Conditioning, Expectancy, and the Placebo Effect: Comment on Stewart-Williams and Podd (2004).

Comments on article by Stewardt-Williams and Podd (2004; see record 2004-11156-007). Classical conditioning is included as a component in the response expectancy model of placebo responding. Though introspectable when attention is drawn to them, expectancies need not be in awareness while guiding behavior. Most placebo effects are linked to expectancies, and classical conditioning is one factor (but not the only factor) by which these expectancies can be produced and altered. Conditioned placebo effects without expectancies exist but are relatively rare in humans. The adaptive advantage of cognition is increased response flexibility. For it to convey that benefit, however, it must be capable of overriding the influence of simpler automatic processes. Thus, the higher up the phylogenetic scale, the smaller the role of nonconscious conditioning processes and the larger the role of cognition. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Placebo effects, common factors, and incremental effectiveness.

In his discussion of the logical consequences of the common-factor definition of the term placebo, I. Kirsch (see record 1986-01780-001) maintained that the common-factors definition of placebo is unacceptable because it (1) fails to encompass placebos such as false biofeedback and (2) overinclusively identifies as placebos traditional procedures such as contingent reinforcement. A solution offered by Kirsch is to formally define the placebo only within medicine while retaining for psychotherapy both the concept of placebo and the use of (relabeled) placebo control groups. The present author addresses the points raised by Kirsch's solution in terms of placebo effects, common factors, and incremental effectiveness. (5 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The Placebo Effect: Dissolving the Expectancy Versus Conditioning Debate.

The authors review the literature on the 2 main models of the placebo effect: expectancy theory and classical conditioning. A path is suggested to dissolving the theoretical impasse that has long plagued this issue. The key is to make a clear distinction between 2 questions: What factors shape placebo effects? and What learning mediates the placebo effect? The reviewed literature suggests that classical conditioning procedures are one shaping factor but that verbal information can also shape placebo effects. The literature also suggests that conditioning procedures and other sources of information sometimes shape conscious expectancies and that these expectancies mediate some placebo effects; however, in other cases conditioning procedures appear to shape placebo effects that are not mediated by conscious cognition. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Goal Activation, Expectations, and the Placebo Effect.

Motivational factors receive little attention in current theories of the placebo effect. Reasons for this position are reviewed, and an argument is made for reconsidering the influence of motivation on the placebo effect. The authors hypothesize that nonconscious goals alter reactions to a placebo expectation. Specifically, the authors predict that the placebo effect is most likely to occur when individuals have a goal that can be fulfilled by confirmation of the placebo expectation. The authors tested this notion in 5 experiments. The results demonstrate the role of motivation in the placebo effect across a variety of symptom domains and via 4 different goal activation techniques. Moreover, this moderating effect occurred for both positive and negative placebo expectations, across different placebo effect measures, and in brief laboratory experiments as well as in lengthier studies. It is argued that theories regarding the placebo effect should incorporate motivational factors. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

More Thoughts About Anger Determinants.

Replies to comments (see record 2004-15096-002, 2004-15096-003, 2004-15096-004, and 2004-15096-005) made about the current authors' article on anger (see record 2004-15096-001). The authors propose that (a) although strong negative affect can evoke anger without appraisals, appraisals after the initial reactions conceivably might influence the later emotional experience independently of the felt displeasure; (b) maintaining that particular stimuli can automatically elicit anger does not imply that anger will be dominant; and (c) anger is frequently blended with other negative emotions such as fear. A particular stimulus' context can affect this stimulus' meaning and thus determine its effect, but if the stimulus' meaning is held constant, the stimulus will evoke the response to which it is connected. Carefully controlled experiments are required to resolve the issues raised. The theories advanced should offer testable postulates rather than untestable assertions of what processes supposedly were operating. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The Potential Role of Drug Onset Cues in Drug Dependence and Withdrawal: Reply to Bardo (2004), Bossert and Shaham (2004), Bouton (2004), and Stewart (2004).

In responding to commentaries (M. Bardo, see record 2004-10475-002; J. Bossert and Y. Shaham, see record 2004-10475-003; M. Bouton, see record 2004-10475-004; J. Stewart, see record 2004-10475-005) on their original article (see record 2004-10475-001), the authors agree that the basic mechanisms underlying intra-administration associations may be extensible to a much wider range of phenomena, including both other examinations of conditioned drug effects (e.g., conditioned place preference) and human psychological disorders. The authors also address the concerns of a number of the commenting authors regarding discrepancies in the literature concerning the effects of drug priming in both human and animal studies of reinstatement of drug self-administration. Finally, the authors accept and endorse the calls by several of these commenting authors for further studies required to generate additional support for their model of conditioned drug effects. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Antidepressants are not placebos.

Comments on the article by I. Kirsch and S. J. Lynn (see record 1999-05760-005), which concerned the effects of expectancy in clinical behavior change. Kirsch and Lynn reviewed several meta-analyses of placebo-controlled trials of antidepressants, and examined areas of research in which response expectancies have been shown to affect experience, behavior, and physiology: placebo effects, the effects of false biofeedback on sexual arousal, and the alteration of perceptual and cognitive functions by hypnotic and nonhypnotic suggestion. The present author questions and argues against Kirsch and Lynn's conclusion that apparent drug effects of antidepressants may in fact be a placebo effect, magnified by differences in experienced side effects and the patient's subsequent recognition of the condition to which he or she has been assigned. Among other criticisms, the present author claims that evidence for the absence of the placebo effect in clinical practice effectively argues against its power. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Invalid evidence for expectancies as causes: Comment on Kirsch.

Contends that shortcomings in the empirical evidence cited by I. Kirsch (see record 1986-13702-001) in his study of expectancy modification leave open to question whether the cognitive state of response expectancy is causally linked to placebo responses and fear reduction. (32 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Considering situational and dispositional approaches to rational self-interest: An extension and response to De Dreu (2006).

The authors respond to C. K. W. De Dreu's (2006; see record 2006-20695-004) critique of their article (B. M. Meglino & M. A. Korsgaard, 2004; see record 2004-21169-004) published in the special section on Theoretical Models and Conceptual Analyses of the Journal of Applied Psychology. They maintain that De Dreu misinterprets their definitions and the psychological processes they addressed and thus raises a number of issues that are not relevant to their model. Meglino and Korsgaard's model focuses on the distinction between rational self-interest and other orientation, whereas the approach taken by De Dreu focuses on the distinction between rational self-interest and collective rationality. In this response, the authors clarify this distinction, address discrepancies between these two approaches, consider the effect of goals and rationality on other orientated behavior, and suggest directions for future research. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Active masks and active inhibition: A comment on Lleras and Enns (2004) and on Verleger, Ja?kowski, Aydemir, van der Lubbe, and Groen (2004).

Verleger, Ja?kowski, Aydemir, van der Lubbe, and Groen (see record 2004-21166-002) and Lleras and Enns (see record 2004-21166-001) have argued that negative compatibility effects (NCEs) obtained with masked primes do not reflect self-inhibition processes in motor control. Instead, NCEs are assumed to reflect activation of the response opposite to the prime, triggered by the presence of prime/targetlike features in the mask. Thus, no NCEs should be elicited when masks do not contain such task-relevant features. In Experiments 1 and 3, the authors demonstrate that NCEs can be obtained when masks contain only irrelevant features. Experiment 2 demonstrates that positive compatibility effects (PCEs) will occur with such masks when masked primes are presented peripherally. These results are inconsistent with the mask-induced activation accounts but are in line with the self-inhibition hypothesis of the NCE. Although perceptual interactions and mask-induced motor activations may contribute to NCEs under certain conditions, they cannot provide a full explanation for these effects. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Can Attentional Theory Explain the Inverse Base Rate Effect? Comment on Kruschke (2001).

In J. K. Kruschke's (2001; see record 2001-18940-005) study, it is argued that attentional theory is the sole satisfactory explanation of the inverse base rate effect and that eliminative inference (P. Juslin, P. Wennerholm, & A. Winman, 2001; see record 2001-07828-016) plays no role in the phenomenon. In this comment, the authors demonstrate that, in contrast to the central tenets of attentional theory, (a) rapid attention shifts as implemented in ADIT decelerate learning in the inverse base-rate task and (b) the claim that the inverse base-rate effect is directly caused by an attentional asymmetry is refuted by data. It is proposed that a complete account of the inverse base-rate effect needs to integrate attention effects with inference rules that are flexibly used for both induction and elimination. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

In defense of functional independence: Violations of assumptions underlying the process-dissociation procedure?

T. Curran and D. L. Hintzman (see record 1995-42725-001) claim to have shown that the independence assumption underlying the process-dissociation procedure (L. L. Jacoby, see record 1992-07943-001) is not justified. They argued that correlations between processes at the level of items can result in an underestimation of automatic processes large enough to produce artifactual dissociations between process estimates. In contrast, the authors show that the effects of extremely high correlations at the level of items are likely to be trivial, and not differential across conditions. Curran and Hintzman's dissociations probably reflect violations of boundary conditions for use of the process-dissociation procedure, rather than violations of independence. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Vicissitudes of a misnomer: Reply to Dalgleish (2005).

The Stroop effect is psychology's classic measure gauging the selectivity of attention to individual attributes of complex stimuli. The emotional Stroop effect gauges the influence on behavior of threat and emotional stimuli. The former taps central/executive processes abstracted from particular stimulus contexts, whereas the latter taps automatic processes inextricably linked to particular stimuli in the environment. T. Dalgleish (see record 2005-14939-009) raised concerns about the data and theory that support the separateness of the 2 effects (D. Algom, E. Chajut, & S. Lev, see record 2004-17825-001). The present reply shows that Dalgleish's objections are unwarranted and that the term emotional Stroop effect blurs the deep conceptual divide separating the 2 phenomena. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Stereotype Threat and the Social and Scientific Contexts of the Race Achievement Gap.

Comments on an article by Paul Sackett, Chaitra Hardison and Michael Cullen entitled On Interpreting Stereotype Threat as Accounting for African American-White Differences on Cognitive Tests (see record 2004-10043-001). In their article, Sackett, Hardison, and Cullen (see record 2000-16592-021) critiqued misrepresentations of the original stereotype threat findings presented by Steele and Aronson. They criticized representations of the research that suggest that stereotype threat explains all the racial achievement gap in academic performance when, in fact, the original studies statistically equated the ability of Black students and White students by using SAT scores as a covariate. As Sackett et al. acknowledged, Steele and Aronson did not claim that stereotype threat explains all the racial achievement gap, though as they suggested in their critique, it may have been a claim made implicitly and even explicitly in some media and textbook coverage of the work. The authors of this comment wish to make three points that Sackett and colleagues did not make. These points highlight the social and scientific contexts in which Sackett et al.'s critical commentary, and stereotype threat research in general, can be interpreted. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Theoretical claims necessitate basic research: Reply to Gawronski, Lebel, Peters, and Banse (2009) and Nosek and Greenwald (2009).

The authors of this reply article note that B. Gawronski, E. P. LeBel, K. R. Peters, and R. Banse (see record 2009-05290-002) (a) expressed agreement in their comment with the analysis put forward in the target article (J. De Houwer, S. Teige-Mocigemba, A. Spruyt, & A. Moors) (see record 2009-05290-001) and (b) pointed to a further implication for the way in which the implicitness of a measure should be examined. The current authors note that B. A. Nosek and A. G. Greenwald (see record 2009-05290-003), on the other hand, raised questions in their comment about the definition of the concept “implicit” in the target article, arguing for a fundamentally different approach to measurement that emphasizes not theoretical understanding but usefulness for predicting behavior. In this reply, the current authors respond to these comments and argue that when theoretical claims are made about measures, these claims should be backed up with appropriate evidence. In the absence of basic research, measures and their relation to behavior can only be described. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Values and Science: Reply.

Responds to Kendler (2004), Johnson (2004), and Zuriff (2004) who directed a number of criticisms against the authors' original article (see record 2003-03405-003) examining the psychological data and policy debates surrounding affirmative action. Kendler and Zuriff both chided the authors for interjecting values into the realm of science. The authors, however, state that both seriously misread the argument, imagining that they talked about "morality" when they did not. The authors claim to hold the same view as Kendler and Zuriff about the dichotomy between data and values and revisit portions of their argument further questioned. To Johnson, they state that the issues are not as clear cut as he has suggested. The authors do, however, reevaluate their original article in light of his criticisms. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Independent retrieval of source dimensions: An extension of results by Starns and Hicks (2005) and a comment on the ACSIM measure.

Recently, J. J. Starns and J. L. Hicks (2005) have argued that source dimensions are retrieved independently from memory (see record 2005-15992-004). In their innovative experiment, manipulating the retrievability of 1 source feature did not affect memory for a 2nd feature. Following C. S. Dodson and A. P. Shimamura (2000; see record 2000-08540-012), the authors argue that the source memory measure that Starns and Hicks used (known as the average conditional source identification measure) is vulnerable to a response bias in this particular paradigm, and this may undermine Starns and Hicks's conclusion. Starns and Hicks, however, acknowledged this possibility. The authors substantiate this claim by a simulation and by replicating Starns and Hicks's experiment. In 2 further experiments, the authors use an extended multinomial model to analyze data showing that Starns and Hicks's conclusion holds even if results cannot be attributed to response biases. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Updating a cautionary tale of masked priming: Reply to Klapp (2005).

The commentary by S. T. Klapp (see record 2005-09704-010) on our recent article (A. Lleras & J. T. Enns, [see record 2004-21166-001]) proposes that the empirical finding of negative compatibility in masked priming be attributed to 2 distinct theoretical constructs: (a) perceptual priming through object updating, as described in our article, and (b) nonperceptual priming based on inhibited unconscious response tendencies. The authors argue that this 2nd construct is not supported by either the new data the authors report or the extant literature. Instead, the negative compatibility effect in masked priming is influenced by perceptual interactions among stimuli that appear in the same spatial location, and the authors believe it is this process that deserves further systematic study. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Rejoinder: The madness to our method: Some thoughts on divergent thinking.

Replies to comments by M. D. Mumford et al. (see record 2008-05954-002), J. Baer (see record 2008-05954-003), M. A. Runco (see record 2008-05954-004), K. H. Kim (see record 2008-05954-005), N. Kogan (see record 2008-05954-006), and S. Lee (see record 2008-05954-007) on the current authors' original article on divergent thinking (see record 2008-05954-001). In this reply, the authors examine the madness to their method in light of the comments. Overall, the authors agree broadly with the comments; many of the issues will be settled only by future research. The authors disagree, though, that past research has proven past scoring methods--including the Torrance methods--to be satisfactory or satisfying. The authors conclude by offering their own criticisms of their method, of divergent thinking, and of the concept of domain-general creative abilities. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)