The reception of my Freud-critique in the psychoanalytic literature.

Responds to comments made over the years by Peter Caws (see record 2003-09630-003), Zvi Lothane (see record 2006-05420-005), Charles Hanly (1988), W. W. Meissner (see record 1991-03025-001), Paul Robinson (1993), Michael Scriven (1959), and Jon Mills, in response to the present author's crique of Freud. Some of the very extensive body of commentary on my psychoanalytic writings has been gratifyingly favorable, while other responses have been more or less adverse, and even denunciatory. Therefore, in this survey of "The Reception of My Freud-Critique in the Psychoanalytic Literature," I include my critical reactions to selected objections to my views, as well as noteworthy commendations of them. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Conflict images, national narratives, and external realities.

Replies to comment by G. Rosenwald (see record 2008-05553-014) on the current author's original article (see record 2007-07130-002) which discusses the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and attitude theory. In his comment on my recent article, my erstwhile colleague at the University of Michigan, George Rosenwald, made one valid observation. In my writings and in my practice, I often dwell on the symmetries in the actions and perceptions of conflicting parties. For example, in my discussions of mirror images, I argue that mirror images arise out of the dynamics of the conflict interaction itself, particularly the motivational and cognitive contexts in which parties in conflict generally operate. The remainder of Rosenwald's (2008) comment, unfortunately, is largely irrelevant, because it is based on a misreading of my article and a misconception of the work to which I have dedicated myself since the early 1970s. I wish I could respond more constructively to Rosenwald's (2008) comment, as I tried to do at the beginning of my remarks in explaining my emphasis on symmetries in the actions and perceptions of the parties in conflict. But, unfortunately, most of what he wrote seems to be based on his theoretical model of my views rather than on the external realities of what I actually write, think, and do. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Rejoinder to Burke's review of Organizational behavior.

Responds to Burke's review (see record 2007-04325-001) of the book, "Organizational Behavior: The Psychology of Effective Management (2nd ed.)" by David J. Lawless (1979). Professor Burke's criticisms would be quite appropriate if directed towards a book, treatise, or thesis expounding the author's theories, but I think they fail to appreciate the objectives of a textbook directed primarily to the undergraduate student. I believe that every textbook writer, consciously or not, has to decide the question of whether he/she writes for students or for colleagues. I write for my students, and not for my colleagues, as teacher-administrator and not as researcher. Professor Burke would make me a purist writing for my colleagues and that is not my intent. The textbook writer provides only the framework upon which the good teacher can build, can embellish, and from which to intrigue his or her students. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Altemeyer replies.

Replies to commentary by J. J. Ray (see record 2007-08928-001) regarding the current author's book, Enemies of freedom: Understanding right wing authoritarianism (see record 1988-98419-000). The foremost of Ray's six criticisms is that "insofar as (I have) studied anything at all, (I have) probably studied some form of conservatism." The constructs of "right-wing authoritarianism" and "conservatism" can be defined as one wishes, and one can declare that they are the same thing. I prefer to draw several conceptual distinctions however, perhaps because one brand of "conservatism", especially visible in the United States, resents government authority. Next, Professor Ray quite correctly points out that my explanation of the development of personal authoritarianism ignored genetic possibilities. The twins-studies have caught me completely flat-footed, with my back turned, though I would find evidence for a DNA-based explanation of authoritarianism quite exciting. As for attitudes toward authorities, I suspect they do wobble some during adolescence. However, neither of the two adult studies Professor Ray cites shows "a general attitude toward authority does not exist." If anything, they suggest it does. Professor Ray says the consistency of the RWA Scale only occurs because my item selection procedures have created a distortion of the real world, a world of my own "from which the most disturbing outside information has been rigorously excluded." In fact, the covariation among items mentioning different kinds of authorities goes back to the Berkeley F Scale. Finally, Professor Ray concludes that I am studying some nonpolitical form of conservatism, because the RWA Scale gives "virtually no prediction of right-wing political preference." Data is presented to dispute this allegation. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Against the grain: “Matter” and “spirit”.

Comments on the original article, "Implications of near-death experiences for a postmaterialist psychology," by B. Greyson (see record 2010-03251-005). Although I will only comment on the paper by Greyson (2010), my initial thoughts pertain to the whole section, which explicitly framed itself as a repudiation of materialism and a defense of spiritual psychology. I find neither of these positions palatable or fair to the nature of reality, which seems to scoff at our pedestrian attempts to tame it, whether by crass materialism or spiritualism. Both “spiritual materialism” and “crass materialism” are but different manifestations of the same maladies: The refusal to consider data that do not fit preconceptions (i.e., that one’s beliefs, whether spiritual or “scientistic” may be wrong or, at least, incomplete), methodological poverty (i.e., that one’s method of knowledge, whether experiential or experimental is the only or the best way to apprehend all of reality), and philosophical shallowness (e.g., the “secret” that we attract what happens to us, which is an insult to the countless victims of genocides and brutalities throughout history, or the pronouncements that consciousness has been “explained” when we have no idea even how electrochemical impulses become experiences). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Immediacy, emotion, and the filling of glasses: Next round's on you.

In this article, I respond to comments made by K. Salzinger (see record 2006-00920-010) and A. Aleman and A. S. David (see record 2006-00920-011) on my original article (see record 2005-03019-003). The constructive, reconstructive, and interpretive nature of human cognition is well illustrated by these two responses to my recent article on schizophrenia. In the original article, I used meta-analytic summaries of the published literature to show that a majority of schizophrenia patients are distinguishable from healthy people on the basis of standard tests of cognitive ability. I also showed that commonly reported brain-imaging findings lack this discriminating power, at least in terms of variables that lend themselves to meta-analytic synthesis. I went on to discuss influences, from brain disturbance to stress to endophenotypes, that may underpin the sensitivity of cognitive performance to schizophrenia. Neither Salzinger nor Aleman and David disputed the meta-analytic evidence I presented. Instead, they have their own rather oblique takes on my findings and advocate research not included in the quantitative summaries or related discussion. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Continuing education in general practice. 1. Attitudes of general practitioners

As part of a Queensland survey, we made an assessment of the attitudes of general practitioners to continuing education. We analysed responses for age, sex, type and geographical location of practice. Almost all the respondents (99%) agreed that commitment to CME is lifelong. Most of them did not feel that there is too much concern with keeping up-to-date. Recognition of their own educational needs is a problem for a sizeable minority. Most feel that GP skills can be taught through CME courses, which should focus on patient management. Informal communication with colleagues is a useful mode of learning. Although exactly half the doctors felt that CME should be mandatory, a greater proportion of younger doctors were in favour.     

To Grade or Not to Grade.

Comments on an article by N. R. F. Maier regarding innovations in education (see record 1972-11804-001). In discussing innovative ways of dealing with increased college enrollments, Maier mentioned that we might use more efficient grading methods, or dispense with grading altogether. Having switched from a traditional grading system to the total absence of evaluation within the course of a year, I may be in a good position to contrast the efficiency of the two approaches. I found that under the traditional system, somewhat surprisingly, about half my time had been taken up by grading-related activities. That is, if we eliminate grading, we might be able to double our enrollments. When I no longer had to explain grading systems in class or administer tests and exams, moreover, a great deal of class time was freed for other activities. And students for the most part used the time they would have spent in studying for tests in individual projects. These considerations, plus increasing evidence that grading is not necessary or useful and may well be harmful, might cause us to re-examine the necessity of grading practices. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Science or ideology?

Responds to the comments by D. McKay (see record 2011-02175-008); B. D. Thombs, L. R. Jewett, and M. Bassel (see record 2011-02175-009); M. D. Anestis, J. C. Anestis, and S. O. Lilienfeld (see record 2011-02175-010); and W. W. Tryon and G. S. Tryon (see record 2011-02175-011) on the current author's original article, "The efficacy of psychodynamic psychotherapy" (see record 2010-02208-012). The academic psychology literature is filled with pronouncements about psychodynamic theory, often stated in authoritative tones, that present a picture of psychodynamic treatment that is unrecognizable to me and to other contemporary psychodynamic practitioners. Several of the comments about my article perpetuate this tradition and, I am sorry to say, introduce disinformation into the pages of the American Psychologist. Before addressing some specifics, I want to say a few words about my understanding of how such misrepresentations can find their way into scholarly academic journals. Three of the four comments on my article appear to have the intent of reasserting the master narrative by creating a smokescreen of doubt and confusion (Anestis, Anestis, & Lilienfeld, 2011; McKay, 2011; Thombs, Jewett, & Bassel, 2011). Two of the four comments (McKay, 2011; Tryon & Tryon, 2011) cite a metaanalysis indicating that there is no empirical support for the concept of “symptom substitution.” Two of the comments (Anestis et al., 2011; Thombs et al., 2011) note that the effect size from the meta-analysis by Leichsenring and Rabung (2008)—one of eight meta-analyses showing substantial benefits for psychodynamic therapy reported in my Table 1 (Shedler, 2010)—has been the target of criticism and reflects a computational error. Three of the comments (Anestis et al., 2011; McKay, 2011; Thombs et al., 2011) imply that the methods used in empirical studies of psychodynamic therapies are somehow inadequate relative to studies of other evidence-based therapies. Unlike the other comments, the comment of Tryon and Tryon (2011) appears to be a sincere effort to engage with my arguments. What disturbs me about the three other comments is not that the authors disagree with my conclusions but that they portray themselves as objective investigators who desire only to promote good science. While Anestis et al. (2011), McKay (2011), and Thombs et al. (2011) imply or explicitly state that I am the one who marshals evidence selectively, from my angle of vision they appear to value only evidence that supports an a priori agenda while ignoring, dismissing, or attacking evidence that does not. If so, this is not science, but ideology masquerading as science. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

I Sold My Private Psychological Practice.

In 1971, following 31 years of private practice in clinical psychology, including 26 years on a full-time basis, I decided that it was time to think about closing out this phase of my career in favor of semiretirement. Five years later my plan became a reality, see article by R. M. Samuels (see record 2005-09169-003). Here is the story of how it was done. It is my opinion that most psychological practices have a sale value and that with adequate planning, a qualified purchaser will be found and an effective transfer of the practice can be realized. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

On not being heard: Response to Gargiulo (2007) and Mills (2007).

Replies to comments made by G. Gargiulo (see record 2007-16468-013) and J. Mills (see record 2007-16468-014) on the current author's original comments (see record 2007-00135-013) on an article by K. Maroda (see record 2007-00135-012). I stand by the extensive clinical evidence that I have garnered, which indicates that a revised version of Freud's topographic theory is superior to his structural theory as a platform for psychoanalytic understanding and technique. I support my position here by citing some original contributions made by the adaptive approach and then highlight adaptive insights into patients' archetypal, unconscious perceptions of the moral implications of a therapist's use of a home office. I conclude with a discussion of why psychoanalysts have rejected the adaptive approach out of hand. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

An updated account of the ethical and legal considerations of record keeping.

The Canadian literature is void of contemporary guidelines for clinical record keeping for psychologists, as the most recent article was published more than two decades ago (Eberlein, 1990). However, the techniques used in record keeping have greatly advanced, specifically with regard to the role of computers and the use of electronic documents. Furthermore, new legislation and guidelines have been developed in response to these technological advancements. The purpose of this article is to provide a concise, accessible, and up-to-date set of guidelines on record keeping in psychology. The professional and legal requirements of psychologists are discussed with regard to the use, content, access, ownership, and retention of records with special consideration given to electronic documents. Recommendations are made for Canadian psychologists that are consistent with the current legal and professional standards of the field. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

How to base continuing medical education (CME) on the concepts of evidence and decision

In order to play its part fully, CME in France must be radically reformed, less in its methods than in its philosophy; it is important to ground CME on objective evaluation, evidence-based medicine and on medical decision making. These notions are often neglected, or even unrecognized, especially in medical education. Asset of actual situation are the recent decision of CME legal obligation, which will require validation of quality criterion in CME, and large network of associations and 'leader-practioners', that would let to most practicing physicians' participation.     

Psychology and women’s studies: Epistemological dilemma or opportunity?

Women used to be relegated to the periphery in psychology: most of us were not really heard as primary members of our discipline. Moreover, fundamental concepts and methods were developed by men about men, and applied to women only as an afterthought and without due process. Recently, more women are speaking straightforwardly from their experiences and are beginning to be heard with increasing respect, though change is slow. Concurrently, Women's Studies is coming to its own as an academic discipline. Now it is paradoxical that as women psychologists, many of us find ourselves with one foot in each of two different worlds—one in psychology and the other in women's studies. As I reflect on what it must have been like for women many years ago in psychology and on how that experience has (and has not) changed in my generation, I am coming to appreciate the intellectual challenge which I face. In this essay I discuss several epistemological and methodological issues in Women's Studies which are relevant to psychology in an attempt to bring both of my feet closer together. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Response to Norcross.

I accept J. Norcross's (2005; see record 2005-07703-002) criticism that I should have advocated for a bolder response to the current plight of therapists (see record 2005-07703-001), and I elaborate on some areas in which he raised questions about my point of view, including the logical-positivist tradition, pharmaceutical treatments, and the newer therapies. In an effort to convey the substance of my position, I invite readers to imagine what would ensue if, in the name of accountability, highly trained educators were subjected to pressures similar to those with which psychotherapists are currently coping. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

U.S. Navy Dental Corps Survey of 1994: analysis of narrative responses

The transfer of control of institutional health delivery from the medical profession to the managerial model and it's implications for the nursing profession is the subject of my enquiry. As the basis for an interpretation of Foucalt's work, I have used a previously unpublished text on power by Foucault, published in 1982 by Dreyfus & Rainbow as an 'afterword' for their book. I have used Michel Foucault's five factors for analysis of power, to summarise the elements which are exercised in these two forms of control. Although emphasis has been given to the effects of control on nursing practice, it is in nursing education that I have found possibilities for the nursing profession to address the challenges it now faces.     

Commentary.

Comments on the article by Omer & London (see record 1989-02299-001) on the changes that have taken place in the psychotherapeutic world since 1970. Although I agree that the more recent changes have been occurring with space-age rapidity, my view of how the changes have occurred differs somewhat from that presented by Omer & London. Consequently, I first will present my perception of what preceded the current deluge of psychotherapeutic treatments and then offer some additional comments. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Ontogenetic studies of seizure patterns and seizure activities induced by cortical focus

Medical audit and continuing medical education (CME) are now the mainstays of quality assurance in hospitals. Audits should address problems that have serious consequences for patients if proper treatment is not given. The single most important step is the selection of essential or scientific criteria that relate process to outcomes. CME does less than commonly believed to improve care. Today, quality assurance increasingly means a near-guarantee to every patient of appropriate treatment and fewest possible complications. Maintenance of the public trust rests on a firm commitment of the medical staff and board to this principle, implemented through an organized program of quality assurance. Under these conditions, medical audit and CME can effectively improve care by improving physician performance.     

A reply to Melzack.

Presents a reply to the comments by Melzack (see record 1989-30022-001). Melzack comments that psychological theory is at a standstill and that the nature of self, mind and reality continue to elude us. I recall realizing during my educational training that we had not agreed upon conceptual understanding of self, let alone mind or reality. As an undergraduate student, I was introduced to, as Melzack states, a "profusion of little theories" and, as a graduate student, to a profusion of bigger clinical theories, without however, any conceptual clarity of these important terms. As I prepared for my dissertation, I found myself frustrated reviewing journal articles on self. Despite masses of studies laboriously investigating implications of self, self was being utilized as a vaguely defined dependent variable. As Melzack concluded, masses of facts are compiled with no agreed upon theoretical framework to hold them together. I would like to describe how I came upon a new avenue toward understanding self, mind and reality which has provided profound meaning to my clinical practice. I believe the ideas presented by Melzack have direct relevance for applied psychological theory. Substituting the term "phantom self for "phantom limb" can have many interesting parallels; when a person says "me," that implies "self" though the "self" described is a phantom as the phantom limb. As the search continues for the brain processes that generate qualities of experience for "self." I strongly recommend the consideration of Buddhist ideology for anyone concerned with defining self, mind and reality. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)