Coordination of the supply chain of seasonal products

Because of the demand uncertainty of seasonal products, the retailer prefers to place an order as late as possible, so that he can have enough time to collect more information, which is helpful to reduce demand forecast error. On the other hand, the manufacturer has limited production capacity in general cases. The late ordering would result in insufficient production times, thus increasing the production cost. Such a conflict exists universally in a supply chain, especially in the seasonal products' supply chain. As a result, coordination between the retailer and the manufacturer becomes very important. In the paper, based on the traditional operating system, an improved operating system is introduced whose impact to both bodies of a supply chain is examined under the condition of information symmetry. The result shows that the manufacturer may not be better off or well off, although the retailer's performance is improved. Then, some profit compensation plans are designed so as to make the operating system Pareto improve     

供应商损失厌恶情形下组装供应链协调

鉴于决策者的风险偏好特性和产品内分工的迅速发展,构建由多个损失厌恶零部件供应商和单个风险中性组装商构成的组装供应链模型,其中各供应商均采用拉式契约向组装商提供一种互补性零部件。首先,给出拉式契约下各节点企业的最优策略,发现拉式契约下各零部件的最优产量均小于集中化情形下的最优产量;然后,通过引入价格补贴策略设计契约协调机制;最后,通过数值分析验证了该契约协调机制的有效性。     

考虑公平关切的服务供应链协调契约

针对服务集成商公平关切行为, 建立了服务提供商和服务集成商的博弈模型, 分析论证了批发价契约无法实现服务供应链协调的问题, 探讨了“成本共担+收入共享” 组合式契约协调的有效性. 研究结果表明, 成本共担契约和收入共享契约都无法实现服务供应链的协调, 而组合式契约不仅能有效协调服务供应链, 且协调具有一定柔性, 但随着服务集成商公平关切程度的增加, 服务提供商与服务集成商的协调空间变小, 协调柔性减弱, 且对服务提供商更不利.     

价格折扣契约下应对突发事件下的闭环供应链协调策略

针对MRCRM模式下的闭环供应链,在考虑随机性基础上,分析了价格折扣契约对闭环供应链的协调作用,对于突发事件可能造成闭环供应链协调被打破的问题,提出了具有抗突发事件性的价格折扣契约,使之能实现对突发事件的协调应对,最后应用一个算例对比加以说明。     

考虑质量控制和损失规避的供应链协调研究

研究质量控制和各成员均损失规避背景下的供应链协调问题,应用损失规避效应函数刻画制造商和零售商的损失规避行为,通过分析比较分散决策和集中决策两种模式下的最优策略,引入批发价格-质量成本分担契约构建供应链协调模型,研究表明,该契约能够使质量控制与损失规避背景下的供应链实现协调.通过算例对损失规避程度、产品合格率和销售价格等参数进行灵敏度分析,揭示了损失规避和质量控制等因素与最优产品质量水平、最优订货量以及供应链效用之间的关系.     

线性时变需求的二级供应链协调模型

考虑由一个供应商和一个零售商构成的二级供应链系统,在线性时变需求、产品的零售价格与其存储时间有关、货栈容量有限且不允许缺货的情形下,研究了供应商如何利用全数量折扣计划来激励零售商合作从而实现自身利润最大化和供应链系统完美协调的问题。从理论上证明和分析了模型最优解的存在性,同时提供了求解最优解的简单方法,并通过算例对上述结论进行佐证。     

Coordination and price competition in a duopoly common retailer supply chain

This paper analyzes the coordination and competition issues in a two-stage supply-chain distribution system where two vendors compete to sell differentiated products through a common retailer in the same market. The demand of a product not only depends on its own price, but also on the price of the other. Mathematical models have been developed to analyze the coordination issues under three different contexts: (i) price competition without channel coordination; (ii) price competition with channel coordination; and (iii) global coordination. It has been shown that under certain conditions, price competition through the dynamic process of price adjustment reaches the Nash–Bertrand equilibrium. Conditions have been derived for the Nash–Bertrand equilibrium to be dynamically stable. Further, it has been shown that duopoly competition can make consumers better-off or worse-off depending on the degree of product differentiation and the type of the product; while coordination enhances overall supply-chain profitability. The model is illustrated with suitable numerical examples.     

Coordination of cooperative advertising models in a one-manufacturer two-retailer supply chain system

This paper considers cooperative advertising issues of a monopolistic manufacturer with competing duopolistic retailers. Four possible game structures (or power configurations), i.e., Stackelberg–Cournot, Stackelberg–Collusion, Nash–Cournot and Nash–Collusion, are discussed. Under each of four game structures, we develop a decision model for the three partners to design the optimal cooperative advertising policies. Through a comparison among the four models, we reveal how cooperative advertising policies and profits of all participants are affected by various competitive behaviors, and then determine whether the partners have any incentives to transit to a different structure. Also presented in the paper are a centralized decision model and a proposed cost-sharing contract, which is able to achieve perfect coordination of the considered channel, where the utility of risk preference is used to determine the fraction of local advertising costs shared by the manufacturer.     

Coordination mechanism of IT service supply chain: an economic perspective

Currently, there are two models of service delivery in the information technology (IT) arena: implementation agent and software-as-a-service (SaaS), and each model results in a different IT service supply chain (SSC) structure. When IT service is delivered via implementation agents, independent software vendors (ISV) form the core of the supply chain, while in SaaS chains, platform operators act as the core. It is important to clarify how to coordinate supply chain participants in their respective supply chains, because there is sparse research about supply chain coordination contracts in the IT service industry. This paper draws upon the theory of revenue sharing contracts and investigates IT SSC coordination mechanisms under both SaaS and implementation agent models. The analytical results indicate that a SaaS supply chain has an optimal IT service price that is only related to the variable costs (C _os ) of the SaaS platform operator, and so if the variable cost (C _os ) can be reduced to zero, perfect coordination would exist. In contrast, the implementation agent supply chain achieves perfect coordination when the variable cost of the implementation agent is equal to the average unit implementation fee. By comparing the two supply chain models and interpreting their respective coordination mechanisms, this study can further advance supply chain contract theory research.     

考虑风险规避的闭环供应链差别定价协调模型

针对再制造成本不确定条件下考虑制造商风险规避特性的新产品与再制造产品差别定价协调问题, 采用均值—方差方法衡量该问题的最优定价决策。在分散化决策下, 采用Stackelberg博弈理论研究价格差敏感系数和制造商风险规避度对闭环供应链定价策略的影响, 然后以集中化决策作为研究基准, 指出分散化决策存在双重边际效应。为消除利益损失, 提出一种收益共享一风险共担契约来协调闭环供应链, 研究表明, 该协调契约能有效实现风险规避下闭环供应链的协调。最后运用数值分析方法对无协调和有协调时的闭环供应链定价策略进行比较研究, 并进一步探讨价格差敏感系数和制造商风险规避度对闭环供应链定价策略以及协调性能的影响。     

信息非对称下考虑制造商回收行为的闭环供应链协调

研究信息非对称下考虑制造商回收行为的闭环供应链协调问题,其中回收率随时间动态变化,制造商的再造品成本为私有信息.通过构建分散决策模型,得到制造商与零售商的最优均衡解,并引入批发价格契约以促使制造商传递真实的成本信息.运用伊藤过程刻画回收率的随机演化过程,通过数值仿真分析信息隐匿度和回收率等参数对供应链的影响.研究表明:...     

零售商资金约束供应链中的金融服务与营运管理协调策略

基于零售商存在资金约束和破产成本的条件假设,研究由一个供应商与一个零售商组成的二级供应链中的外部金融服务和营运管理协调策略.研究表明,不确定需求分布下零售商的融资能力和订购水平是有限的.资金不足零售商可通过外部金融服务实现最优订购,为供应链创造价值,并且金融市场的竞争程度、零售商的初始资金量和破产成本率会影响零售商的订购策略、供应商的批发价策略和供应链绩效.     

BOPS模式下基于成本共担契约的供应链协调策略

随着线上线下融合的全渠道零售兴起,线上购买线下自提(buy online and pickup in store, BOPS)模式成为供应链管理领域的热点问题.针对由制造商与具有销售努力行为的线下零售商构成的提供BOPS服务的全渠道供应链,构建BOPS销量计入线上渠道和BOPS销量计入线下渠道整合模型,探讨不同BOPS销量整合模式下供应链的定价及销售努力策略,进一步分析基于销售努力成本共担机制实现全渠道供应链的协调问题.研究结果表明:基准情形下的集中决策有助于提高销售努力水平并提升供应链整体绩效;分散决策中BOPS销量计入线上渠道能让供应链系统获利更多.在满足参与约束的前提下,不同BOPS销量整合模型中成本共担契约的实施均能够缓解双重边际化效应,激励零售商提高销售努力水平,实现供应链系统收益的帕累托改进.     

Coordination between strategic forest management and tactical logistic and production planning in the forestry supply chain

In this paper, we study the coordination mechanism in the forestry supply chain between strategic forest management and tactical production planning. We first formulate an integrated model to establish a theoretical benchmark for performance of the entire supply chain. It is a mixed integer programming model that involves harvesting, bucking, transportation, production, and sales decisions for both tactical and strategic planning levels. We then present two sequential approaches S‐A and S‐B where the coordination is done through internal pricing. S‐A is the approach currently used in practice where harvesting in the forest is the main driver of the supply chain activities and internal pricing is introduced to control bucking decision in a separate stage. In contrast, S‐B takes downstream demand information into consideration and internal pricing directly influences harvesting decision in the first stage. In order to find the appropriate setting of internal pricing that leads to the system optimum, we suggest two heuristics H‐I and H‐II. The internal pricing in H‐I is based on dual values and in H‐II, it is derived from a Lagrangian decomposition. A real‐life case study in the Chilean forestry industry is used to compare the results of different approaches. It is shown that the new sequential approach S‐B generates as good feasible solution as that obtained from the integrated approach but in much less time. Both heuristics H‐I and H‐II bring about near‐optimal feasible solutions. H‐II also provides optimistic bound of the optimal objective function value, which can be used as a measure of the solution quality.     

需求和回收努力扰动下闭环供应链定价与协调

针对干扰事件下由单个制造商和单个零售商组成的闭环供应链系统, 建立制造商为主导的Stackelberg博弈模型, 首先分析了数量折扣契约对闭环供应链的协调作用, 然后分析了数量折扣契约应对干扰事件的协调作用。结果表明, 当干扰事件引起市场规模、再制造成本、回收努力同时扰动时, 原契约具有一定鲁棒性; 当扰动超出一定范围时, 原有的协调被打破; 为此, 给出改进的数量折扣契约具有抗干扰事件性, 并讨论闭环供应链成员的最优利润分配策略, 最后通过数值实验来验证结论的有效性。     

Coordination policy for a two-stage supply chain considering quantity discounts and overlapped delivery with imperfect quality

Unlike the traditional integrated supplier–buyer coordination model, this research incorporates overlapped delivery and imperfect items into the production–distribution model. This model improves the observable fact that the system might experience shortage during the screening duration and also takes quantity discount into account. This approach has not been discussed in previous integrated supplier–buyer coordination models. The expected annual integrated total cost function is derived and properties and theorems are explored to help develop an algorithm. A solution procedure, free from the convexity associated with an algorithm is established to find the optimal solution. A numerical example is given to illustrate the proposed procedure and algorithm. A sensitivity analysis is made to investigate the effects of five important parameters (the inspect rate, the annual demand, the defective rate, the holding cost, and the receiving cost) on the optimal solution. Managerial insights are also discussed.     

Dynamic supply chain scheduling

Based on a combination of fundamental results of modern optimal program control theory and operations research, an original approach to supply chain scheduling is developed in order to answer the challenges of dynamics, uncertainty, and adaptivity. Both supply chain schedule generation and execution control are represented as an optimal program control problem in combination with mathematical programming and interpreted as a dynamic process of operations control within an adaptive framework. Hence, the problems and models of planning, scheduling, and adaptation can be consistently integrated on a unified mathematical axiomatic of modern control theory. In addition, operations control and flow control models are integrated and applicable for both discrete and continuous processes. The application of optimal control for supply chain scheduling becomes possible by formulating the scheduling model as a linear non-stationary finite-dimensional controlled differential system with the convex area of admissible control and a reconfigurable structure. For this model class, theorems of optimal control existence can be used regarding supply chain scheduling. The essential structural property of this model are the linear right parts of differential equations. This allows applying methods of discrete optimization for optimal control calculation. The calculation procedure is based on applying Pontryagin’s maximum principle and the resulting essential reduction of problem dimensionality that is under solution at each instant of time. The gained insights contribute to supply chain scheduling theory, providing advanced insights into dynamics of the whole supply chains (and not any dyadic relations in them) and transition from a partial “one-way” schedule optimization to the feedback loop-based dynamic and adaptive supply chain planning and scheduling.     

Coordination in a retailer‐dominated supply chain with a risk‐averse manufacturer under marketing dependency

In this paper, a combined contract composed of option and cost sharing is proposed to investigate coordination and risk‐sharing issues of the supply chain consisting of a dominant retailer and a risk‐averse manufacturer. Demand faced by the retailer is stochastic in nature and dependent on marketing effort. We adopt the conditional value‐at‐risk (CVaR) criterion to model risk aversion of the manufacturer, and derive the optimal strategy for each member with a Stackelberg game in which the retailer acts as the leader. It is verified that the combined contract can coordinate the supply chain and achieve Pareto‐improvement. Moreover, the dominant retailer can allocate the system‐wide profit arbitrarily only by option price in the premise of coordination. It is worth mentioning that coordination of the supply chain is reachable only when the manufacturer is low in risk aversion, and the manufacturer's risk aversion is a significant element for contract design and profit allocation.