Choosing category or complementary relations: prior tendencies modulate instructional effects

Concepts in semantic memory are associated with other categorically (e.g., dog-horse) and complementarily (e.g., dog-bone) related concepts. Although complementary relations produce more robust priming (e.g., Lupker, 1984), categorical responding is more common in preference tasks where participants choose directly between categorical and complementary relations (e.g., Smiley & Brown, 1979). Three experiments examined the effects of instructions and individual differences on adult preferences. Experiment 1 demonstrated that category preferences were infrequent, and that "most similar" instructions produced modestly more category responses than "goes together" instructions. In Experiments 2 and 3, emphasizing key words enhanced the instructional effect, and "similar" instructions produced especially large increases in category preferences for participants predisposed to categorical relationships. These preference experiments demonstrate that complementary advantages are similar to those for priming, and that instructions and prior tendencies can have subtle influences on semantic memory.     

Perceptions of serendipity: Career paths of prominent academic women in counseling psychology.

Consensual qualitative research was used to investigate the impact of chance events on the career choices of prominent academic women in counseling psychology and to examine the contextual factors surrounding the chance events. The results suggest that chance events affected career choices most often by changing women's career paths altogether or by altering their self-concepts. The results also suggest that both internal characteristics (e.g., ability to take risks, self-confidence, etc.) and external factors (e.g., a strong support system, few external barriers, etc.) helped women take advantage of chance opportunities. The implications of integrating the concept of serendipity into our existing understanding of career development is discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Anger, disgust, and the negative aesthetic emotions: Expanding an appraisal model of aesthetic experience.

Negative aesthetic emotions, such as disgust and anger, are central to understanding why people reject, deface, and censor art. Psychological theories of aesthetic preferences have little to say about negative aesthetic emotions, however, and the major theories associated with Berlyne and Martindale cannot in principle explain emotions like anger and disgust. The present research uses a recent appraisal model of aesthetic emotions to illuminate negative responses to art. People viewed a set of pictures, which included offensive and controversial works. The predictions were based on the appraisal profiles of anger and disgust. As expected, anger was associated with appraising a picture as incongruent with one's values and as intentionally offensive, and disgust was associated with appraising a picture as incongruent with one's values and as unpleasant. Implications for competing theories of aesthetic emotions are considered. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Why Susie sells seashells by the seashore: Implicit egotism and major life decisions.

Because most people possess positive associations about themselves, most people prefer things that are connected to the self (e.g., the letters in one's name). The authors refer to such preferences as implicit egotism. Ten studies assessed the role of implicit egotism in 2 major life decisions: where people choose to live and what people choose to do for a living. Studies 1-5 showed that people are disproportionately likely to live in places whose names resemble their own first or last names (e.g., people named Louis are disproportionately likely to live in St. Louis). Study 6 extended this finding to birthday number preferences. People were disproportionately likely to live in cities whose names began with their birthday numbers (e.g., Two Harbors, MN). Studies 7-10 suggested that people disproportionately choose careers whose labels resemble their names (e.g., people named Dennis or Denise are overrepresented among dentists). Implicit egotism appears to influence major life decisions. This idea stands in sharp contrast to many models of rational choice and attests to the importance of understanding implicit beliefs. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Let your preference be your guide? Preferences and choices are more tightly linked for North Americans than for Indians.

Using experimental paradigms from economics and social psychology, the authors examined the cross-cultural applicability of 3 widely held assumptions about preference and choice: People (a) recruit or construct preferences to make choices; (b) choose according to their preferences; and (c) are motivated to express their preferences in their choices. In 6 studies, they compared how middle-class North American and Indian participants choose among consumer products. Participants in both contexts construct nonrandom preferences at similar speeds. Those in Indian contexts, however, are slower to make choices, less likely to choose according to their personal preferences, and less motivated to express their preferences in their choices. The authors infer that the strong link between preferences and choices observed among North Americans is not a universal feature of human nature. Instead, this link reflects the disjoint model of agency, which prescribes that people should choose freely on the basis of their preferences. In contrast, Indian contexts reflect and promote a conjoint model of agency, according to which agency is responsive to the desires and expectations of important others and may require restraining one's preferences. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The associative memory deficit of older adults: The role of strategy utilization.

Past research has established an associative deficit hypothesis (e.g., M. Naveh-Benjamin, 2000) that attributes part of older adults' poor episodic memory performance to their difficulty in creating and retrieving cohesive episodes. Here, the authors evaluate the degree to which this deficit can be reduced by older adults' use of associative strategies. Young and older adults learned word pairs under either intentional-learning instructions or instructions eliciting associative strategies either at encoding or both at encoding and at retrieval, and they then took tests on their memory for both the components and the associations. Results replicated the associative deficit of older adults under intentional-learning instructions. In addition, they showed that instructions to use appropriate associative strategies during either encoding or, even more so, during encoding and retrieval resulted in a significant decrease in the associative deficit. The theoretical and applied implications of these results are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Detection of coached general malingering on the MMPI—2.

The current study examined the effects of validity-scale coaching on one's ability to feign general psychopathology. College students were coached on malingering strategies and completed the MMPI-2. Their responses were compared with students asked to malinger psychopathology without validity-scale coaching and with psychiatric inpatients completing the MMPI-2 under standard instructions. In accordance with previous research (e.g., J. R. Graham, D. Watts, and R. E. Timbrook, 1991), uncoached malingerers were adequately discriminated from patients by using the Infrequency (F) scale. However, as suggested by previous research (R. Rogers, R. A. Bagby, and D. Chakraborty, 1993), the F scale was not as effective at classifying coached malingerers. It was found that other validity indicators, such as the Infrequency Psychopathology Scale were more accurate at discriminating between coached malingerers and hospitalized patients. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The effect of instructional set and need for social approval on commonality of word association responses.

This study investigated the effect of various instructional sets (speed, relaxed time instructions, and "set popular" instructions) on commonality of word associations. Findings were generally supportive of the hypotheses: significantly more common associations were given under speed as compared to relaxed instructions, Ss were able to significantly increase their commonality scores under a set to give popular responses, and need for social approval was differentially related to commonality under relaxed but not under speed instructions. Contrary to a suggestion of Jenkins, social sensitivity (as reflected in the need for approval measure) was not related to the ability to increase one's commonality score under "set popular" instructions. (17 ref.) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Distinction Bias: Misprediction and Mischoice Due to Joint Evaluation.

This research identifies a new source of failure to make accurate affective predictions or to make experientially optimal choices. When people make predictions or choices, they are often in the joint evaluation (JE) mode; when people actually experience an event, they are often in the single evaluation (SE) mode. The "utility function" of an attribute can vary systematically between SE and JE. When people in JE make predictions or choices for events to be experienced in SE, they often resort to their JE preferences rather than their SE preferences and overpredict the difference that different values of an attribute (e.g., different salaries) will make to their happiness in SE. This overprediction is referred to as the distinction bias. The present research also specifies when the distinction bias occurs and when it does not. This research contributes to literatures on experienced utility, affective forecasting, and happiness. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Making choices impairs subsequent self-control: A limited-resource account of decision making, self-regulation, and active initiative.

The current research tested the hypothesis that making many choices impairs subsequent self-control. Drawing from a limited-resource model of self-regulation and executive function, the authors hypothesized that decision making depletes the same resource used for self-control and active responding. In 4 laboratory studies, some participants made choices among consumer goods or college course options, whereas others thought about the same options without making choices. Making choices led to reduced self-control (i.e., less physical stamina, reduced persistence in the face of failure, more procrastination, and less quality and quantity of arithmetic calculations). A field study then found that reduced self-control was predicted by shoppers' self-reported degree of previous active decision making. Further studies suggested that choosing is more depleting than merely deliberating and forming preferences about options and more depleting than implementing choices made by someone else and that anticipating the choice task as enjoyable can reduce the depleting effect for the first choices but not for many choices. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

How Subjective Grouping of Options Influences Choice and Allocation: Diversification Bias and the Phenomenon of Partition Dependence.

The authors argue that people's tendency to diversify their allocations of money and consumption choices over alternatives gives rise to decisions that vary systematically with the subjective grouping of available options. These subjective groupings are influenced by subtle variations in the presentation of options or elicitation of preferences. Studies 1-4 demonstrate such "partition dependence" in allocations of money to beneficiaries, consumption experiences to future time periods, and choices to a menu of consumption options. Study 5 documents weaker partition dependence among individuals with greater relevant experience discriminating among options, and Study 6 shows that the effect is attenuated among participants with stronger or more accessible intrinsic preferences. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

How choice affects and reflects preferences: Revisiting the free-choice paradigm.

After making a choice between 2 objects, people reevaluate their chosen item more positively and their rejected item more negatively (i.e., they spread the alternatives). Since Brehm's (1956) initial free-choice experiment, psychologists have interpreted the spreading of alternatives as evidence for choice-induced attitude change. It is widely assumed to occur because choosing creates cognitive dissonance, which is then reduced through rationalization. In this article, we express concern with this interpretation, noting that the free-choice paradigm (FCP) will produce spreading, even if people's attitudes remain unchanged. Specifically, if people's ratings/rankings are an imperfect measure of their preferences and their choices are at least partially guided by their preferences, then the FCP will measure spreading, even if people's preferences remain perfectly stable. We show this, first by proving a mathematical theorem that identifies a set of conditions under which the FCP will measure spreading, even absent attitude change. We then experimentally demonstrate that these conditions appear to hold and that the FCP measures a spread of alternatives, even when this spreading cannot have been caused by choice. We discuss how the problem we identify applies to the basic FCP paradigm as well as to all variants that examine moderators and mediators of spreading. The results suggest a reassessment of the free-choice paradigm and, perhaps, the conclusions that have been drawn from it. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Adults' Age-Related Differences in Adaptivity of Strategy Choices: Evidence From Computational Estimation.

Four experiments document adults' age-related changes in computational estimation performance and in adaptivity of strategy choices (i.e., the ability to choose the most precise strategy on each trial). Young and older adults were asked to provide estimates of 2-by-2-digit multiplication problems (e.g., 43 X 78) under varying conditions of speed and accuracy emphasis. The main findings showed that (a) older adults provided less accurate estimates and took more time to estimate, especially on the most difficult problems or when using harder strategies; (b) young and older adults had similar strategy preferences; and (c) older adults chose estimation strategies less adaptively than young adults. Implications of these findings for understanding strategic changes during adulthood in a wide variety of cognitive domains are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Challenging the notion of a thematic preference in young children.

Many researchers have argued that early cognitive development is characterized by a conceptual preference for thematic over taxonomic relations. However, more recent research indicates that infants and toddlers may not favor thematic relations. To resolve this discrepancy, the conceptual preferences of children ranging from 2 to 4 years of age were examined, using a forced-choice task including a target (e.g., a carrot), a thematic alternative (e.g., a rabbit), and a taxonomic alternative (e.g., a tomato). The effects of age, experimenter's instructions, hierarchical level (basic vs. superordinate), and stimulus medium (pictures vs. objects) were examined systematically. Children revealed no pervasive preference for either thematic or taxonomic relations. This challenges the notion of a developmental shift in conceptual preferences and suggests a more continuous trajectory in early conceptual development. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Conflict between intuitive and rational processing: When people behave against their better judgment.

When offered an opportunity to win $1 on every "win" trial in which they drew a red jelly bean, Ss frequently elected to draw from a bowl that contained a greater absolute number, but a smaller proportion, of red beans (e.g., 7 in 100) than from a bowl with fewer red beans but better odds (e.g., 1 in 10). Subjects reported that although they knew the probabilities were against them, they felt they had a better chance when there were more red beans. Similar, but less extreme results were obtained on "lose" trials, where drawing a red bean meant losing $1. These results were predicted from the concretive and experiential principles of cognitive-experiential self-theory. Nonoptimal choices in the laboratory were significantly correlated with heuristic responses to relevant vignettes and with self-reported gambling in real life. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Implicit learning of semantic category sequences: Response-independent acquisition of abstract sequential regularities.

Through the use of a new serial naming task, the authors investigated implicit learning of repeating sequences of abstract semantic categories. Participants named objects (e.g., table, shirt) appearing in random order. Unbeknownst to them, the semantic categories of the objects (e.g., furniture, clothing) followed a repeating sequence. Irrespective of whether participants were instructed to attend to the categories (Experiment 1) or whether no mention was made of the categories (Experiments 2 and 3), naming latencies reliably increased when the repeating category sequence was switched to a random sequence. This was the case even for participants showing no explicit knowledge in reproduction and recognition tests. Results indicate that abstract sequential structures are learned implicitly, even if neither the surface stimuli nor the responses follow a sequence. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The beginnings of orthographic knowledge: Children's knowledge of double letters in words.

Three experiments were carried out to examine the development of knowledge about double letters. Children and adults chose items they thought looked most word-like from pairs of nonwords. First graders chose nonwords with final doublets (e.g., baff) and allowable doublets (e.g., yill) as more word-like than nonwords with initial doublets (e.g., bbaf) or unallowable doublets (e.g., yihh). Children in late kindergarten chose final-doublet nonwords (e.g., pess) more often than initial-doublet nonwords (e.g., ppes), but performed at chance when choosing between items such as jull and jukk . The same children in 1st grade chose jull more often than jukk even though their own spellings were semiphonetic and phonetic according to stage theories of spelling development. Only participants in the 6th grade and above knew the correspondence between a medial doublet and a preceding short vowel (e.g., tebbif). The results suggest that even young writers know about simple orthographic patterns. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Are phonological representations of printed and spoken language isomorphic? Evidence from the restrictions on unattested onsets.

Are the phonological representations of printed and spoken words isomorphic? This question is addressed by investigating the restrictions on onsets. Cross-linguistic research suggests that onsets of rising sonority are preferred to sonority plateaus, which, in turn, are preferred to sonority falls (e.g., bnif, bdif, lbif). Of interest is whether these grammatical preferences constrain the recognition of auditory and printed words by speakers of English--a language in which such onsets are unattested. Five experiments compare phonological lexical decision responses to nonwords, including unattested onsets, through either aural or visual presentation. Results suggest that both hearers and readers are sensitive to the phonotactics of unattested onsets. However, the phonotactic generalizations of hearers and readers differ on their scope and source. Hearers differentiated all three types of onsets (e.g., bnif, bdif, and lbif), and their behavior implicated both grammatical and statistical constraints. In contrast, readers were able to differentiate only those structures similar to attested English onsets from dissimilar structures (i.e., bnif vs. bdif or lbif), and their preferences reflected statistical knowledge alone. These findings suggest that the phonological representations informing lexical decision to spoken and printed words are not isomorphic. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Developing biased social judgments: The false-consensus effect.

Research with adults has demonstrated a false-consensus bias, a tendency to overestimate peer agreement with one's own choices and or behaviors. To test this effect with children, summer campers divided into 3 mean-age groups, including 71 7-yr-old, 40 9-yr-old, and 76 10-yr-old children, voted for their favorite camp activities and then guessed how the vote would turn out for either same-age, younger, or older peers. Results indicate a strong false-consensus bias, which declined with age for Ss whose preferences were in the minority. Ss whose own preferences were consistently in the minority (i.e., nonconformers) exhibited a stronger bias, especially when they were predicting the preferences of older peers. Results were discussed in light of 3 competing explanations for the false consensus effect: egocentrism, ego-defensiveness, and attributional/information processing explanations. None of these theoretical perspectives could account for all of the findings, suggesting that the false-consensus bias may have multiple causes. (24 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)