Attitudes and cognitive response: An electrophysiological approach.

Two experiments employed electrophysiological procedures to assess the covert information-processing activity of message recipients. In Exp I, 24 undergraduates expected to hear discrepant communications and were requested to "collect their thoughts" following each forewarning. As discrepancy increased, anticipatory counterargumentation increased, whereas production of favorable thoughts and agreement decreased. Following forewarnings, oral muscle, cardiac, and respiratory activity increased, whereas nonoral muscle activity remained constant and quiescent. In Exp II, 60 undergraduates anticipated and heard a proattitudinal (P), a counterattitudinal (C), or a neutral (N) communication. Ss evaluated more positively and generated more favorable thoughts and fewer counterarguments to the P than the C advocacy but rated similarly the N and P advocacies. As in Exp I, incipient oral muscle activity increased following the forewarning of an involving C advocacy; it also increased for all conditions during the message. Patterns of subtle facial muscle changes reflected the affective nature of the cognitive responding before and during the message. (3 p ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Issue involvement can increase or decrease persuasion by enhancing message-relevant cognitive responses.

Two experiments with 96 undergraduates tested the hypothesis that high issue involvement enhances thinking about the content of a persuasive communication. Exp I varied involvement and the direction of a message (pro- or counterattitudinal). Increasing involvement enhanced persuasion for the proattitudinal but reduced persuasion for the counterattitudinal advocacy. Exp II again varied involvement, but both messages took a counterattitudinal position. One message employed compelling arguments and elicited primarily favorable thoughts, whereas the other employed weak arguments and elicited primarily counterarguments. Increasing involvement enhanced persuasion for the strong message but reduced persuasion for the weak one. Together the experiments provide support for the view that high involvement with an issue enhances message processing and therefore can result in either increased or decreased acceptance. (43 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Individual differences in relative hemispheric alpha abundance and cognitive responses to persuasive communications.

Exp I found that 40 right-handed undergraduates who were characterized by relative left-hemisphere EEG activity over the parietal areas also produced a less affectively polarized profile of thought listings about a persuasive communication. This individual difference emerged only when Ss were confronted by the forewarning and message; the basal patterns of interhemispheric EEG activity, which were obtained prior to the announcement of the attitudinal recommendation, did not portend distinguishable profiles of cognitive responding. Exp II with 8 Ss replicated the major findings of Exp I using different topics and a within-Ss rather than a between-Ss design. Analyses suggested that thinking about an attitude issue rather than responding to a persuasive communication was sufficient to obtain the above relationship between interhemispheric EEG alpha abundance and cognitive response. Exp III with 7 Ss used a time-to-think procedure to assess interhemispheric EEG patterning as a function of the affective polarization of topic-relevant thinking. Results support the expectation that as Ss thought longer about attitude issues they exhibited a shifting of relative hemispheric EEG activity from the left toward the right parietal areas. The significance and limitations of these findings for research on attitude change and the utility of including psychophysiological approaches to elusive research problems in personality and social psychology are discussed. (43 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Positive mood and persuasion: Different roles for affect under high- and low-elaboration conditions.

Two experiments examined the processes by which positive mood influences attitude change under high and low message elaboration conditions. To examine elaboration, Exp 1 included individuals who differed in their need for cognition, and Exp 2 manipulated the relevance of the message. In each study, Ss were exposed to a persuasive communication following a positive or neutral mood induction. In both studies, positive mood produced more positive attitudes toward the advocacy, but positive mood influenced the positivity of Ss' thoughts only under high-elaboration conditions. Path analyses showed that positive mood had a direct effect on attitudes in the low-elaboration conditions but influenced attitudes indirectly by modifying the positivity of thoughts in the high-elaboration conditions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The impact of repetition-induced familiarity on agreement with weak and strong arguments.

Repeated statements are perceived as more valid than novel ones, termed the illusion of truth effect, presumably because repetition imbues the statement with familiarity. In 3 studies, the authors examined the conditions under which and the processes by which familiarity signals from repetition and argument quality signals from processing of message content influenced agreement with persuasive arguments. Participants with low or high motivation to process information were presented persuasive arguments seen once or twice. In all 3 studies, repetition increased the persuasiveness of weak and strong arguments when little processing of message content occurred. Two of the studies used a process dissociation procedure to reveal that both greater controlled processing (which reflected argument content) and the greater automatic influence of familiarity (which reflected repetition) were associated with increased acceptance of strong arguments but that greater controlled processing dissipated the benefits of familiarity for agreement with weak arguments. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The effects of majority versus minority source status on persuasion: A self-validation analysis.

The present research proposes that sources in the numerical majority (vs. minority) can affect persuasion by influencing the confidence with which people hold their thoughts in response to the persuasive message. Participants received a persuasive message composed of either strong or weak arguments that was presented by a majority or a minority source. Consistent with the self-validation hypothesis, we predicted and found that the majority (vs. minority) status of the source increased the confidence with which recipients held their thoughts. As a consequence, majority (vs. minority) sources increased argument quality effects in persuasion when source status information followed message processing (Experiment 1). In contrast, when the information regarding source status preceded (rather than followed) the persuasive message, it validated the perception of the position advocated, reducing message processing. As a consequence of having more confidence in the position advocated before receiving the message, majority (vs. minority) sources reduced argument quality effects in persuasion (Experiment 2). Finally, Experiment 3 isolated the timing of the source status manipulation, revealing that sources in the numerical majority (vs. minority) can increase or decrease persuasion to strong arguments depending on whether source status is introduced before or after processing the message. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Effects of source magnification of cognitive effort on attitudes: An information-processing view.

In Exp I 120 undergraduates viewed a videotape of 1 or 3 speakers presenting 1 or 3 arguments in favor of a counterattitudinal position. The 3-source/3-argument message produced significantly more persuasion than any of the other conditions, which did not differ from each other. It is suggested that each time a speaker appears, the recipient "gears up" to process the message and that if either speaker or argument is repeated, further thinking about the arguments is minimal. Exp II (30 Ss) excluded an alternative to this processing interpretation by showing that Ss exposed to the multiple-source/multiple-argument message did not infer that the pool of proproposal arguments was larger than that inferred by other Ss. In Exp III (100 Ss), Ss exposed to 3 compelling arguments purportedly produced by 3 different persons generated more positive thoughts and were more persuaded than Ss who read the same high quality arguments presumably generated by 1 person. However, Ss exposed to 3 weak arguments purportedly produced by 3 different persons generated more negative thoughts and were less persuaded than Ss who read the same low quality arguments attributed to 1 source. Overall, results indicate that increasing the number of sources of a message increases thinking about the message content. This increased thinking can result in either increased or decreased persuasion, depending on the cogency of the message arguments. (16 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Personal involvement as a determinant of argument-based persuasion.

Hypothesized that when a persuasive communication was on a topic of (a) high personal relevance, attitude change was governed by issue-relevant arguments, and (b) low personal relevance, peripheral features were more important. 145 undergraduates expressed their attitudes on the issue of comprehensive senior exams after exposure to a counterattitudinal advocacy that was of high or low personal relevance containing either strong or weak arguments that emanated from a source of either high or low expertise. Another 18 Ss were controls who were surveyed but not exposed to a counterattitudinal advocacy. Interactions of the personal relevance manipulation with the argument quality and expertise manipulations revealed that under high relevance (the exams were to be instituted the following year), attitudes were influenced primarily by the quality of the arguments in the message, whereas under low relevance (the exams were to be instituted in 10 years), attitudes were influenced primarily by the expertise of the source. It is suggested that an increase in involvement is associated with an increase in the importance of message arguments because people are motivated to hold "correct" and defensible opinions, and they have a better framework for things that are relevant to the self. (45 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Effects of rhetorical questions on persuasion: A cognitive response analysis.

Applied a cognitive response analysis to the use of rhetorical questions in persuasion. 160 college students heard a counterattitudinal message in which the major arguments were summarized in either statement or rhetorical forms. The personal relevance of the issue and the quality of the arguments employed in the message were also varied. The use of rhetorical questions was found to either increase or decrease the cognitive elaboration of a message depending on the personal relevance of the communication. When the message was of low personal relevance and recipients were not naturally processing the statement form of the message diligently, the use of rhetoricals enhanced thinking: A message with strong arguments became more persuasive, and a message with weak arguments became less persuasive with rhetoricals. However, when the message was of high personal relevance and recipients were already highly motivated to process the statement form of the message, the use of rhetoricals disrupted thinking: A message with strong arguments became less persuasive, and a message with weak arguments became more persuasive with rhetoricals. This 3-way interaction was expected from the cognitive response analysis, but not from competing formulations. (29 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Memory for persuasive messages: A test of a schema-copy-plus-tag model.

Examined how arguments contained in persuasive messages are represented and retrieved from memory. It was proposed that there exist generic schemata that contain typical arguments supporting positions on familiar issues and that guide the representation and retrieval of message content in a manner similar to that hypothesized by A. C. Graesser and G. V. Nakamura's (1982) schema-copy-plus-tag model of prose memory. 261 undergraduates read a political candidate's arguments for his position on several familiar social issues. The arguments varied in their perceived typicality for messages generally supporting each position. After either a 10-min or 2-day delay, Ss were given either a recall or recognition test for the message content. Results strongly support the schema-copy-plus-tag model. Over time, more typical than atypical arguments were correctly recalled, and Ss' recall protocols showed increasing clustering by typicality. However, recall of typical arguments was accompanied more by intrusion errors (false recalls) than was recall of atypical arguments. Furthermore, recognition discrimination was better for atypical arguments at both retention intervals, although this difference was smaller after 2 days. In general, fewer atypical than typical arguments were falsely recognized as having been stated in the message. Results are discussed in terms of their implications for studying the relation between attitudes and memory message content. (28 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The effects of involvement on responses to argument quantity and quality: Central and peripheral routes to persuasion.

Tested the view that the number of arguments in a message could affect agreement with a communication by serving as a simple acceptance cue when personal involvement was low but could affect agreement by enhancing issue-relevant thinking when personal involvement was high. In addition to manipulating the personal relevance of the communication topic, both the number and the quality of the arguments in the message were varied. In a pilot study with 46 undergraduates, when the issue was of low relevance, Ss showed more agreement in response to a message containing 6 arguments (3 strong and 3 weak) than to messages containing either 3 strong or 3 weak arguments. Under high involvement, however, the 6-argument message did not increase agreement over the message containing only 3 strong arguments. In the full experiment, 168 undergraduates received either 3 or 9 arguments that were either all cogent or all specious under conditions of either high or low involvement. The manipulation of argument number had a greater impact under low than under high involvement, but the manipulation of argument quality had a greater impact under high than low involvement. Results indicate that increasing the number of arguments in a message could affect persuasion whether or not the actual content of the arguments was scrutinized. (53 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Heuristic versus systematic information processing and the use of source versus message cues in persuasion.

In Exp I, 183 undergraduates read a persuasive message from a likable or unlikable communicator who presented 6 or 2 arguments on 1 of 2 topics. High involvement (HI) Ss anticipated discussing the message topic at a future experimental session, whereas low-involvement (LI) Ss anticipated discussing a different topic. For HI Ss, opinion change was significantly greater given 6 arguments but was unaffected by communicator likability. For LI Ss, opinion change was significantly greater given a likable communicator but was unaffected by the argument's manipulation. In Exp II with 80 similar Ss, HI Ss showed slightly greater opinion change when exposed to 5 arguments from an unlikable (vs 1 argument from a likable) communicator, whereas LI Ss exhibited significantly greater persuasion in response to 1 argument from a likable (vs 5 arguments from an unlikable) communicator. Findings support the idea that HI leads message recipients to employ a systematic information processing strategy in which message-based cognitions mediate persuasion, whereas LI leads recipients to use a heuristic processing strategy in which simple decision rules mediate persuasion. Support was also obtained for the hypothesis that content- vs source-mediated opinion change would result in greater persistence. (37 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Development of the ability to distinguish between comprehension and memory: Evidence from goal-state evaluation tasks.

Three experiments investigated developmental changes in children's ability to monitor and evaluate memorization and comprehension. First and 3rd graders rated the perceived difficulty of memorization (verbatim recall) and comprehension (block-building construction) after engaging in (a) a memory strategy (rote repetition) or a comprehension strategy (pictorial clarification of unfamiliar words; Exp 1); (b) no strategy or repetition (Exp 2); and (c) no strategy or clarification (Exp 3). In Exp 1, children recognized that clarification aided construction more than recall, but not that repetition aided recall more than construction. In Exp 2, children recognized that repetition aided recall but not construction. In Exp 3, children recognized that clarification aided construction more than recall. Thus, by 1st grade, children are sensitive to some aspects of the comprehension-memory distinction. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Effects of need for cognition on message evaluation, recall, and persuasion.

Studied the relation among need for cognition (NFC), message processing, and persuasion. 57 pairs of undergraduates holding approximately the same attitude toward instituting senior comprehensive exams but differing widely in their scores on a NFC scale participated in Exp I. Ss read a set of either strong or weak arguments supporting the recommendation that senior comprehensive exams be instituted. Results reveal that argument quality had a greater impact on the message evaluations and source impressions provided by Ss high than by those low in NFC and that Ss high in NFC reported expending more cognitive effort and recalled more message arguments regardless of argument quality. The findings from Exp I were replicated in Exp II (110 female undergraduates) with a different topic (i.e., raising student tuition) and cover story. The inclusion of a postcommunication attitude measure revealed that the attitudes of Ss high in NFC were more affected by argument quality than those of Ss low in NFC. These studies document a reliable difference among individuals in their tendency to derive information from and elaborate on externally provided message arguments. (39 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Persistence of induced opinion change and retention of the inducing message contents.

Induced opinion change shows a strong positive relationship to recall of the contents of the persuasive message 1 week after receipt of the communication but tends, over time, to become functionally autonomous of recall of at least some aspects of the contents of the inducing message. Induced opinion change was found to decay rectilinearly over a 6-week period, while recall of contents showed a negatively accelerated decay trend. Opinion change and recall of the message topic were positively related 1 week after the communication, but negatively related 6 weeks later. Recall of the side taken and of the specific arguments used were positively related to opinion change both 1 week and 6 weeks after the communication. Recall of source was complexly related to opinion change. (23 ref.) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Exact and conceptual repetition dissociate conceptual memory tests: Problems for transfer appropriate processing theory.

Tested whether a conceptual implicit memory test exhibited repetition effects similar to those found in free recall. 555 Ss participated in 3 experiments. In Exp 1, Ss rated a series of target words and their associates according to their degree of pleasantness in the implicit word-fragment completion and cued recall, and category cued and free recall tests. In Exp 2, Air Force recruits were tested on the category instance generation (CIG) and 4 additional tests in Exp 1. Exp 3 tested the Ss for CIG or category cued recall using instructions for relational process. Both CIG and category cued recall exhibited conceptual repetition effects. Category cued recall showed important differences between CIG and free recall. Theoretical implications are discussed. (French abstract) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Majority and minority influence: Source-position imbalance as a determinant of message scrutiny.

Two experiments addressed the issue of whether endorsement of a position by a numerical majority or a minority leads to greater scrutiny of the information presented in a persuasive message. In Exp 1, a counterattitudinal position was endorsed by a majority or a minority and was supported by strong or weak arguments. Argument quality had a larger impact on attitudes with majority than with minority endorsement. In Exp 2, a proattitudinal or a counterattitudinal message was endorsed by a majority or a minority and was supported by strong or weak arguments. When the source and message position were unexpected (i.e., majority-counter and minority-pro messages), argument quality had a larger impact on attitudes than when the source and message position were expected (i.e., majority-pro and minority-counter messages). Thus, either majority or minority endorsement can enhance message scrutiny if the source-position pairing is surprising. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Mood effects on attitude judgments: Independent effects of mood before and after message elaboration.

Investigated the independent effects of induced mood on the encoding of persuasive messages and on the assessment of attitude judgments. In Exp 1, positive or negative mood was induced either before the encoding of a counterattitudinal message or before the assessment of attitude judgments. When mood was induced before message presentation, Ss in a bad mood were more persuaded by strong than by weak arguments, whereas Ss in a good mood were equally persuaded by strong and by weak arguments. When Ss encoded the message in a neutral mood, however, the advantage of strong over weak arguments was more pronounced when Ss were in a good rather than in a bad mood at the time of attitude assessment. In Exp 2, Ss exposed to a counterattitudinal message composed of either strong or weak arguments formed either a global evaluation or a detailed representation of the message. Positive, negative, or neutral mood was then induced. Ss in a good mood were most likely and Ss in a negative mood least likely to base their reported attitudes on global evaluations. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Memory for pictures and sounds: Independence of auditory and visual codes.

Examined the mnemonic independence of auditory and visual nonverbal stimuli (pictures, corresponding environmental sounds, or picture-sound pairs) in free recall. In Exp 1 with 169 undergraduates, free recall was tested under 3 learning conditions (standard intentional, intentional with a rehearsal-inhibiting distracter task, or incidental with the distracter task). In all groups, recall was best for the picture-sound items, and appeared to be additive relative to pictures or sounds alone when the distracter task was used. Exp 2 with 76 undergraduates included a group that saw 2 copies of the same picture simultaneously, and a group that saw 2 different pictures of the same concept. Recall in the picture-sound condition was greater than in either single-modality condition. Exp 3 with 24 undergraduates doubled exposure time, resulting in additively higher recall for repeated pictures with different exemplars. (French abstract) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Self-persuasion and self-presentation as mediators of anticipatory attitude change.

Three experiments with 197 undergraduates determined when anticipatory attitude change occurs via self-persuasion or self-presentation and identified the implications for attitude persistence of a shift by either process. In Exp I, Ss' thoughts and attitudes were assessed while they expected either a counterattitudinal or a proattitudinal message. Ss generated thoughts and reported attitudes consistent with the direction of the anticipated message, even though their responses were anonymous. In the final 2 experiments, the publicness of Ss' attitudes was varied to examine the impact of self-presentational concerns on thoughts and attitudes. In Exp II, Ss in the private condition spontaneously generated more thoughts relevant to the anticipated counterattitudinal message than did Ss in the public condition. In Exp III, some Ss were told that the anticipated counterattitudinal message was not forthcoming. When the message was canceled in the public condition, Ss failed to show an anticipatory shift in attitude; in the private condition, however, anticipatory attitude change was obtained. It is concluded that when self-presentation concerns are manifest, temporary changes in attitude occur in response to these concerns. In contrast, when pressures to self-present are low, anticipatory changes reflect genuine shifts in attitude resulting from an active consideration of the merits of the counterattitudinal position. (25 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)