Coordinating static and dynamic supply chains with advertising through two-part tariffs

Zaccour (2008) analyses a marketing channel where firms invest in advertising to increase brand equity, showing that an exogenous two-part tariff cannot replicate the vertically integrated performance. I revisit the model proving that a multiplicity of efficient franchising contracts exists. I characterise an optimal two-part tariff specified as a linear function of the upstream firm’s advertising effort, performing this task both in the static and in the dynamic games. An analogous result emerges both in the static game, writing the fixed component of the two-part tariff as a non-linear function of the manufacturer’s advertising effort, and in the dynamic game, using a contract which is linear in the brand equity.     

竞争环境下硬件平台的激励合同选择策略研究

讨论竞争环境下硬件平台的激励合同选择问题,旨在研究竞争环境下硬件平台的三部定价激励合同与传统接入费合同的表现,识别硬件平台激励合同竞争模式的动态演变过程,并对最终市场均衡进行分析.首先,建立硬件平台竞争博弈模型,研究两个平台均提供传统接入费合同、均提供三部定价合同以及分别提供三部定价合同和传统接入费合同这3种情况下的博弈均衡和绩效情况;然后,比较上述3种情况下硬件商和软件商的利润,分析三部定价激励合同与传统接入费合同的不同表现;最后,从硬件商和软件商同时实现帕累托改进的角度,识别竞争性硬件平台的激励合同博弈演化过程并分析最终博弈均衡.结果表明,硬件平台竞争博弈最终会收敛到两个硬件商均使用激励合同的纳什均衡,而这在某些情况下反而会使各平台陷入利润的囚徒困境.     

Two-Way Interconnection with Partial Consumer Participation

This paper incorporates partial consumer participation in a model of competition between telecommunications networks with two-way interconnection. It is shown, in contrast to the results of similar models with full participation, that the firms' equilibrium profits depend on the level of a reciprocal access charge under two-part retail pricing. Under some simplifying assumptions, it is shown that firms prefer the access charge be set equal to the marginal cost of termination, which coincides with the social optimum. Without these additional assumptions the model is analytically complex and simulation results are presented that suggest firms prefer the access charge to be less than marginal cost, while the socially optimal access charge may be above or below cost depending on the differentiation of the firms.     

Optimal Two-Part Pricing and Capacity Allocation with Multiple User Classes and Elastic Arrivals at Constrained Transportation Facilities

This paper focuses on the joint determination of optimal two-part prices and optimal capacity allocation at transportation facilities with elastic arrivals of multiple user classes. The model considers a general cost function and a two-part tariff comprised of an entrance fee and a dwell charge for use of the facility. Examples of this type of decision problems include: parking lots, airline seat allocation, and area congestion pricing schemes, among others. The results indicate that, in general, the optimal prices for the major pricing rules (i.e., profit maximization or welfare maximization) have three main components: one that captures the contributions of the willingness to pay and marginal costs, i.e., the classic solution; one that reflects the role of capacity constraint; and another that captures the role of elastic arrivals. Both welfare maximizing and second best prices have an additional term that accounts for the effect on consumer surplus produced by the dwell charges through the arrival rates. The models developed demonstrate the existence of a new dimension, namely cross-effects among the optimal prices and the underlying demand functions. The theoretical analyses in the paper were complemented with numerical calculations to provide a context for the discussion.     

公平关切下考虑企业社会责任的物流服务供应链协调

针对由单个物流服务集成商(LSI)和单个功能型物流服务提供商(FLSP)组成的物流服务供应链(LSSC),考虑LSI的企业社会责任(CSR)和FLSP的物流服务水平,研究LSI和FLSP的公平关切偏好在成本分担契约和成本分担-两部关税的组合契约下对LSSC最优决策、各成员利润和整体利润以及供应链协调性的影响.研究表明:公平关切偏好不影响LSSC在不同契约下的协调状态,但影响LSSC成员的利润;成本分担-两部关税的组合契约能实现LSI和FLSP的双赢.LSI在成本分担契约下应降低自己的公平关切偏好并与公平关切偏好程度较低的FLSP合作,在成本分担-两部关税的组合契约下应增加自身的公平关切偏好并与公平关切偏好较低的FLSP合作;FLSP在两种契约下都应该增加自身的公平关切偏好并与公平关切偏好较低的LSI合作.     

第三方互联网支付平台的盈利分析

针对我国第三方互联网支付平台要在盈利的前提下发展, 就合理的定价策略进行了建模讨论。该建模方法基于产业组织理论的双边市场理论, 运用了实际数据帮助判定平台的市场结构为垄断, 并结合目前国内平台的实际收费情况即只收取用户手续费和对商户采取两部收费, 分析得出当一系列的内生变量增加时, 平台都会趋向于向商户收取更多的手续费, 而减少用户的手续费和商户的注册费; 最后对定价策略的完善提出了建议。     

Internet Service Pricing: Flat or Volume?

In this paper, we study the pricing of Internet services under monopoly and duopoly environments using an analytic model in which a service provider and users try to maximize their respective payoffs. We compare a few popular pricing schemes, including flat, volume-based, two-part, and nonlinear tariffs, with respect to revenue, social welfare, and user surplus. We perform a study of the sensitivity of these schemes to the estimation errors. In the duopoly situation, we formulate a simple normal form game between two service providers and study their equilibrium behaviors. Our main findings include: (1) the flat pricing generates higher revenue than the pure volume pricing when the elasticity of demand is low; (2) the volume-based pricing is better for society and users than the flat pricing regardless of the elasticity; (3) the market is segmented into two when one provider provides flat pricing and another provides volume based pricing.     

考虑消费者参考效应的双渠道乳制品供应链协调机制设计

将消费者对乳制品新鲜度的参考效应引入第三方物流(third party logistics,TPL)服务商参与的双渠道乳制品供应链中,考虑到乳制品新鲜度受到制造商加工水平和TPL服务商物流服务水平的共同影响,构建分散式、集中式以及引入基于二部定价的成本共担契约下的微分博弈模型,求解并比较3种情形下供应链成员的最优均衡策...     

Strategic Pricing in Next-Hop Routing with Elastic Demands

We consider a model of next-hop routing by self-interested agents. In this model, nodes in a graph (representing ISPs, Autonomous Systems, etc.) make pricing decisions of how much to charge for forwarding traffic from each of their upstream neighbors, and routing decisions of which downstream neighbors to forward traffic to (i.e., choosing the next hop). Traffic originates at a subset of these nodes that derive a utility when the traffic is routed to its destination node; the traffic demand is elastic and the utility derived from it can be different for different source nodes. Our next-hop routing and pricing model is in sharp contrast with the more common source routing and pricing models, in which the source of traffic determines the entire route from source to destination. For our model, we begin by showing sufficient conditions for prices to result in a Nash equilibrium, and in fact give an efficient algorithm to compute a Nash equilibrium which is as good as the centralized optimum, thus proving that the price of stability is 1. When only a single source node exists, then the price of anarchy is 1 as well, as long as some minor assumptions on player behavior is made. The above results hold for arbitrary convex pricing functions, but with the assumption that the utilities derived from getting traffic to its destination are linear. When utilities can be non-linear functions, we show that Nash equilibrium may not exist, even with simple discrete pricing models.     

具有多优先级多服务网络的激励价格控制

运用Stackelberg对策中的激励原理,研究具有多优先级的多服务网络系统的价控问题。提出了具有管理者的用户两优先级的激励模型,给出了确定激励参数的方法。将此方法扩展到多优先级的情形,推导出互联激励参数矩阵。通过数值例子说明了激励价格策略的有效性。     

产出不确定环境下考虑供货承诺的定价与投入决策模型

针对一个供应商和两个零售商所组成的两级供应链模型,研究产出不确定环境下的最优定价和投入决策问题.在常规情形中,供应商首先在产出不确定环境下确定投入量,并在实际产出确定之后确定批发价,而零售商最终确定订购量.在此基础上,讨论供应商向零售商提供供货承诺时的竞争模型.运用逆向归纳法讨论以上决策模型的均衡解.数值分析表明,供货承诺在一定的条件下能够优化供应链的性能.     

Paradigm shift to enhanced water supply planning through augmented grids,scarcity pricing and adaptive factory water: A system dynamics approach

This paper details a system dynamics model developed to simulate proposed changes to water governance through the integration of supply, demand and asset management processes. To effectively accomplish this, interconnected feedback loops in tariff structures, demand levels and financing capacity are included in the model design, representing the first comprehensive life-cycle modelling of potable water systems. A number of scenarios were applied to Australia's populated South-east Queensland region, demonstrating that introducing temporary drought pricing (i.e. progressive water prices set inverse with availability), in conjunction with supply augmentation through rain-independent sources, is capable of efficiently providing water security in the future. Modelling demonstrated that this alternative tariff structure reduced demand in scarcity periods thereby preserving supply, whilst revenues are maintained to build new water supply infrastructure. In addition to exploring alternative tariffs, the potential benefits of using adaptive pressure-retarded osmosis desalination plants for both potable water and power generation was explored. This operation of these plants for power production, when they would otherwise be idle, shows promise in reducing their net energy and carbon footprints. Stakeholders in industry, government and academia were engaged in model development and validation. The constructed model displays how water resource systems can be reorganised to cope with systemic change and uncertainty.     

Control over chaotic price dynamics in a price competition model

The dynamic model of price competition in which processes of strategic interaction between companies on an imperfect competition market are described with the game-theoretic approach and methods of nonlinear dynamics. The pricing dynamics for the companies is modeled with difference equations (mappings). We study the stability of the fixed point of the price mapping. Results of our numerical modeling have shown the existence of periodic and chaotic solutions in the price competition model. We present intra-company adaptation mechanisms based on changing the prices in a way proportional to the rate of change in the companies’ profits; this lets us reduce the prices to a local Nash equilibrium and stabilize the chaotic dynamics of the market.     

Pricing ad slots with consecutive multi-unit demand

We consider the optimal pricing problem for a model of the rich media advertisement market, that has other related applications. Our model differs from traditional position auctions in that we consider buyers whose demand might be multiple consecutive slots, which is motivated by modeling buyers who may require these to display a large size ad. We study three major pricing mechanisms, the Bayesian pricing model, the maximum revenue market equilibrium model and an envy-free solution model. Under the Bayesian model, we design a polynomial-time computable truthful mechanism that optimizes the revenue. For the market equilibrium paradigm, we find a polynomial-time algorithm to obtain the maximum revenue market equilibrium solution. In the envy-free setting, an optimal solution is presented for the case where the buyers have the same demand for the number of consecutive slots. We present results of a simulation that compares the revenues from the above schemes.     

A newsvendor pricing game

This paper considers a horizontal market of multiple firms that face stochastic price-dependent demand. The firms make joint pricing/inventory decisions and use price to compete for market demand. With fairly general demand models that are price-dependent, stochastic, and substitutable among firms, we prove the existence and uniqueness of the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. The market at the equilibrium exhibits a bias toward under-pricing caused by competition; specifically, raising prices at any equilibrium of the game increases the total system profit, and at any joint-optimal set of pricing levels each self-interested firm has an incentive to lower its price. This result closely parallels that obtained in the inventory competition games in which prices are fixed and the bias is toward overstocking.     

考虑权力结构与股权合作的低碳闭环供应链生产决策及协调

低碳时代传统制造业的成本构成以及盈利模式已被彻底颠覆,考虑再制造及碳减排的闭环供应链生产决策及协调优化值得关注.在3种渠道权力结构下,构建零售商持股制造商减排投资的闭环供应链决策模型,分析权力结构与股权合作对闭环供应链生产决策及企业利润的影响,探讨股权合作与两部定价契约的协调效果.研究发现,不同权力结构的闭环供应链需选择合适的持股比例,零售商主导下更高的持股比例产生更高的回收率、碳减排量及市场需求,而Nash博弈下则相反.有主导者的权力结构中,零售商持股比例的增加能够提高主导企业的利润;无主导者的权力结构中,企业利润的增减受持股比例与消费者低碳偏好的共同影响.无论何种权力结构,股权合作仅能实现闭环供应链的部分协调,通过两部定价契约可实现完美协调.     

固定费率下城市出租车拥挤收费模型与算法

针对出租车自身的特殊性, 研究了实施拥挤收费政策过程中出租车是否也应进行拥挤收费。在收费费率已知条件下, 采用组合网络均衡模型描述了出租车拥挤收费前后对出行产生、模式划分、流量分配以及出行分布的影响, 构建了与之等价的最优化模型, 设计了求解模型的启发式算法, 比较了对出租车征收拥挤费前后的社会福利变化。算例表明, 收费前的社会福利总是明显大于收费后的, 并且二者之间的差距随着出行者时间价值(VOT)的增加而减小, 随着弹性灵敏参数的增加而增大。这一研究有助于为拥挤收费政策制定者提供科学的决策依据。     

OFDMA认知无线电网络中面向功率控制的频谱定价与分配

针对OFDMA认知无线电网络,提出一种基于Stackelberg博弈的频谱定价和分配模型.对于次基站控制次网络传输功率来保护主网络通信的场景,主基站可通过该模型获得最优的频谱定价方案.从功率控制的角度,重新设计次用户的效用函数,运用Stackelberg博弈对单个主基站和多个次用户在频谱租赁市场中的交易行为进行建模.通过逆向归纳法,求解市场均衡下的最优频谱定价,使得主基站在考虑主网络QoS降级的同时获得最大收益.此外,对于主基站只能获取本地信息的情形,提出了基于动态Stackelberg博弈的分布式频谱定价和分配模型.仿真实验表明,该模型能够在控制次网络传输功率的基础上,提供最优频谱定价和频谱分配方案.     

发电企业竞价上网博弈模型及其算法研究

假设所有发电企业通过密封报价这种形式来上网竞价,并在发电企业共同见证及同一时刻开标,且规定报价最低者将会被选为中标方,设计两个发电企业竞价上网的基于静态贝叶斯理论的博弈模型以及算法,当参与的发电企业均应用线性策略时,对模型所对应的收敛性进行了分析,同时对贝叶斯纳什均衡解是否存在进行了讨论;接下来对两个发电企业竞价上网模型予以相应扩展,分析了若干个发电企业竞价条件下的贝叶斯纳什均衡及相关问题,与此同时,构建了一个包含若干发电企业在内的共同竞价上网博弈模型;最后借助计算机系统予以仿真实验,得到的结论是：在电力竞价上网的博弈模型中,随着企业数量的不断增加,各自报价将会更加理性,并不断趋于预测值。     

制造商主导型双渠道供应链协调决策模型

以制造商主导型供应链为研究对象, 分析双渠道供应链协调策略问题. 引入双渠道价格敏感系数和竞争系数两个变量, 分别建立双渠道供应链集中决策、分散决策和协调决策的3 种模型. 研究结果表明, 不同合同策略协调后, 零售商和供应链整体收益增加; 经两部定价和批发价格合同协调, 零售商需要支付固定费用给制造商才能够达到协调, 而经Shapley 值法分配合同协调, 则双渠道供应链可直接达到协调效果.