基于节能发电调度的两部制上网电价机制设计

上网电价机制设计是关系到当前节能发电调度能否顺利推行及未来成本型电力库能否平稳运行的关键因素。以实行两部制上网电价前后各相关主体的利益保持静态不变为原则进行上网电价机制设计,提出了电量电价和容量电价设计方案和调整机制,引入了供求关系调节系数、机组可用率调节系数及容量电费平衡机制,所提出的方案设计在当前节能发电调度及未来成本型电力库两个阶段均可起到保持现有利益格局、稳定市场的功效。     

发电侧电力市场竞价交易模式的研究

为适应发电竞价上网的需要，在对现有发电侧竞价交易模式进行比较分析的基础上，紧密结合发展中国家电力工业由国家垄断的计划经济体制逐步过渡到市场经济体制和电网经济调度的特点，该文提出了两种可供实际操作的发电侧电力市场竞价交易模式：一种是基于由固定成本和变动成本之和确定容量合同电价而提出的“容量合同 效率置换 适时市场”模式：另一种是基于仅由固定成本确定容量电价而提出的“容量合同 全电量竞价 适时市场”模式。经系统仿真和实际试运营，所提出的两种模式都是切实可行的。该两种模式有利于电力市场的运营和平稳过渡，有利于实现资源的优化配置、降低发电总成本、降低用户电价，促进工农业生产的快速发展。     

发电侧峰谷分时电价设计及电量分配优化模型

构建发电侧与售电侧峰谷分时电价联动机制有利于平衡发电公司和供电公司之间的利益,但必须建立在定制出合理的上网定价机制的基础上,因此有必要研究发电侧分时电价问题。从发电成本的角度考虑,采用两部制电价对发电侧峰谷分时电价进行研究。应用会计成本法计算发电侧容量成本,并根据发电容量确定峰谷分时容量电价;根据发电厂煤耗等变动成本确定发电侧峰谷分时电量电价,从而得到发电侧峰谷分时电价;构建各时段各发电厂的电量分配优化模型。通过算例分析证明所提出的发电侧峰谷分时电价设计机制及电量分配优化模型是可行的。     

考虑碳减排的发电商电量上网机制设计

现行的发电商上网电量基本上是按发电容量等比例确定,而上网电价则实行统一的“标杆电价”。基于碳排放约束下总上网电量发电成本最小原则,设计寡头发电商的上网电量分配机制与上网电价机制,并与现行的电量上网机制进行数值分析比较,分析结果表明：（1）新机制可诱导发电商真实地报告自己的成本类型、以保证碳排放约束下总发电成本最小目标的实施;（2）相对于现行的等比例电量上网机制,新机制有利于减排CO₂,且在相同排放水平下可节省总的发电成本;（3）新机制下低排放发电商电量优先上网,且可促使高排放机组逐步退出市场。     

电力市场环境下发电企业竞价策略研究

目前 ,发电侧电力市场试行以当量电价竞价获取竞价电量 ,发电企业如何做好电力市场环境下的竞价策略研究 ,以取得最大电量和最大利润 ,已成发电企业的主要研究课题。根据发电企业存在容量成本和运行成本两种成本因素 ,提出了建立容量成本电价和变动成本电价的数学模型 ,发电企业应用数学模型可设计企业的竞价曲线 ,依据企业的发电目标确定竞价策略。     

基于会计成本法的水电上网电价的定价

当前我国电力行业正处于“厂网分开,竞价上网”的电力市场改革初级阶段。电力作为一种商品,合理的电价是电力市场改革的核心问题。该文基于会计成本法的定价方法理论,指出目前水电上网电价机制（一部制电价）的不足,提出了将两部制电价机制应用于水电上网电价的构想。本着将上网电价分为容量电价和电量电价两部分,并由电量电价参与竞价的基本原则,构建了两部制水电上网电价定模型,最后通过实例,验证了所建模型是可行性的。     

节能发电调度配套上网电价定价机制研究

在不影响电力系统供电安全可靠性以及保障社会总福利不变的前提下,研究与节能发电调度相配套的机组上网电价定价机制,提出了基于发电权转让的单一制电价补偿机制和适应节能发电调度的两部制上网电价机制2种方案。对第1种方案给出了发电权转让补偿价格计算公式,并对其优缺点进行了分析;对第2种方案给出了基于容量电价分档和电量电价分档的直接定价法和间接定价法2种方法,并设计了电价调整机制,对其优缺点进行了分析。最后提出了下一步节能发电调度配套上网电价定价机制改革的思路。     

微电网与配电网的成本效益关系及交互电量定价方法

为研究微电网上网电价与配网售电电价的交互关系,实现二者交互电量的合理定价,提出了一种实现微电网和配电网双方效益最大化的电价制定方法。通过探讨微电网建设运营对配电网和微电网运营商带来的影响,建立微电网的成本效益模型和配电网的综合效益模型,对各项成本效益做出量化评估;然后将各项成本效益划分为容量类成本效益与电量类成本效益,分别建立微电网与配电网的最优效益模型;最后通过求解最优模型,得到微电网网内售电电价对微电网和配电网最优效益的影响,并通过具体的微电网算例,对比分析不同微电网网内售电电价下微电网与配电网交互电价的合理范围,验证了所提模型的可行性。     

确定两部制上网电价的长期边际成本方法

随着发电侧电力市场的开放和“厂网分开，竞价上网”的实施，单一的电量电价制已不适应电力市场健康，协调，持续发展的要求，建立符合市场经济规律的两部制上网电价体系已为大势所趋。在分析单一制电量电价弊端的基础上，提出应用长期边际成本原理确定两部制上网电价的方法，并给出了算例。计算研究表明，两部制上网电价体现了同网同质同价原则，体现了合理补偿成本，合理确定收益的原则，有利于市场竞争，有利于融资，符合当前电力体制改革方向，是一种衔接新老电力体制的较好模式。     

实行两部制上网电价的探讨

介绍两部制电价的概念、两部制电价的结算举例和如何在上网电价中实行两部制电价。论证将发电的固定成本和可变成本以容量和电量的方式分开计算,可以进一步完善电价体系,从而调动发电、电网调度等各方面的积极性。     

基于全局发电最优的日调度计划方法

提出了一种基于全局发电最优的调度计划方法,它对电网的日用电量用Ｋ－Ｔ算法进行最优化求解,将其分解到各个交换计划,再用系数法求得交换计划曲线,在时间变量ｔ较小时,则交换计划曲线变化较平缓。自１９９８年７月１日起,该方法用于制订湖南电网模拟电力市场的日发电计划,电网的购电结构得到了优化,达到了降低电网购电均价和下网均价的目的。     

Economic evaluation of independent power producers viewed from total generating costs of electric power systems

In Japan, electric power utilities purchase electricity from independent power producers (IPPs) through competitive bidding; the IPP evaluation is based on the avoided costs of corresponding generators of utilities. In this evaluation, however, nonpricing factors such as power flow constraints in the electric power system cannot be considered. In this paper, we propose a new approach to evaluate economic impacts of IPPs, the IPP electricity being priced on the basis of total generating costs of the electric power utilities. Such a price to purchase the electricity of IPPs is referred to as the “break‐even cost.” The main results are summarized as follows: 1) Break‐even cost depends on not only the power flow constraints in the system, but also various IPP factors such as generating pattern, location, and capacity, 2) Break‐even cost for the base‐type IPP is higher than the avoided cost of corresponding utility generators, because IPPs located on demand sides can reduce the transmission power loss in the electric power system, 3) Break‐even cost is affected by available capacity of utility generators, especially for the peak‐type IPP generating only during peak demand periods. © 2000 Scripta Technica, Electr Eng Jpn, 133(2): 20–30, 2000     

完全开放的双边电力市场中供需双方叫价拍卖的贝叶斯博弈模型

随着我国进行电力体制改革和建立发电侧竞争市场，需求方很快也会引入竞争，并建立完全开放的双边电力市场。研究供给侧和需求侧如何建立有效的报价策略具有十分重要的理论和实践价值。作者将所有发电公司看成供给方，把所有买电代理商看成需求方，将供给方和需求方的报价问题看成是他们向市场的投标问题，并根据市场确定的规则，总需求电量将在某一价格下完成交易，因而它是供给方和需求方的双方叫价拍卖问题。通过对双方叫价拍卖的交易规则进行描述，针对供给方的生产成本和需求方的估价是私有信息的情况，建立了完全开放的双边电力市场中供给和需求双方叫价拍卖的不完全信息贝叶斯博弈模型，并求解贝叶斯纳什均衡，给出供给方和需求方的均衡报价策略。     

A study of the buying price of photovoltaic electricity under a carbon tax regime

Assuming that photovoltaic (PV) systems are adopted in residential houses under a carbon tax regime, the economic performance of PV systems is investigated from the standpoint of an electric utility. The economic performance is estimated by using the buying price of PV electricity and the PV economic index, which is defined as the ratio of the buying price to the generation cost of the electric utility. Because these values depend on electric power development and operation, the best mix and the operation of power plants are obtained by linear programming subject to restrictions on power generation. Then, the buying price of PV electricity is calculated from the total cost of the electric utility. The buying price means the upper limit at which the electric utility never suffers a loss. The buying price is also compared with the power generation cost. The parameters are the prevalence attainment ratio of PV systems (0 to 100%), the upper limit of newly developed nuclear power plants (0 to 4 GW/10 y), and the generated energy ratio of coal‐fired thermal plants (0 to 15%). Chubu Electric Power Company, Inc. is used as the electric utility. The calculation results show that the buying price of PV electricity increases linearly with increasing carbon tax rate, and its values are 9 and 11.5 yen/kWh when the carbon tax rate is 0 and 25 thousand yen/t‐C, respectively, which does not depend on the prevalence attainment ratio of PV systems and the upper limit of newly developed nuclear power plants. It is not the carbon tax rate but the newly developed nuclear power plant that influences the PV economic index. The values of the PV economic index are 1.35 to 1.45 and 1.50 to 1.60 when the newly developed nuclear power plant capacity is 0 and 4 GW/10 y, respectively. These results show that the economic performance of PV systems is increased by developing nuclear power plants at a certain rate and introducing a carbon tax. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Electr Eng Jpn, 143(2): 38–49, 2003; Published online in Wiley InterScience ( www.interscience.wiley.com ). DOI 10.1002/eej.10067     

电力市场大用户电能直购策略的研究与应用

大用户直购电作为电力系统市场改革中的新型电能购买模式,在开发电力市场潜能的同时,在电力销售端将竞争机制引入,有助于电价的形成和电力能源的合理分配,因此对大用户直购电的策略研究意义重大。本文通过对国外大用户直购电的方案和经验的合理借鉴,根据我国电力市场发展的特点,建立了基于成本和风险最优化组合的大用户直购电策略模型,对我国大用户购电策略的研究和应用有一定的借鉴意义。     

发电公司容量信用最优交易量确定方法

建立发电容量市场有助于确保市场环境下的发电容量充裕性,满足电力系统运行的安全可靠性要求。本文分析发电公司参与容量市场的机会成本,得到不同市场环境下的均衡容量电价和相应的发电公司容量信用交易量。算例结果表明,均衡容量价格由容量市场总需求量、发电公司不可外送容量、区域间电价差等决定,它与容量电价上限值共同决定发电公司容量信用的最优交易量,此方法具有较强的实用性与可操作性。     

分段竞价电力市场的出清算法实现

根据分段竞价的原理，提出了一种具体的分段竞价电力市场的出清算法。考虑将日负荷预测曲线分成基荷、腰荷和峰荷段。它既可以区分1d中的电能质量，又可以从电能计量上实现，同时与常规的调度概念相近，便于接受。根据电厂的报价曲线，各段按报价从低到高的顺序进行初步安排，安排中考虑了机组的爬坡速度约束。为保证电能同质同价的公平原则，各分段按照各自统一的出清价结算。根据总购电费用最小进行优化调整，即对腰荷段和峰荷段的分界点寻优以使腰荷段和峰荷段购电费用之和最小，最后进一步优化组合基荷机组达到总体的优化方案。对于水电机组，其强迫出力和可调节电量事先在负荷曲线上安排。通过算例系统的计算表明，这种具体的出清算法计算简单，能更好地满足电力运行的条件。     

An evaluation of the influence caused by the introduction of IPP considering the uncertainty of supply capability

Recently, utilities have been able to purchase the electric energy supplied from independent power producers (IPP) owing to deregulation in the electric industry. This paper evaluates the influence of IPP uncertainty on the utility and/or customer. In general, the production cost of energy supplied from IPPs is lower than that of a utility, although the IPP energy has more uncertainty compared with the utilities energy. This paper analyzes the effects caused by IPPs from the following three points: (i) By modeling a process of determining purchased power price as a negotiation model, the authors evaluate the influence of its uncertainty on a potentiality to introduce IPPs through variation of the purchased price. (ii) The authors evaluate the difference of power system reliability between a system under the deregulated environment with IPPs and a conventional system without IPPs. It is assumed that the system reliability is determined by minimizing the sum of supply cost and outage cost. (iii) Finally, the authors evaluate how the customer's various requirements about reliability influence the introduced amount of IPPs. © 2000 Scripta Technica, Electr Eng Jpn, 131(1): 56–67, 2000     

Purchase allocation and demand bidding in electric power markets

The purchase allocation problem is one of the most important problems faced by an electric energy service provider under new market environments. The optimal purchase allocation problem for dual electric power markets and demand bid generation are discussed in this paper. The price volatility is explicitly considered in purchase allocation problems and the sequential nature is modeled by conditional stochastic characteristics. An analytical solution for the optimal allocation is derived with given demand and statistical characteristics of the market prices. The method for generating demand bids for purchaser based on market allocation and price forecasting is then developed. The numerical simulations for market allocation and bid generation are demonstrated based on the actual data of the U.S. California power market.     

关于充分发挥三峡工程发电效益防止重复建设的建议

文章简要分析了三峡电站投产前后华中、华东、川渝电网的电力、电量增长及发电装机容量情况,指出为充分发挥三峡工程发电效益必须注意防止重复建议。为此建议：（１）将三峡电站的电力、电量及早分配到各省、市电网,优先列入电力平衡,防止重复建设;（２）供需各方尽早签订集电合同、电价合同;（３）合理确定电价,上网电价要略低于同期电网新增水电、炎电的上网电价水平;（４）做好电力规划、防止重复建设。