The Nature of Nonmonotonic Reasoning

Conclusions reached using common sense reasoning from a set of premises are often subsequently revised when additional premises are added. Because we do not always accept previous conclusions in light of subsequent information, common sense reasoning is said to be nonmonotonic. But in the standard formal systems usually studied by logicians, if a conclusion follows from a set of premises, that same conclusion still follows no matter how the premise set is augmented; that is, the consequence relations of standard logics are monotonic. Much recent research in AI has been devoted to the attempt to develop nonmonotonic logics. After some motivational material, we give four formal proofs that there can be no nonmonotonic consequence relation that is characterized by universal constraints on rational belief structures. In other words, a nonmonotonic consequence relation that corresponds to universal principles of rational belief is impossible. We show that the nonmonotonicity of common sense reasoning is a function of the way we use logic, not a function of the logic we use. We give several examples of how nonmonotonic reasoning systems may be based on monotonic logics.     

Nonmonotonic fuzzy set operations: A generalization and some applications

Proposed is a certain generalization of nonmonotonic fuzzy set operators introduced originally by R. R. Yager. By introducing a modulating function one can effectively model situations in which available information interacts (overlaps) with a given default fuzzy set. Discussed is a complete learning environment in which the default values (sets) can be derived based upon some experimental data. The role of the nonmonotonic operations is also revealed in the setting of reasoning carried out in the presence of fuzzy data. ©1997 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

Belief extrapolation (or how to reason about observations and unpredicted change)

We give a logical framework for reasoning with observations at different time points. We call belief extrapolation the process of completing initial belief sets stemming from observations by assuming minimal change. We give a general semantics and we propose several extrapolation operators. We study some key properties verified by these operators and we address computational issues. We study in detail the position of belief extrapolation with respect to revision and update: in particular, belief extrapolation is shown to be a specific form of time-stamped belief revision. Several related lines of work are positioned with respect to belief extrapolation.     

A Classification and Survey of Preference Handling Approaches in Nonmonotonic Reasoning

In recent years, there has been a large amount of disparate work concerning the representation and reasoning with qualitative preferential information by means of approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning. Given the variety of underlying systems, assumptions, motivations, and intuitions, it is difficult to compare or relate one approach with another. Here, we present an overview and classification for approaches to dealing with preference. A set of criteria for classifying approaches is given, followed by a set of desiderata that an approach might be expected to satisfy. A comprehensive set of approaches is subsequently given and classified with respect to these sets of underlying principles.     

Encompassing full nonmonotonicity within belief modification activity

 In this paper, starting from an analysis of the general activity of belief modification, the concept of full nonmonotonicity is introduced and discussed. Such concept is based on the identification of two different types of nonmonotonicity and includes all the cases of belief modification that may occur in reasoning activity. This distinction cannot be encompassed by the most known nonmonotonic logic formalisms nor by the classical view of conditioning and belief revision axiomatically set up by Gardenfors [9]. A conceptual model able to correctly capture fully nonmonotonic reasoning is discussed: such model includes an explicit representation for the concepts of uncertainty about the applicability of a piece of knowledge and of reasoning attitude. Finally, the issue of formalizing fully nonmonotonic reasoning is discussed and preliminary formalization proposals are introduced.     

Translating Multi-Agent Autoepistemic Logic into Logic Program

In order to develop a proof procedure of multi-agent autoepistemic Logic (MAEL), a natural framework to formalize belief and reasoning including inheritance, persistence, and causality, we introduce a method that translates a MAEL theory into a logic program with integrity constraints. It is proved that there exists one-to-one correspondence between extensions of a MAEL theory and stable models of a logic program translated from it. Our approach has the following advantages: (1) We can obtain all extensions of a MAEL theory if we compute all stable models of the translated logic program. (2) We can fully use efficient techniques or systems for computing stable models of a logic program. We also investigate the properties of reasoning in MAEL through this translation. The fact that the extension computing problem can be reduced to the stable model computing problem implies that there are close relationships between MAEL and other formalizations of nonmonotonic reasoning.     

Preorder-based triangle: a modified version of bilattice-based triangle for belief revision in nonmonotonic reasoning

Bilattice-based triangle provides an elegant algebraic structure for reasoning with vague and uncertain information. But the truth and knowledge ordering of intervals in bilattice-based triangle cannot handle repetitive belief revisions which is an essential characteristic of nonmonotonic reasoning. Moreover, the ordering induced over the intervals by the bilattice-based triangle is not sometimes intuitive. In this work, we construct an alternative algebraic structure, namely preorder-based triangle and we formulate proper logical connectives for this. It is also demonstrated that Preorder-based triangle serves to be a better alternative to the bilattice-based triangle for reasoning in application areas, that involve nonmonotonic fuzzy reasoning with uncertain information.     

Fuzzy reasoning based on a new fuzzy rough set and its application to scheduling problems

In this paper, we study the fuzzy reasoning based on a new fuzzy rough set. First, we define a broad family of new lower and upper approximation operators of fuzzy sets between different universes using a set of axioms. Then, based on the approximation operators above, we propose the fuzzy reasoning based on the new fuzzy rough set. By means of the above fuzzy reasoning based on the new fuzzy rough set, for a given premise, we can obtain the fuzzy reasoning consequence expressed by the fuzzy interval constructed by the above two approximations of fuzzy sets. Furthermore, through the defuzzification of the lower and upper approximations, we can get the corresponding two values constructing the interval used as the fuzzy reasoning consequence after defuzzification. Then, from the above interval, a suitable value can be selected as the final reasoning consequence so that some special constraints are satisfied as possibly. At last, we apply the fuzzy reasoning based on the new fuzzy rough set to the scheduling problems, and numerical computational results show that the fuzzy reasoning based on the new fuzzy rough set is more suitable for the scheduling problems compared with the fuzzy reasoning based on the CRI method and the III method.     

A review of: “ANTICIPATORY SYSTEMS”, by Robert Rosen,Pergamon Press,Oxford, 1985, X + 436pp.

In rough set theory there exists a pair of approximation operators, the upper and lower approximations, whereas in Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence there exists a dual pair of uncertainty measures, the plausibility and belief functions. It seems that there is some kind of natural connection between the two theories. The purpose of this paper is to establish the relationship between rough set theory and Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence. Various generalizations of the Dempster-Shafer belief structure and their induced uncertainty measures, the plausibility and belief functions, are first reviewed and examined. Generalizations of Pawlak approximation space and their induced approximation operators, the upper and lower approximations, are then summarized. Concepts of random rough sets, which include the mechanisms of numeric and non-numeric aspects of uncertain knowledge, are then proposed. Notions of the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence within the framework of rough set theory are subsequently formed and interpreted. It is demonstrated that various belief structures are associated with various rough approximation spaces such that different dual pairs of upper and lower approximation operators induced by the rough approximation spaces may be used to interpret the corresponding dual pairs of plausibility and belief functions induced by the belief structures.     

定性Dempster-Shafer理论

采用一个全序的符号值集合来代替数值信任度集合[0,1],提出定性Dempster-Shafer理论来处理既有不确定性又有不精确性的推理问题．首先,定义了适合对不确定性进行定性表达和推理的定性mass函数、定性信任函数等概念,并且研究了这些概念之间的基本关系;其次,详细讨论了定性证据合成问题,提出了基于平均策略的证据合成规则．这种定性Dempster-Shafer理论与其他相关理论相比,既通过在定性领域重新定义Dempster-Shafer理论的基本概念,继承了Dempster-Shafer理论在不确定推理方面的主要特点,同时又具有适合对不精确性操作的既有严格定义又符合直观特性的定性算子,因此更适合基于Dempster-Shafer理论框架不精确表示和处理不确定性．     

Modal nonmonotonic logics demodalized

The study of the relation between default logic and modal nonmonotonic logics has been mostly concerned with the task of translating default logic to autoepistemic or some other modal nonmonotonic logic. Here, we discuss the reverse problem, that is, the possibility of translating modal nonmonotonic logics into default-type systems formulated in the language without modal operators. To this end, we first consider a reformulation of both formalisms in terms of what we call default consequence relations. These consequence relations turn out to be especially suitable for studying default and modal nonmonotonic reasoning. We show, in particular, that different kinds of such reasoning naturally correspond to different structural rules imposed on default consequence relations. Our main results also demonstrate that all modal nonmonotonic objects considered have exact nonmodal counterparts. As an immediate consequence of these results, we obtain a method of reducing common types of modal nonmonotonic reasoning to nonmodal default reasoning.     

Default logic and specification of nonmonotonic reasoning

In this paper constructions leading to the formation of belief sets by agents are studied. The focus is on the situation when possible belief sets are built incrementally in stages. An infinite sequence of theories that represents such a process is called a reasoning trace. A set of reasoning traces describing all possible reasoning scenarios for the agent is called a reasoning frame. Default logic by Reiter is not powerful enough to represent reasoning frames. In the paper a generalization of default logic of Reiter is introduced by allowing infinite sets of justifications. This formalism is called infinitary default logic. In the main result of the paper it is shown that every reasoning frame can be represented by an infinitary default theory. A similar representability result for antichains of theories (belief frames) is also presented.     

Default reasoning and belief revision: A syntax-independent approach

As an important variant of Reiter‘s default logic.Poole(1988) developed a nonmonotonic reasoning framework in the classical first-order language,Brewka and Nebel extended Poole‘s approach in order to enable a representation of priorities between defaults.In this paper a general framework for default reasoning is presented,which can be viewed as a generalization of the three approaches above.It is proved that the syntax-independent default reasoning in this framework is identical to the general belief revision operation introduced by Zhang et al.(1997).This esult provides a solution to the problem whether there is a correspondence between belief revision and default logic for the infinite case .As a by-product,an answer to the the question,raised by Mankinson and Gaerdenfors(1991),is also given about whether there is a counterpart contraciton in nonmonotonic logic.     

Nonmonotonic reasoning,nonmonotonic logics and reasoning about change

In this paper we introduce nonmonotonic reasoning and the attempts at formalizing it using nonmonotonic logics. We examine and compare the best known of these. Despite the difference in motivation and technical construction there are strong similarities between these logics which are confirmed when they are finally shown to have a common basis. Finally we consider using nonmonotonic logics to represent reasoning about change.     

Logics of knowledge and belief—applications

In this paper we survey formal techniques for the study of reasoning about knowledge and belief, and consider their application in the areas of distributed computing and nonmonotonic reasoning.     

Fuzzy analysis of statistical evidence

Bayesian classifiers are effective methods for pattern classification, although their assumptions on the belief structure among attributes are not always justified. In this paper, we introduce a new classification method based on the possibility measure, which does not require a precise belief model and, in a sense, it includes the Bayesian classifiers as special cases. This new classification method uses the fuzzy operators to aggregate attributes information (evidence) and it is referred to as fuzzy analysis of statistical evidence (FASE). FASE has several nice properties. It is noise tolerant, it can handle missing values with ease, and it can extract statistical patterns from the data and represent them by knowledge of beliefs, which, in turn, are propositions for an expert system. Thus, from pattern classification to expert systems, FASE provides a linkage from inductive reasoning to deductive reasoning     

Towards a Model of Learning through Communication

Communication is an interactive, complex, structured process involving agents that are capable of drawing conclusions from the information they have available about some real-life situations. Such situations are generally characterized as being imperfect. In this paper, we aim to address learning from the perspective of the communication between agents. To learn a collection of propositions concerning some situation is to incorporate it within one's knowledge about that situation. That is, the key factor in this activity is for the goal agent, where agents may switch role if appropriate, to integrate the information offered with what it already knows. This may require a process of belief revision, which suggests that the process of incorporation of new information should be modeled nonmonotonically. We shall employ for reasoning a three-valued based nonmonotonic logic that formalizes some aspects of revisable reasoning and it is accessible to implementation. The logic is sound and complete. A theorem-prover of the logic has successfully been implemented. Received 3 August 1999 / Revised 17 April 2000 / Accepted 6 May 2000     

Uniform semantic treatment of default and autoepistemic logics

We revisit the issue of epistemological and semantic foundations for autoepistemic and default logics, two leading formalisms in nonmonotonic reasoning. We develop a general semantic approach to autoepistemic and default logics that is based on the notion of a belief pair and that exploits the lattice structure of the collection of all belief pairs. For each logic, we introduce a monotone operator on the lattice of belief pairs. We then show that a whole family of semantics can be defined in a systematic and principled way in terms of fixpoints of this operator (or as fixpoints of certain closely related operators). Our approach elucidates fundamental constructive principles in which agents form their belief sets, and leads to approximation semantics for autoepistemic and default logics. It also allows us to establish a precise one-to-one correspondence between the family of semantics for default logic and the family of semantics for autoepistemic logic. The correspondence exploits the modal interpretation of a default proposed by Konolige. Our results establish conclusively that default logic can be viewed as a fragment of autoepistemic logic, a result that has been long anticipated. At the same time, they explain the source of the difficulty to formally relate the semantics of default extensions by Reiter and autoepistemic expansions by Moore. These two semantics occupy different locations in the corresponding families of semantics for default and autoepistemic logics.     

Minimal Belief and Negation as Failure in Multi-Agent Systems

We propose an epistemic, nonmonotonic approach to the formalization of knowledge in a multi-agent setting. From the technical viewpoint, a family of nonmonotonic logics, based on Lifschitz's modal logic of minimal belief and negation as failure, is proposed, which allows for formalizing an agent which is able to reason about both its own knowledge and other agents' knowledge and ignorance. We define a reasoning method for such a logic and characterize the computational complexity of the major reasoning tasks in this formalism. From the practical perspective, we argue that our logical framework is well-suited for representing situations in which an agent cooperates in a team, and each agent is able to communicate his knowledge to other agents in the team. In such a case, in many situations the agent needs nonmonotonic abilities, in order to reason about such a situation based on his own knowledge and the other agents' knowledge and ignorance. Finally, we show the effectiveness of our framework in the robotic soccer application domain.