Implicit and explicit category learning by macaques (Macaca mulatta) and humans (Homo sapiens).

An influential theoretical perspective differentiates in humans an explicit, rule-based system of category learning from an implicit system that slowly associates different regions of perceptual space with different response outputs. This perspective was extended for the 1st time to the category learning of nonhuman primates. Humans (Homo sapiens) and macaques (Macaca mulatta) learned categories composed of sine-wave gratings that varied across trials in bar width and bar orientation. The categories had either a single-dimensional, rule-based solution or a two-dimensional, information-integration solution. Humans strongly dimensionalized the stimuli and learned the rule-based task far more quickly. Six macaques showed the same performance advantage in the rule-based task. In humans, rule-based category learning is linked to explicit cognition, consciousness, and declarative reports about the contents of cognition. These results demonstrate an empirical continuity between human and nonhuman primate cognition, suggesting that nonhuman primates may have some structural components of humans’ capacity for explicit cognition. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Stages of category learning in monkeys (Macaca mulatta) and humans (Homo sapiens).

Smith and Minda (1998) and Blair and Homa (2001) studied the time course of category learning in humans. They distinguished an early, abstraction-based stage of category learning from a later stage that incorporated a capacity for categorizing exceptional category members. The present authors asked whether similar processing stages characterize the category learning of nonhuman primates. Humans (Homo sapiens) and monkeys (Macaca mulatta) participated in category-learning tasks that extended Blair and Homa’s paradigm comparatively. Early in learning, both species improved on typical items more than on exception items, indicating an initial mastery of the categories’ general structure. Later in learning, both species selectively improved their exception-item performance, indicating exception-item resolution or exemplar memorization. An initial stage of abstraction-based category learning may characterize categorization across a substantial range of the order Primates. This default strategy may have an adaptive resonance with the family resemblance organization of many natural-kind categories. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Rules and resemblance: Their changing balance in the category learning of humans (Homo sapiens) and monkeys (Macaca mulatta).

In an early dissociation between intentional and incidental category learning, Kemler Nelson (1984) gave participants a categorization task that could be performed by responding either to a single-dimensional rule or to overall family resemblance. Humans learning intentionally deliberately adopted rule-based strategies; humans learning incidentally adopted family resemblance strategies. The present authors replicated Kemler Nelson’s human experiment and found a similar dissociation. They also extended her paradigm so as to evaluate the balance between rules and family resemblance in determining the category decisions of rhesus monkeys. Monkeys heavily favored the family resemblance strategy. Formal models showed that even after many sessions and thousands of trials, they spread attention across all stimulus dimensions rather than focus on a single, criterial dimension that could also produce perfect categorization. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Mechanisms of inferential order judgments in humans (Homo sapiens) and rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta).

If A > B, and B > C, it follows logically that A > C. The process of reaching that conclusion is called transitive inference (TI). Several mechanisms have been offered to explain transitive performance. Scanning models claim that the list is scanned from the ends of the list inward until a match is found. Positional discrimination models claim that positional uncertainty accounts for accuracy and reaction time patterns. In Experiment 1, we trained rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) and humans (Homo sapiens) on adjacent pairs (e.g., AB, BC, CD, DE, EF) and tested them with previously untrained nonadjacent pairs (e.g., BD). In Experiment 2, we trained a second list and tested with nonadjacent pairs selected between lists (e.g., B from List 1, D from List 2). We then introduced associative competition between adjacent items in Experiment 3 by training 2 items per position (e.g., B?C?, B?C?) before testing with untrained nonadjacent items. In all 3 experiments, humans and monkeys showed distance effects in which accuracy increased, and reaction time decreased, as the distance between items in each pair increased (e.g., BD vs. BE). In Experiment 4, we trained adjacent pairs with separate 9- and 5-item lists. We then tested with nonadjacent pairs selected between lists to determine whether list items were chosen according to their absolute position (e.g., D, 5-item list > E, 9-item list), or their relative position (e.g., D, 5-item list     

What meaning means for same and different: Analogical reasoning in humans (Homo sapiens), chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), and rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta).

Thus far, language- and token-trained apes (e.g., D. Premack, 1976; R. K. R. Thompson, D. L. Oden, & S. T. Boysen, 1997) have provided the best evidence that nonhuman animals can solve, complete, and construct analogies, thus implicating symbolic representation as the mechanism enabling the phenomenon. In this study, the authors examined the role of stimulus meaning in the analogical reasoning abilities of three different primate species. Humans (Homo sapiens), chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), and rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) completed the same relational matching-to-sample (RMTS) tasks with both meaningful and nonmeaningful stimuli. This discrimination of relations-between-relations serves as the basis for analogical reasoning. Meaningfulness facilitated the acquisition of analogical matching for human participants, whereas individual differences among the chimpanzees suggest that meaning can either enable or hinder their ability to complete analogies. Rhesus monkeys did not succeed in the RMTS task regardless of stimulus meaning, suggesting that their ability to reason analogically, if present at all, may be dependent on a dimension other than the representational value of stimuli. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Prototype abstraction by monkeys (Macaca mulatta).

The authors analyze the shape categorization of rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) and the role of prototype- and exemplar-based comparison processes in monkeys' category learning. Prototype and exemplar theories make contrasting predictions regarding performance on the Posner-Homa dot-distortion categorization task. Prototype theory--which presumes that participants refer to-be-categorized items to a representation near the category's center (the prototype)--predicts steep typicality gradients and large prototype-enhancement effects. Exemplar theory--which presumes that participants refer to-be-categorized items to memorized training exemplars-predicts flat typicality gradients and small prototype-enhancement effects. Across many categorization tasks that, for the first time, assayed monkeys' dot-distortion categorization, monkeys showed steep typicality gradients and large prototype-enhancement effects. These results suggest that monkeys--like humans--refer to-be-categorized items to a prototype-like representation near the category's center rather than to a set of memorized training exemplars. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The learning of exclusive-or categories by monkeys (Macaca mulatta) and humans (Homo sapiens).

A central question in categorization research concerns the categories that animals and humans learn naturally and well. Here, the authors examined monkeys' (Macaca mulatta) and humans' (Homo sapiens) learning of the important class of exclusive-or (XOR) categories. Both species exhibited—through a sustained level of ongoing errors—substantial difficulty learning XOR category tasks at 3 stimulus dimensionalities. Clearly, both species brought a linear-separability constraint to XOR category learning. This constraint illuminates the primate category-learning system from which that of humans arose, and it has theoretical implications concerning the evolution of cognitive systems for categorization. The present data also clarify the role of exemplar-specific processes in fully explaining XOR category learning, and suggest that humans sometimes overcome their linear-separability constraint through the use of language and verbalization. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Detection of directed gaze in rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta).

To examine the ability of monkeys to detect the direction of attention of other individuals, the authors quantitatively investigated the visual scanning pattern of rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) in response to visually presented images of a human frontal face. The present results demonstrated not only that monkeys predominantly gaze at the eyes as compared with other facial areas in terms of duration and number of fixations, but also that they gaze at the eyes for a longer time period and more frequently when a human face, presented as a stimulus, gazed at them than when the gaze was shifted. These results indicate that rhesus monkeys are sensitive to the directed gaze of humans, suggesting that monkeys pay more attention to the human whose attention is directed to them. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Flexible serial response learning by pigeons (Columba livia) and humans (Homo sapiens).

Experimental tasks designed to involve procedural memory are often rigid and unchanging, despite many reasons to expect that implicit learning processes can be flexible and support considerable variability. A version of the serial response time (SRT) task was developed, in which the locations of targets were probabilistically determined. Targets appeared in locations according to both a structured sequence and a cue validity parameter, and the time to respond to each target was measured. Pigeons (Columba livia) and humans (Homo sapiens) both showed response time facilitation at the highest tested value for cue validity, and the magnitude of that facilitation gradually weakened as cue validity was decreased. Both species showed evidence that response times were largely determined by the local predictabilities of individual cue locations. In addition, humans showed some evidence that explicit knowledge of the sequence affected response times, specifically when cue validity was 100%. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Analogical reasoning and the differential outcome effect: Transitory bridging of the conceptual gap for rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta).

Monkeys, unlike chimpanzees and humans, have a marked difficulty acquiring relational matching-to-sample (RMTS) tasks that likely reflect the cognitive foundation upon which analogical reasoning rests. In the present study, rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) completed a categorical (identity and nonidentity) RMTS task with differential reward (pellet ratio) and/or punishment (timeout ratio) outcomes for correct and incorrect choices. Monkeys in either differential reward-only or punishment-only conditions performed at chance levels. However, the RMTS performance of monkeys experiencing both differential reward and punishment conditions was significantly better than chance. Subsequently when all animals experienced nondifferential outcomes tests, their RMTS performance levels were at chance. These results indicate that combining differential reward and punishment contingencies provide an effective, albeit transitory, scaffolding for monkeys to judge analogical relations-between-relations. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Disconnect in concept learning by rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta): Judgment of relations and relations-between-relations.

The authors investigated the role that entropy measures, discriminative cues, and symbolic knowledge play for rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) in the acquisition of the concepts of same and different for use in a computerized relational matching-to-sample task. After repeatedly failing to perceive relations between pairs of stimuli in a 2-choice discrimination paradigm, monkeys rapidly learned to discriminate between 8-element arrays. Subsequent tests with smaller arrays, however, suggested that, although important for the initial acquisition of the concept, entropy is not a variable on which monkeys are dependent. Not only do monkeys choose a corresponding relational pair in the presence of a cue, but they also choose the cue itself in the presence of the relational pair--in essence, labeling those relations. Subsequent failure in the judgment of relations-between-relations, however, suggests that perhaps a qualitatively different cognitive component exists that prevents monkeys from behaving analogically. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Discriminating the relation between relations: The role of entropy in abstract conceptualization by baboons (Papio papio) and humans (Homo sapiens).

Two baboons (Papio papio) successfully learned relational matching-to-sample: They picked the choice display that involved the same relation among 16 pictures (same or different) as the sample display, although the sample display shared no pictures with the choice displays. The baboons generalized relational matching behavior to sample displays created from novel pictures. Further experiments varying the number of sample pictures and the mixture of same and different sample pictures suggested that entropy plays a key role in the baboons' conceptual behavior. Two humans (Homo sapiens) were similarly trained and tested; their behavior was both similar to and different from the baboons' behavior. The results suggest that animals other than humans and chimpanzees can discriminate the relation between relations. They further suggest that entropy detection may underlie same-different conceptualization, but that additional processes may participate in human conceptualization. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Ordinal judgments of symbolic stimuli by capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) and rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta): The effects of differential and nondifferential reward.

Ordinal learning was investigated in capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) and rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta). In Experiment 1, both species were presented with pairings of the Arabic numerals 0 to 9. Some monkeys were given food rewards equal to the value of the numeral selected and some were rewarded with a single pellet only for choosing the higher numeral within the pair. Both species learned to select the larger numeral, but only rhesus monkeys that were differentially rewarded performed above chance levels when presented with novel probe pairings. In Experiment 2, the monkeys were first presented with arrays of 5 familiar numerals (from the range 0 to 9) and then arrays of 5 novel letters (from the range A to J) with the same reward outcomes in place as in Experiment 1. Both species performed better with the numerals, suggesting that an ordinal sequence of all stimuli had been learned during Experiment 1, rather than a matrix of two-choice discriminations. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Perception of chirps by Sykes's monkeys (Cercopithecus albogularis) and humans (Homo sapiens).

Four Sykes's monkeys (Cercopithecus albogularis) and 4 humans (Homo sapiens) discriminated among 12 chirps presented in a repeating background paradigm. The test stimuli consisted of sets of 4 chirps recorded from Sykes's monkeys, red-tailed monkeys (C. ascanius), and small East African birds. Reaction times (RTs) were submitted to a multidimensional scaling analysis. All monkey listeners perceived the bird chirps as similar to each other and distinct from the monkey calls, whereas 3 of the 4 human listeners had difficulty distinguishing the bird chirps from the monkey calls. Both human and monkey subjects tended to perceive Sykes's and red-tailed monkey calls as very similar to one another, but the degree of perceived similarity was greatest for the monkey listeners. The data suggest that the perceptual map of these calls is influenced by their biological significance in nature. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Detection of Grouped and Ungrouped Parts in Visual Patterns by Tufted Capuchin Monkeys (Cebus apella) and Humans (Homo sapiens).

The authors investigated perceptual grouping in capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) and humans (Homo sapiens). In Experiment 1, 6 monkeys received a visual pattern as the sample and had to identify the comparison stimulus featuring some of its parts. Performance was better for ungrouped parts than for grouped parts. In Experiment 2, the sample featured the parts, and the comparison stimuli, the complex figures: The advantage for ungrouped elements disappeared. In Experiment 3, in which new stimuli were introduced, the results of the previous experiments were replicated. In Experiment 4, 128 humans were presented with the same tasks and stimuli used with monkeys. Their accuracy was higher for grouped parts. Results suggest that human and nonhuman primates use different modes of analyzing multicomponent patterns. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Salience of Caller Identity in Rhesus Monkey (Macaca mulatta) Coos and Screams: Perceptual Experiments With Human (Homo sapiens) Listeners.

Recent evidence from acoustic analysis and playback experiments indicates that adult female rhesus monkey (Macaca mulatta) coos are individually distinctive but their screams are not. In this study, the authors compared discrimination of individual identity in these sounds by naive human listeners who judged whether 2 sounds had been produced by the same monkey or 2 monkeys. Each of 3 experiments using this same-different design showed significantly better discrimination of vocalizer identity from coos than from screams. Experiment 1 demonstrated the basic finding. Experiment 2 also tested the effect of non-identity-related scream variation, and Experiment 3 added a comparison with human vowel sounds. Outcomes suggest that acoustic structural differences in coos and screams influence salience of caller-identity cues, with significant implications for understanding the functions of these calls. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Social learning in pig-tailed macaques (Macaca nemestrina) and adult humans (Homo sapiens) on a two-action artificial fruit.

An artificial fruit (AF) was used to test for social learning in pig-tailed macaques (Macaca nemestrina) and adult humans (Homo sapiens). A monkey demonstrator opened the AF, showing alternative methods to 2 groups of cage mates. Video films of the monkey demonstrations were presented to adult humans. Compared with chimpanzees and children, the macaques watched the demonstrations significantly less and in a much more sporadic manner. They also produced only very weak and transitory evidence of social learning. In contrast, the adult humans performed as one might expect of optimum imitators, even producing evidence of components of a "ratchet effect." (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Social competence is reduced in socially deprived rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta).

Rhesus monkeys deprived for some period from their mother have often served as a model for the effect of adverse rearing conditions on social competence in humans. Social competence is the capacity to react in a species-specific way to social interactions. The current study assesses whether early deprivation from peers also affects the rates of behavior and social competence in rhesus monkeys. This was studied in groups of rhesus monkeys with different rearing conditions: subadult females that were mother-only reared during their first year of life and subsequently housed with peers were compared with subadult females from five naturalistic social groups. Socially deprived monkeys showed higher rates of submission and stereotypic behaviors than socially reared individuals. In addition, they show socially incompetent behavior, since they react with agonistic behavior to nonthreatening social situations. The results suggest that this socially incompetent behavior is rooted in a general feeling of anxiety toward group companions. The authors hypothesize that anxiety negatively affects social information processing, which results in socially incompetent behavior. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) enumerate large and small sequentially presented sets of items using analog numerical representations.

Two rhesus monkeys selected the larger of two sequentially presented sets of items on a computer monitor. In Experiment 1, performance was related to the ratio of set sizes, and the monkeys discriminated between sets with up to 10 items. Performance was not disrupted when 1 set had fewer than 4 items and 1 set had more than 4 items, a critical trial type for differentiating object file and analog models of numerical representation. Experiment 2 controlled the interitem rate of presentation. Experiment 3 included some trials on which number and amount (visual surface area) offered conflicting cues. Experiment 4 varied the total duration of set presentation and the duration of item visibility. In all of the experiments, performance remained high, although total set presentation duration also acted as a partial cue for the monkeys. Overall, the data indicated that rhesus monkeys estimate the approximate number of items in sequentially presented sets and that they are not relying solely on nonnumerical cues such as rate, duration, or cumulative amount. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Interpreting the effects of image manipulation on picture perception in pigeons (Columba livia) and humans (Homo sapiens).

The effects of picture manipulations on humans' and pigeons' performance were examined in a go/no-go discrimination of two perceptually similar categories, cat and dog faces. Four types of manipulation were used to modify the images. Mosaicization and scrambling were used to produce degraded versions of the training stimuli, while morphing and cell exchange were used to manipulate the relative contribution of positive and negative training stimuli to test stimuli. Mosaicization mainly removes information at high spatial frequencies, whereas scrambling removes information at low spatial frequencies to a greater degree. Morphing leads to complex transformations of the stimuli that are not concentrated at any particular spatial frequency band. Cell exchange preserves high spatial frequency details, but sometimes moves them into the “wrong” stimulus. The four manipulations also introduce high-frequency noise to differing degrees. Responses to test stimuli indicated that high and low spatial frequency information were both sufficient but not necessary to maintain discrimination performance in both species, but there were also species differences in relative sensitivity to higher and lower spatial frequency information. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)