Intelligence, cognitive style, and rationality: Is being rational smart?

Reviews the book, Who is rational: Studies of individual differences in reasoning by Keith E. Stanovich (see record 1999-02413-000). Why do seemingly intelligent and otherwise rational people perform so poorly on a variety of laboratory reasoning tasks? Stanovich summarizes the findings of an extensive research program whose goal is to describe systematic individual differences between the reasoners who produce normatively correct responses and those who do not. This approach provides a unique and thought-provoking perspective on the issue of human rationality. Overall, the reviewer thinks that this is certain to be a widely cited and influential book, and because it offers such a well-reasoned challenge to prevailing views of rationality, it is certain to be a controversial one as well. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Review of The Robot's Rebellion: Finding Meaning in the Age of Darwin.

Review of book The Robot's Rebellion: Finding Meaning in the Age of Darwin by Keith E. Stanovich (see record 2004-95228-000). In his interesting scholarly book, The Robot's Rebellion, Stanovich leads us on a journey to find meaning in a world populated by mortal biological vehicles, the robots, put on earth to replicate their masters' selfish genes. If the genes do a satisfactory job programming the robots, then the genes replicate in perpetuity and are, therefore, immortal. Stanovich's basic assumptions are: a) vehicles are designed to replicate genes; b) at least in human animals, the brain houses two minds; c) the first mind, System 1 or The Autonomous Set of Systems, evolved much earlier in evolutionary history than did the second mind, System 2 or the Analytic System; d) System 1 is associative, parallel, fast to respond, and designed to automatically serve its genetic master; e) System 2 is rule-based, serial, slow to respond, not aware of System 1 functioning but sometimes privy to System 1 output, controls executive functioning, and is capable of self-evaluation and leading the rebellion against its genetic master; and, f) memes, culturally generated ideas passed on by nongenetic means, can sometimes be as effective as System 1 at squashing the rebellion. These assumptions are derived from work in cognitive science and evolutionary biology, and provide a solid foundation for the book. Both the metaphor and the basic assumptions are embedded in detailed and informative reviews of decision theory, evolutionary psychology, memetic theory, rational philosophy, and utility theory. The interweaving of metaphor and review provides a framework that allows Stanovich to make inferences to help the general reader understand "the implications of modern science" (p. xi). He also develops criteria to evaluate memes that are needed in his quest to find meaning in human existence. In combination with the basic assumptions, these criteria are used to create an ethical ideology that will be embraced by some readers. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Conceptions of intelligence in ancient Chinese philosophy.

Ancient Chinese philosophical conceptions of intelligence differ markedly from those in the ancient Western tradition, and also from contemporary Western conceptions. Understanding these ancient Chinese conceptions of intelligence may help us better understand how a very important culture—Chinese culture—influences people's thinking and behavior, and may also help us broaden, deepen, as well as re-examine our own conceptions of intelligence. This article reviews two ancient Chinese conceptions of intelligence–the Confucian and Taoist– and discusses their ramifications for current thinking about intelligence and its role in the world. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

White matter lesions account for all age-related declines in speed but not in intelligence.

MRI scans measured white matter lesion prevalence (WMLP) in 65 people ages 65-84 years who also took 17 cognitive tests: 3 tests of general fluid intelligence, 3 of vocabulary, 2 of episodic and 3 of working memory, 2 of processing speed, and 4 of frontal and executive function. Entry of age with WMLP into regression equations as predictors of test scores showed that inferences about the functional relationships between markers of brain aging and cognitive impairments are seriously misleading if they are based on simple correlations alone. A new finding that WMLP accounts for all of the age-related variance between individuals in tests of speed and executive ability but for none of the age-related variance in intelligence revises current hypotheses that gross brain changes affect general fluid intelligence and other mental abilities solely through their effects on information-processing speed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Review of Intelligence and learning.

Reviews the book, Intelligence and Learning edited by Morton P. Friedman, J. P. Das and Neil O'Connor (1981). This volume (624 pages) consists of 57 papers presented at the NATO conference on intelligence and learning held at York University, England in 1979. It brings together concepts of intelligence from traditional psychometric approaches, the developmental and qualitative views of the Piagetians, biological theories and information processing models. The emphasis is upon intelligence within the context of learning and experience, with a balanced treatment of theory, research and the applications of both. In their introductory remarks the editors rather unassumingly refer to the book as "a sample of research and thinking relating intelligence to major psychological processes." It is a sample which provides a comprehensive and in-depth account of a complex field of inquiry. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Piecing together the neuroscience of creativity: Review of Creativity and the brain.

Reviews the book, Creativity and the brain by Kenneth M. Heilman (see record 2005-05841-000). This book is a well-written introduction to the neurobiology of creativity and related cognitive constructs. Although it may not be the best source for neuroscience professionals or those looking for specific information about the neural mechanics of creativity, it is definitely a worthy read for an interested layperson. Heilman walks the reader through a variety of issues related to creativity: intelligence, handedness, gender, neurological disorders, and several others. He is an excellent writer--good at explaining complex ideas such as brain physiology--and his diagrams and language are accessible and "user friendly." Most chapters begin with a basic overview of the neuroscience relevant to the chapter's specific topic. This organization is especially helpful to those unfamiliar with the basics. The thematic chapters, however, present a problem. Chapters such as Intelligence, Knowledge and Talents, Imagery, Gender, Aging, and Nurture are all appropriate topics for a book on creativity; however, the structure feels distracting, as if Heilman is skirting the issue of creativity and the neurobiology specific to it. Instead of delving into direct questions on structures or neurotransmitters in the brain, Heilman focuses on the neuroscience of constructs related to creativity. This book is a worthwhile exploration of the neurological mechanisms of cognitive constructs which are related to creativity--areas such as intelligence, aging, and disability. For an educated layperson looking for a clear, well-written, synopsis of these ideas, the reviewer recommends the book. However, as an academic book published by an academic press, it is neither current enough nor detailed enough to be of any special interest to a creativity or neuroscience researcher. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Reasoning the fast and frugal way: Models of bounded rationality.

Humans and animals make inferences about the world under limited time and knowledge. In contrast, many models of rational inference treat the mind as a Laplacean Demon, equipped with unlimited time, knowledge, and computational might. Following H. Simon's notion of satisficing, the authors have proposed a family of algorithms based on a simple psychological mechanism: one-reason decision making. These fast and frugal algorithms violate fundamental tenets of classical rationality: They neither look up nor integrate all information. By computer simulation, the authors held a competition between the satisficing "Take The Best" algorithm and various "rational" inference procedures (e.g., multiple regression). The Take The Best algorithm matched or outperformed all competitors in inferential speed and accuracy. This result is an existence proof that cognitive mechanisms capable of successful performance in the real world do not need to satisfy the classical norms of rational inference. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Review of Social learning and clinical psychology.

Reviews the book, Social learning and clinical psychology by Julian B. Rotter (1954). Social Learning and Clinical Psychology is in effect two books in one, a trenchant and forceful evaluation of just what clinicians are doing, and a formulation of a behavior theory which strives to provide a more secure groundwork upon which meaningful clinical practice may be based. The theory, admittedly tentative and incomplete, represents a genuine contribution to the clarification of thinking about clinical problems. The book falls rather naturally into three distinct sections. Chapters I through IV present a detailed survey of the current functions and problems faced by the working clinical psychologist from a theoretical and technical point of view. The middle section of the book comprises the author's unique contribution, a "social learning theory of personality." The third section of this book, while broadest in scope, is somewhat disappointing. Here Rotter attempts to relate his four classes of variables, the subject's behavior, expectation of reinforcement, the value of external reinforcements, and the psychological situation, to the vast panoply of theoretical approaches, clinical instruments, and psychotherapeutic techniques which are involved in the clinician's functioning. On the whole, then, this book is an impressive achievement. Despite a few shortcomings, there is much to be learned from this book by those who are willing to read it carefully and reflectively. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Tulving's memory.

Reviews the book, Elements of Episodic Memory by Endel Tulving (1983). The book is organized into three major sections presenting, in turn, a discussion of the distinction between episodic and semantic memory (Chapters 2-6), an outline of a general framework (Chapters 7-9), and an application of the framework to experiments (Chapters 10-14). In the first major section, Tulving goes to great lengths to clarify the distinction between the two memory systems. Semantic memory is knowledge of the world, including language, and could be called generic or categorical knowledge. Episodic memory, in contrast, is recollection in which the recollector is part of the memory, and is thus personal and autobiographical memory for events occurring in particular places at particular times. In addition to clarifying the distinction, Tulving directly addresses some possible misinterpretations. For example, the episodic and semantic systems are interdependent rather than exclusive, and they share many properties that are properties of memory in general. Additionally, the two systems are not exhaustive, but rather are two facets of an overall memory system that includes, for instance, procedural memory as an important system. Tulving thus presents the episodic and semantic systems as but two interdependent pieces from some as yet unknown picture of the whole memory system. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Review of Expressing emotion: Myths, realities, and therapeutic strategies.

Reviews the book, Expressing emotion: Myths, realities, and therapeutic strategies by Eileen Kennedy-Moore and Jeanne C. Watson (see record 1999-02735-000). This book is a timely exposition of the theory, research, and clinical techniques associated with emotion and the expression of emotion. It is a particularly relevant text for clinical psychology in the context of recent discussions of emotional intelligence and the limitations of purely behavioural or cognitive perspectives on human functioning and therapeutic change. It deals with the myths about emotional expression that have permeated the field, such as that emotion is dangerous and to be avoided in therapy, or that the cathartic ventilation of emotion drains negativity much like lancing a wound. This book provides a rich contrast to such simplistic, all or nothing positions on emotion that have so often dominated psychological thinking, especially in the literature on psychotherapy. One of the strengths of the treatment-oriented part of the book is that it is integrative. A second strength of this volume is that it is well written. This book addresses a very complex and intriguing topic in a stimulating, readable manner. It is pragmatic enough for the practicing therapist and stimulating enough for the theoretically oriented reader. It will find a treasured place in many a clinician's and teacher's library. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Are processing speed tasks biomarkers of cognitive aging?

We examined the association between 5 processing speed measures and general cognitive ability in a large (>900) sample of relatively healthy men and women at age 70. The processing speed tests were the Wechsler Digit Symbol-Coding and Symbol Search, simple reaction time, 4-choice reaction time, and inspection time. To inquire whether the processing speed tasks might be biomarkers of cognitive aging, we examined the attenuations in their associations with general cognitive ability after adjusting for cognitive ability measured almost 60 years earlier. With the exception of inspection time, the attenuations were substantial. Inspection time was the only processing speed measure—all of which were measured at age 70—whose correlation with cognitive ability at age 70 was significantly greater than the correlation with cognitive ability at age 11. In old age, individual differences in most commonly used measures of processing speed are largely dependent on childhood cognitive ability. For all processing speed tasks, a little variance is left that appears to be related to aging differences. Inspection time, the marker that was least dependent on childhood intelligence, should be considered further as one biomarker of cognitive aging. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Review of It's Not All In Your Head: How Worrying about Your Health Could Be Making You Sick--and What You Can Do about It.

Reviews the book, It's Not All In Your Head: How Worrying about Your Health Could Be Making You Sick--and What You Can Do about It by Gordon J. G. Asmundson and Steven Taylor (see record 2005-07983-000). In this book, Drs. Gordon Asmundson and Steven Taylor provide a 14-week, self-help program designed for people who suffer from health anxiety. The book is organized in a manner consistent with standard cognitive-behavioural therapeutic (CBT) practice, with three sections: Understanding Health Anxiety (Chapters 1-4), Breaking the Health Anxiety Cycle (Chapters 5-7), and Maintaining Your Gains (Chapters 8-10), emulating the treatment process of psychoeducation, skills training, and relapse prevention. Most impressive is the tone adopted by the authors whereby they strive to validate the experience of health anxious individuals by acknowledging the reality of their symptoms and the frustration they must feel when unsatisfactorily served by traditional medical treatments. This approach lends itself to facilitating, rather than demanding, change in behaviour. Readers are encouraged to "take control" of their health, an important message for a population that relies so heavily on the expertise and reassurance of healthcare practitioners. This book is well written and user-friendly although it may be most helpful as a tool to be employed within the therapeutic context. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The theory of successful intelligence.

This article presents a theory of successful intelligence. The opening addresses some general issues of problems with conventional thinking about intelligence. The rest of the article is divided into 4 main sections. The 1st argues that conventional and some other notions of intelligence are, at best, incomplete and, at worst, wrong. The 2nd section suggests an alternative notion of successful intelligence that expands on conventional notions of intelligence. The 3rd section discusses how we have gotten to the point in psychology and society in which we draw heavily on theories and tests that are inadequate. The final section draws some conclusions about the nature of intelligence. The main conclusion is that it is time to replace conventional notions of intelligence and especially the notion of a general factor of intelligence. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Brief Intelligence Testing in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Do you use brief measures of intelligence? There is available an increasing variety of short forms and new and revised quick tests of intelligence. However, little is known about clinical practice using these abbreviated instruments. The authors report the results of a 4-country exploratory survey of the extent and circumstances of the use of short forms and quick tests. Such measures are commonly used, and practitioners generally followed literature-based advice about the role of brief measures. However, idiosyncratic subtest combinations and inappropriate prorating were also prevalent with short forms. Frequently used quick tests were identified, as were the reasons for using brief measures. The authors offer specific recommendations for the appropriate use of brief measures. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Review of The Psychological Foundations of Culture.

In this article, I review the book by Crandall and Schaller (see record 2003-88101-000), which seeks to reveal how culture is influenced by processes operating at the individual level (e.g., cognitions, goals, information processing strategies) as well as at the interpersonal level (e.g., communication, social influence). The book draws together authors from a number of cognate disciplines to address the issue of behaviour-culture relationships, with an emphasis on how the former might allow us to better understand the origin, development, and distribution of the latter. While the book does deal with the "flip side" of culture-behaviour relationships, it is not unique in doing so; in my view, the field already has a better sense of balance than this book claims. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Effects of global atrophy, white matter lesions, and cerebral blood flow on age-related changes in speed, memory, intelligence, vocabulary, and frontal function.

Brain images were obtained from 133 healthy people of ages 61-85 years who completed 20 tests of information processing speed, intelligence, frontal and executive function, memory, and vocabulary. Structural equation models examined relationships between cognitive test scores, ages and measurements of global age-associated atrophy, white matter lesions, and cerebral blood flow. These neurophysiological measures jointly account for all age-related variance in information processing speed. Speed entirely mediated relationships between neurophysiological measures and memory and partly mediated relationships between neurophysiological measures and intelligence and frontal function. Neurophysiological measures, but not calendar age, accounted for vocabulary scores. Cognitive slowing was responsible for some, but not all, age-related declines in mental function. Age-related declines in intelligence, frontal function, and speed were due to changes in different functional systems. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Complex niches favour rational species

On the whole living things evolve from simpler to more complex forms, though not undirectionally. The evolution of more complex species makes the environment more complex and also makes the evolution of even more complex species possible and more selectable. With the evolution of sentients, species can be classified according to their degree of rationality. A more rational species is one whose behaviour (i.e. of its individual members) is controlled (relatively) more by the reward-penalty system than by the automatic, inflexible, programmed responses. In two reasonable simple models, it is shown that a more complex environment favours the evolution of more rational species. This result partly explains the dramatic speed of evolution based mainly on random mutation and natural selection, a speed doubted by creationists.