Stateless Transitive Signature Schemes

A new practical method is introduced to transform the stateful transitive signature scheme to stateless one with-out the loss of security.According to the approach,two concrete stateless transitive signature schemes based on Factoringand RSA are presented respectively.Under the assumption of the hardness of factoring and one-more-RSA-inversion prob-lem,both two schemes are secure under the adaptive chosen-message attacks in random oracle model.     

Leakage-resilient certificateless signcryption scheme

In practical applications,the potential adversary may exploit partial information about the secret keys by side-channel attacks ,traditional certificateless signcryption schemes can’t resist these key-leakage attacks.A leakage-resilient certificateless signcryption scheme based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography and bilinear pairing was presented.In the random oracle,proved that the security of the scheme is based on the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption.The scheme is also proved semantically secure against adaptive posterior chosen-ciphertext key-leakage attacks (KL-CCA2),and existentially unforgeable against chosen-message key-leakage attacks(KL-CMA).The proposed scheme was free from non-interactive zero knowledge proof system and needs no bilinear paring operation in signcryption phase.Compared with other schemes of the same kind,the proposed scheme can resist key-leakage attacks and maintains high efficiency.     

一个高效的有向传递签名方案

传递签名是由Micali和Rivest在2002年首先提出的,主要用于对二元传递关系进行签名.已有的传递签名方案都是无向的,只适用于对等价关系签名,提出有向传递签名方案是个留待解决的公开问题.该文提出一个高效的全序有向传递签名方案,并证明该方案在选择明文攻击下是安全的.在方案中,签名的β_uv部分被限定在0和q/2之间,以防止敌手由(u,v)的签名伪造(v,u)的签名,从而保证签名的有向性.将该方案与无向传递签名方案结合,提出一个可对任何有向二元传递关系进行签名的方案.     

一种标准模型下无证书签名方案的安全性分析与改进

无证书签名具有基于身份密码体制和传统公钥密码体制的优点，可解决复杂的公钥证书管理和密钥托管问题.Wu和Jing提出了一种强不可伪造的无证书签名方案，其安全性不依赖于理想的随机预言机.针对该方案的安全性，提出了两类伪造攻击.分析结果表明，该方案无法实现强不可伪造性，并在"malicious-but-passive"的密钥生成中心攻击下也是不安全的.为了提升该方案的安全性，设计了一个改进的无证书签名方案.在标准模型中证明了改进的方案对于适应性选择消息攻击是强不可伪造的，还能抵抗恶意的密钥生成中心攻击.此外，改进的方案具有较低的计算开销和较短的私钥长度，可应用于区块链、车联网、无线体域网等领域.     

基于无证书的格基代理签密方案

无证书代理签密在信息安全领域发挥着越来越重要的作用。现有的大多数无证书代理签密基于传统数学理论,无法抵制量子计算攻击。该文采用格密码技术提出基于无证书的格基代理签密(L-CLPSC)方案。L-CLPSC在带错误学习(LWE)问题和小整数解(SIS)问题的困难假设下满足自适应选择密文攻击下的不可区分性和自适应选择消息攻击下的不可伪造性。相比较而言,L-CLPSC具有更高的计算效率和更低的通信代价。     

Short Signatures Without Random Oracles and the SDH Assumption in Bilinear Groups

We describe a short signature scheme that is strongly existentially unforgeable under an adaptive chosen message attack in the standard security model. Our construction works in groups equipped with an efficient bilinear map, or, more generally, an algorithm for the Decision Diffie-Hellman problem. The security of our scheme depends on a new intractability assumption we call Strong Diffie-Hellman (SDH), by analogy to the Strong RSA assumption with which it shares many properties. Signature generation in our system is fast and the resulting signatures are as short as DSA signatures for comparable security. We give a tight reduction proving that our scheme is secure in any group in which the SDH assumption holds, without relying on the random oracle model. An extended abstract entitled “Short Signatures Without Random Oracles” (Boneh and Boyen in Advances in Cryptology—EUROCRYPT 2004, LNCS, vol. 3027, pp. 56–73, 2004) appears in Eurocrypt 2004. Dan Boneh: Supported by NSF and the Packard Foundation.     

Improved certificateless multi-proxy signature

Multi-proxy signature is a scheme that an original signer delegates his or her signing capability to a proxy group.In the scheme,only the cooperation of all proxy signers in the proxy group can create a signature on behalf of the original signer.Jin and Wen firstly defined the formal security model of certificateless multi-proxy signature(CLMPS) and proposed a concrete CLMPS scheme.However,their construction has three problems:the definition of the strengthened security model is inaccurate,the concrete signature scheme has a security flaw,and the proof of the security is imperfect.With further consideration,a remedial strengthened security model is redefined,and an improved scheme is also proposed,which is existentially unforgeable against adaptively chosen-warrant,chosen-message and chosen-identity attacks in the random oracles.In this condition,the computational Diffie-Hellman(CDH) assumption is used to prove full security for our CLMPS scheme.     

原始签名人匿名的代理环签名研究

环签名是一种新的匿名签名技术,能保证签名用户的无条件匿名性。代理环签名是将代理签名和环签名相结合产生的一种签名。已有的代理环签名方案都是利用环签名的思想实现代理签名人的身份匿名性,但原始签名人的身份始终是公开的。该文基于RSA问题的难解性提出了一种新的代理环签名方案,在保证代理签名人身份匿名性的同时,还能保证原始签名人身份匿名性,并证明该方案在随机预言模型下能抵抗适应性选择消息攻击。     

Strengthening Zero-Knowledge Protocols Using Signatures

Recently there has been an interest in zero-knowledge protocols with stronger properties, such as concurrency, simulation soundness, non-malleability, and universal composability. In this paper we show a novel technique to convert a large class of existing honest-verifier zero-knowledge protocols into ones with these stronger properties in the common reference string model. More precisely, our technique utilizes a signature scheme existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen-message attacks, and transforms any Σ-protocol (which is honest-verifier zero-knowledge) into a simulation sound concurrent zero-knowledge protocol. We also introduce Ω-protocols, a variant of Σ-protocols for which our technique further achieves the properties of non-malleability and/or universal composability. In addition to its conceptual simplicity, a main advantage of this new technique over previous ones is that it avoids the Cook-Levin theorem, which tends to be rather inefficient. Indeed, our technique allows for very efficient instantiation based on the security of some efficient signature schemes and standard number-theoretic assumptions. For instance, one instantiation of our technique yields a universally composable zero-knowledge protocol under the Strong RSA assumption, incurring an overhead of a small constant number of exponentiations, plus the generation of two signatures.     

标准模型下安全的无证书签名方案

随机预言模型下的证明能够为无证书签名方案提供基本的安全保证,但随机预言机的实现方式可能会导致方案不安全。一些标准模型下的方案在提出后被证明无法抵抗公钥替换攻击。为了解决这一问题,构造了一个标准模型下安全的无证书签名方案,基于NGBDH和Many-DH困难问题,证明所提出的方案对自适应选择消息攻击是存在性不可伪造的。此外,提出的方案具有计算代价和通信代价较低、能够抵抗密钥替换攻击等优点。     

Fully Leakage-Resilient Signatures

A signature scheme is fully leakage resilient (Katz and Vaikuntanathan, ASIACRYPT’09) if it is existentially unforgeable under an adaptive chosen-message attack even in a setting where an adversary may obtain bounded (yet arbitrary) leakage information on all intermediate values that are used throughout the lifetime of the system. This is a strong and meaningful notion of security that captures a wide range of side-channel attacks. One of the main challenges in constructing fully leakage-resilient signature schemes is dealing with leakage that may depend on the random bits used by the signing algorithm, and constructions of such schemes are known only in the random-oracle model. Moreover, even in the random-oracle model, known schemes are only resilient to leakage of less than half the length of their signing key. In this paper we construct the first fully leakage-resilient signature schemes without random oracles. We present a scheme that is resilient to any leakage of length (1?o(1))L bits, where L is the length of the signing key. Our approach relies on generic cryptographic primitives, and at the same time admits rather efficient instantiations based on specific number-theoretic assumptions. In addition, we show that our approach extends to the continual-leakage model, recently introduced by Dodis, Haralambiev, Lopez-Alt and Wichs (FOCS’10), and by Brakerski, Tauman Kalai, Katz and Vaikuntanathan (FOCS’10). In this model the signing key is allowed to be refreshed, while its corresponding verification key remains fixed, and the amount of leakage is assumed to be bounded only in between any two successive key refreshes.     

基于多时间服务器的时控性加密体制研究

时控性加密(TRE)是一种被称为“向未来发送消息”的密码原语,接收方在未来指定时间之前无法解密密文。目前,大部分TRE方案采用非交互式单时间服务器方法,系统用户能够正常解密,依赖于单一时间服务器在预定解密时间计算并广播的时间陷门。如果单一的时间服务器遭受攻击,或被腐败,则容易直接威胁TRE的安全应用。因此,需要将1个时间服务器“分散”成多个。但已有多时间服务器TRE方案既没有给出安全性分析,也没有给出严格的安全性证明。为此,该文给出一种随机预言机模型下基于双线性迪菲·赫尔曼(BDH)问题的多时间服务器的TRE模型MTSTRE,构造出一种可证明安全的具体和通用方案,并严格证明所提具体方案在自适应选择明文攻击下是安全的。效率分析表明,与已有最有效的多时间服务器TRE解决方案相比,所提具体方案的计算效率也略有提高。     

Efficient Signature Schemes with Tight Reductions to the Diffie-Hellman Problems

We propose and analyze two efficient signature schemes whose security is tightly related to the Diffie-Hellman problems in the random oracle model. The security of our first scheme relies on the hardness of the computational Diffie-Hellman problem; the security of our second scheme - which is more efficient than the first-is based on the hardness of the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem, a stronger assumption. Given the current state of the art, it is as difficult to solve the Diffie-Hellman problems as it is to solve the discrete logarithm problem in many groups of cryptographic interest. Thus, the signature schemes shown here can currently offer substantially better efficiency (for a given level of provable security) than existing schemes based on the discrete logarithm assumption. The techniques we introduce can also be applied in a wide variety of settings to yield more efficient cryptographic schemes (based on various number-theoretic assumptions) with tight security reductions.     

标准模型下抗CPA与抗CCA2的RSA型加密方案

RSA型加密系统（RSA加密系统及其改进系统的统称）至今仍然被广泛应用于许多注重电子数据安全的电子商务系统中.然而对现有的RSA型加密方案分析发现：（1）只有在随机谕言机模型下抗CCA2攻击的RSA型加密方案,还没有在标准模型下实现IND-CCA2安全的RSA型概率加密方案;（2）没有在标准模型下实现抗CPA且保持乘法同态性的RSA型同态加密方案,而同态性是实现安全多方计算和云计算安全服务的重要性质之一;（3）在实现密文不可区分方面,这些方案除HD-RSA外都是通过一个带hash的Feistel网络引入随机因子的,从而导致这些方案只能在随机谕言机模型下实现IND-CCA2安全.针对以上问题,本文在RSA加密系统的基础上,通过增加少量的有限域上的模指数运算,设计了一个标准模型下具有IND-CPA安全的RSA型概率同态加密方案和一个具有IND-CCA2安全的RSA型概率加密方案.这两个方案在实现密文不可区分时,都不再通过明文填充引入随机因子.此外,本文还提出一个RSA问题的变形问题（称作RSA判定性问题）.     

Provable secure identity‐based multi‐proxy signature scheme

Multi‐proxy signature is one of the useful primitives of the proxy signature. Till now, only a few schemes of identity‐based multi‐proxy signature (IBMPS) have been proposed using bilinear pairings, but most of the schemes are insecure or lack a formal security proof. Because of the important application of IBMPS scheme in distributed systems, grid computing, and so on, construction of an efficient and provable‐secure IBMPS scheme is desired. In 2005, Li & Chen proposed an IBMPS scheme from bilinear pairings, but their paper lacks a formal model and proof of the security. Further, in 2009, Cao & Cao presented an IBMPS scheme with the first formal security model for it. Unfortunately, their scheme is not secure against the Xiong et al's attack. In this paper, first, we present an IBMPS scheme, then we formalize a security model for the IBMPS schemes and prove that the presented scheme is existential unforgeable against adaptive chosen message and identity attack in the random oracle model under the computational Diffie–Hellman assumption. Also, our scheme is not vulnerable for the Xiong et al's attack. The presented scheme is more efficient in the sense of computation and operation time than the existing IBMPS schemes. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

An efficient identity-based secret key management scheme for MANETs

This paper put forward an identity-based key management scheme for mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs), it provids an efficient secret key management mechanism for security schemes, which be implemented over any cyclic group in that the strong Diffie-Hellman problem is supposed to be hard. By employing identity-based and threshold cryptography, the proposed scheme eliminates the burden of certificates management and can be high level tolerance to node compromise. The scheme is based on threshold Schnorr signature (TSch), for higher efficiency, we transform TSch to a simpler form, donated by SimpleTSch, and prove that SimpleTSch is unforgeable under passive attacks in the random oracle model. However, to cope with active attacks, we enforce the security by introducing Fiore et al's key agreement. We can say that the proposed key management scheme gives lots of help for design of security protocols in MANETs.     

面向车载自组网的无证书聚合签名方案的安全性分析与改进

2018年,王大星和滕济凯提出了一种适用于车载自组织网络的无证书聚合签名方案,并在随机模型下证明该方案是存在不可伪造的。针对该方案的安全性,给出了3类伪造攻击:“honest-but-curious”的KGC攻击、恶意的KGC与RSU的联合攻击、内部签名者的联合攻击。分析结果表明,王大星等人设计的无证书聚合签名方案在这3类攻击下均是不安全的。为了抵抗这些攻击,进一步提出了一个改进的无证书聚合签名方案。所提方案不仅在自适应性选择消息攻击下满足存在不可伪造性,还能有效抵抗联合攻击。     

Schnorr签名对自适应攻击的安全性

Schnorr签名具有预处理的特点,这使它可以应用于对计算量有严格要求的终端和Smart卡上。而算法的应用取决于算法是否安全。讨论了Schnorr签名在自适应攻击下的安全性。在随机问答器模型下证明了Schnorr签名对自适应选择消息攻击是不存在伪造的,为Schnorr签名的应用提供了理论基础。     

一种基于无证书的多方合同签署协议的安全性分析与改进

2019年,曹等人(doi:10.11999/JEIT190166)提出了一个适用于多方合同签署环境中高效的无证书聚合签名方案,并证明了该方案在随机预言模型下存在不可伪造性。然而,通过安全性分析发现,该方案无法抵抗替换公钥攻击和内部签名者的联合攻击。为了解决上述安全缺陷,该文提出一个改进的无证书聚合签名方案。新方案不仅在随机预言模型下基于计算性Diffie-Hellman问题满足不可伪造性,同时也能够抵抗联合攻击。     

Identity-based multisignature and aggregate signature schemes from m-torsion groups

I. Introduction A multisignature allows any subgroup of a given group of potential signers to jointly sign a message such that a verifier is convinced that each member of the subgroup participated in signing. An aggre-gate signature, recently proposed by Boneh et al.[1], however, is a scheme that allows n members of a given group of potential signers to sign n different messages and all these signatures can be aggregated into a single signature. This single signature will convince the verifie…