Understanding and Predicting Parental Decisions About Early Childhood Immunizations.

This research investigated the factors that influence decisions about immunizations. Women in the third trimester of pregnancy (N=195) rated their likelihood of immunizing their child; stated their reasons for and against immunizing; and rated their perceptions of the benefits and risks of immunization, feelings of responsibility, and anticipated regret if harm occurred. Immunization status was determined at follow-up. Stepwise regression analyses demonstrated that immunization decisions are strongly influenced by omission bias factors such as anticipated responsibility and regret variance (which explained more than 50% of variance). It is suggested that parents may benefit from antenatal decision aids that address omission bias and encourage them to assess benefits and risks of immunizations on the basis of scientific evidence. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Children's Reasoning About the Causal Significance of the Temporal Order of Events.

Four experiments examined children's ability to reason about the causal significance of the order in which 2 events occurred (the pressing of buttons on a mechanically operated box). In Study 1, 4-year-olds were unable to make the relevant inferences, whereas 5-year-olds were successful on one version of the task. In Study 2, 3-year-olds were successful on a simplified version of the task in which they were able to observe the events although not their consequences. Study 3 found that older children had difficulties with the original task even when provided with cues to attend to order information. However, 5-year-olds performed successfully in Study 4, in which the causally relevant event was made more salient. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Informal Reasoning: Theory and Method.

Presents an overview of this special issue and provides some implications for theory and conclusions. The great majority of the everyday reasoning, including that of expert groups engaged in their professions, is informal. By contrast, most of the studies of human inference reported by psychologists in the literature are of formal reasoning. This discrepancy provides considerable cause for concern and not only because cognitive psychology should have some practical application. Excessive focus on formal reasoning tasks has also, in our view, inhibited the development of good theories of human reasoning. What Is Informal Reasoning, and Why Do We Need to Study It? Psychological studies of formal reasoning have fallen largely into two domains: deductive reasoning and statistical inference. These two endeavours have much in common and some researchers work in both areas. In both cases, participants are presented with what problem-solving researchers call well-defined problems. A well-defined problem can be solved by use of the information provided and no other; in fact, the correct solution to these problems often requires the reasoner to use only the information provided in the premises, and to avoid adding background information and knowledge to the problem domain. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

An Experimental Analysis of Dynamic Hypotheses About Cognitive Abilities and Achievement From Childhood to Early Adulthood.

This study examined the dynamics of cognitive abilities and academic achievement from childhood to early adulthood. Predictions about time-dependent "coupling" relations between cognition and achievement based on R. B. Cattell's (1971, 1987) investment hypothesis were evaluated using linear dynamic models applied to longitudinal data (N=672). Contrary to Cattell's hypothesis, a first set of findings indicated that fluid and crystallized abilities, as defined by the Woodcock-Johnson Psycho-Educational Battery-Revised (WJ-R; R. W. Woodcock & M. B. Johnson, 1989-1990), were not dynamically coupled with each other over time. A second set of findings provided support for the original predictions and indicated that fluid ability was a leading indicator of changes in achievement measures (i.e., quantitative ability and general academic knowledge). The findings of this study suggest that the dynamics of cognitive abilities and academic achievement follow a more complex pattern than that specified by Cattell's investment hypothesis. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The Natural Emergence of Reasoning About the Afterlife as a Developmental Regularity.

Participants were interviewed about the biological and psychological functioning of a dead agent. In Experiment 1, even 4- to 6-year-olds stated that biological processes ceased at death, although this trend was more apparent among 6- to 8-year-olds. In Experiment 2, 4- to 12-year-olds were asked about psychological functioning. The youngest children were equally likely to state that both cognitive and psychobiological states continued at death, whereas the oldest children were more likely to state that cognitive states continued. In Experiment 3, children and adults were asked about an array of psychological states. With the exception of preschoolers, who did not differentiate most of the psychological states, older children and adults were likely to attribute epistemic, emotional, and desire states to dead agents. These findings suggest that developmental mechanisms underlie intuitive accounts of dead agents' minds. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Acting and Planning on the Basis of a False Belief: Its Effects on 3-Year-Old Children's Reasoning About Their Own False Beliefs.

This study examined 3-year-olds' explanations for actions of theirs that were premised on a false belief. In Experiment 1, children stated what they thought was inside a crayon box. After stating "crayons," they went to retrieve some paper to draw on. Children were then shown that the box contained candles and were asked to (a) state their initial belief and (b) explain their action of getting paper. Children who were unable to retrieve their false belief were unable to correctly explain their action. Experiments 2 and 3 ruled out several alternative interpretations for these findings. In Experiment 4, children planned and acted on their false belief. Again, children who were unable to retrieve their false belief were unable to correctly explain their action. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Age-trend-related differences in tasks involving conjunctive probabilistic reasoning.

Conjunctive probabilistic reasoning has been studied at different ages to ascertain whether the conjunction fallacy is due to a task demand misinterpretation. Such a misinterpretation might occur because a task that requires a comparison between a superordinate class A and a subordinate class A&B is mistakenly interpreted as requiring a comparison between the two complementary subordinate classes of A (i.e., A&B and A¬B). Children (7- and 10-year-olds) and adults were required to make conjunctive probability judgments about problems for which explicit objective probabilities were provided. The total number of A items was kept constant and the frequencies of the A&B and of the A¬B items varied across problems. When the number of A&B items was smaller than the number of A¬B items, the frequency of congruent responses increased with age. When the number of A&B items was greater or equal to that of the A¬B items, the frequency of correct answers decreased. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Content and Strategy in Syllogistic Reasoning.

Syllogistic reasoning has been investigated as a general deductive process (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991; Revlis, 1975; Rips, 1994). However, several studies have demonstrated the role of cognitive strategies in this type of reasoning. These strategies focus on the method used by the participants (Ford, 1995; Gilhooly, Logie, Wetherick, & Wynn, 1993) and strategies related to different interpretations of the quantified premises (Roberts, Newstead, & Griggs, 2001). In this paper, we propose that content (as well as individual cognitive differences) is an important factor in inducing a certain strategy or method for syllogistic resolution. Specifically, we suggest that syllogisms with a causal conditional premise that can be extended by an agency premise induce the use of a conditional method. To demonstrate this, we carried out two experiments. Experiment 1 provided evidence that this type of syllogism leads participants to draw the predicted conditional conclusions, in contrast with control content syllogisms. In Experiment 2, we demonstrated that the drawing of conditional conclusions is based on a causal conditional to an agent representation of the syllogism premises. These results support the role of content as inducing a particular strategy for syllogistic resolution. The implications of these results are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Cultivating Expertise in Informal Reasoning.

People generally develop some degree of competence in general informal reasoning and argument skills, but how do they go beyond this to attain higher expertise? Ericsson has proposed that high-level expertise in a variety of domains is cultivated through a specific type of practice, referred to as "deliberate practice." Applying this frame-work yields the empirical hypothesis that high-level expertise in informal reasoning is the outcome of extensive, deliberate practice. This paper reports results from two studies evaluating the hypothesis. University student participants completed 12 weeks of deliberate practice in informal reasoning. Quantity of practice was recorded by computer, and additionally assessed via self-report. The hypothesis was supported: Students in both studies showed a large improvement, and practice, as measured by computer, was related to amount of improvement in informal reasoning. These findings support adopting a deliberate practice approach when attempting to teach or learn expertise in informal reasoning. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Probabilistic contingency learning with limbic or prefrontal damage.

A fundamental capacity of the human brain is to learn relations (contingencies) between environmental stimuli and the consequences of their occurrence. Some contingencies are probabilistic; that is, they predict an event in some situations but not in all. Animal studies suggest that damage to limbic structures or the prefrontal cortex may disturb probabilistic learning. The authors studied the learning of probabilistic contingencies in amnesic patients with limbic lesions, patients with prefrontal cortex damage, and healthy controls. Across 120 trials, participants learned contingent relations between spatial sequences and a button press. Amnesic patients had learning comparable to that of control subjects but failed to indicate what they had learned. Across the last 60 trials, amnesic patients and control subjects learned to avoid a noncontingent choice better than frontal patients. These results indicate that probabilistic learning does not depend on the brain structures supporting declarative memory. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Partition-Edit-Count: Naive Extensional Reasoning in Judgment of Conditional Probability.

The authors provide evidence that people typically evaluate conditional probabilities by subjectively partitioning the sample space into n interchangeable events, editing out events that can be eliminated on the basis of conditioning information, counting remaining events, then reporting probabilities as a ratio of the number of focal to total events. Participants' responses to conditional probability problems were influenced by irrelevant information (Study 1), small variations in problem wording (Study 2), and grouping of events (Study 3), as predicted by the partition-edit-count model. Informal protocol analysis also supports the authors' interpretation. A 4th study extends this account from situations where events are treated as interchangeable (chance and ignorance) to situations where participants have information they can use to distinguish among events (uncertainty). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Reasoning From Inconsistency to Consistency.

This article presents a theory of how individuals reason from inconsistency to consistency. The theory is based on 3 main principles. First, individuals try to construct a single mental model of a possibility that satisfies a current set of propositions, and if the task is impossible, they infer that the set is inconsistent. Second, when an inconsistency arises from an incontrovertible fact, they retract any singularly dubious proposition or any proposition that is inconsistent with the fact; otherwise, they retract whichever proposition mismatches the fact. A mismatch can arise from a proposition that has only mental models that conflict with the fact or fail to represent it. Third, individuals use their causal knowledge-in the form of models of possibilities-to create explanations of what led to the inconsistency. A computer program implements the theory, and experimental results support each of its principles. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Childhood intellectual development of adult schizophrenics.

Intelligence test scores from the early and later childhoods of 153 schizophrenic adults, 124 with 2 childhood Stanford-Binet tests, and 29 with 2 childhood group tests, were found and analyzed. A statistically significant (.01) loss between early childhood (ages 5-8) and late childhood (ages 11-14) was found on both tests. A control group of 872 children from the same school system showed a gain in score on the 2 group tests between these same years and studies of retest performance of children on the Binet show relatively little loss for children at comparable levels of intelligence. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Childhood victimization and illicit drug use in middle adulthood.

Using a prospective cohort design, the authors examined in this study whether childhood victimization increases the risk for illicit drug use and related problems in middle adulthood. Court-documented cases of childhood physical and sexual abuse and neglect and matched controls (N = 892) were first assessed as young adults (mean age = 29 years) during 1989-1995 and again in middle adulthood (mean age = 40 years) during 2000-2002. In middle adulthood, abused and neglected individuals were about 1.5 times more likely than controls to report using any illicit drug (in particular, marijuana) during the past year and reported use of a greater number of illicit drugs and more substance-use-related problems compared with controls. The current results reveal the long-term impact of childhood victimization on drug use in middle adulthood. These new results reinforce the need for targeted interventions with abused and neglected children, adolescents, and adults, and particularly for women. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Reasoning counterfactually: Making inferences about things that didn't happen.

The authors investigated the relationship between reasoners' understanding of subjunctive conditionals (e.g., if p had happened, then q would have happened) and the inferences they were prepared to endorse. Reasoners who made a counterfactual interpretation of subjunctive statements (i.e., they judged the statement to imply that p and q did not happen) endorsed different inferences than those who did not. Those who made a counterfactual interpretation were more likely to (a)judge the situation in which p and q occurred to be inconsistent with the conditional statement and (b) make negative inferences such as modus tollens (i.e., – q therefore – p ). These findings occurred with familiar and unfamiliar content, affirmative and negative conditionals, and conditional and biconditional relations. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Conditional probability versus spatial contiguity in causal learning: Preschoolers use new contingency evidence to overcome prior spatial assumptions.

This study examines preschoolers' causal assumptions about spatial contiguity and how these assumptions interact with new evidence in the form of conditional probabilities. Preschoolers saw a toy that activated in the presence of certain objects. Children were shown evidence for the toy's activation rule in the form of patterns of probability: The toy was more likely to activate either when objects made contact with its surface (on condition) or when objects were several inches above its surface (over condition). In Experiment 1, 61 three-year-olds saw a deterministic activation rule. In Experiments 2 and 3, 48 four-year-olds saw an activation rule that was probabilistic. In Experiment 4, 30 four-year-olds saw a screening-off pattern of activation. In all 4 experiments, children used new evidence in the form of patterns of probability to make accurate causal inferences, even in the face of conflicting prior beliefs about spatial contiguity. However, children were more likely to make correct inferences when causes were spatially contiguous, particularly when faced with ambiguous evidence. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Syllogistic Reasoning Performance in MDMA (Ecstasy) Users.

Previous research has demonstrated working memory and executive deficits in recreational users of MDMA (3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine; Ecstasy). In turn, both of these constructs have been implicated in syllogistic reasoning performance. Twenty-two MDMA users (mean age=21.36) and 26 MDMA nonuser controls (mean age=21.31) were tested on syllogisms of varying difficulty and on measures of working memory and executive functioning. MDMA users were significantly impaired in aspects of syllogistic reasoning, and the effect remained significant after the authors controlled for the use of other drugs. However, the MDMA-related variance was reduced to below statistical significance following control for group differences in working memory span. The results are consistent with the possibility that MDMA-related deficits in aspects of executive functioning result in impaired reasoning performance among MDMA users. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)