Culture and basic psychological processes--Toward a system view of culture: Comment on Oyserman et al. (2002).

D. Oyserman, H. A. Coon, and M. Kemmelmeier (2002) (see record 2002-00183-001) provide a most comprehensive review of empirical studies that used attitudinal surveys to capture cultural variations in individualism and collectivism. In the present article, the author suggests that the cross-cultural validity of attitudinal surveys can no longer be taken for granted. Moreover, the meta-theory underlying this literature (called the entity view of culture) is called into question. The author presents an alterative meta-theory (called the system view of culture) and discusses its implications for future work in cultural and cross-cultural psychology. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Using individualism and collectivism to compare cultures--A critique of the validity and measurement of the constructs: Comment on Oyserman et al. (2002).

Analyzing national and ethnic differences in individualism and collectivism, D. Oyserman, H. M. Coon, and M. Kemmelmeier (2002) (see record 2002-00183-001) showed that small differences in scales or samples produce markedly divergent results, challenging the validity of these constructs. The author examines the following limitations of research on individualism and collectivism: It treats nations as cultures and culture as a continuous quantitative variable; conflates all kinds of social relations and distinct types of autonomy; ignores contextual specificity in norms and values; measures culture as the personal preferences and behavior reports of individuals; rarely establishes the external validity of the measures used; assumes cultural invariance in the meaning of self-reports and anchoring and interpretation of scales; and reduces culture to explicit, abstract verbal knowledge. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Bringing culture to basic psychological theory--Beyond individualism and collectivism: Comment on Oyserman et al. (2002).

D. Oyserman, H. M. Coon, and M. Kemmelmeier (2002) (see record 2002-00183-001) offered a comprehensive literature review on individualism and collectivism that forwards valuable suggestions for ways to enhance future research conducted within this framework. The author argues that although their criticisms of much contemporary social psychological research on individualism and collectivism are valid, even more fundamental problems need to be recognized as characterizing work within this tradition, such as the insufficiently subtle nature of the views held of culture, the limited attention given to meanings, and the downplaying of contextual variation. The author suggests adopting more nuanced and process-oriented conceptions of culture and more contextually grounded views of its impact on psychological functioning as a way of realizing the promise of cultural psychology to broaden and provide insight into basic psychological theory. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Reclaiming the individual from Hofstede's ecological analysis--A 20-year odyssey: Comment on Oyserman et al. (2002).

D. Oyserman, H. M. Coon, and M. Kemmelmeier (2002) (see record 2002-00183-001) challenge the stereotype that European Americans are more individualistic and less collectivistic than persons from most other ethnic groups. The author contends that this stereotype took firm empirical root with G. Hofstede's (1980) monumental publication identifying the United States as the most individualistic of his then 40 nations. This empirical designation arose because of challengeable decisions Hofstede made about the analysis of his data and the labeling of his dimensions. The conflation of concepts under the rubric of cultural individualism plus psychologists' unwarranted psychologizing of the construct then combined with Hofstede's empirical location of America to set a 20-year agenda for data collection. Oyserman et al disentangle and organize this mass of studies, enabling the discipline of cross-cultural psychology to forge ahead in more productive directions, less reliant on previous assumptions and measures. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Advantages and disadvantages of studying the process of relapse in rats: Reply to Baker and Curtin (2002), Bardo (2002), Goeders (2002), Marlatt (2002), and Tiffany and Conklin (2002).

The authors investigated the effects of an episode of heroin self-administration (i.e., lapse) after extinction on subsequent drug seeking in the absence of heroin (i.e., relapse). Reexposure to heroin in the presence of drug seeking was identified as a critical element of a lapse experience, leading to elevated drug seeking on the test of relapse. T. B. Baker and J. J. Curtin (see record 2002-06535-002), G. A. Marlatt (see record 2002-06535-005), and S. T. Tiffany and C. A. Conklin (see record 2002-06535-006) indicate that animal studies fail to model important aspects of human addiction. M. T. Bardo (see record 2002-06535-003) and N. E. Goeders (see record 2002-06535-004) point out specific methodological problems. In spite of these difficulties, the authors' research makes a valuable contribution to the study of relapse by focusing on aspects of learning and memory involved in the transition from lapse to relapse. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Corporal punishment, physical abuse, and the burden of proof: Reply to Baumrind, Larzelere, and Cowan (2002), Holden (2002), and Parke (2002).

This reply explores issues reviewed in comments by D. Baumrind, R. E. Larzelere, and P. A. Cowan (2002, see record 2002-01514-002), G. W. Holden (2002, see record 2002-01514-003), and R. D. Parke (2002, see record 2002-01514-004) on E. T. Gershoff's (2002, see record 2002-01514-001) article on parental punishment. The current discussion includes how corporal punishment should be defined, how corporal punishment can be distinguished from physical abuse, and whether established associations with child behaviors are best thought of as parent- or child-driven effects. In light of their comments, Gershoff herein revises the process-context model, revisits the issue of whether current knowledge is sufficient to condemn the use of parental corporal punishment, and concludes that lack of demonstrated positive effects and the potential links to physical abuse argue for discouraging corporal punishment in favor of alternative methods of discipline. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Executive functioning and alcohol-related aggression: Reply to Weingartner (2000), Bates (2000), Lyvers (2000), Cherek (2000), and Berman (2000).

H. Weingartner (see record 2000-02949-018), M. E. Bates (see record 2000-02949-014), M. Lyvers (see record 2000-02949-017), D. R. Cherek (see record 2000-02949-016), and M. E. Berman (see record 2000-02949-015) put forth some very interesting and thought-provoking commentaries on the author's executive functioning framework for alcohol-related aggression (P. R. Giancola; see record 2000-02949-013). Many of their comments raised very important questions such as how executive functioning should be defined and conceptualized. Specifically, they asked whether executive functioning is better conceptualized as a unidimensional macroconstruct or as a set of related, yet independent, cognitive processes. Another key question was what other factors does executive functioning interact with to facilitate intoxicated aggression. Although these issues are far from being resolved, the author hopes that his article, their commentaries, and his responses will generate new research that will ultimately help to better predict and prevent alcohol-related aggression. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Response to Amato's (2002) letter.

Responds to J. J. Amato's commentary (see record 2003-02090-007) on articles by M. A. Yarhouse (see record 1998-11146-011) and M. A. Yarhouse and W. Throckmorton (see record 2002-13988-007). Yarhouse contends that by claiming he is surreptitiously importing ideology in the name of science, Amato is setting this up as a false dichotomy, as though science is a completely objective enterprise and that beliefs and values can be avoided altogether. This position is a modernist view and it ignores the postmodern society and the advances in philosophy of science over the past 50 years. Yarhouse also addresses Amato's claims regarding changing same sex attraction and the concept of autonomy. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Only a God can save us: reply to Slavin (2002).

Malcolm Stavin's (2002) understanding of "Shattered Worlds/ Psychotic States" (G. E. Atwood, D. M. Orange, & R. D. Stolorow, 2002) is both sympathetic and accurate (see record 2002-12574-003). His article (see record 2002-12574-004) makes an important contribution in its own right to the clarification of the role of Cartesian thinking in psychoanalysis. Only a God can save us. -Martin Heidegger (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The Potential Role of Drug Onset Cues in Drug Dependence and Withdrawal: Reply to Bardo (2004), Bossert and Shaham (2004), Bouton (2004), and Stewart (2004).

In responding to commentaries (M. Bardo, see record 2004-10475-002; J. Bossert and Y. Shaham, see record 2004-10475-003; M. Bouton, see record 2004-10475-004; J. Stewart, see record 2004-10475-005) on their original article (see record 2004-10475-001), the authors agree that the basic mechanisms underlying intra-administration associations may be extensible to a much wider range of phenomena, including both other examinations of conditioned drug effects (e.g., conditioned place preference) and human psychological disorders. The authors also address the concerns of a number of the commenting authors regarding discrepancies in the literature concerning the effects of drug priming in both human and animal studies of reinstatement of drug self-administration. Finally, the authors accept and endorse the calls by several of these commenting authors for further studies required to generate additional support for their model of conditioned drug effects. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Reply to Rodgers and Rowe (2002).

That a theory fits data is meaningful only if it was plausible that the theory would not fit. S. Roberts and H. Pashler (2000; see record 2000-15248-005) knew of no enduring theories initially supported by good fits alone (good fits, i.e., where it was not clear that the theory could have plausibly failed to fit). J. L. Rodgers and D. C. Rowe (2002; see record 2002-13781-008) claimed to provide 6 examples. Their 3 nonpsychological examples (Kepler, etc.) are instances of good practice: How the theory constrained outcomes was evident, so it was clear that the theory could have plausibly failed to fit. Their 3 psychological examples are flawed in various ways. It remains possible that no examples exist. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Developmental Dynamics and Contemporary Evolutionary Psychology: Status Quo or Irreconcilable Views? Reply to Bjorklund (2003), Krebs (2003), Buss and Reeve (2003), Crawford (2003), and Tooby et al. (2003).

The authors address commentaries by D. F. Bjorklund (2003; see record 200309105-002); D. M. Buss and H. K. Reeve (2003; see record 200309105-004); C. B. Crawford (2003; see record 200309105-005); D. L. Krebs (2003; see record 2003-09105-003); and J. Tooby, L. Cosmides, and H. C. Barrett (2003; see record 2003-09105-006) on their analysis of the underlying assumptions of contemporary evolutionary psychology (R. Lickliter & H. Honeycutt, 2003; see record 200309105-001). The authors argue that evolutionary psychology currently offers no coherent framework for how to integrate genetic, environmental, and experiential factors into a theory of behavioral or cognitive phenotypes. The authors propose that this absence is due to a lack of developmental analysis in the major works of evolutionary psychology, resulting in an almost exclusive focus on adaptationist accounts of evolution by natural selection rather than a more broad-based focus on the process and products of evolution by epigenetic developmental dynamics. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Response to Glassgold et al. (2002).

Replies to comments by J. M. Glassgold et al (see record 2003-06066-010) on the current authors' original article (see record 2002-13988-007) which identified the ethical issues in efforts to ban reorientation therapies. Glassgold et al commented that the original article failed to represent the issues accurately and comprehensively. The current authors elaborate on the context in which their article was written and then comment on a couple of the points of criticism served by Glassgold et al. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

On mood variation and memory: Reply to Isen (1985), Ellis (1985), and Mayer and Bower (1985).

Responds to comments by A. M. Isen (see record 1986-13663-001); H. C. Ellis (see record 1986-13654-001); and J. D. Mayer and G. M. Bower (see record 1986-13675-001) on the present authors' (see record 1986-03061-001) findings that (a) depressed college students showed no overall deficit in recall performance and (b) depressed students failed to show selective recall for mood-congruent (negative) events in a story. Issues considered included performance deficits in depression, selectivity effects in memory, the possibility that affective traits rather than mood states were assessed, and potential reactions to the mood questionnaires. Evidence is presented that the Beck Depression Inventory is not a mild mood-induction procedure. (27 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

McSweeney, Murphy, and Kowal: Reply to Branch (2005), Rowlett (2005), and Siegel (2005).

The authors thank M. N. Branch (see record 2005-10634-002), J. K. Rowlett (see record 2005-10634-003), and S. Siegel (see record 2005-10634-004) for their comments. Branch's commentary contains many misconceptions. The authors try to clarify these issues. They agree with Rowlett that converging approaches to understanding drug consumption will ultimately yield the best results. The authors also agree that measuring reinforcer effectiveness is difficult. New techniques such as probe preference tests make this task more manageable. The authors thank Siegel for describing recent changes in his model. Nevertheless, the authors believe that their discussion of his compensatory response model helps to clarify their own model. They also believe Siegel defines homeostasis somewhat differently than they do; thus, their positions may be more similar than they appear. The details of their model remain to be worked out, but the authors believe that it provides a testable and parsimonious model for the regulation of drug consumption. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Autonomic and eyeblink conditioning are closely related to contingency awareness: Reply to Wiens and ?hman (2002) and Manns et al (2002).

S. Wiens and A. Ohman (see record 2002-00340-002) disputed the conclusion that Pavlovian conditioning is strongly related to contingency awareness (P. F. Lovibond & D. R. Shanks, see record 2002-00340-001) on the basis that an inappropriate definition of awareness was used. J. R. Manns, R. E. Clark, and L. R. Squire (see record 2002-00340-003) contended that delay eyeblink conditioning is independent of awareness. The authors of the present article consider these arguments, highlight several problems in the new studies described by the commentators, and conclude that there is still little evidence for unconscious conditioning in either subliminal autonomic conditioning or eyeblink conditioning. The most parsimonious account of existing data is that a single learning process gives rise to both awareness and conditioned responding. Further progress in evaluating the possibility of unconscious conditioning would be facilitated by the development of more completely specified and testable dual-process models. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Establishment of a diazepam preference in human volunteers following a differential-conditioning history of placebo versus diazepam choice: Reply to Bouton (2002), Carroll (2002), Kelly (2002), Stewart (2002), and Vuchinich (2002).

The 6 submitted commentaries (see records 2002-12827-003, 2002-12827-004, 2002-12827-005, 2002-12827-006, 2002-12827-007, 2002-12827-008) on the authors' study examining the establishment of diazepam as a conditioned reinforcer were generally supportive of the need to characterize environmental determinants of drug self-administration while emphasizing the need for more research. The comments discuss several important topics, including clarifying the mechanisms responsible for the switch in drug preference the authors reported, comparing the strengths of various procedures used to confer reinforcing efficacy onto a drug, opportunities for collaborative research, and practical applications of differential conditioning to the treatment of drug abuse. The authors suspect that future work on this topic will incorporate the issues discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Comments on Henry Friedman's (2002) review of Arnold Goldberg's Being of Two Minds.

This commentary is a response to a review by H. Friedman (see record 2002-08457-006) of Arnold Goldberg's (2000) book Being of Two Minds: The Vertical Split in Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy (see record 1999-02973-000). The writer argues against Friedman's contention that Goldberg is judgmental and not empathic toward his misbehaving patients, that he does not appreciate the importance of his own subjectivity as context for the patient's splitting, and that he is authoritarian regarding both the need and direction of change in requiring the patient give up the misbehavior. Last, Friedman erroneously criticizes Goldberg for assuming all marital infidelity is misbehavior, whereas Goldberg clearly makes the distinction between the larger category of bad behavior and actions specified as behavior disorder. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Amplifying issues related to psychological testing and assessment.

Responds to comments by D. A. Smith (see record 2002-10716-011), H. N. Garb et al (see record 2002-10716-012), R. Fernández-Ballesteros (see record 2002-10716-013), J. Hunsley (see record 2002-10716-014) regarding the G. J. Meyer et al (see record 2001-00159-003) summary of evidence and issues associated with psychological assessment. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)