Network Design with Weighted Players

We consider a model of game-theoretic network design initially studied by Anshelevich et al. (Proceedings of the 45th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), pp. 295–304, 2004), where selfish players select paths in a network to minimize their cost, which is prescribed by Shapley cost shares. If all players are identical, the cost share incurred by a player for an edge in its path is the fixed cost of the edge divided by the number of players using it. In this special case, Anshelevich et al. (Proceedings of the 45th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), pp. 295–304, 2004) proved that pure-strategy Nash equilibria always exist and that the price of stability—the ratio between the cost of the best Nash equilibrium and that of an optimal solution—is Θ(log k), where k is the number of players. Little was known about the existence of equilibria or the price of stability in the general weighted version of the game. Here, each player i has a weight w _i ≥1, and its cost share of an edge in its path equals w _i times the edge cost, divided by the total weight of the players using the edge. This paper presents the first general results on weighted Shapley network design games. First, we give a simple example with no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. This motivates considering the price of stability with respect to α-approximate Nash equilibria—outcomes from which no player can decrease its cost by more than an α multiplicative factor. Our first positive result is that O(log w _max)-approximate Nash equilibria exist in all weighted Shapley network design games, where w _max is the maximum player weight. More generally, we establish the following trade-off between the two objectives of good stability and low cost: for every α=Ω(log w _max), the price of stability with respect to O(α)-approximate Nash equilibria is O((log W)/α), where W is the sum of the players’ weights. In particular, there is always an O(log W)-approximate Nash equilibrium with cost within a constant factor of optimal. Finally, we show that this trade-off curve is nearly optimal: we construct a family of networks without o(log w _max/ log log w _max)-approximate Nash equilibria, and show that for all α=Ω(log w _max/log log w _max), achieving a price of stability of O(log W/α) requires relaxing equilibrium constraints by an Ω(α) factor. Research of H.-L. Chen supported in part by NSF Award 0323766. Research of T. Roughgarden supported in part by ONR grant N00014-04-1-0725, DARPA grant W911NF-04-9-0001, and an NSF CAREER Award.     

The Impact of Social Ignorance on Weighted Congestion Games

We consider weighted linear congestion games, and investigate how social ignorance, namely lack of information about the presence of some players, affects the inefficiency of pure Nash equilibria (PNE) and the convergence rate of the ε-Nash dynamics. To this end, we adopt the model of graphical linear congestion games with weighted players, where the individual cost and the strategy selection of each player only depends on his neighboring players in the social graph. We show that such games admit a potential function, and thus a PNE. Next, we investigate the Price of Anarchy (PoA) and the Price of Stability (PoS) of graphical linear congestion games with respect to the players’ total actual cost. Our main result is that the impact of social ignorance on the PoA and on the PoS is naturally quantified by the independence number α(G) of the social graph G. In particular, we show that the PoA grows roughly as α(G)(α(G)+2), which is essentially tight as long as α(G) does not exceed half the number of players, and that the PoS lies between α(G) and 2α(G). Moreover, we show that the ε-Nash dynamics reaches an α(G)(α(G)+2)-approximate configuration in polynomial time that does not directly depend on the social graph. For unweighted graphical linear games with symmetric strategies, we show that the ε-Nash dynamics reaches an ε-approximate PNE in polynomial time that exceeds the corresponding time for symmetric linear games by a factor at most as large as the number of players.     

Price of Stability in Survivable Network Design

We study the survivable version of the game theoretic network formation model known as the Connection Game, originally introduced in Anshelevich et al. (Proc. 35th ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2003). In this model, players attempt to connect to a common source node in a network by purchasing edges, and sharing their costs with other players. We introduce the survivable version of this game, where each player desires 2 edge-disjoint connections between her pair of nodes instead of just a single connecting path, and analyze the quality of exact and approximate Nash equilibria. This version is significantly different from the original Connection Game and have more complications than the existing literature on arbitrary cost-sharing games since we consider the formation of networks that involve many cycles.     

Approximate schemas,source-consistency and query answering

We use the Edit distance with Moves on words and trees and say that two regular (tree) languages are ε-close if every word (tree) of one language is ε-close to the other. A transducer model is introduced to compare tree languages (schemas) with different alphabets and attributes. Using the statistical embedding of Fischer et al. (Proceedings of 21st IEEE Symposium on Logic in Computer Science, pp. 421–430, 2006), we show that Source-Consistency and Approximate Query Answering are testable on words and trees, i.e. can be approximately decided within ε by only looking at a constant fraction of the input.

Capabilities and Limits of Compact Error Resilience Methods for Algorithmic Self-Assembly

Winfree’s pioneering work led the foundations in the area of error-reduction in algorithmic self-assembly (Winfree and Bekbolatov in DNA Based Computers 9, LNCS, vol. 2943, pp. 126–144, [2004]), but the construction resulted in increase of the size of assembly. Reif et al. (Nanotechnol. Sci. Comput. 79–103, [2006]) contributed further in this area with compact error-resilient schemes that maintained the original size of the assemblies, but required certain restrictions on the Boolean functions to be used in the algorithmic self-assembly. It is a critical challenge to improve these compact error resilient schemes to incorporate arbitrary Boolean functions, and to determine how far these prior results can be extended under different degrees of restrictions on the Boolean functions. In this work we present a considerably more complete theory of compact error-resilient schemes for algorithmic self-assembly in two and three dimensions. In our error model, ε is defined to be the probability that there is a mismatch between the neighboring sides of two juxtaposed tiles and they still stay together in the equilibrium. This probability is independent of any other match or mismatch and hence we term this probabilistic model as the independent error model. In our model all the error analysis is performed under the assumption of kinetic equilibrium. First we consider two-dimensional algorithmic self-assembly. We present an error correction scheme for reduction of errors from ε to ε ² for arbitrary Boolean functions in two dimensional algorithmic self-assembly. Then we characterize the class of Boolean functions for which the error can be reduced from ε to ε ³, and present an error correction scheme that achieves this reduction. Then we prove ultimate limits on certain classes of compact error resilient schemes: in particular we show that they can not provide reduction of errors from ε to ε ⁴ is for any Boolean functions. Further, we develop the first provable compact error resilience schemes for three dimensional tiling self-assemblies. We also extend the work of Winfree on self-healing in two-dimensional self-assembly (Winfree in Nanotechnol. Sci. Comput. 55–78, [2006]) to obtain a self-healing tile set for three-dimensional self-assembly.     

Graph Spanners in the Streaming Model: An Experimental Study

This article reports the results of an extensive experimental analysis of efficient algorithms for computing graph spanners in the data streaming model, where an (α,β)-spanner of a graph G is a subgraph S⊆G such that for each pair of vertices the distance in S is at most α times the distance in G plus β. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first computational study of graph spanner algorithms in a streaming setting. We compare experimentally the randomized algorithms proposed by Baswana () and by Elkin (In: Proceedings of the 34th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming (ICALP 2007), Wroclaw, Poland, pp. 716–727, 9–13 July 2007) for general stretch factors with the deterministic algorithm presented by Ausiello et al. (In: Proceedings of the 15th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2007), Engineering and Applications Track, Eilat, Israel, 8–10 October 2007. LNCS, vol. 4698, pp. 605–617, 2007), designed for building small stretch spanners. All the algorithms we implemented work in a data streaming model where the input graph is given as a stream of edges in arbitrary order, and all of them need a single pass over the data. Differently from the algorithm in Ausiello et al., the algorithms in Baswana () and Elkin (In: Proceedings of the 34th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming (ICALP 2007), Wroclaw, Poland, pp. 716–727, 9–13 July 2007) need to know in advance the number of vertices in the graph. The results of our experimental investigation on several input families confirm that all these algorithms are very efficient in practice, finding spanners with stretch and size much smaller than the theoretical bounds and comparable to those obtainable by off-line algorithms. Moreover, our experimental findings confirm that small values of the stretch factor are the case of interest in practice, and that the algorithm by Ausiello et al. tends to produce spanners of better quality than the algorithms by Baswana and Elkin, while still using a comparable amount of time and space resources. Work partially supported by the Italian Ministry of University and Research under Project MAINSTREAM “Algorithms for Massive Information Structures and Data Streams”. A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the 15th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2007) 5.     

On the complexity of constrained Nash equilibria in graphical games

A widely accepted rational behavior for non-cooperative players is based on the notion of Nash equilibrium. Although the existence of a Nash equilibrium is guaranteed in the mixed framework (i.e., when players select their actions in a randomized manner) in many real-world applications the existence of “any” equilibrium is not enough. Rather, it is often desirable to single out equilibria satisfying some additional requirements (in order, for instance, to guarantee a minimum payoff to certain players), which we call constrained Nash equilibria.In this paper, a formal framework for specifying these kinds of requirement is introduced and investigated in the context of graphical games, where a player p may directly be interested in some of the other players only, called the neighbors of p. This setting is very useful for modeling large population games, where typically each player does not directly depend on all the players, and representing her utility function extensively is either inconvenient or infeasible.Based on this framework, the complexity of deciding the existence and of computing constrained equilibria is then investigated, in the light of evidencing how the intrinsic difficulty of these tasks is affected by the requirements prescribed at the equilibrium and by the structure of players’ interactions. The analysis is carried out for the setting of mixed strategies as well as for the setting of pure strategies, i.e., when players are forced to deterministically choose the action to perform. In particular, for this latter case, restrictions on players’ interactions and on constraints are identified, that make the computation of Nash equilibria an easy problem, for which polynomial and highly-parallelizable algorithms are presented.     

Practical Methods for Shape Fitting and Kinetic Data Structures using Coresets

The notion of ε-kernel was introduced by Agarwal et al. (J. ACM 51:606–635, 2004) to set up a unified framework for computing various extent measures of a point set P approximately. Roughly speaking, a subset Q⊆P is an ε-kernel of P if for every slab W containing Q, the expanded slab (1+ε)W contains P. They illustrated the significance of ε-kernel by showing that it yields approximation algorithms for a wide range of geometric optimization problems. We present a simpler and more practical algorithm for computing the ε-kernel of a set P of points in ℝ ^d . We demonstrate the practicality of our algorithm by showing its empirical performance on various inputs. We then describe an incremental algorithm for fitting various shapes and use the ideas of our algorithm for computing ε-kernels to analyze the performance of this algorithm. We illustrate the versatility and practicality of this technique by implementing approximation algorithms for minimum enclosing cylinder, minimum-volume bounding box, and minimum-width annulus. Finally, we show that ε-kernels can be effectively used to expedite the algorithms for maintaining extents of moving points. A preliminary version of the paper appeared in Proceedings of the 20th Annual ACM Symposium on Computational Geometry, 2004, pp. 263–272. Research by the first two authors is supported by NSF under grants CCR-00-86013, EIA-98-70724, EIA-01-31905, and CCR-02-04118, and by a grant from the US–Israel Binational Science Foundation. Research by the fourth author is supported by NSF CAREER award CCR-0237431.     

On the Performance of Approximate Equilibria in Congestion Games

We study the performance of approximate Nash equilibria for congestion games with polynomial latency functions. We consider how much the price of anarchy worsens and how much the price of stability improves as a function of the approximation factor ε. We give tight bounds for the price of anarchy of atomic and non-atomic congestion games and for the price of stability of non-atomic congestion games. For the price of stability of atomic congestion games we give non-tight bounds for linear latencies. Our results not only encompass and generalize the existing results of exact equilibria to ε-Nash equilibria, but they also provide a unified approach which reveals the common threads of the atomic and non-atomic price of anarchy results. By expanding the spectrum, we also cast the existing results in a new light.     

Selfish Routing with Incomplete Information

In his seminal work, Harsanyi (Manag. Sci. 14, 159–182, 320–332, 468–502, 1967) introduced an elegant approach to study non-cooperative games with incomplete information. In our work, we use this approach to define a new selfish routing game with incomplete information that we call Bayesian routing game. Here, each of n selfish users wishes to assign its traffic to one of m parallel links. However, users do not know each other’s traffic. Following Harsanyi’s approach, we introduce, for each user, a set of possible types. In our model, each type of a user corresponds to some traffic and the players’ uncertainty about each other’s traffic is described by a probability distribution over all possible type profiles. We present a comprehensive collection of results about our Bayesian routing game. Our main findings are as follows:

Efficiently Testing Sparse <Emphasis Type="Italic">GF</Emphasis>(2) Polynomials

We give the first algorithm that is both query-efficient and time-efficient for testing whether an unknown function f:{0,1} ⁿ →{−1,1} is an s-sparse GF(2) polynomial versus ε-far from every such polynomial. Our algorithm makes poly(s,1/ε) black-box queries to f and runs in time n⋅poly(s,1/ε). The only previous algorithm for this testing problem (Diakonikolas et al. in Proceedings of the 48th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS, pp. 549–558, 2007) used poly(s,1/ε) queries, but had running time exponential in s and super-polynomial in 1/ε.     

Approximately Fair Cost Allocation in Metric Traveling Salesman Games

A traveling salesman game is a cooperative game . Here N, the set of players, is the set of cities (or the vertices of the complete graph) and c _D is the characteristic function where D is the underlying cost matrix. For all S⊆N, define c _D (S) to be the cost of a minimum cost Hamiltonian tour through the vertices of S∪{0} where is called as the home city. Define Core as the core of a traveling salesman game . Okamoto (Discrete Appl. Math. 138:349–369, [2004]) conjectured that for the traveling salesman game with D satisfying triangle inequality, the problem of testing whether Core is empty or not is -hard. We prove that this conjecture is true. This result directly implies the -hardness for the general case when D is asymmetric. We also study approximately fair cost allocations for these games. For this, we introduce the cycle cover games and show that the core of a cycle cover game is non-empty by finding a fair cost allocation vector in polynomial time. For a traveling salesman game, let and ∀ S⊆N, x(S)≤ε⋅c _D (S)} be an ε-approximate core, for a given ε>1. By viewing an approximate fair cost allocation vector for this game as a sum of exact fair cost allocation vectors of several related cycle cover games, we provide a polynomial time algorithm demonstrating the non-emptiness of the log ₂(|N|−1)-approximate core by exhibiting a vector in this approximate core for the asymmetric traveling salesman game. We improve it further by finding a -approximate core in polynomial time for some constant c. We also show that there exists an ε ₀>1 such that it is -hard to decide whether ε ₀-Core is empty or not. A preliminary version of the paper appeared in the third Workshop on Approximation and Online Algorithms (WAOA), 2005.     

Equilibria problems on games: Complexity versus succinctness

We study the computational complexity of problems involving equilibria in strategic games and in perfect information extensive games when the number of players is large. We consider, among others, the problems of deciding the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium in strategic games or deciding the existence of a pure Nash or a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium with a given payoff in finite perfect information extensive games. We address the fundamental question of how can we represent a game with a large number of players? We propose three ways of representing a game with different degrees of succinctness for the components of the game. For perfect information extensive games we show that when the number of moves of each player is large and the input game is represented succinctly these problems are PSPACE-complete. In contraposition, when the game is described explicitly by means of its associated tree all these problems are decidable in polynomial time. For strategic games we show that the complexity of deciding the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium depends on the succinctness of the game representation and then on the size of the action sets. In particular we show that it is NP-complete, when the number of players is large and the number of actions for each player is constant, and that the problem is -complete when the number of players is a constant and the size of the action sets is exponential in the size of the game representation. Again when the game is described explicitly the problem is decidable in polynomial time.     

Graphical Congestion Games

We consider congestion games with linear latency functions in which each player is aware only of a subset of all the other players. This is modeled by means of a social knowledge graph G in which nodes represent players and there is an edge from i to j if i knows j. Under the assumption that the payoff of each player is affected only by the strategies of the adjacent ones, we first give a complete characterization of the games possessing pure Nash equilibria. Namely, if the social graph G is undirected, the game is an exact potential game and thus isomorphic to a classical congestion game. As a consequence, it always converges and possesses Nash equilibria. On the other hand, if G is directed an equilibrium is not guaranteed to exist, but the game is always convergent and an equilibrium can be found in polynomial time if G is acyclic, even if finding the best equilibrium remains an intractable problem.     

Cost-Sharing Mechanisms for Network Design

We consider a single-source network design problem from a game-theoretic perspective. Gupta, Kumar and Roughgarden (Proc. 35th Annual ACM STOC, pp. 365–372, 2003) developed a simple method for a single-source rent-or-buy problem that also yields the best-known approximation ratio for the problem. We show how to use a variant of this method to develop an approximately budget-balanced and group strategyproof cost-sharing method for the problem. The novelty of our approach stems from our obtaining the cost-sharing methods for the rent-or-buy problem by carefully combining cost-shares for the simpler Steiner tree problem. Our algorithm is conceptually simpler than the previous such cost-sharing method due to Pál and Tardos (Proc. 44th Annual FOCS, pp. 584–593, 2003), and improves the previously-known approximation factor of 15 to 4.6. A preliminary version of this work appears in the Proc. International Workshop on Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization Problems, 2004. This research was done in part during the IMA Workshop on Network Management and Design at the University of Minnesota, April 2003. A. Gupta supported in part by an NSF CAREER award CCF-0448095, and by an Alfred P. Sloan Fellowship. A. Srinivasan supported in part by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. 0208005 and ITR Award CNS-0426683. Research of é. Tardos supported in part by ONR grant N00014-98-1-0589, and NSF grants CCR-0311333 and CCR-0325453.     

On one problem of construction of energy-saving schedules

Construction of energy-saving schedules for the execution of n jobs on a processor with the use of the dynamic voltage scaling (DVS) mechanism is considered. A formal problem statement is presented. The problem is shown to be NP-hard. An algorithm with complexity O(n ₂/ε) guaranteeing finding of a (1 + ε)-approximate solution is suggested.     

On Equilibria in Quantitative Games with Reachability/Safety Objectives

In this paper, we study turn-based multiplayer quantitative non zero-sum games played on finite graphs with reachability objectives. In this framework each player aims at reaching his own goal as soon as possible. We focus on existence results for two solution concepts: Nash equilibrium and secure equilibrium. We prove the existence of finite-memory Nash (resp. secure) equilibria in n-player (resp. 2-player) games. For the case of Nash equilibria, we extend our result in two directions. First, we show that finite-memory Nash equilibria still exist when the model is enriched by allowing n-tuples of positive costs on edges (one cost by player). Secondly, we prove the existence of Nash equilibria in quantitative games with both reachability and safety objectives.     

Adaptive Spatial Partitioning for Multidimensional Data Streams

We propose a space-efficient scheme for summarizing multidimensional data streams. Our sketch can be used to solve spatial versions of several classical data stream queries efficiently. For instance, we can track ε-hot spots, which are congruent boxes containing at least an ε fraction of the stream, and maintain hierarchical heavy hitters in d dimensions. Our sketch can also be viewed as a multidimensional generalization of the ε-approximate quantile summary. The space complexity of our scheme is O((1/ε) log R) if the points lie in the domain [0, R]^d, where d is assumed to be a constant. The scheme extends to the sliding window model with a log (ε n) factor increase in space, where n is the size of the sliding window. Our sketch can also be used to answer ε-approximate rectangular range queries over a stream of d-dimensional points.     

Strategic Multiway Cut and Multicut Games

We consider cut games where players want to cut themselves off from different parts of a network. These games arise when players want to secure themselves from areas of potential infection. For the game-theoretic version of Multiway Cut, we prove that the price of stability is 1, i.e., there exists a Nash equilibrium as good as the centralized optimum. For the game-theoretic version of Multicut, we show that there exists a 2-approximate equilibrium as good as the centralized optimum. We also give poly-time algorithms for finding exact and approximate equilibria in these games.     

Bidirectional Optimization from Reasoning and Learning in Games

We reopen the investigation into the formal and conceptual relationship between bidirectional optimality theory (Blutner in J Semant 15(2):115–162, 1998, J Semant 17(3):189–216, 2000) and game theory. Unlike a likeminded previous endeavor by Dekker and van Rooij (J Semant 17:217–242, 2000), we consider signaling games not strategic games, and seek to ground bidirectional optimization once in a model of rational step-by-step reasoning and once in a model of reinforcement learning. We give sufficient conditions for equivalence of bidirectional optimality and the former, and show based on numerical simulations that bidirectional optimization may be thought of as a process of reinforcement learning with lateral inhibition.