Conditioning, Expectancy, and the Placebo Effect: Comment on Stewart-Williams and Podd (2004).

Comments on article by Stewardt-Williams and Podd (2004; see record 2004-11156-007). Classical conditioning is included as a component in the response expectancy model of placebo responding. Though introspectable when attention is drawn to them, expectancies need not be in awareness while guiding behavior. Most placebo effects are linked to expectancies, and classical conditioning is one factor (but not the only factor) by which these expectancies can be produced and altered. Conditioned placebo effects without expectancies exist but are relatively rare in humans. The adaptive advantage of cognition is increased response flexibility. For it to convey that benefit, however, it must be capable of overriding the influence of simpler automatic processes. Thus, the higher up the phylogenetic scale, the smaller the role of nonconscious conditioning processes and the larger the role of cognition. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The Placebo Effect: Dissolving the Expectancy Versus Conditioning Debate.

The authors review the literature on the 2 main models of the placebo effect: expectancy theory and classical conditioning. A path is suggested to dissolving the theoretical impasse that has long plagued this issue. The key is to make a clear distinction between 2 questions: What factors shape placebo effects? and What learning mediates the placebo effect? The reviewed literature suggests that classical conditioning procedures are one shaping factor but that verbal information can also shape placebo effects. The literature also suggests that conditioning procedures and other sources of information sometimes shape conscious expectancies and that these expectancies mediate some placebo effects; however, in other cases conditioning procedures appear to shape placebo effects that are not mediated by conscious cognition. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Autonomic and eyeblink conditioning are closely related to contingency awareness: Reply to Wiens and ?hman (2002) and Manns et al (2002).

S. Wiens and A. Ohman (see record 2002-00340-002) disputed the conclusion that Pavlovian conditioning is strongly related to contingency awareness (P. F. Lovibond & D. R. Shanks, see record 2002-00340-001) on the basis that an inappropriate definition of awareness was used. J. R. Manns, R. E. Clark, and L. R. Squire (see record 2002-00340-003) contended that delay eyeblink conditioning is independent of awareness. The authors of the present article consider these arguments, highlight several problems in the new studies described by the commentators, and conclude that there is still little evidence for unconscious conditioning in either subliminal autonomic conditioning or eyeblink conditioning. The most parsimonious account of existing data is that a single learning process gives rise to both awareness and conditioned responding. Further progress in evaluating the possibility of unconscious conditioning would be facilitated by the development of more completely specified and testable dual-process models. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Wringing the perceptual rags: Reply to IJzerman and Koole (2011).

We Landau, Meier, & Keefer (2010) reviewed a growing body of research demonstrating metaphors' far-reaching influence on social information processing. In their commentary, IJzerman and Koole (2011) claimed that we devoted insufficient attention to the origin of metaphors, and they reviewed research showing that bodily, social, and cultural experiences constrain metaphor development. Given the focus of our article and the tone of our admittedly cursory treatment of metaphors' origins, we view IJzerman and Koole's commentary less as a critique and more as a valuable extension of our analysis. We elaborate on this extension and address three related issues raised in the comment: metaphors and representational format, the explanatory value of a metaphor-enriched perspective over the embodied cognition perspective, and the direction of metaphoric mappings between concrete and abstract concepts. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

How Many Selves in Emotion Experience? Reply to Dalgleish and Power (2004).

T. Dalgleish and M. J. Power (see record 2004-15929-012) suggest that J. A. Lambie and A. J. Marcel's (2002) article implicitly presents a unitary view of self in emotion experience and propose that certain clinical phenomena require multiple selves. This reply summarizes Lambie and Marcel's usages of the term self and examines both Dalgleish and Power's gloss of these and their own usages. This indicates that their own central usage of the term misrepresents Lambie and Marcel and is itself an improper usage. More important, examination of the phenomena claimed to require multiple selves suggests that they do not and that Dalgleish and Power may have misread the relevant clinical literature. Finally, Lambie and Marcel's own conception of dissociative phenomena and multiple selves are outlined, and alternative approaches are sketched. In discussing the usages of the term self and interpretation of cognitive and affective disorders, this reply attempts to clarify certain confusions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

On False Premises and the Hypnotic Enhancement Effect: Reply to Schnall (2004).

Replies to the comments by E. Schnall (see record 2004-13299-016) on the current author's original article (see record 2003-05896-014), which examined whether adding hypnosis enhances cognitive-behavioral pain treatments. Here, the author addresses Schnall's critique point-by-point, and concludes that--Schnall aside--a a voluminous body of research has clearly established that both hypnosis and cognitive-behavioral treatments are useful for reducing pain, and all evidence from a small but growing literature currently suggests that there is no benefit in adding one procedure to the other. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Converging Toward an Integrated Theory of Self-Esteem: Reply to Crocker and Nuer (2004), Ryan and Deci (2004), and Leary (2004).

In this response to the commentaries regarding their terror management analysis of self-esteem (T. Pyszczynski, J. Greenberg, S. Solomon, J. Arndt, & J. Schimel, 2004). the authors focus on the convergence on certain points regarding self-esteem as a way of progressing toward an integrative perspective. In doing so, they briefly discuss how the need for self-esteem relates to anxiety, interpersonal relations, growth, evolution, and death. They also discuss sources of self-esteem, whether the pursuit of self-esteem is good or bad, and whether such a pursuit could fruitfully be abandoned. They conclude that self-esteem buffers anxiety, is greatly influenced by social relations, and can either facilitate or undermine growth and that the value of the pursuit of self-esteem depends on the sources on which it is based but that its pursuit is too inextricably woven into the way people manage their anxieties and regulate their behavior to ever be abandoned. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The Easy to Hard Effect and Perceptual Learning in Flavor Aversion Conditioning.

In experiments on the easy to hard effect, pretraining on an easy discrimination results in better performance on a harder version of the discrimination than pretraining on the hard discrimination itself. In addition, some theories posit that unreinforccd preexposure to the easy discrimination should be as effective as differentially reinforced easy pretraining in producing the easy to hard effect. Two experiments on flavor aversion conditioning in rats demonstrated the basic easy to hard effect. However, in neither experiment was easy preexposure more effective than hard preexposure in enhancing learning of the hard discrimination. Indeed, in Experiment 2, rats preexposed to an easy discrimination learned the hard discrimination significantly more slowly than those preexposed to the hard discrimination itself. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Central and basolateral amygdala neurons crash the aversive conditioning party: Theoretical comment on Rorick-Kehn and Steinmetz (2005).

Rorick-Kehn and Steinmetz (2005) (see record 2005-13804-012) report that neurons in the central and basolateral nuclei of the amygdala exhibit learning-related spike firing to conditional stimuli associated with shock in 3 different aversive conditioning paradigms: eyeblink conditioning, fear conditioning, and signaled avoidance conditioning. Central nucleus neurons responded in all 3 tasks, whereas basolateral nucleus neurons were more activated by fear and avoidance conditioning. These results reveal that amygdala neurons are differentially engaged by aversive conditioning, but questions remain concerning the associative basis and functional role for these unit responses. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Attentional Theory Is a Viable Explanation of the Inverse Base Rate Effect: A Reply to Winman, Wennerholm, and Juslin (2003).

A. Winman, P. Wennerholm. and P. Juslin (2003; see record 2003-09575-025) have admitted that J. K. Kruschke (2001a; see record 2001-18940-005) cogently demonstrated the shortcomings of cumulative inference as an explanation of the inverse base rate effect, but they raise criticisms of Kruschke's attentionally based explanation. First, Winman et al. pointed out that attentional shifting does not improve learning performance in Kruschke's (1996) ADIT model, contrary to the claims that attentional shifting accelerates learning. This reply demonstrates that the deceleration of learning is a natural consequence when attentional shifts are not learned, as is the ca.se in ADIT; however, when attentional shifts are learned, as was assumed by the underlying theory and as is the case in the EXIT model (Kruschke, 2001a, 2001b), then performance is indeed accelerated by attentional shifts. Second, Winman et al. pointed out that, whereas EXIT captures essentially all of the notable effects in the transfer data, it fails to capture a small effect [viz., p(CΠC)>p(RΠR)]. This reply demonstrates that when this trend in the data is merely weighted more heavily in the model fitting, then the EXIT model accommodates it. EXIT accomplishes this by emphasizing base rate learning more strongly... (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Associative and propositional processes in evaluation: Conceptual, empirical, and metatheoretical issues: Reply to Albarracín, Hart, and McCulloch (2006), Kruglanski and Dechesne (2006), and Petty and Bri?ol (2006).

Commentators (see records 2006-10465-004, 2006-10465-005, and 2006-10465-006) on B. Gawronski and G. V. Bodenhausen's (2006; see record 2006-10465-003) recently proposed associative-propositional evaluation (APE) model raised a number of interesting conceptual, empirical, and meta-theoretical issues. The authors consider these issues and conclude that (a) the conceptual criticisms raised against the APE model are based on misinterpretations of its basic assumptions, (b) the empirical criticisms are unfounded, as they are inconsistent with the available evidence, and (c) the proposed alternative accounts appear to be less parsimonious and weaker in their predictive power than the APE model. Nevertheless, the commentators offered valuable suggestions for extensions of the APE model, which the authors discuss with respect to their implications for new directions in attitude research. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Is the Promissory Note of Personality as Vulnerability to Depression in Default? Reply to Zuroff, Mongrain, and Santor (2004).

In contrast to D. C. Zuroff, M. Mongrain, and D. A. Santor (2004), the current authors find the promissory note of dependency-sociotropy (DEP-SOC) and self-criticism-autonomy (SC-AUT) as a model of risk for depression to be in default. The authors propose reorganizing what has been cast as unitary effort into 3 distinct endeavors: a psychoanalytic clinical theory, development of a refined empirical model of risk for clinical depression, and research examining the effects of DEP-SOC and SC-AUT on interpersonal relationships in nonclinical samples. The authors identify some issues that need to be accommodated regardless of whether the assessment of Zuroff et al. (2004) or their own is accepted. DEP-SOC and SC-AUT are best construed as correlated, continuous dimensions. Future work also needs to accommodate depression as chronic recurrent condition, advances in developmental psychopathology, and more stringent criteria for positing a risk factor for clinical disorder. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Assessing the belief bias effect with ROCs: Reply to Dube, Rotello, and Heit (2010).

Comments on an article by Dube, Rotello, and Heit (see record 2010-14834-005). The authors argued (a) that the so-called receiver operating characteristic is nonlinear for data on belief bias in syllogistic reasoning; (b) that their data are inconsistent with Klauer, Musch, and Naumer's (see record 2000-02818-008) model of belief bias; (c) that their data are inconsistent with any of the existing accounts of belief bias and only consistent with a theory provided by signal detection theory; and (d) that in fact, belief bias is a response bias effect. In this reply, we present reanalyses of Dube et al.'s data and of old data suggesting (a) that the receiver operating characteristic is linear for binary “valid” versus “invalid” responses, as employed by the bulk of research in this field; (b) that Klauer et al.'s model describes the old data significantly better than does Dube et al.'s model and that it describes Dube et al.'s data somewhat better than does Dube et al.'s model; (c) that Dube et al.'s data are consistent with the account of belief bias by misinterpreted necessity, whereas Dube et al.'s signal detection model does not fit their data; and (d) that belief bias is more than a response bias effect. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Prototypes in the mist: The early epochs of category learning": Correction to Smith and Minda (1998).

Reports an error in "Prototypes in the mist: The early epochs of category learning" by J. David Smith and John Paul Minda (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 1998[Nov], Vol 24[6], 1411-1436). As a result of errors made in production, two equations in the article were printed incorrectly. The corrected equations are included in the erratum. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 1998-12790-005.) Recent ideas about category learning have favored exemplar processes over prototype processes. However, research has focused on small, poorly differentiated categories and on task-final performances--both may highlight exemplar strategies. Thus, we evaluated participants' categorization strategies and standard categorization models at successive stages in the learning of smaller, less differentiated categories and larger, more differentiated categories. In the former case, the exemplar model dominated even early in learning. In the latter case, the prototype model had a strong early advantage that gave way slowly. Alternative models, and even the behavior of individual parameters within models, suggest a psychological transition from prototype-based to exemplar-based processing during category learning and show that different category structures produce different trajectories of learning through the larger space of strategies. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The Potential Role of Drug Onset Cues in Drug Dependence and Withdrawal: Reply to Bardo (2004), Bossert and Shaham (2004), Bouton (2004), and Stewart (2004).

In responding to commentaries (M. Bardo, see record 2004-10475-002; J. Bossert and Y. Shaham, see record 2004-10475-003; M. Bouton, see record 2004-10475-004; J. Stewart, see record 2004-10475-005) on their original article (see record 2004-10475-001), the authors agree that the basic mechanisms underlying intra-administration associations may be extensible to a much wider range of phenomena, including both other examinations of conditioned drug effects (e.g., conditioned place preference) and human psychological disorders. The authors also address the concerns of a number of the commenting authors regarding discrepancies in the literature concerning the effects of drug priming in both human and animal studies of reinstatement of drug self-administration. Finally, the authors accept and endorse the calls by several of these commenting authors for further studies required to generate additional support for their model of conditioned drug effects. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

An attentional learning account of the shape bias: Reply to Cimpian and Markman (2005) and Booth, Waxman, and Huang (2005).

Recently, Developmental Psychology published 2 articles on the shape bias; both rejected the authors' previous proposals about the role of attentional learning in the development of a shape bias in object name learning. A. Cimpian and E. Markman (2005; see record 2005-14938-017) did so by arguing that the shape bias does not exist but is an experimental artifact. A. E. Booth, S. R. Waxman, and Y. T. Huang (2005; see record 2005-05098-004), in contrast, concluded that the shape bias (and its contextual link to artifact categories) does exist but that the mechanisms that underlie it are conceptual knowledge and not attentional learning. In response, in this article the authors clarify the claims of the Attentional Learning Account (ALA) and interpretations of the data under question. The authors also seek to make explicit the deeper theoretical divide: cognition as sequestered from processes of perceiving and acting versus as embedded in, and inseparable from, those very processes. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Perverse Spite: The Possessive Gleam in the Mother's Eye and the Struggle to Own One's Soul: Reply to Stern (2004).

In this response to Jeffrey Stern's (2004) (see record 2004-21113-016) commentary on my article, "Giving the Devil His Due: Spite and the Struggle for Individual Dignity" (P. Shabad, 2000) (see record 2000-00917-004), I suggest that in emphasizing the conscious vindictiveness of explicit spite, Stern minimizes the perverse aspects of "cutting off one's nose to spite one's face" as a means of avenging oneself against powerful others. The underlying impetus of perverse spite is to break free from the prison of subtle developmental contingencies and unconscious seductions surrounding maternal possessiveness. When the child's self-assertive strivings are blocked because of the shame and fear of premature separateness, the inward obsessional churning of resentment becomes a fertile ground for perverse spite. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The verbal threat information pathway to fear in children: The longitudinal effects on fear cognitions and the immediate effects on avoidance behavior.

Verbal information has long been assumed to be an indirect pathway to fear. Children (aged 6-8 or 12-13 years) were exposed to threat, positive, or no information about 3 novel animals to see the long-term impact on their fear cognitions and the immediate impact on avoidance behavior. Their directly (self-report) and indirectly (implicit association task) measured attitudes toward the animals changed congruent with the information provided, and the changes persisted up to 6 months later. Verbal threat information also induced behavioral avoidance of the animal. Younger children formed stronger animal- threat and animal-safe associations because of threat and positive verbal information than older children, but there were negligible age effects on self-reported fear beliefs and avoidance behaviors. These results support theories of fear acquisition that suppose that verbal information affects components of the fear emotion. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)