The fate of memory: Comment on McCloskey and Zaragoza.

M. McCloskey and M. Zaragoza (see record 1986-03053-001) argued that misleading postevent (PE) suggestions do not affect the availability of originally encoded information. Careful consideration of the predictions of their experimental test suggests that it may be insufficiently sensitive to reveal the impact of PE information. A small effect of PE information can be observed when their paradigm is repeated with a more sensitive recognition test. McCloskey and Zaragoza's "no impairment" hypothesis is also difficult to reconcile with numerous reports of "blend" memories that reflect a compromise between the original and PE information. (20 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

On the psychology of eyewitness testimony.

Investigated various aspects of eyewitness testimony in a simulated courtroom setting. 80 undergraduates were shown a filmed murder and then testified about their observations in one of several experimental conditions. Testimony was rated for accuracy and quantity. Significant main effects were found for sex of witness, immediacy of testimony (immediately or after a 1-wk delay), testimony structure (unstructured free recall or response to questions), question type (open-ended, leading, and multiple choice), and question bias (positive, negative, and neutral). Results also support a predicted cognitive-set hypothesis, relating accuracy and quantity of testimony to the specificity of the questioning situation. The strong findings attest to the efficacy of empirically investigating aspects of courtroom procedures as a viable research paradigm. (27 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Age and schematic differences in the reliability of eyewitness testimony.

Examined the reliability of eyewitness testimony for the crime of shoplifting as a function of age, prior knowledge/expectations, and type of memory test. Study 1, with 100 10-yr-olds, 100 undergraduates, and 65 older adults (mean age 72.3 yrs), was designed to empirically establish Ss' expectations for common and unusual occurrences in shoplifting. Results from a rating task indicate that Ss had expectations for common and unusual occurrences of objects and actions but not person characteristics. In Study 2, 32 10-yr-olds, 32 undergraduates, and 29 older adults (mean age 67.6 yrs) viewed videotapes of staged shopliftings incorporating high and low probability-of-occurrence actions and objects. Incidental memory was tested 1 wk later under recall and recognition test instructions. All Ss' reports were more complete, but less accurate, for high than low probability-of-occurrence information. Children's reports were as complete as but less accurate than younger adults'. Older adults' reports were less complete than but as accurate as college students'. Age differences were greatest for completeness of recall measures. Implications for theories of memory development and for the use of eyewitness testimony in legal situations are discussed. (25 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Effects of inconsistencies in eyewitness testimony on mock-juror decision making.

In attempting to impeach an eyewitness, attorneys often highlight inconsistencies in the eyewitness's recall. This study examined the differential impact of types of inconsistent testimony on mock juror decisions. Participants viewed 1 of 4 versions of a videotaped trial in which the primary evidence against the defendant was the testimony of the eyewitness. The types of inconsistent statements given by the eyewitness in the 4 versions were manipulated: (a) consistent testimony, (b) information given on the stand but not during the pretrial investigation, (c) contradictions between on-the-stand and pretrial statements, and (d) contradictions made on the stand. Participants exposed to any form of inconsistent testimony were less likely to convict and found the defendant less culpable and the eyewitness less effective. These effects were larger for contradictions than for information given on the stand but not during pretrial investigations. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Do the eyes have it? More on expert eyewitness testimony.

Comments on M. McCloskey and H. E. Egeth's (see record 1984-06612-001) argument that psychologists should not give expert testimony concerning eyewitness reliability on the basis of psychological findings on perception and memory. The present author discusses the importance of process issues in legal situations and contests McCloskey and Egeth's conclusions concerning "overbelief" of eyewitness accuracy. (5 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Age differences in source forgetting: Effects on reality monitoring and on eyewitness testimony.

Age differences in memory for the source of memories were investigated using two different experimental paradigms. Experiment 1 used a reality monitoring paradigm. A series of actions were either performed, imagined, or watched, and subjects were later tested for their ability to recognize the actions and identify their origins. Elderly subjects made more false positive responses than did young subjects, and they made more source confusion errors, attributing actions to the wrong sources. Both new and imagined actions were most often misclassified as watched. Experiment 2 used an eyewitness testimony paradigm. After watching a film, subjects read a written version of the story. A recognition test showed that elderly subjects were more often misled by false information in the story than were the younger subjects, and were more confident that their erroneous responses were correct. The findings suggest that a decline in memory for sources may diminish the accuracy of elderly witnesses. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Process and outcome considerations in juror evaluation of eyewitness testimony.

Responds to comments by G. L. Wells (see record 1985-20040-001) on the present authors' (see record 1984-06612-001) argument that current empirical findings on perception and memory do not justify a role for psychologists in evaluating eyewitness testimony. The present authors argue that Wells's statements on process and outcome confuse the outcome of an individual trial and trials in the aggregate. The question of whether jurors tend to overbelieve eyewitness testimony is discussed. (4 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The "general acceptance" of psychological research on eyewitness testimony: A survey of the experts.

63 experts on eyewitness testimony were surveyed about their courtroom experiences and opinions on various issues. There was a strong consensus indicated by an agreement rate of at least 80% that the data on the following topics are reliable enough to present in court: the wording of questions, lineup instructions, misleading postevent information, the accuracy–confidence correlation, attitudes and expectations, exposure time, unconscious transference, showups, and the forgetting curve. Over 70% of the experts also endorsed lineup fairness, the cross-race identification bias among White witnesses, and the tendency to overestimate the duration of events. Although most eyewitness experts who have testified have done so on behalf of criminal defendants, they were just as likely to consent for the prosecution as for the defense; moreover, they were more likely to agree to testify in civil cases than in criminal. Concerning their role in court, most respondents indicated that their main objective is to educate the jury, and that juries are more competent with the aid of experts than without. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Causal and associative hypotheses in psychology: Examples from eyewitness testimony research.

Two types of hypotheses interest psychologists: causal hypotheses and associative hypotheses. The conclusions that can be reached from studies examining these hypotheses and the methods that should be used to investigate them differ. Causal hypotheses examine how a manipulation affects future events, whereas associative hypotheses examine how often certain events co-occur. In general, experimental methods with random allocation are well suited for addressing causal hypotheses, whereas random sampling is an asset when examining associative hypotheses. These hypotheses are discussed primarily with reference to 4 topics within eyewitness testimony research: the own-race bias, emotion and memory, event duration estimation, and system variables in lineups. Some other examples in forensic psychology are provided to illustrate difference between causal and associative hypotheses. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

On the "general acceptance" of eyewitness testimony research: A new survey of the experts.

In light of recent advances, this study updated a prior survey of eyewitness experts (S. M. Kassin, P. C. Ellsworth, & V. L. Smith, 1989). Sixty-four psychologists were asked about their courtroom experiences and opinions on 30 eyewitness phenomena. By an agreement rate of at least 80%, there was a strong consensus that the following phenomena are sufficiently reliable to present in court: the wording of questions, lineup instructions, confidence malleability, mug-shot-induced bias, postevent information, child witness suggestibility, attitudes and expectations, hypnotic suggestibility, alcoholic intoxication, the cross-race bias, weapon focus, the accuracy–confidence correlation, the forgetting curve, exposure time, presentation format, and unconscious transference. Results also indicate that these experts set high standards before agreeing to testify. Despite limitations, these results should help to shape expert testimony so that it more accurately represents opinions in the scientific community. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Criteria for judging the admissibility of eyewitness testimony of long past events.

Court cases of recovered memories of childhood abuse, in which the victim's testimony may constitute the only evidence available, and a growing body of research demonstrating the inexactitude and suggestibility of autobiographical memory of long past events, are forcing courts and cognitive scientists to seek scientific, principled criteria for admissibility of such testimony. The authors use as examples 2 recent court cases. In the 1st case, a concussion produced total retrograde amnesia for an accident for a period of 3 years, and then, over a few months, the driver claimed his memory returned. In the 2nd, 2 adults reported to the police that they witnessed their sister's murder 35 years earlier, when they were 3 and 5 years old, respectively. The authors provide objective guidelines for courts to determine whether testimony about recovered or very-long-term memory for eyewitnessed events should be admissible. The principles outlined can be expanded easily to include eyewitness testimony in general. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Effects on mock jurors of experts favorable and unfavorable toward hypnotically elicited eyewitness testimony.

Mock jurors were told that a rape victim's initial identification of the defendant was made either during a police interrogation or a hypnotic interrogation. Jurors given the hypnotic interrogation case then saw a videotape of an expert who was favorable toward hypnotically elicited testimony, an expert who was unfavorable, or both experts. Jurors' private beliefs of the defendant's guilt (assessed before exposure to the experts) was not influenced by knowledge that the witness had been hypnotized. However, jurors' guilt ratings were significantly influenced by both the favorable and the unfavorable experts and by the process of deliberation. Juries in all treatments strongly favored acquittal, and jury verdicts were not significantly influenced by expert testimony. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Two years later: Effect of question repetition and retention interval on the eyewitness testimony of children and adults.

Examined witnesses' memories for an event experienced 2 yrs earlier. Ss in 4 age groups (6-, 8-, and 10-yr-olds and adults; N?=?79) answered repeated questions about an ambiguous incident that occurred as part of an earlier study (D. A. Poole and L. T. White; see record 1992-08648-001). Surprisingly, the effects of question repetition were similar to the patterns observed 2 yrs ago. There were important differences in the testimonies of children and adults, however, that were not observed in the initial study: Children were less consistent than adults across sessions on yes–no questions, less accurate in response to open-ended questions, and more likely to fabricate answers to a question about a man's occupation. Some children also confused the actions of 2 research assistants. These results indicate the need for additional research on qualitative and quantitative changes in children's testimonies over long delays. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Composite Holographic Associative Recall Model (CHARM) and blended memories in eyewitness testimony.

The idea that compositing or blending occurs in human episodic memory stems from two sources: (a) distributed memory models and (b) studies on the errors that occur in eyewitness testimony. These two traditions of research—theoretical and empirical—have been independent and distinct. Here, data from the eyewitness testimony paradigm are simulated by the distributed model CHARM (Composite Holographic Associative Recall Model). Of focal concern are Loftus's studies, which have been interpreted in favor of the blending hypothesis, and McCloskey and Zaragoza's studies, which have been interpreted as refuting Loftus's position. Both of these seemingly contradictory results, as well as recent findings with yes/no recognition, fall out of the model. Finally , the model predicts empirically found color shifts and provides specifications for when blends and memory impairments will and will not be expected. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Research methodology: A possible reconciliation.

Examines both the experimental and psychometric models, pointing out major strengths and limitations. Reconciliation is proposed through the use of major strengths from each procedure. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The role of eyewitness identification evidence in felony case dispositions.

We addressed the question of whether felony case dispositions are associated with eyewitness identification evidence. Toward this end, 725 felony cases (rape, robbery, and assault) were randomly sampled from the archives of a District Attorney's Office in a large south-western city in the United States. A positive identification was present more often in accepted compared to rejected cases, although the association was significant in acquaintance cases (i.e., cases in which one or more of the eyewitnesses was familiar with the defendant), not stranger cases. Additionally, suspect and crime incident factors were associated with case issuing outcomes to a larger extent than eyewitness identification evidence. Analyses further indicated that eyewitness identification evidence was stronger in prosecuted compared to rejected cases in which eyewitness testimony was the sole evidence against the defendant. Neither the presence of multiple identifications nor nonidentifications of the suspect varied across issuing outcomes. The findings are discussed in relation to additional research that is needed at the police and prosecution stages to advance public policy development with respect to the evaluation of eyewitness identification evidence by prosecutors. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Emotional stress and eyewitness memory: A critical review.

The eyewitness literature often claims that emotional stress leads to an impairment in memory and, hence, that details of unpleasant emotional events are remembered less accurately than details of neutral or everyday events. A common assumption behind this view is that a decrease in available processing capacity occurs at states of high emotional arousal, which, therefore, leads to less efficient memory processing. The research reviewed here shows that this belief is overly simplistic. Current studies demonstrate striking interactions between type of event, type of detail information, time of test, and type of retrieval information. This article also reviews the literature on memory for stressful events with respect to 2 major theories: the Yerkes-Dodson law and J. A. Easterbrook's (1959) cue-utilization hypothesis. To account for the findings from real-life studies and laboratory studies, this article discusses the possibility that emotional events receive some preferential processing mediated by factors related to early perceptual processing and late conceptual processing. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Calibration and diagnosticity of confidence in eyewitness identification: Comments on what can be inferred from the low confidence–accuracy correlation.

The relationship between eyewitness confidence and accuracy as measured by the ψ point-biserial correlation has been described as poor or even nonexistent in the literature on lineup identifications. In this article, 3 arguments are made. First, a low point-biserial correlation is compatible with good or even perfect calibration (realism) of confidence, and the correlation provides no information about whether witnesses over- or underestimate the probability of a correct identification. Second, point-biserial correlations provide almost no information about whether confidence is diagnostic in the sense that it should be taken into account by the court when evaluating eyewitness identifications. Third, useful information is provided by calibration analysis and computation of diagnosticity indices. These arguments are illustrated with data from an experiment with photo-confrontations that rely on photo material used by the Swedish Police and where foils were selected by experienced police officers in the manner of routine investigations. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)