of logically valid and logically invalid conditional inferences in discourse comprehension.

Two competing theories of processing of conditionals (if-then) were tested. Syntactic theories posit that people only draw inferences conforming to the logically valid modus ponens (MP) schema. Mental models theories predict that people draw MP and invalid affirming-the-consequent (AC) inferences. Three experiments tested these predictions. Participants read short stories that conformed to either the MP or AC form but without conclusions, and they completed either priming or recognition tasks. Results indicate that both MP and AC inferences occur during discourse processing: MP and AC premise forms prime their respective conclusions, participants erroneously judged that they had read the conclusions to MP and AC arguments, and AC inferences did not stem from a biconditional interpretation of conditionals. Findings support mental models theories. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Making advance directives meaningful.

Advance directives have been criticized as impractical and/or ineffective, but very little of the criticism differentiates among diverse types of advance directives. The thesis of this article is that carefully drawn documents can be effective. The inadequacy of the advance directive mechanism to date flows in part from documents that are too vague and uninformative. People preparing advance directives are usually seeking to define a level of intolerable indignity at which death becomes preferable. By focusing on the elements of indignity that commonly trouble dying persons, drafters of advance directives can prepare forms that are relevant and meaningful to most people. The author examines the efforts of some existing forms to define intolerable indignity and suggests a different approach. That approach is a unique values profile geared to helping people describe what is, for them, an intolerably deteriorated status. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Theories of Conditional Reasoning: A Developmental Examination of Competing Hypotheses.

Children and adolescents were presented with problems that contained deontic (i.e., if action p is taken, then precondition q must be met) or causal (i.e., if event p occurs, then event q will transpire) conditionals and that varied in the ease with which alternative antecedents could be activated. Results showed that inferences were linked to the availability of alternative antecedents and the generation of "disabling" conditions (claims that the conditionals were false under specific circumstances). Age-related developments were found only on problems involving indeterminate inferences. Correlations among inferences differed for children and adolescents. The findings provide stronger support for domain-general theories than for domain-specific theories of reasoning and suggest, under some conditions, age-related changes in the roles of implicit and explicit processing. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Vasoconstrictors and the heart

The use of vasoconstrictors in local anesthetics, as topical hemostatic agents, and in gingival retraction cord, remains controversial although data exists from which to formulate reasonable guidelines. The value of such vasoconstrictors to increase local anesthetic efficacy and reduce systemic uptake is unquestioned. Elevated blood levels of epinephrine can occur with their use but do not generally appear to be associated with any significant cardiovascular effects in healthy patients or those with mild to moderate heart disease. Reduced dosages or local anesthetics without vasoconstrictors are indicated for patients with more significant disease, and epinephrine-impregnated retraction cord should be used cautiously or avoided in certain situations. Endogenous epinephrine released in dental treatment-associated stress may also reach significant blood levels and make it difficult to determine causation of cardiovascular adverse events. The safety record of dental local anesthetics and their vasoconstrictors has been impressive and will remain so with continued judicious use of these agents.     

The meaning(s) of conditionals: Conditional probabilities, mental models, and personal utilities.

[Correction Notice: An erratum for this article was reported in Vol 29(6) of Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition (see record 2007-16865-001). On page 684, Table 4, all correlations should have been identified as having a pp then q") as indicating a high conditional probability P(q|p). Participants estimated the probability that a given conditional is true (Experiments 1A, 1B, and 3) or judged whether a conditional was true or false (Experiments 2 and 4) given information about the frequencies of the relevant truth table cases. Judgments were strongly influenced by the ratio of pq to p?q cases, supporting the conditional probability account. In Experiments 1A, 1B, and 3, judgments were also affected by the frequency of pq cases, consistent with a version of mental model theory. Experiments 3 and 4 extended the results to thematic conditionals and showed that the pragmatic utility associated with believing a statement also affected the degree of belief in conditionals but not in logically equivalent quantified statements. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)