Inadequacy of voice recognition as a demonstration of self-deception.

R. C. Gur and H. A. Sackeim (see record 1980-25654-001) argued that Ss deceived themselves when they failed to recognize their own voices on playback from a tape recorder. It is suggested that even though Ss may not consciously recognize their own voices, a heightened physiological response implies that true recognition did in fact occur at some other level of cognitive processing. The present study with 30 female Australian undergraduates showed that results similar to those arrived at by Gur and Sackeim can also be produced when Ss attempt to recognize the voice of a familiar "other." These results suggest that self-deception is not the main factor operating to produce the heightened physiological response. (6 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Voice recognition and the ontological status of self-deception.

W. Douglas and K. Gibbins (see record 1983-29703-001) argued that the present authors' (see record 1979-26213-001) demonstration that errors in self–other recognition are often instances of self-deception was inadequate. In their study, they found that both self–other and acquaintance–other recognition errors met 2 of the 4 criteria the present authors had offered as necessary and sufficient for ascribing self-deception. They presented no evidence that either type of recognition error was not an instance of self-deception. The original basis of the authors' demonstration is described, and the logical fallacy in Douglas and Gibbins's argument is pointed out. (11 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

It's a sin to tell a lie if you don't believe it yourself.

Questions D. L. Schacter's (see record 1986-20237-001) philosophical assumption that individuals who are capable of self-deception should be held less responsible for criminal acts than those incapable of this, especially since Schacter suggests that individuals may differ in the genuineness of their self-deception. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Still no convincing evidence of a relation between brain size and intelligence in humans.

Replies to the comment by R. Lynn (see record 1994-24539-001) on M. Peters's (see record 1992-18876-001) claim that there is no association between brain size and IQ. It is countered that the available evidence is not strong enough to accept the proposition that brain size and IQ are positively correlated. (French abstract) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Thinking and feeling: A skeptical review.

Comments that R. B. Zajonc's (see record 1980-09733-001) claim that poetry, intuition, and experimental evidence support the claim that preferences need no inferences is one-sided. Zajonc fails to mention that a simpler theory can account for the evidence he cites. M. H. Birnbaum and B. A. Mellers's (see record 1980-29307-001) one-mediator model provides a better fit to Zajonc's data. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Hypnosis and the Lamaze method: A reply to Wideman and Singer.

Comments on M. V. Wideman and J. E. Singer's (see record 1985-28845-001) claim that no correlation exists between hypnotic susceptibility and response to the Lamaze method in childbirth by refuting their claim with results from the present author's own research and by suggesting that the possibility that hypnotizability is a relevant dimension in nonhypnotic forms of therapy is an area that warrants further research. (10 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Factors in the Self-Deception Questionnaire: Associations with depression.

[Correction Notice: An erratum for this article was reported in Vol 48(6) of Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (see record 2008-10977-001). Errors appear in Table 2 on page 247. The factor loading for Item 7 (.65) is listed under Factor 2 and it should be under Factor 4. The factor loading for Item 18 (.54) is listed under Factor 2 and it should be under Factor 3.] Administered the Self-Deception Questionnaire (SDQ) and the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) to 60 male and 52 female undergraduates and replicated the negative correlation found by H. A. Sackeim and R. C. Gur (1978; see also PA, Vol 62:6213). The SDQ was factor analyzed to determine which factors might account for this correlation with depression. Analysis showed that the 3 largest factors, identified by content themes of relationship with parents, emotionality, and denial of tabooed activities, correlated reliably with the BDI. Acceptable conceptualizations of distortion and reality and data that empirically relate those conceptualizations to depression and other forms of psychopathology are needed to clarify any associations that exist between cognitive accuracy and emotional functioning. (34 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Sacred space, not sacred cows, or it's never fun being prophetic.

Replies to comments by E. F. Loftus (see record 1998-00766-029), S. Buchholz (see record 1998-00766-030), L. G. Humphreys (see record 1998-00766-031), D. S. Lindsay (see record 1998-00766-032), and T. Dineen (see record 1998-00766-033) regarding the article (see record 84-26142) concerning managed care and false memory movement issues in social justice-oriented psychology. Firstly, Brown contends that Loftus"s assertions of misrepresentation are inaccurate. Secondly, Brown argues that making memory retrieval per se the guiding strategy and goal of therapy is more likely to be detrimental than helpful to abuse survivors, and is not consistent with a pro-survivor stance. It is also stated that each claim of recovered memories must be evaluated carefully and on an individual basis in light of all available evidence. Lastly, Brown argues that her goal for her colleagues and readers was for them to develop and assert their own strategies for the achievement of tikkunolam, to be the authors of their own actions, as she attempts to create a therapy in which clients are the authors of their own lives. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Traits, consistency, and self-schemata: What do our methods measure?

Psychologists have responded to the inadequacies that W. Mischel (1968) noted in the trait approach to personality by exploring 2 other facets of personality, cross-situational consistency and self-schemata. It is argued that these newer approaches have yet to be clearly distinguished conceptually or empirically from the traditional model that they were designed to supplement or replace. In the present 2 studies, 362 undergraduates rated the extent to which 10 traits applied to them (overall level), their consistency on these traits (cross-situational consistency), and the importance of these traits to their view of themselves (self-schema). Correlational analyses showed that the measures of consistency and self-schema lacked discriminant validity from the measures of overall level. Specifically, their correlations with level were as high as their internal consistencies. It is concluded that the measurement models for cross-situational consistency and for self-schemata do not adequately reflect their theoretical counterparts. This failure undercuts the interpretations of recent research by H. Markus (see record 1977-27585-001), Markus et al (see record 1982-23588-001), and S. Bem (see record 1981-25685-001). (28 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A reconciliation of the evidence on eyewitness testimony: Comments on McCloskey and Zaragoza.

E. F. Loftus (see record 1978-26704-001) demonstrated distorted reports of memory for an event in the direction of postevent misleading information. M. McCloskey and M. Zaragoza (see record 1986-03053-001) argued that these results do not necessarily imply a weakening of the memory for the original event. They obtained evidence supporting their position by using a modified recognition test. In this experiment we introduced still another modification to the recognition test ("Yes"/"No" instead of forced choice) to answer McCloskey and Zaragoza's objections to Loftus and her colleagues' procedures. We obtained evidence for distorted reports of original information as a consequence of the misleading information. Memory and confidence data support an interference or inaccessibility interpretation of the memory errors but cannot rule out overwriting of the original information in some cases. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Associative versus contingency accounts of category learning: Reply to Melz, Cheng, Holyoak, and Waldmann (1993).

E. R. Melz et al (see record 1994-24205-001) argue that the partial blocking of cue A that was previously reported (D. R. Shanks; see record 1991-26433-001) when Ss were presented with intermixed AB?→?1, B?→?1 category learning trials is not consistent with the associative Rescorla-Wagner (R-W; 1972) theory analysis that was offered, given that the theory predicts complete blocking at asymptote. However, this claim assumes that Ss were trained to asymptote in these experiments, and there is no reason to believe this was the case. Melz et al further argue that there has been no reported evidence of complete blocking in associative learning tasks, which is incorrect. It is shown that, on the contrary, there is abundant evidence of it. The R-W theory analysis of the results is therefore sound. The results reported were inconsistent with contingency theories as they are normally formulated. Melz et al propose a revised contingency theory which, they argue, can account for data from a range of learning tasks. In particular, they claim that their theory can accommodate the results. It is shown that the theory can be refuted… (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The defense that fails.

Suggests that L. Berkowitz and E. Donnerstein's (see record 1982-29293-001) defense of laboratory research fails because they do not demonstrate the validity of their most basic claim: that the lab is a uniquely useful setting in which to test causal hypotheses. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Developmental issues in the evolution of the mind.

D. J. Povinelli (see record 1993-35769-001) did not integrate theory-of-mind (TOM) literature with that in other cognitive domains, and did not reference other investigators' research on TOM in great apes. Povinelli's claim that most chimpanzees do not display evidence of self-recognition until age 6–8 yrs is refuted with reference to this research. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

On starting points and priorities: A rejoinder.

Responds to the reply by L. T. Hoshmand and J. Martin (see record 1997-02285-002) to S. C. Yanchar and K. B. Kristensen's comments (see record 1997-02285-001) on Hoshmand and Martin's (see record 1995-28533-001) proposal for a naturalistic epistemological approach to psychological science. Hoshmand and Martin argue that in Yanchar and Kristensen's stance toward some aspects of their proposal, they have attributed to Hoshmand and Martin a relationship between theory, method, and data that they do not hold. According to Hoshmand and Martin, in making their case Yanchar and Kristensen have objected to empirical means of evaluation, and essentially undermined their own argument. The authors clarify their position by responding to these claims. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Comment on Hofsten and Spelke, object perception and object-directed reaching in infancy.

Refutes the claim by C. von Hofsten and E. S. Spelke (see record 1986-08802-001) that data indicating that infants reach for and grasp boundaries in the visual display demonstrate the presence of object perception in infants by the time they are 5 mo old. This claim is countered on the grounds that the authors do not report that infants specifically reached and grasped at boundaries in the display and that although patterns of reach are clearly affected by changes in boundary cues, there is no evidence that the boundaries the infants perceive are necessarily object boundaries. (2 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

An unequivocal "yes" for morality study.

The author cites her own study (see record 1971-20823-001) and one by H. Hartshorne and M. May (1930) on cheating and the moral development of children to illustrate that morality can be studied objectively, a possibility that was addressed by N. Haan (see record 1983-22367-001). It is contended that these researchers investigated moral behavior without allowing their own value systems to contaminate the data. (5 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Token" learning programs.

Emphasizes F. M. Levine and G. Fasnacht's (see record 1975-07966-001) statement that a distinction must be made between operant techniques in motivational applications vs those in learning applications. Thus, there is a difference between what clients cannot do and what they do not do. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

On the distinction between two tests as measures of the same construct and as interchangeable.

Comments on the debate between E. R. Harcum (see record 1989-31713-001) and W. Branch (see record 1990-13759-001) regarding the assumption that 2 tests measure the same construct because they correlate moderately highly with each other. Although 2 highly correlated measures do assess the same underlying construct, they may not be interchangeable due to their respective psychometric properties. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Comment and integration.

Addresses those criticisms of the learned helplessness model of depression not anticipated by L. Y. Abramson et al (see record 1979-01110-001). Seligman (one of the previous authors) herein suggests that learned helplessness models those depressions that are caused by cognition of response–outcome independence, show passivity and negative cognitive set, and are specifically responsive to antihelplessness therapies. This subclass may cut across traditional ways of subdividing depressions, both mild and clinical. The necessity of grouping patients not only by depression inventory but by diagnostic category in testing the helplessness model in clinical populations is affirmed. It is suggested that C. G. Costello's (see record 1979-01145-001) claim that helplessness experiments do not support the model systematically ignores the supporting evidence. The relevance of skill expectancy shift data to the reformulated learned helplessness model of depression is questioned. Finally, it is suggested that mild depression should not be considered merely an "analog" to some other, more "real," disorder but is itself a disorder of major importance. (39 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Interpretation of real and simulated lesion experiments.

Argues that P. Dean's (see record 1980-31401-001) comments do not refute the author's claim (see record 1979-27552-001) that simulated lesions illustrate logical difficulties for the interpretation of lesions in real nervous systems. Such difficulties are based on the demonstration of a potential inconsistency between (a) the function of a given element or region of the model as defined in terms of performance deficits following its removal and (b) the function of that region as defined by the known structural and functional organization of the model. (10 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)