Egotism versus learned helplessness as an explanation for the unsolvable problem effect: Comment on Kofta and Sédek (1989).

M. Kofta and G. S?dek (see record 1989-24900-001) attempted to test the egotism explanation for the unsolvable problem effect (unsolvable problems lead to poor performance on a new task) by making failure less explicit and by creating uncertainty about the difficulty and solvability of the test task. They concluded that their results were more supportive of learned helplessness theory. Keeping in mind the central mechanisms posited by each theory (expectancy of control and threat to self-esteem), we believe that the overall pattern of results is equivocal with respect to egotism but damaging to learned helplessness theory. We discuss the seductiveness of terminology; for example, labeling behavior as helpless may predispose one to interpret it in terms of learned helplessness theory. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Repeated failure: A source of helplessness or a factor irrelevant to its emergence?

Tested the validity of the egotism model of human helplessness (HE). In contrast to the original theoretical approach of M. E. P. Seligman (1975) and his associates, which points to response–outcome noncontingency as the main source of HE, the egotism alternative proposes that repeated failure itself is the critical determinant of HE symptoms. Repeated failure threatens the self-esteem of the S, who supposedly engages in a least-effort strategy during the test phase of a typical learned HE study, which results in performance impairment. To examine the egotism explanation, we gave Ss noncontingent-feedback training with or without repeated failure on 5 consecutive discrimination problems. In 2 experiments, noncontingent-feedback preexposure produced HE deficits in performance on avoidance learning, whereas repeated failure appeared irrelevant to HE. This and our other findings from research are inconsistent with the egotism explanation and support instead Seligman's original proposal, in which HE is attributed to prolonged experience with noncontingency. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Assessing the Validity of Implicit Egotism: A Reply to Gallucci (2003).

B. W. Pelham, M. C. Mirenberg, and J. T. Jones (see record 2002-12744-001) argued that most people prefer stimuli that are associated with the self, a preference they called implicit egotism. In support of implicit egotism, Pelham et al presented evidence from 10 archival studies showing that people gravitate toward careers and places of residence that resemble their names or birthday numbers. M. Gallucci (see record 2003-09138-001) argued that alternate analyses of the same data provide strong evidence against implicit egotism. Whereas Gallucci was correct that Pelham et al's original analyses were flawed, their results remain significant even when more conservative tests are used. The authors also present new data in support of implicit egotism, including exhaustive studies of (a) common surnames and US city names and (b) common surnames and street names. The new studies also revealed that as sample sizes grow larger, studies are more likely to produce evidence of implicit egotism. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Poor performance following unsolvable problems: Learned helplessness or egotism?

People often perform poorly on tasks following experience with unsolvable problems. The current experiment tested 2 competing explanations (learned helplessness and egotism) for this performance deficit. 40 college students were given either solvable or unsolvable discrimination problems and then a series of anagrams that were alleged to be either highly or moderately difficult. Ss previously given unsolvable problems did better on the anagrams when led to believe that the anagrams were highly difficult than when led to believe that the anagrams were moderately difficult. This result is contrary to a learned helplessness theory interpretation, which attributes performance deficits following unsolvable problems to the belief that outcomes are independent of responses. Instead, this result supports an egotism explanation, which maintains that people are not likely to try hard on a task following experience with unsolvable problems (i.e., following failure), unless a poor performance would not pose a further threat to their self-esteem. (27 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Internal attributions and types of depression in college students: The learned helplessness model revisited.

Tested the relation between attributions and types of depression (with and without low self-esteem) postulated by reformulated learned helplessness theory vs. an alternative (R. Janoff-Bulman; see record 1981-01320-001). 334 Ss completed the Beck Depression Inventory, Attributional Style Questionnaire, and Janis-Field Feelings of Inadequacy Scale. Scores above 8 on the Beck were considered depressed. A median split on the Janis-Field scale divided Ss into those with and without low self-esteem. Clearest support was found for Janoff-Bulman's formulations. Depressed Ss with low self-esteem made more internal characterological attributions for bad events than the other groups. Nondepressed Ss made more internal behavioral attributions than depressed Ss. The implications for counseling and future research on depression and learned helplessness are noted. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Attributional formulation of depression as a diathesis-stress model: Metalsky et al. reconsidered.

Tests of the reformulated learned helplessness model of depression proposed by L. Y. Abramson et al (see record 1979-00305-001) have demonstrated correlations between attributional style and affective disturbance but have left open the question of whether an uncontrollable aversive event is a necessary part of the causal sequence in depression onset. G. I. Metalsky et al (see record 1979-08913-001) claimed to have tested this aspect of the model in a prospective study of examination success or failure. However, their finding of a significant attribution—mood correlation following failure but not following success—is considered to be ambiguous because they did not test the difference in correlation between the success and failure groups, which leaves the main hypothesis unresolved. (15 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Helplessness and hospitalization: More remarks.

Responds to criticisms by M. M. Bates and E. A. Skinner (1983) of research by the present authors and colleagues (see record 1983-01784-001) that indicated that hospitalization can cause learned helplessness. Although the present authors agree with Bates and Skinner's criticisms that perceived control was not directly assessed and that factors other than helplessness could explain the data, it is argued that the study complements the basic laboratory work from which helplessness theory was derived. (6 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Persistence following failure: The interactive role of self-awareness and the attributional basis for negative expectancies.

C. S. Carver et al (see record 1981-01305-001), in support of their cybernetic model, have shown that under conditions of high self-awareness, lower expectations resulted in less persistence. However, A. Frankel and M. L. Snyder (see record 1980-08892-001), in support of their egotism model, have shown that manipulations that presumably created lower expectations resulted in improved performance. The present authors investigated the suggestion that negative expectations may decrease performance when expected failure is attributed to the self and may increase performance when expected failure is attributed to the environment. The attributional basis of 57 undergraduates' negative expectancies and their level of self-awareness were manipulated. Results show that under high self-awareness, persistence and interest in the task were greater when expectations were externally based than when expectations were internally based; under low self-awareness, the 2 conditions did not differ. The role of attributional factors in Carver's model and of self-awareness in Snyder's formulation are discussed. (19 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Depression and causal attributions: What is their relation?

Discusses the reformulated theory of learned helplessness (L. Y. Abramson et al; see record 1979-00305-001) and evaluates its success in accounting for task performance deficits. The reformulated learned helplessness theory of depression includes 2 primary models of the relation between attributions and depression, the onset model and the vulnerability model. Other models that can be identified include the recovery and coping models (consistent with learned helplessness theory) and the symptom model (inconsistent with the theory). It is concluded from a review of the evidence that there is support for the symptom, recovery, and coping models, but that tests of the onset and vulnerability hypotheses do not offer any confirmation of their validity. The evidence indicates that attributions, like other cognitions, are probably influenced by clinical states; attributions also have considerable predictive value and may be involved in the processes of recovery from and coping with depression. The implications of these findings and the research strategies needed to test the reformulated learned helplessness model are discussed. (62 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Performance impairment after failure: Mechanism and sex differences.

Conducted 2 experiments in which 120 male and 120 female 7th graders completed 10 solvable or unsolvable matching-figures tasks and then tried to solve 15 anagrams described as highly or moderately difficult. In Exp I, 120 Ss did not have the option to give up on an anagram before the allotted time had elapsed. No performance impairment in response to failure was found. In Exp II with another 120 Ss, Ss were able to give up and choose to move on to the next anagram. Boys performed significantly worse after failure when anagrams were described as moderately difficult. They performed as well as Ss who completed solvable matching figures, however, when the 2nd task was described as very difficult. These data for the boys were consistent with M. Zuckerman's (see record 1980-28101-001) ego-threat hypothesis. Girls followed the pattern associated with learned helplessness (e.g., C. S. Dweck and N. D. Reppucci; see record 1973-26160-001), performing less well when the 2nd task was described as very difficult. The presence or absence of an observer had no effect. (18 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The fan effect: New results and new theories.

The fan effect (J. R. Anderson, see record 1975-06644-001) has been attributed to interference among competing associations to a concept. Recently, it has been suggested that such effects might be due to multiple mental models (G. A. Radvansky, D. H. Spieler, & R. T. Zacks, see record 1993-16287-001) or suppression of concepts (M. C. Anderson & B. A. Spellman, see record 1995-16174-001); A. R. A. Conway & R. W. Engle, see record 1994-08314-001). It was found that the Adaptive Control of Thought—Rational (ACT-R) theory, which embodies associative interference, is consistent with the results of G. A. Radvansky et-al. and that there is no evidence for concept suppression in a new fan experiment. The ACT-R model provides good quantitative fits to the results, as shown in a variety of experiments. The 3 key concepts in these fits are (a) the associative strength between 2 concepts reflects the degree to which one concept predicts the other, (b) foils are rejected by retrieving mismatching facts; and (c) participants can adjust the relative weights they give to various cues in retrieval. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

On mood variation and memory: Reply to Isen (1985), Ellis (1985), and Mayer and Bower (1985).

Responds to comments by A. M. Isen (see record 1986-13663-001); H. C. Ellis (see record 1986-13654-001); and J. D. Mayer and G. M. Bower (see record 1986-13675-001) on the present authors' (see record 1986-03061-001) findings that (a) depressed college students showed no overall deficit in recall performance and (b) depressed students failed to show selective recall for mood-congruent (negative) events in a story. Issues considered included performance deficits in depression, selectivity effects in memory, the possibility that affective traits rather than mood states were assessed, and potential reactions to the mood questionnaires. Evidence is presented that the Beck Depression Inventory is not a mild mood-induction procedure. (27 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Comment and integration.

Addresses those criticisms of the learned helplessness model of depression not anticipated by L. Y. Abramson et al (see record 1979-01110-001). Seligman (one of the previous authors) herein suggests that learned helplessness models those depressions that are caused by cognition of response–outcome independence, show passivity and negative cognitive set, and are specifically responsive to antihelplessness therapies. This subclass may cut across traditional ways of subdividing depressions, both mild and clinical. The necessity of grouping patients not only by depression inventory but by diagnostic category in testing the helplessness model in clinical populations is affirmed. It is suggested that C. G. Costello's (see record 1979-01145-001) claim that helplessness experiments do not support the model systematically ignores the supporting evidence. The relevance of skill expectancy shift data to the reformulated learned helplessness model of depression is questioned. Finally, it is suggested that mild depression should not be considered merely an "analog" to some other, more "real," disorder but is itself a disorder of major importance. (39 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Stereotyping and its threat are real.

Replies to comments by A. L. Whaley (see record 1998-02607-012) regarding C. M. Steele's (see record 1997-04591-001) discussion of stereotype threat theory and domain identification as extra pressures that affect the test performance and academic identities of African Americans and women in math. Steele describes and responds to Whaley's 3 major critiques: first, that the concept of stereotype threat does not include the possibility of being threatened by real discrimination; second, that tests of stereotype threat theory with African American students do not take into account the possibility that these student may perform less well on standardized testes because they do not trust these tests or are less culturally motivated to perform; and third, that stereotype threat-disidentification theory may not generalize to the experience of lower-class, urban African American students. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Who am I? Why am I here?" Self-esteem, self-clarity, and prototype matching.

Recent research has demonstrated that individuals with low self-esteem lack self-clarity; they have less certain and less stable self-concepts than do those with high self-esteem (A. H. Baumgardner; see PA, Vol 77:30941; J. Campbell; see PA, Vol 78:4413). Self-concept confusion should mitigate against the use of a decision-making strategy that involves using the self to guide choice behavior (i.e., prototype matching; P. M. Niedenthal et al; see record 1985-20122-001). Two correlational studies demonstrated that people with high self-esteem, but not low self-esteem, made use of prototype matching in forming preferences. In a 3rd study, the self-concept was made more clear or made more confused. Clarity was associated with the use of prototype matching regardless of level of self-esteem. Self-concept confusion was associated with a failure to use the strategy regardless of level of self-esteem. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Motivational and functional helplessness: The moderating effect of state versus action orientation.

Presents a 3-factor theory of learned helplessness that differs from M. E. Seligman's (see PA, Vols 54:1316 and 61:1206) theory in placing the emphasis on functional rather than motivational helplessness. Generalized performance decrements following exposure to uncontrollable results are attributed to deteriorated cognitive functioning caused by an increase of state-oriented cognitions (functional helplessness). Motivational helplessness (i.e., performance decrements caused by motivational deficits that are attributable to a belief in uncontrollability) is considered a special case of the 3-factor theory. Two experiments (36 undergraduates) demonstrated that Ss did not generalize reduced perception of controllability from training to test task. Ss exposed to uncontrollable failure in training nevertheless showed increased or decreased performance compared to a control group. Those performance effects could be explained on the basis of a personal disposition for and situational induction of state vs action orientation. It is concluded that a decision concerning the type of therapy for helplessness–depression should not be made until it is known whether motivational or functional helplessness is the primary problem. Although an attributional training may reverse motivational helplessness, it may have adverse effects when applied to depressives characterized by functional helplessness. (54 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Span of apprehension deficits in vulnerable children: Further comments.

Replies to the comments of R. F. Asarnow et al (see record 1985-01251-001) on the failure by the present authors (see record 1985-01308-001) to replicate findings of an earlier study by Asarnow and colleagues (see record 1978-05788-001) that showed performance deficits on the span of apprehension task in children vulnerable to psychopathology. Although the present authors acknowledge that the procedure used by Asarnow and colleagues involved nonfoveal presentations while the present authors' procedure did not, they stand by their conclusion that the findings of the earlier study are not generalizable. (4 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Jealousy: Loss of relationship rewards, loss of self-esteem, depression, anxiety, and anger.

Tested the theory of romantic jealousy proposed by G. L. White (see record 1982-27319-001) that the loss (or anticipated loss) of a romantic partner to a rival causes 2 kinds of suffering—loss (or anticipated loss) of relationship rewards and loss (or anticipated loss) of self-esteem. In Study 1, 40 male and 40 female undergraduates completed questionnaires measuring separation and interpersonal jealousy. In Study 2, White's theory was elaborated with the proposition that loss of relationship rewards causes depression, whereas loss of self-esteem causes anxiety and anger. 44 male and 44 female undergraduates completed a modified separation questionnaire (no-loss items were eliminated) and the interpersonal jealousy scale. Depression, anxiety, anger, and jealousy scores were obtained from the separation questionnaire. Results show that general support was found for White's theory and the elaborations but not for the hypothesis that the loss of self-esteem causes anxiety. Anxiety may be a product of both loss of self-esteem and loss of relationship rewards. (9 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Neuropsychological correlates of asthma: Effect of hypoxia or drugs?

The neuropsychological deficits seen in asthmatic children are thought by W. M. Suess and H. Chai (see record 1981-10731-001) to be possibly a function of certain antiasthma medication. It is argued that a study by the author and L. E. Baade (see record 1980-12219-001) on neuropsychological adaptive behavior patterns of asthmatic children does not support this hypothesis. (4 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Less pain and more to gain: Why high-status group members blame their failure on discrimination.

Retracted August 2001. (See record 2001-01642-001.) Members of high-status groups are more likely than members of low-status groups to blame their failure on discrimination and are less likely to blame it on themselves. This tendency was demonstrated in 3 experiments comparing men and women, White and Black students, and members of experimentally created high- and low-status groups. Results also showed that when making an attribution to discrimination, high-status group members were less likely to experience a threat to their social state self-esteem, performance perceived control, and social perceived control and were more likely to protect their performance state self-esteem. These findings help to explain why high-status group members are more willing to blame their failure on discrimination by showing that it is less harmful for them than for low-status group members. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)