Implicit and explicit category learning by macaques (Macaca mulatta) and humans (Homo sapiens).

An influential theoretical perspective differentiates in humans an explicit, rule-based system of category learning from an implicit system that slowly associates different regions of perceptual space with different response outputs. This perspective was extended for the 1st time to the category learning of nonhuman primates. Humans (Homo sapiens) and macaques (Macaca mulatta) learned categories composed of sine-wave gratings that varied across trials in bar width and bar orientation. The categories had either a single-dimensional, rule-based solution or a two-dimensional, information-integration solution. Humans strongly dimensionalized the stimuli and learned the rule-based task far more quickly. Six macaques showed the same performance advantage in the rule-based task. In humans, rule-based category learning is linked to explicit cognition, consciousness, and declarative reports about the contents of cognition. These results demonstrate an empirical continuity between human and nonhuman primate cognition, suggesting that nonhuman primates may have some structural components of humans’ capacity for explicit cognition. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Generalization hypothesis of abstract-concept learning: Learning strategies and related issues in Macaca mulatta, Cebus apella, and Columba livia.

The generalization hypothesis of abstract-concept learning was tested with a meta-analysis of rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta), capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella), and pigeons (Columba livia) learning a same/different (S/D) task with expanding training sets. The generalization hypothesis states that as the number of training items increases, generalization from the training pairs will increase and could explain the subjects' accurate novel-stimulus transfer. By contrast, concept learning is learning the relationship between each pair of items; with more training items subjects learn more exemplars of the rule and transfer better. Having to learn the stimulus pairs (the generalization hypothesis) would require more training as the set size increases, whereas learning the concept might require less training because subjects would be learning an abstract rule. The results strongly support concept or rule learning despite severely relaxing the generalization-hypothesis parameters. Thus, generalization was not a factor in the transfer from these experiments, adding to the evidence that these subjects were learning the S/D abstract concept. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Mechanisms of inferential order judgments in humans (Homo sapiens) and rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta).

If A > B, and B > C, it follows logically that A > C. The process of reaching that conclusion is called transitive inference (TI). Several mechanisms have been offered to explain transitive performance. Scanning models claim that the list is scanned from the ends of the list inward until a match is found. Positional discrimination models claim that positional uncertainty accounts for accuracy and reaction time patterns. In Experiment 1, we trained rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) and humans (Homo sapiens) on adjacent pairs (e.g., AB, BC, CD, DE, EF) and tested them with previously untrained nonadjacent pairs (e.g., BD). In Experiment 2, we trained a second list and tested with nonadjacent pairs selected between lists (e.g., B from List 1, D from List 2). We then introduced associative competition between adjacent items in Experiment 3 by training 2 items per position (e.g., B?C?, B?C?) before testing with untrained nonadjacent items. In all 3 experiments, humans and monkeys showed distance effects in which accuracy increased, and reaction time decreased, as the distance between items in each pair increased (e.g., BD vs. BE). In Experiment 4, we trained adjacent pairs with separate 9- and 5-item lists. We then tested with nonadjacent pairs selected between lists to determine whether list items were chosen according to their absolute position (e.g., D, 5-item list > E, 9-item list), or their relative position (e.g., D, 5-item list     

Rules and resemblance: Their changing balance in the category learning of humans (Homo sapiens) and monkeys (Macaca mulatta).

In an early dissociation between intentional and incidental category learning, Kemler Nelson (1984) gave participants a categorization task that could be performed by responding either to a single-dimensional rule or to overall family resemblance. Humans learning intentionally deliberately adopted rule-based strategies; humans learning incidentally adopted family resemblance strategies. The present authors replicated Kemler Nelson’s human experiment and found a similar dissociation. They also extended her paradigm so as to evaluate the balance between rules and family resemblance in determining the category decisions of rhesus monkeys. Monkeys heavily favored the family resemblance strategy. Formal models showed that even after many sessions and thousands of trials, they spread attention across all stimulus dimensions rather than focus on a single, criterial dimension that could also produce perfect categorization. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) lack expertise in face processing.

Faces are salient stimuli for primates that rely predominantly on visual cues for recognizing conspecifics and maintaining social relationships. While previous studies have shown similar face discrimination processes in chimpanzees and humans, data from monkeys are unclear. Therefore, three studies examined face processing in rhesus monkeys using the face inversion effect, a fractured face task, and an individual recognition task. Unlike chimpanzees and humans, the monkeys showed a general face inversion effect reflected by significantly better performance on upright compared to inverted faces (conspecifics, human and chimpanzees faces) regardless of the subjects' expertise with those categories. Fracturing faces alters first- and second-order configural manipulations whereas previous studies in chimpanzees showed selective deficits for second-order configural manipulations. Finally, when required to individuate conspecific's faces, i.e., matching two different photographs of the same conspecific, monkeys showed poor discrimination and repeated training. These results support evolutionary differences between rhesus monkeys and Hominoids in the importance of configural cues and their ability to individuate conspecifics' faces, suggesting a lack of face expertise in rhesus monkeys. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Quality before quantity: Rapid learning of reverse-reward contingency by capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella).

Capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) were tested on a reverse-reward task involving different quantities of the same food, or an identical quantity of different foods. All monkeys tested first on the qualitative version spontaneously mastered the task, whereas only one of four spontaneously mastered the quantitative version. No monkey reached criterion when the tasks were switched, although almost all did so following remedial procedures after the study. The results suggest that (a) qualitative reverse-reward is easier than quantitative versions of the problem, (b) quality and quantity dimensions are processed differently in food-related tasks, and (c) capuchin monkeys can show rapid and spontaneous learning of reverse-reward contingencies. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Stages of category learning in monkeys (Macaca mulatta) and humans (Homo sapiens).

Smith and Minda (1998) and Blair and Homa (2001) studied the time course of category learning in humans. They distinguished an early, abstraction-based stage of category learning from a later stage that incorporated a capacity for categorizing exceptional category members. The present authors asked whether similar processing stages characterize the category learning of nonhuman primates. Humans (Homo sapiens) and monkeys (Macaca mulatta) participated in category-learning tasks that extended Blair and Homa’s paradigm comparatively. Early in learning, both species improved on typical items more than on exception items, indicating an initial mastery of the categories’ general structure. Later in learning, both species selectively improved their exception-item performance, indicating exception-item resolution or exemplar memorization. An initial stage of abstraction-based category learning may characterize categorization across a substantial range of the order Primates. This default strategy may have an adaptive resonance with the family resemblance organization of many natural-kind categories. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Rhesus monkeys (macaca mulatta) immediately generalize the uncertain response.

Rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) have learned, like humans, to use an uncertain response adaptively under test conditions that create uncertainty, suggesting a metacognitive process by which human and nonhuman primates may monitor their confidence and alter their behavior accordingly. In this study, 4 rhesus monkeys generalized their use of the uncertain response, without additional training, to 2 familiar tasks (2-choice discrimination learning and mirror-image matching to sample) that predictably and demonstrably produce uncertainty. The monkeys were significantly less likely to use the uncertain response on trials in which the answer might be known. These results indicate that monkeys, like humans, know when they do not know and that they can learn to use a symbol as a generalized means for indicating their uncertainty. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Administration of dehydroepiandrosterone (DHEA) enhances visual-spatial performance in postmenopausal women.

The current article examines the effect of administering dehydroepiandrosterone (DHEA) on visual-spatial performance in postmenopausal women (N = 24, ages 55–80). The concurrent reduction of serum DHEA levels and visual-spatial performance in this population, coupled with the documented effects of DHEA's androgenic metabolites on visual-spatial performance, suggests that DHEA administration may enhance visual-spatial performance. The current experiment used a double-blind, placebo-controlled crossover design in which 50 mg of oral DHEA was administered daily in the drug condition to explore this hypothesis. Performance on the Mental Rotation, Subject-Ordered Pointing, Fragmented Picture Identification, Perceptual Identification, Same-Different Judgment, and Visual Search tasks and serum levels of DHEA, DHEAS, testosterone, estrone, and cortisol were measured in the DHEA and placebo conditions. In contrast to prior experiments using the current methodology that did not demonstrate effects of DHEA administration on episodic and short-term memory tasks, the current experiment demonstrated large beneficial effects of DHEA administration on Mental Rotation, Subject-Ordered Pointing, Fragmented Picture Identification, Perceptual Identification, and Same-Different Judgment. Moreover, DHEA administration enhanced serum levels of DHEA, DHEAS, testosterone, and estrone, and regression analyses demonstrated that levels of DHEA and its metabolites were positively related to cognitive performance on the visual-spatial tasks in the DHEA condition. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Detection of Grouped and Ungrouped Parts in Visual Patterns by Tufted Capuchin Monkeys (Cebus apella) and Humans (Homo sapiens).

The authors investigated perceptual grouping in capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) and humans (Homo sapiens). In Experiment 1, 6 monkeys received a visual pattern as the sample and had to identify the comparison stimulus featuring some of its parts. Performance was better for ungrouped parts than for grouped parts. In Experiment 2, the sample featured the parts, and the comparison stimuli, the complex figures: The advantage for ungrouped elements disappeared. In Experiment 3, in which new stimuli were introduced, the results of the previous experiments were replicated. In Experiment 4, 128 humans were presented with the same tasks and stimuli used with monkeys. Their accuracy was higher for grouped parts. Results suggest that human and nonhuman primates use different modes of analyzing multicomponent patterns. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

What meaning means for same and different: Analogical reasoning in humans (Homo sapiens), chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), and rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta).

Thus far, language- and token-trained apes (e.g., D. Premack, 1976; R. K. R. Thompson, D. L. Oden, & S. T. Boysen, 1997) have provided the best evidence that nonhuman animals can solve, complete, and construct analogies, thus implicating symbolic representation as the mechanism enabling the phenomenon. In this study, the authors examined the role of stimulus meaning in the analogical reasoning abilities of three different primate species. Humans (Homo sapiens), chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), and rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) completed the same relational matching-to-sample (RMTS) tasks with both meaningful and nonmeaningful stimuli. This discrimination of relations-between-relations serves as the basis for analogical reasoning. Meaningfulness facilitated the acquisition of analogical matching for human participants, whereas individual differences among the chimpanzees suggest that meaning can either enable or hinder their ability to complete analogies. Rhesus monkeys did not succeed in the RMTS task regardless of stimulus meaning, suggesting that their ability to reason analogically, if present at all, may be dependent on a dimension other than the representational value of stimuli. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Comparison of grouping abilities in humans (Homo sapiens) and baboons (Papio papio) with the Ebbinghaus illusion.

This research comparatively assessed grouping mechanisms of humans (n = 8) and baboons (n = 8) in an illusory task that employs configurations of target and surrounding circles arranged to induce the Ebbinghaus (Titchener) illusion. Analyses of response behaviors and points of subjective equality demonstrated that only humans misjudged the central target size under the influence of the Ebbinghaus illusion, whereas baboons expressed a more veridical perception of target sizes. It is argued that humans adopted a global mode of stimulus processing of the illusory figure in our task that has favored the illusion. By contrast, a strong local mode of stimulus processing with attention restricted to the target must have prevented illusory effects in baboons. These findings suggest that monkeys and humans have evolved modes of object recognition that do not similarly rely on the same gestalt principles. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Analogical reasoning and the differential outcome effect: Transitory bridging of the conceptual gap for rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta).

Monkeys, unlike chimpanzees and humans, have a marked difficulty acquiring relational matching-to-sample (RMTS) tasks that likely reflect the cognitive foundation upon which analogical reasoning rests. In the present study, rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) completed a categorical (identity and nonidentity) RMTS task with differential reward (pellet ratio) and/or punishment (timeout ratio) outcomes for correct and incorrect choices. Monkeys in either differential reward-only or punishment-only conditions performed at chance levels. However, the RMTS performance of monkeys experiencing both differential reward and punishment conditions was significantly better than chance. Subsequently when all animals experienced nondifferential outcomes tests, their RMTS performance levels were at chance. These results indicate that combining differential reward and punishment contingencies provide an effective, albeit transitory, scaffolding for monkeys to judge analogical relations-between-relations. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Analogical reasoning in a capuchin monkey (Cebus apella).

Previous evidence has suggested that analogical reasoning (recognizing similarities among object relations when the objects themselves are dissimilar) is limited to humans and apes. This study investigated whether capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) can use analogical reasoning to solve a 3-dimensional search task. The task involved hiding a food item under 1 of 2 or 3 plastic cups of different sizes and then allowing subjects to search for food hidden under the cup of analogous size in their own set of cups. Four monkeys were exposed to a series of relational matching tasks. If subjects reached criterion on these tasks, they were exposed to relational transfer tasks involving novel stimuli. Three of the monkeys failed to reach criterion on the basic relational matching tasks and therefore were not tested further. One monkey, however, revealed above-chance performance on a series of transfer tasks with 3 novel stimuli. This evidence suggests that contrary to previous arguments, a member of a New World monkey species can solve an analogical problem. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Rhesus Macaques (Macaca mulatta) Categorize Unknown Conspecifics According to Their Dominance Relations.

The authors trained 3 adult male rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) to categorize pairs of unknown conspecifics presented in a video according to the dominance status of the videotaped monkeys. The subjects were trained to choose the dominant monkey for a category of films (e.g., films showing 1 monkey chasing another); then, new films were presented involving different conspecifics, and the monkeys' first responses to this new category of behavior (e.g., monkeys fighting) were taken as evidence of transfer. Two subjects were able to generalize categorical judgments of dominance to new films involving new behaviors. These findings seem to indicate that monkeys can use abstract social concepts and are aware of the social relationships within their group. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Great apes' (Pan troglodytes, Pan paniscus, Gorilla gorilla, Pongo pygmaeus) understanding of tool functional properties after limited experience.

Primates' understanding of tool functionality has been investigated extensively using a paradigm in which subjects are presented with a tool that they must use to obtain an out-of-reach reward. After being given experience on an initial problem, monkeys can transfer their skill to tools of different shapes while ignoring irrelevant tool changes (e.g., color). In contrast, monkeys without initial training perform poorly on the same tasks. Compared to most monkeys, great apes show a clear propensity for tool using and may not require as much experience to succeed on tool functionality tasks. We investigated this question by presenting 171 apes (Pan troglodytes, Pan paniscus, Gorilla gorilla, and Pongo pygmaeus) with several tool-use problems without giving them initial training or familiarizing them with the test materials. Apes succeeded without experience, but only on problems based on basic properties such as the reward being supported by an object. However, only minimal experience was sufficient to allow them to quickly improve their performance on more complex problems in which the reward was not in contact with the tool. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Prototype abstraction by monkeys (Macaca mulatta).

The authors analyze the shape categorization of rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) and the role of prototype- and exemplar-based comparison processes in monkeys' category learning. Prototype and exemplar theories make contrasting predictions regarding performance on the Posner-Homa dot-distortion categorization task. Prototype theory--which presumes that participants refer to-be-categorized items to a representation near the category's center (the prototype)--predicts steep typicality gradients and large prototype-enhancement effects. Exemplar theory--which presumes that participants refer to-be-categorized items to memorized training exemplars-predicts flat typicality gradients and small prototype-enhancement effects. Across many categorization tasks that, for the first time, assayed monkeys' dot-distortion categorization, monkeys showed steep typicality gradients and large prototype-enhancement effects. These results suggest that monkeys--like humans--refer to-be-categorized items to a prototype-like representation near the category's center rather than to a set of memorized training exemplars. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Grey parrot (Psittacus erithacus) numerical abilities: Addition and further experiments on a zero-like concept.

A Grey parrot (Psittacus erithacus), able to quantify 6 or fewer item sets (including heterogeneous subsets) by using English labels (I. M. Pepperberg, 1994), was tested on addition of quantities involving 0-6. He was, without explicit training, asked, "How many total X?" for 2 sequentially presented collections (e.g., of variously sized jelly beans or nuts) and required to answer with a vocal English number label. His accuracy suggested (a) that his addition abilities are comparable to those of nonhuman primates and young children, (b) some limits as to his correlation of "none" and the concept of zero, and (c) a possible counting-like strategy for the quantity 5. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Auditory frequency discrimination in primates: Species differences (Cercopithecus, Macaca, Homo).

Auditory frequency difference limens (DLs) at 2 kHz were measured in Old World monkeys (Cercopithecus, Macaca) and humans using a go/no-go repeating standard procedure and positive reinforcement operant conditioning techniques. Quantitative and qualitative differences occurred between monkey and human sensitivity. Best DLs for monkeys were 20–60 Hz, and for humans they were 3–4 Hz. Monkey sensitivity decreased as sensation level increased from 30 to 70 dB, whereas human sensitivity increased. Sensitivity differences also occurred in the various monkey species. Cercopithecus monkeys were generally more sensitive to frequency decrements, whereas Japanese macaques were more sensitive to frequency increments, as were humans. Results are related to other comparative psychoacoustic data and primate vocal communication, including human speech. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Relative pitch perception in Japanese monkeys (Macaca fuscata).

To investigate whether monkeys perceive relative pitch, the author trained 3 Japanese monkeys (Macaca fuscata) to detect changes from rising to falling contours of 3-tone sequences. Tone sequences were presented serially with transposition, so monkeys were urged to attend to cues other than the absolute frequency of a component tone. Results from probe tests with novel sequences showed that monkeys discriminated by the relative pitch when the frequency ranges of sequences were within the training range, showing a similar tendency as birds in previous studies (e.g., S. H. Hulse, J. Cynx, & J. Humpal, 1984). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)