区域人口密度差异下的医疗服务质量竞争研究

中国各区域间人口规模存在明显的差异,更好的医疗服务质量与更丰富的医疗资源集中在大城市。在人口规模差异、医疗资源分布不均的状况下,存在竞争时,影响患者、医院和医保部门决策的因素值得研究。针对人口密度存在差异的情况,构建由两家医院组成的A la salop模型,使用博弈的方法进行研究。研究表明,为了实现社会福利最优,当由政府指定患者接受医疗服务的医院时,政府会根据医院边际成本的差距程度进行分配。边际成本的差距越大,医保部门越倾向于把患者集中安排到一家医院接受服务。当医院可以对自身的医疗服务质量进行决策,且患者可以自由选择医院时,影响医院和患者决策的主要因素有医院的服务质量和成本差距。     

基于链链竞争的闭环供应链渠道结构选择策略

研究当零售商之间存在价格竞争时,两条竞争闭环供应链的渠道结构选择问题。结果表明：从供应链系统总利润角度出发,当两条链之间竞争强度较小时,中心化渠道结构占优;反之,分散化渠道结构占优。从消费者与环境的角度出发,无论两链之间竞争强度为何值,两条链同时选择中心化渠道结构时最有利。     

服务规则约束下B2C平台企业竞争策略

基于服务规则约束机制的策略已成为B2C电子商务平台获取竞争优势重要手段之一。在双边市场理论模型基础上,分别建立了垄断和寡头竞争情形的B2C平台Hotelling竞争模型,比较分析了买方多归属卖方单归属和买卖双方多归属情形下竞争性B2C平台服务规则约束机制的最优策略。通过研究发现,垄断B2C平台下,平台企业和卖方企业都没有提高服务规则约束力度的意愿;在买方多归属卖方单归属时,卖方企业运作和维护服务规则约束机制更能提高用户体验和提高B2C平台绩效;在买卖双方多归属时,平台企业运作和维护服务规则约束机制更为有利。     

生产商竞争的供应链系统退货决策分析

分析了生产商竞争的供应链系统决策主体的主从性,并基于报童模型和信息揭示原理,建立生产商竞争的供应链系统退货决策模型．通过对模型及其数值仿真分析,指出最优订购量只受信忠隐蔽因素的影响,而与竞争因素无关,但生产商的竞争影响退货补偿率并明显提高销售商的价格决策地位．     

供应链间竞争下绿色广告决策研究

通过构建两条供应链中的零售商横向竞争和制造商横向竞争模型研究分散和集中两种决策下的绿色广告决策问题,分析绿色广告成本系数和绿色广告敏感系数对绿色广告效应以及供应链成员利润的影响。研究结果表明：集中式供应链绿色广告效应更大;绿色广告成本系数较小时会对供应链成员利润产生显著影响且微小变动会引起需求市场剧烈变动;集中式决策下绿色产品供应链优势明显,而普通产品供应链的决策方式受绿色广告效应敏感系数的影响。     

基于产量竞争的供应链RFID技术投资均衡与协调

以单制造商和单零售商组成的双渠道供应链为研究对象,基于供应链成员是否采用无线射频识别(radio frequency identification, RFID)技术,分别构建链上成员均不采用RFID(NN)、仅制造商采用RFID(AN)、仅零售商采用RFID (NA)以及链上成员均采用RFID (AA)四种情景下的收益模型,求解出相应的最优解,并探讨链上成员采用RFID的均衡策略.研究发现:双渠道供应链采用RFID的均衡策略取决于渠道竞争强度、收益共享系数及RFID标签成本.竞争强度较小时,供应链成员均倾向于采用RFID;反之,则仅零售商倾向于采用该技术.收益共享系数较高时, AA情景不会出现;反之,若制造商采用RFID,则AA为均衡策略. RFID标签成本较低(高)时,供应链成员倾向于采用(不采用) RFID技术.     

网络外部性下基于不确定环境的竞争供应链纵向结构选择

在网络外部性情境下, 考察网络外部性强度、竞争强度和市场风险对竞争供应链结构选择的影响, 分别从制造商与供应链的角度出发, 识别竞争供应链的纵向结构选择策略和动态演化均衡. 基于制造商的结构选择受市场风险波动范围和竞争强度的影响, 竞争强度边界和风险的范围依赖于网络外部性强度系数, 在不同的网络外部性环境下, 竞争强度和风险对制造商的结构选择的影响作用不同; 基于供应链系统的控制结构选择与市场风险无关, 仅与依赖于网络外部性强度的竞争强度有关.

     

构建差异化竞争优势

当前很多企业都在讨论外包,问题的关键的是缺少对外包领域的细分。选择合适的外包细分领域是构建外包竞争优势的前提和基础。     

竞争环境下B2C平台增值服务投资决策

为提高竞争环境下的平台经济效益,讨论平台企业对双边用户的增值服务投资问题,在考虑用户多归属条件下构建B2C平台竞争模型.通过比较分析发现,在双边单归属或一边多归属条件下,平台企业的最优投资满足一个区间策略:若投资资源小于该区间的下界,则根据边际投资成本小于或大于某一阈值,平台企业选择投资全部或部分资源;若投资资源大于该区间的上界,则最优投资存在两个纯策略均衡;若投资资源位于该区间内,则最优投资存在唯一纳什均衡.此外,在双边多归属条件下,平台企业的最优投资满足一个单阈值策略:根据边际投资成本小于或大于某一阈值,平台企业选择投资全部或部分资源.     

不同竞争结构下闭环供应链碳减排和低碳推广决策

为了研究闭环供应链的竞争减排和竞争低碳推广问题,分别构建了两个制造商和一个零售商分散决策结构(模型HR)、一个制造商和两个零售商分散决策结构(模型MH),两个制造商和两个零售商分散决策结构(模型HH)和两个制造商和两个零售商纵向合作结构(模型CC),通过对比前三种结构(模型HR、MH和HH)的决策结果,研究制造商竞争和零售商竞争对不同供应链结构决策的影响。通过对比后两种结构(模型HH和CC)的决策结果,研究供应链企业纵向合作对供应链竞争决策的影响。研究表明：零售商之间的横向竞争能够提高制造商的废旧产品回收水平。两个制造商和两个零售商纵向合作结构的回收水平和低碳推广努力程度最高以及市场需求最大,该结构的减排水平高低受到制造商的竞争强度和零售商的竞争强度影响。最后,结合算例分析,进一步对比四种不同供应链结构的决策结果和利润。     

链与链基于价格和服务竞争的纵向结构选择

通过构建两个制造商、两个排他性零售构成的竞争供应链结构模型,揭示价格竞争、服务竞争以及服务行业的成本对供应链纵向控制结构选择绩效的影响,从而识别出高中低服务成本行业竞争供应链的纵向结构均衡差异特征．上述结论对进一步探索竞争供应链纵向结构协调的合同选择提供了基本的理论基础．     

基于成本差异与产品替代的链与链竞争纵向结构

考察了成本差异与产品替代组合对链与链竞争纵向结构的影响,结果表明:成本优势是弱化低效率囚徒困境结构均衡的有效方法;通过同质化策略使分散化控制结构为有效结构模式,或者通过产品的差异化策略使控制模式变为更具效率的中心化控制模式,从而实现制造商双方绩效的改进.     

Supply chain structure and demand risk

V. Agrawal and S. Seshadri (2000) [Risk intermediation in supply chains. IIE Transactions, 32, 819-831] considered a problem in which a single risk neutral distributor supplies a short-lifecycle, long-leadtime product to several retailers that are identical except in their attitudes towards risk. They proved that the distributor should not offer the same terms to every retailer but instead offer less risky (from the demand risk perspective) contracts to more risk averse retailers. They did not prove the optimality of their menu.In this paper we reconstruct their results when the number of retailers is infinite and their coefficient of risk aversion is drawn from a continuous distribution. We use optimal control theory to solve this problem. We show that this distribution uniquely determines the channel structure. Moreover, the optimal contract menu not only has the same structure as in Agrawal and Seshadri but is also optimal among nearly all contracts. The implications of these findings for channel design are discussed.     

Pharmaceutical supply chain networks with outsourcing under price and quality competition

In this paper, we present a pharmaceutical supply chain network model with outsourcing under price and quality competition, in both equilibrium and dynamic versions. We consider a pharmaceutical firm that is engaged in determining the optimal pharmaceutical flows associated with its supply chain network activities in the form of manufacturing and distribution. In addition to multimarket demand satisfaction, the pharmaceutical firm seeks to minimize its total cost, with the associated function also capturing the firm's weighted disrepute cost caused by possible quality issues associated with the contractors. Simultaneously, the contractors, who compete with one another noncooperatively in prices in the manner of Bertrand, and in quality, seek to secure manufacturing and distribution of the pharmaceutical product from the pharmaceutical firm. This game theory model allows for the determination of the optimal pharmaceutical product flows associated with the supply chain in‐house and outsourcing network activities and provides the pharmaceutical firm with its optimal make‐or‐buy decisions and the optimal contractor selections. We state the governing equilibrium conditions and derive the equivalent variational inequality formulation. We then propose dynamic adjustment processes for the evolution of the product flows, the quality levels, and the prices, along with stability analysis results. The algorithm yields a discretization of the continuous‐time adjustment processes. We present convergence results and compute solutions to numerical examples to illustrate the generality and applicability of the framework.     

带有风险规避型销售商的供需链协调

以一个两阶段的供需链系统为背景，针对供需链上决策激励不一致和风险规避效应导致供需链低效的问题，研究了在实践中广泛应用的利益共享合同和批量折扣合同对供需链协调性的影响．证明了两种合同均可克服双重边际效应和风险规避效应，使得供需链协调．并给出了合同参数的设计方案，同时指出在实施上，利益共享合同需强制执行，批量折扣合同自动执行．     

Supply chain coordination based on return contracts with a threshold ordering quantity

Return contracts are commonly used by companies selling products with short life cycles and highly uncertain demand. Current research on return contracts assumes suppliers are responsible for all surplus products. In practice, retailers tend to order more than necessary and leave suppliers with large after‐season returns. To mitigate the problem, a new type of return contract with a threshold ordering quantity has been developed by some enterprises. Under these contracts, suppliers specify a threshold for retailers’ ordering quantity. They buy back only the portion in excess of the threshold. In this paper, we show that this new type of contract can achieve two objectives: (a) the supply chain is coordinated, and (b) both the supplier and the retailer can gain more profit than they can gain under a wholesale‐price‐only contract. The new contract does not require any manipulation of wholesale prices. This makes it more acceptable in practice by supply chain members. We also illustrate our findings in a numerical example.     

基于网络外部性与产品替代的链与链纵向结构选择

研究产品替代程度和网络外部性强度对链与链纵向控制结构的影响,分别从制造商绩效和供应链绩效的角度出发,识别链与链的纵向结构选择策略和动态演化均衡,揭示网络外部性强度系数以及依赖于网络外部性强度系数的产品替代程度对纵向控制结构选择的影响.研究结果表明,当网络外部性对替代程度的影响不强时,一体化为均衡的结构,当网络外部性对替代程度的影响很强时,分散化为均衡的控制结构.     

Modelling inter-supply chain competition with resource limitation and demand disruption

This paper proposes a comprehensive model for studying supply chain versus supply chain competition with resource limitation and demand disruption. We assume that there are supply chains with heterogeneous supply network structures that compete at multiple demand markets. Each supply chain is comprised of internal and external firms. The internal firms are coordinated in production and distribution and share some common but limited resources within the supply chain, whereas the external firms are independent and do not share the internal resources. The supply chain managers strive to develop optimal strategies in terms of production level and resource allocation in maximising their profit while facing competition at the end market. The Cournot–Nash equilibrium of this inter-supply chain competition is formulated as a variational inequality problem. We further study the case when there is demand disruption in the plan-execution phase. In such a case, the managers need to revise their planned strategy in order to maximise their profit with the new demand under disruption and minimise the cost of change. We present a bi-criteria decision-making model for supply chain managers and develop the optimal conditions in equilibrium, which again can be formulated by another variational inequality problem. Numerical examples are presented for illustrative purpose.     

链与链基于价格竞争和规模不经济的纵向控制结构选择

考察价格竞争和规模不经济因素对链与链纵向控制结构选择的影响,并从制造商的绩效角度和供应链系统的绩效角度识别了纵向控制结构的动态演变过程及最终均衡结构,得到当价格竞争强度相对较弱且严重依赖于规模不经济效应时,不管是从制造商角度还是供应链系统角度,一体化结构为占优均衡结构;当价格竞争惨烈但又严重依赖于规模不经济效应时,分散化结构为供应链系统的占优均衡结构.     

规模不经济下主从竞争供应链两部定价合同研究

基于链与链市场地位不平等和制造商规模不经济情形,考察具有先后决策顺序的主从竞争供应链模型的纵向控制结构选择和两部定价合同能否实现供应链协调及各成员的帕累托改进.结果表明,规模不经济系数不会对两条链的均衡结构产生影响,从链收益在均衡结构下随市场竞争强度增加而增加.当市场竞争强度较弱时,合理引入两部定价合同能实现供应链协调及成员的帕累托改进.