Commitment decisions with demand information updating and a capital‐constrained supplier

In this paper, we study a single two‐echelon supply chain with a capital‐constrained supplier (manufacturer) and a retailer. The supply chain faces a stochastic demand. As the production lead time is long, the market demand is updated during the supplier's production lead time. The supplier needs to determine the production quantity based on the original demand forecast, and the retailer needs to determine the time and quantity to order. The retailer can place an order before the supplier's production (preorder) or after the supplier's production (regular order). We prove the existence of optimal equilibrium solutions under both preorder and regular order strategies. We analytically investigate the order strategies for the supply chain agents under perfect and worthless market information updating. Moreover, we numerically analyze the impact of the information updating quality on the order strategy selection, and the effect of exogenous shocks on the supply chain agents.     

Determinant on RFID technology investment for dominant retailer subject to inventory misplacement

Radio‐frequency identification (RFID) technology has been publicized as an effective way to solve the problem of inventory misplacement in academic research as well as in the user industries. In this paper, we consider a supply chain that consists of one supplier and one retailer where the retailer is the Stackelberg leader and makes the decisions first. The consignment contract is provided such that the supplier determines the order quantity, instead of the retailer. A Non‐RFID case, a supplier investing in RFID, and a retailer investing in RFID cases are analyzed and compared. By assuming an iso‐elastic demand function and the corresponding random factor follows uniform distribution, it is intriguing to find that both supplier and retailer have the incentive to take charge of the RFID tag cost, which is not revealed in previous research. Therefore, a case of joint investment in RFID technology is formulated to find out that there are upper and lower threshold values of RFID tag cost sharing rate; that is, if the tag cost sharing rate exceeds the upper value, it is beneficial for the supplier to invest in RFID; if the tag cost sharing rate is smaller than the lower value, it is beneficial for the retailer to invest in RFID; if the tag cost sharing rate is somewhere between these two values, both supplier and retailer are better‐off. Additionally, the end customer will be better‐off if the retailer invests in RFID.     

基于VMI供应商资金受限的供应链协调策略

研究随机需求下供应商资金受限的供应链协调问题,基于供应商管理库存（VMI）建立零售商-供应商Stackelberg博弈模型,分析库存补贴策略和零售商预付款策略对供应链绩效的影响,并比较两种策略的适用范围。结果表明,零售商可以通过库存补贴策略消除分散决策下双重边际效应导致的供应链绩效损失,同时提高供应商和零售商利润。相比于库存补贴,零售商预付款策略可以消除由供应商资金受限导致的供应链绩效损失,并减小部分由双重边际效应导致的供应链绩效损失,实现帕累托改进,提高供应链整体绩效。     

Contract efficiency for a decentralized supply chain in the presence of quality improvement

In this paper, we study a joint pricing and product quality decision problem in a decentralized supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer. Although the manufacturer decides the product quality with an associated cost, the retailer decides the retail price. We aim to study and compare different contract formats for this decentralized supply chain. There is a trade‐off in the choice of contracts: simpler format contract (with a few parameters) is less complicated, but the contract efficiency is low. We start with the simplest one‐parameter contract: a wholesale price contract that serves as the benchmark. We then study how contract efficiency can be improved by adding one more parameter. Specifically, we consider three two‐parameter contracts that are commonly used in reality: two‐part tariff contract, revenue‐sharing contract, and effort cost sharing contract. We find that the contract efficiency is improved under all the three contracts, but in different ways: the improvement in contract efficiency under each of them dominates the other two when manufacturer's quality improvement effectiveness is relatively low, moderate, and high, respectively. Furthermore, through numerical examples, we find that under some cases, a choice from these three two‐parameter contracts can achieve a close‐to‐perfect efficiency (>85%). Finally, we investigate whether a combination of the three two‐parameter contracts can achieve coordination. Interestingly, we find that only the combination of effort cost sharing contract and revenue‐sharing contract can achieve coordination, whereas combinations of either of them and two‐part tariff contract cannot.     

考虑保质期的两级供应链MTS-MTO提前期优化研究

在具有保质期特性的快消品行业中,供应商在面向订单(MTO)生产策略下较长的订货提前期会给零售商带来高库存以及高运作成本,削弱供应链的快速响应能力.对比原来的MTO生产策略,提出一种面向库存-面向订单(MTS-MTO)混合生产策略.首先,基于产品保质期的特点建立MTO生产策略下的供应链成本模型,并给出供应链成本最优的经济订货批量;其次,根据MTO求出的最优经济订货批量,建立MTS-MTO生产策略下的供应链成本模型,并确定供应商的应持有库存M,求出供应商在MTS-MTO生产时的充要条件,为供应链决策提供依据;再次,给出一种基于满意度的Nash协商模型以确定零售商应给予供应商的补偿H;最后,通过数值分析验证并讨论符合MTS-MTO生产的产品特征.     

风险规避零售商期末二次订购的供应链决策模型

以风险规避零售商和风险规避供应商组成的两层供应链系统为研究对象, 在条件风险估值的风险度量准则下讨论两生产模式下风险规避零售商的最优订购策略和风险规避供应商的最优生产策略. 通过数值实验得出如下结论: 若零售商的风险规避度越小, 则零售商的第1 次最优订购量越多, 风险利润越大; 供应商的第1 次最优生产量随着供应商的风险规避度减小而增大; 零售商的风险规避度越小, 越不利于供应商的生产投机行为.

     

供应商竞争关系下的第三方物流融资及物流服务决策

研究第三方物流企业（3PL）在处于竞争关系中的供应商面临资金约束时的融资策略选择问题。考虑由两个竞争关系的供应商和一个零售商构成的两级供应链,3PL企业为供应链提供代采购、物流及融资服务,分别考虑在代采购中向供应商提供融资能够获得价格折扣和代采购中考虑额外资金成本情况下,3PL融资意愿选择,向供应商提供（不提供）融资。建立3PL、供应商和零售商在不同情况下的收益模型,并给出供应商和零售商的最优定价,以及3PL的最优物流服务收费决策,通过比较融资前后各个企业的收益分析3PL参与供应链融资的积极作用。研究发现3PL向处于竞争环境下的资金短缺供应商提供融资能够增加3PL、零售商和供应链整体的收益,且3PL更愿意在考虑自身资金成本的情况下向供应商提供融资,并且供应商之间竞争越激烈,3PL和零售商的获益越大。     

Multi-item integrated supply chain model for deteriorating items with stock dependent demand under fuzzy random and bifuzzy environments

In this paper, we have investigated multi-item integrated production-inventory models of supplier and retailer with a constant rate of deterioration under stock dependent demand. Here we have considered supplier’s production cost as nonlinear function depending on production rate, retailers procurement cost exponentially depends on the credit period and suppliers transportation cost as a non-linear function of the amount of quantity purchased by the retailer. The models are optimized to get the value of the credit periods and total time of the supply chain cycle under the space and budget constraints. The models are also formulated under fuzzy random and bifuzzy environments. The ordering cost, procurement cost, selling price of retailer’s and holding costs, production cost, transportation cost, setup cost of the supplier’s and the total storage area and budget are taken in imprecise environments. To show the validity of the proposed models, few sensitivity analyses are also presented under the different rate of deterioration. The models are also discussed in non deteriorating items as a special case of the deteriorating items. The deterministic optimization models are formulated for minimizing the entire monetary value of the supply chain and solved using genetic algorithm (GA). A case study has been performed to illustrate those models numerically.     

Contracts choice for supply chain under inflation

Inflation causes an increase in the retail price and a decrease in the market demand, both arise from the problem of seasonal product management and occur during the long production lead time. As an effective tool for hedging against the risks, option contracts, including call, put, and bidirectional option contracts, have been proved to benefit two members in a one‐supplier and one‐retailer supply chain under inflation. The aim of this paper is to examine the effect of different option contacts on the decisions and performances for both the supplier and the retailer under inflation. Our results suggest that the retailer prefers adopting portfolio contracts with bidirectional options under inflation, whereas the supplier is inclined to provide call option contracts under inflation. Our study also reveals that call option contracts are implemented ultimately by the supply chain under inflation because of the supplier's market dominant position.     

An analysis of contract form for supply chains with quality improvement

This study examines different contract forms for the supply chain with quality improvement decision and retailer price decision. We consider three types of quality improvement: cost consuming, cost identical, and cost saving, which correspond to the cases in which quality improvement leads to an increment, no change, and a decrease in production cost, respectively. We compare the performance of two types of quality contracts: (1) pay‐before‐performance contract, under which the supplier receives monetary support from the buyer before exerting quality improvement effort; and (2) pay‐after‐performance contract, under which the supplier receives monetary compensation based on the outcome of effort. We find that the performance of each contract depends on the types of quality improvement. Further, the pay‐after‐performance contract leads to close‐to‐perfect contract efficiency and dominates the pay‐before‐performance contract from the supplier's perspective in most cases. However, this result does not apply in two extended cases: when there are multiple competing suppliers, the pay‐before‐performance contract can dominate the pay‐after‐performance contract if quality improvement is cost consuming; and when the buyer can exert sales effort, neither contract can achieve close‐to‐perfect efficiency in most cases.     

VMI下价格补贴机制协调模型研究

以零售商和供应商组成的供应商管理库存(VMI)供应链系统为研究对象,考虑随机需求下VMI系统中可能存在滞销成本和缺货惩罚,建立传统、Stackelberg博弈、相同权力Nash协商、不同权力Nash协商的4种价格补贴机制的协调模型。通过数值分析得出:价格补贴机制下传统的VMI协调的不合理性;Stackelberg博弈的VMI协调达不到集成供应链整体收益,但可使零售商和供应商收益得到改善;相同权力和不同权力的Nash协商均能完美协调分散式VMI,零售商与供应商各自增加的收益在协商权力相同时是相等的,在协商权力不同时与自身协商权力正相关。     

Analysis on the effects of stock sharing on supply chain

Considering a two-period, two-part supply chain consisting of one supplier and multi-retailers, this paper studies the effects of stock sharing among retailers on the supply chain. By establishing analysis model and using simulation method, the effects of stock sharing mode and also the traditional mode without stock sharing on retailer, supplier and the whole supply chain’s performance are analyzed. The research results show that when supplier is in a dominant position, although only under certain conditions the stock sharing can stimulate retailer to increase order volume and make supplier to gain a better profit, it always make the profitability of retailer and supplier better than in the traditional mode. When supplier is in a dominant position, stock sharing can always stimulate retailer to increase their order volume, and the profitability of the retailer, supplier and the whole supply chain is always better than the traditional mode situation without stock sharing.     

基于批发价格事前和事后决策的供应链合作促销策略研究

针对单一供应商和单一零售商组成的二级供应链系统,构建了批发价格事前和事后决策下的合作促销模型,探讨了批发价格事前和事后决策对合作促销的影响,并求得Stackelber主从博弈下的均衡合作促销策略。研究结果表明,在批发价格事前决策且零售商努力影响需求、或批发价格事后决策且供应商努力影响需求的情形下,合作促销均不是一个有效的激励策略;在批发价格事前决策且供应商努力影响需求的情形下,只有当促销努力成本共担系数小于一定的阈值时,合作促销才是一个有效的激励策略;在批发价格事后决策且零售商努力影响需求的情形下,合作促销始终是有效的激励策略。最后通过算例分析验证了上述结论的有效性。     

Coordinating a three-level supply chain with delay in payments and a discounted interest rate

Both researchers and practitioners recognize the importance of the interactions between financial and inventory decisions in the development of cost effective supply chains. Moreover, achieving effective coordination among the supply chain players has become a pertinent research issue. This paper considers a three-level supply chain, consisting of a capital-constrained supplier, a retailer, and a financial intermediary (bank), coordinating their decisions to minimize the total supply chain costs. Specifically, we consider a retailer managing its cash through the supplier’s bank, in return for permissible delay in payments from the supplier. The bank, benefiting from increasing its cash holdings with the retailer’s cash deposits, offers the supplier a discount on its borrowing rate. We show that the proposed coordination mechanism achieves significant cost reduction, by up to 26.2%, when compared to the non-coordinated model. We also find that, with coordination, the retailer orders in larger quantities than its economic order quantity, and that a higher return on cash for the retailer leads to a higher order quantity. Furthermore, we empirically validate our proposed coordination mechanism, by showing that banks, retailers, and suppliers have much to gain through collaboration. Thus, using COMPUSTAT datasets for the years 1950 through 2012, we determine the most important factors that affect the behavior of the retailers and suppliers in granting and receiving trade credit. Our results indicate that engaging into such a coordination mechanism is a win–win situation to all parties involved.     

考虑权力结构与股权合作的低碳闭环供应链生产决策及协调

低碳时代传统制造业的成本构成以及盈利模式已被彻底颠覆,考虑再制造及碳减排的闭环供应链生产决策及协调优化值得关注.在3种渠道权力结构下,构建零售商持股制造商减排投资的闭环供应链决策模型,分析权力结构与股权合作对闭环供应链生产决策及企业利润的影响,探讨股权合作与两部定价契约的协调效果.研究发现,不同权力结构的闭环供应链需选择合适的持股比例,零售商主导下更高的持股比例产生更高的回收率、碳减排量及市场需求,而Nash博弈下则相反.有主导者的权力结构中,零售商持股比例的增加能够提高主导企业的利润;无主导者的权力结构中,企业利润的增减受持股比例与消费者低碳偏好的共同影响.无论何种权力结构,股权合作仅能实现闭环供应链的部分协调,通过两部定价契约可实现完美协调.     

A hierarchical model of the impact of RFID practices on retail supply chain performance

The primary purpose of this study was to evaluate the impact of radio frequency identification (RFID) practices on supply chain performance. We examined eight variables of RFID applications grouped in two categories: location (supplier’s warehouse, retailer’s central warehouse, retailer’s local warehouse, retailer’s owned stores) and utilisation (standards, transportation, pallet level, specialised software). Given the inherent difficulty in assessing supply chain performance and the widespread use of different performance models, such as the SCOR and balanced scorecard, we developed a list of performance indicators. Factor analysis produced 7 supply chain performance factors: supplier, inventory, distribution, ordering, plan, sales, and forecasting.Empirical data were collected via an online survey administered to 300 retail companies. 130 usable questionnaires were returned, for a 43.3% response rate. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to provide an analytical model that places supply chain performance indicators as dependent variables in a hierarchical regression equation with RFID variables as independent variables. Results found that the implementation of RFID practices significantly affect the supply chain performance in the following areas: supplier, inventory, distribution, plan, sales, and forecasting. RFID can improve the performance of distribution systems, including products dispatched and inventory in transit by 33.8% and stock availability by 45.6%. This study contributes to both the RFID and the supply chain performance literatures. Limitations and suggestions for further research are also discussed.     

Designing optimal and practical volume discounting contracts for the dominant retailer with information asymmetry

With the increasing prevalence of huge international retail chains and the subcontracting of manufacturing to developing countries by owners of major international brands, the dominant‐retailer‐oriented incentive contracts become increasingly more relevant. The literature suggests that most of the contract formats known as channel‐coordinating for the dominant supplier become quite or totally ineffective when the retailer is the dominant player in the supply chain. A menu of contracts is shown to be theoretically most effective for the dominant retailer; however, it is too complex to be implemented in the real world. This paper first proves that the menu of contracts is actually a nonlinear volume discounting contract. Based on this characteristic, we propose two contract formats, namely, volume discounting on markup and volume discounting on slotting fee. Our results show that these two new proposed schemes perform substantially better than the currently most‐used contract formats (e.g., markup contract formats), and they can also be perceived as performing nearly as well as the menu of contracts.     

平台品牌赋能情境下考虑信息不对称的供应链渠道冲突

随着平台型电商企业对供应链合作伙伴的赋能行为迅速增加,对供应链成员的运营决策及收益产生了举足轻重的影响.在平台型电商企业进行品牌赋能的情境下,研究由一个平台型电商企业、一个零售商和一个其他渠道供应商构成的供应链中,如何设计合适的激励机制以缓解供应链成员之间的垂直渠道冲突,并在信息不对称的条件下,剖析作为核心企业的平台型电商企业如何运用机制设计的方法来识别零售商从其他渠道订购产品的质量水平.研究表明,平台型电商企业可以通过设计包括混合策略与分离策略在内的激励机制来提升零售商从平台型电商企业订购产品的数量和比例.若零售商从产品质量较高的其他渠道供应商订购产品的概率较高时,则平台型电商企业采用分离策略更有助于提升零售商的总订购量,反之则应采用混合策略.平台型电商企业在分离策略下获得的期望利润要大于混合策略,并且均大于不向零售商提供激励机制的情形.     

高科技易逝品的三层联合定价与订货决策

研究高科技产业背景下三级供应链系统中原材料供应商的最优定价决策、制造商和零售商的最优定价和订货决策. 围绕高科技易逝品的售价和零部件购买价格随时间递减的特点, 分别建立以零售商和供应商为主导的三层联合定价和订货模型, 并设计了三层粒子群算法对模型进行求解. 数值实验验证了所提出算法的有效性. 对模型特点的分析结果表明, 零售商主导下的三层供应链系统能更好地提高整个供应链的效率.

     

Supply chain coordination with risk sensitive retailer under target sales rebate

Target sales rebate (TSR) contracts have been shown to be useful in coordinating supply chains with risk-neutral agents. However, there have been few studies on the cases with risk sensitive agents. As a result, based on the classic Markowitz portfolio theory in finance, we carry out in this paper a mean–variance (MV) analysis of supply chains under TSR contracts. We study a supply chain with a single supplier and a single risk averse retailer. We propose TSR contracts for achieving coordination. We demonstrate how TSR contracts can coordinate the supply chain which takes into consideration the degree of risk aversion of the retailer. We find that the supplier can coordinate the channel with flexible TSR contracts. In addition, we extend the supply chain model to include sales effort decision of the retailer. Conditions for TSR contracts to coordinate the supply chain with sales effort of retailer are also derived.