Young children's memory for the true and pretend identities of objects.

Two studies examined how children conceive of the true and pretend identities of an object used in object-substitution pretense. In each study, 3- and 4-year-olds were assessed for their memory for each identity of an object that they used in a previous episode of pretend play (Study 1) or observed someone else using (Study 2). More children correctly remembered the true than the pretend identity of the objects, and there was no contingency between their tendency to remember each identity Additionally, children's tendency to correctly specify each identity was related to their age and when (i.e., during or after the pretend episode) the task was given. The results were explained by factors affecting young children's ability to manage separate representations of true and pretend identities of objects. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Development of beliefs about the origins and controllability of dreams.

In three studies the authors investigated the development of beliefs about dreaming. Study 1 assessed 3 to 5-year-old children's beliefs about the origins and controllability of dreams. Results revealed significant changes in children's beliefs about the roles of behavioral experiences and mental processes in the generation of dream content. Results also revealed that young children consider both dreams and imagination to be highly controllable. In Study 2, preschool-age children, elementary school-age children, and adults received either imagination or dream stories and were questioned about controllability. In Study 3, emotional valence of the dream content was varied. Results of Studies 2 and 3 revealed significant development in beliefs that dreams are not subject to conscious control. Beliefs in controllability were higher among females. Study 3 showed that the emotional content of a dream affects these claims. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Preschoolers' use of desires to solve theory of mind problems in a pretense context

K. Bartsch and H. M. Wellman (1995) have suggested that 3-year-old children's preference to construe behavior in terms of desire may interfere with their ability to reason according to belief in standard false belief tasks. Other researchers have suggested that young children fail typical measures of theory of mind because they have a reality bias (e.g., P. Mitchell, 1994). Study 1 demonstrates that even young children are able to correctly attribute a false belief to an agent when that belief is about the status of a pretense. Study 2 shows that children find it easier to attribute a false belief when the desires of the agent are eliminated. However, Study 3 suggests that a reality bias also influences children's ability to consider beliefs. Implications for recent accounts of theory of mind development are discussed.     

A comparison of young children's understanding of contradictory representations in pretense, memory, and belief

The present study examined the nature of young children's understanding of various mental representations. 3- and 4-year-olds were presented with story protagonists who held mental representations (beliefs, pretenses, and memories) that contradicted reality. Subjects chose 1 of 2 alternate "thought pictures" (depicting either the mental representation or reality) that reflected the mental state. While 4-year-olds performed relatively well on all scenario types, 3-year-olds chose the correct thought picture significantly more often for pretense and memory scenarios than for false belief scenarios. These results suggest that young children conceptualize pretense as involving mental representations, and that they have more difficulty understanding contradictory mental representations that purport to correspond to reality.     

Representing quantity beyond whole numbers: Some, none, and part.

Examined the development of children's representations of quantity and their conceptions of the meaning of those representations. 75 children (aged 3–7 yrs) were asked to write a representation to indicate a quantity presented in a game-like scenario. Three kinds of quantities were included: whole numbers, zeros, and fractions. The children's notations were shown to them shortly after they were produced and then again 2 wks later to see if children could interpret them. The results show the familiar developmental pattern towards increased use of conventional notations for all quantities. The ability to read the notations was greatest for conventional numbers where performance was at ceiling, lower for analogue representations, and very poor for idiosyncratic global recordings. Children's choice of a notational format was influenced almost entirely by their age and not by the quantity being represented. Children were able to solve the zero problems almost as well as they could the whole numbers, but their understanding and use of representations for fractions was very limited. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Children's recollections of traumatic and nontraumatic events

Whereas the social and emotional consequences of childhood trauma are well documented, less is known about how young children understand, represent, and remember traumatic experiences. A review of the literature indicates striking similarities in the development of young children's ability to recall traumatic and nontraumatic events. More specifically, events experienced before the age of about 18 months do not seem to be verbally accessible; events experienced between about 18 months and 2.5-3 years are reported in fragmentary fashion and seem to be prone to increasing error over time. From about age 3 years on, children can give reasonably coherent accounts of their past experiences and can retain these memories over long durations. The ways in which children are able to participate in conversations about events as they are occurring and in retrospect seems to play a critical role in their developing event memories. Implications of the empirical data for understanding trauma memory in childhood are discussed.     

Preschoolers' understanding of mental and bodily reactions to contamination: What you don't know can hurt you, but cannot sadden you.

Evidence of the operation of a biological theory might be found in children's distinction between mental (emotional) and bodily (illness) reactions to contamination. Study 1 explored whether children see emotions as voluntary but illness as outside of intentional control. Three- and 5-yr-olds judged that simple volitions were insufficient to alter either outcome. Study 2 suggested that children distinguish reactions mediated by representations from those mediated by physical interactions. Children indicated that knowledge determines mental reactions to contamination, but physical contact determines bodily reactions. Study 3 explored knowledge about particulars of emotional and illness reactions. Most preschoolers did not realize that illness takes time to develop. These data suggest that preschoolers do distinguish between physical and mental reactions to contamination but have a poor understanding of the actual bodily processes involved. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Why can''t we be friends?

1. Research designed to examine the systematic ability of children's drawings to disclose abuse or neglect has been equivocal. 2. The use of art to understand preschool-aged children is particularly advantageous because very young children usually are not able to communicate their feelings clearly. 3. The study shows that the family drawings of abused or neglected preschool children can be differentiated from those of children not identified as abused or neglected.     

Children's use of triadic eye gaze information for "mind reading."

Five experiments examined children's use of eye gaze information for "mind-reading" purposes, specifically, for inferring another person's desire. When presented with static displays in the first 3 experiments, only by 4 years of age did children use another person's eye direction to infer desires, although younger children could identify the person's focus of attention. Further, 3-year-olds were capable of inferring desire from other nonverbal cues, such as pointing (Experiment 3). When eye gaze was presented dynamically with several other scaffolding cues (Experiment 4), 2- and 3-year-olds successfully used eye gaze for desire inference. Scaffolding cues were removed in Experiment 5, and 2- and 3-year-olds still performed above chance in using eye gaze. Results suggest that 2-year-olds are capable of using eye gaze alone to infer about another's desire. The authors propose that the acquisition of the ability to use attentional cues to infer another's mental state may involve both an association process and a differentiation process. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

View specificity, array specificity, and egocentrism in young children's drawings.

Examined the concept of egocentrism in an experiment in which 80 children (aged 6 yrs 1 mo to 7 yrs 2 mo) were asked to draw 2 pictures of an array of 2 objects, one characterizing their own view and the other characterizing the view of another child seated in a different position. Ss were able to represent their partner's view when the latter presented few problems in graphic complexity or mental rotation. Ss who were asked to draw their own view after drawing their partner's produced more view specific drawings than Ss asked to draw their own view first. It is concluded that the production of array-specific representations of spatial relations in young children's drawings should not be seen as a manifestation of egocentrism. (French abstract) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Mother-child participation in conversation about the past: relationships to preschoolers' theory of mind

Forty 3.5 to 4.5-year-olds discussed 3 past events with their mothers and completed a set of theory of mind tasks indexing their ability to reason about conflicting mental representations and their understanding of knowledge. Semipartial correlations and analyses of covariance showed that children's theory of mind scores were related to their participation in memory conversations, independent of age and linguistic skill. The frequency with which mothers provided new information was related to children's theory of mind scores, although mothers' direct replies to children were generally unrelated to children's understanding of mind. This research takes an important step toward examining the relevance of theory of mind skills to real-world, social interaction. The results have implications for explaining the emergence of autobiographical memory.     

When all signs point to you: Lies told in the face of evidence.

Young children's ability to tell a strategic lie by making it consistent with the physical evidence of their transgression was investigated along with the sociocognitive correlates of such lie-telling behaviors. In Experiment 1, 247 Chinese children between 3 and 5 years of age (126 boys) were left alone in a room and asked not to lift a cup to see the contents. If children lifted up the cup, the contents would be spilled and evidence of their transgression would be left behind. Upon returning to the room, the experimenter asked children whether they peeked and how the contents of the cup ended up on the table. Experiment 1 revealed that young children are able to tell strategic lies to be consistent with the physical evidence by about 4 or 5 years of age, and this ability increases in sophistication with age. Experiment 2, which included 252 Chinese 4-year-olds (127 boys), identified 2 sociocognitive factors related to children's ability to tell strategic lies. Specifically, both children's theory-of-mind understanding and inhibitory control skills were significantly related to their ability to tell strategic lies in the face of physical evidence. The present investigation reveals that contrary to the prevailing views, even young children are able to tell strategic lies in some contexts. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

What the stories children tell can tell about their memory: Narrative skill and young children's suggestibility.

The authors examined the relation between children's narrative ability, which has been identified as an important contributor to memory development, and suggestibility. Across 2 studies, a total of 112 preschool-aged children witnessed a staged event and were subsequently questioned suggestively. Results from Study 1 indicated that children's ability to provide a high-quality narrative of the event was related to resistance to suggestive questions, and narrative ability appeared to supersede age as a predictor of such resistance. In Study 2, children's general language and narrative abilities were measured in addition to their ability to produce a high-quality narrative about the target event. These results replicated Study 1's findings that children's ability to produce a high-quality narrative of a previously experienced event predicted resistance to suggestion. However, the quality of children's autobiographical memory narratives predicted shifting from denial to assent. Findings are considered in light of narrative's role in memory development and underlying mechanisms that may explain children's suggestibility. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Making numbers count: The early development of numerical inferences.

Two experiments examined preschool children's ability to draw inferences about numerosity from correspondences between sets. In Experiment 1, 3- and 4-year-old children made numerical inferences about a hidden set from their own counts of a corresponding visible set and also from numerical information about that set stated by the experimenter. Experiment 2 contrasted a count condition with a move condition, in which children's attention was not explicitly drawn to the numerosity of the visible set. Again, children were able to make numerical inferences as early as 3 years of age. However, differences between the 2 conditions implicate production deficiencies in young children's use of counting as a problem-solving strategy when they are not explicitly told to count. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A comparison of aggressive-rejected and nonaggressive-rejected children's interpretations of self-directed and other-directed rejection

The hypothesis that aggressive-rejected children are unaware of their social status because they are self-protective when processing negative peer feedback was tested in 3 studies. In Study 1, fourth-grade girls and boys were asked to name peers they liked or disliked, as well as peers they thought liked or disliked them. Comparisons of aggressive-rejected, nonaggressive-rejected, and average status groups revealed that aggressive-rejected children were more unrealistic in their assessments of their social status than were nonaggressive-rejected children. In Study 2, rejected and average boys identified in Study 1 were asked to name who they thought liked or disliked other children from their classroom. Comparisons of perceived and actual nominations for peers revealed that aggressive-rejected children were able to assess the social status of others as well as did nonaggressive-rejected and average status children. Because the difficulties aggressive-rejected children demonstrated in Study 1 did not generalize to judging the status of others in Study 2, the self-protective hypothesis was supported. Study 3 provided a parallel test of this hypothesis under more controlled conditions. Subjects from Study 2 viewed other children receiving rejection feedback from peers in videotaped interactions and received similar feedback themselves from experimental confederates. While all subjects rated self-directed feedback somewhat more positively than other-directed feedback, aggressive-rejected subjects had the largest self-favoring discrepancy between their judgments of self- and other-directed feedback. These findings also suggest that aggressive-rejected children may make self-protective "errors" when judging other children's negative feelings about them. Ethnicity differences in evaluating peer feedback emerged in Studies 1 and 3, raising questions about the impact of minority status on children's evaluations of rejection feedback.     

Why dogs have puppies and cats have kittens: the role of birth in young children's understanding of biological origins

Three studies examined young children's understanding of the biologically causal role of birth in determining animal properties and species kind identity. In Studies 1 and 2, 4- to 7-year-olds and adults were told stories in which a baby was born to an animal of one species (e.g., a horse) but was adopted and raised by an animal of another species (e.g., a cow). In Study 1, children were asked to judge which parent the baby would resemble on a set of physical properties and beliefs. The majority of children were unable to say that the baby would resemble the birth parent on physical properties but share the beliefs of the adoptive parent. These results indicate that children were not using domain-specific causal understandings to reason about the origins of these properties. In Study 2, however, when asked to explicitly predict the kind of the baby, even 5-year-olds were able to reliably judge that the baby would be of the same species kind as the birth parent rather than the adoptive parent. This result suggests that children do understand at some level that birth determines species kind. Study 3 examined further the extent to which knowledge about birth influenced children's inferences about properties. Five-year-olds were asked to judge whether a baby would share a set of physical and nonphysical properties with its mother or its father. The results showed that children who knew the factual information about where babies come from (i.e., inside mommies' tummies) were more likely to attribute the mother's properties to the baby than the father's, regardless of whether the properties were physical or nonphysical. But this finding was true only if the property of one of the parents was not inherently more desirable or true than that of the other parent. In sum, the results of these 3 studies indicate that knowledge of birth does play a role in children's inferential reasoning, even for 5-year-olds, but that that role is not domain-specific. The implications for children's understanding of biological inheritance are discussed.     

Knowing what to remember and forget: a developmental study of cue memory in intentional forgetting

These experiments are the first to investigate children's encoding and use of information about a memory cue in Bjork's (1972) intentional forgetting task. In Experiment 1, children in Grades 2, 4, and 6 and college students were given cues to either remember or forget after the presentation of each picture. Recall and recognition tests of pictures and cues followed. The procedure in Experiment 2 was identical to that in Experiment 1 except that the list of presentation pictures was altered for some children (Grades 3 and 4) and adolescents (Grades 8 and 9) so that remember and forget cues were associated with particular taxonomic categories. In Experiment 3, the testing component was modified so that children (Grades 2, 3, and 4) and college students were asked to recall only the cue associated with each picture. The results indicated that (1) children as young as second graders encode the cue associated with each picture, although to a lesser extent than do college students, (2) much improvement in intentional forgetting is still occurring during adolescence, (3) only adults adequately cluster their recall by cue, (4) associating remember and forget cues with items from different categories does not increase the differentiation between cues, and (5) eliminating picture recall and recognition has minimal effects on the magnitude of cue judgments. These results suggest that children's difficulties on intentional forgetting tasks stem, at least in part, from their poorer encoding of information about whether an item should be remembered or forgotten.     

Mother–child participation in conversation about the past: Relationships to preschoolers' theory of mind.

Forty 3.5- to 4.5-year-olds discussed 3 past events with their mothers and completed a set of theory of mind tasks indexing their ability to reason about conflicting mental representations and their understanding of knowledge. Semipartial correlations and analyses of covariance showed that children's theory of mind scores were related to their participation in memory conversations, independent of age and linguistic skill. The frequency with which mothers provided new information was related to children's theory of mind scores, although mothers' direct replies to children were generally unrelated to children's understanding of mind. This research takes an important step toward examining the relevance of theory of mind skills to real-world, social interaction. The results have implications for explaining the emergence of autobiographical memory. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Origins of children's helpless and mastery achievement patterns in the family.

An exploratory study examined the origins of children's motivational patterns in the family by observing 3rd-grade children (10 helpless and 11 mastery-oriented) and their mothers performing a series of solvable and insolvable problem-solving tasks. Mothers of mastery children appeared to show sensitivity and responsiveness to their children's ability perceptions and requests for help. They also appeared to support mastery behaviors in their children by increasing task-focused teaching behaviors and maintaining high-positive affect during the insolvable puzzles. Furthermore, in the face of failures, they retrained their children's low-ability attributions and performance-goal statements, while promoting mastery or task-focused behaviors. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that mothers of mastery children may socialize their children's achievement motivation. However, because of the small sample size and other limitations, the results should be interpreted with caution. Several directions are outlined for future research on the familial origins of helpless and mastery patterns in children. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Can children recognize pride?

Recent research has shown that pride, like the "basic" emotions of anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, and surprise, has a distinct, nonverbal expression that can be recognized by adults (J. L. Tracy & R. W. Robins, 2004b). In 2 experiments, the authors examined whether young children can identify the pride expression and distinguish it from expressions of happiness and surprise. Results suggest that (a) children can recognize pride at above-chance levels by age 4 years; (b) children recognize pride as well as they recognize happiness; (c) pride recognition, like happiness and surprise recognition, improves from age 3 to 7 years; and (d) children's ability to recognize pride cannot be accounted for by the use of a process of elimination (i.e., an exclusion rule) to identify an unknown entity. These findings have implications for the development of emotion recognition and children's ability to perceive and communicate pride. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)