A user friendly mutual authentication and key agreement scheme for wireless sensor networks using chaotic maps

Spread of wireless network technology has opened new doors to utilize sensor technology in various areas via Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs). Many authentication protocols for among the service seeker users, sensing component sensor nodes (SNs) and the service provider base-station or gateway node (GWN) are available to realize services from WSNs efficiently and without any fear of deceit. Recently, Li et al. and He et al. independently proposed mutual authentication and key agreement schemes for WSNs. We find that both the schemes achieve mutual authentication, establish session key and resist many known attacks but still have security weaknesses. We show the applicability of stolen verifier, user impersonation, password guessing and smart card loss attacks on Li et al.’s scheme. Although their scheme employs the feature of dynamic identity, an attacker can reveal and guess the identity of a registered user. We demonstrate the susceptibility of He et al.’s scheme to password guessing attack. In both the schemes, the security of the session key established between user and SNs is imperfect due to lack of forward secrecy and session-specific temporary information leakage attack. In addition both the schemes impose extra computational load on resource scanty sensor-nodes and are not user friendly due to absence of user anonymity and lack of password change facility. To handle these drawbacks, we design a mutual authentication and key agreement scheme for WSN using chaotic maps. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to propose an authentication scheme for WSN based on chaotic maps. We show the superiority of the proposed scheme over its predecessor schemes by means of detailed security analysis and comparative evaluation. We also formally analyze our scheme using BAN logic.     

An efficient two-factor user authentication scheme with unlinkability for wireless sensor networks

User authentication with unlinkability is one of the corner stone services for many security and privacy services which are required to secure communications in wireless sensor networks (WSNs). Recently, Xue et al. proposed a temporal-credential-based mutual authentication and key agreement scheme for WSNs, and claimed that their scheme achieves identity and password protection, and the resiliency of stolen smart card attacks. However, we observe that Xue et al.’s scheme is subject to identity guessing attack, tracking attack, privileged insider attack and weak stolen smart card attack. In order to fix the drawbacks, we propose an enhanced authentication scheme with unlinkability. Additionally, the proposed scheme further cuts the computational cost. Therefore, the proposed scheme not only remedies its security flaws but also improves its performance. It is more suitable for practical applications of WSNs than Xue et al.’s scheme.     

A dynamic password-based user authentication scheme for hierarchical wireless sensor networks

Most queries in wireless sensor network (WSN) applications are issued at the point of the base station or gateway node of the network. However, for critical applications of WSNs there is a great need to access the real-time data inside the WSN from the nodes, because the real-time data may no longer be accessed through the base station only. So, the real-time data can be given access directly to the external users (parties) those who are authorized to access data as and when they demand. The user authentication plays a vital role for this purpose. In this paper, we propose a new password-based user authentication scheme in hierarchical wireless sensor networks. Our proposed scheme achieves better security and efficiency as compared to those for other existing password-based approaches. In addition, our scheme has merit to change dynamically the user's password locally without the help of the base station or gateway node. Furthermore, our scheme supports dynamic nodes addition after the initial deployment of nodes in the existing sensor network.     

On the security and improvement of a two-factor user authentication scheme in wireless sensor networks

User authentication is a basic security requirement during the deployment of the wireless sensor network (WSN), because it may operate in a rather hostile environment, such as a military battlefield. In 2010, Khan and Alghathbar (KA) found out that Das’s two-factor user authentication scheme for WSNs is vulnerable to the gateway node (GW-node) bypassing attack and the privileged-insider attack. They further presented an improved scheme to overcome the security flaws of Das’s scheme. However, in this paper, we show that KA’s scheme still suffers from the GW-node impersonation attack, the GW-node bypassing attack, and the privileged-insider attack. Hence, to fix the security flaws in KA’s scheme, we propose a new user authentication scheme for WSNs. The security of the user authentication session in the proposed scheme is reduced by the model of Bellare and Rogaway. The security of partial compromise of secrets in the proposed scheme is reduced and analyzed by our adversarial model. Based on the performance evaluation, the overall cost of the proposed scheme is less than that of KA’s scheme. Hence, we believe that the proposed scheme is more suitable for real security applications than KA’s scheme.     

面向多网关的无线传感器网络多因素认证协议

无线传感器网络作为物联网的重要组成部分,广泛应用于环境监测、医疗健康、智能家居等领域.身份认证为用户安全地访问传感器节点中的实时数据提供了基本安全保障,是保障无线传感器网络安全的第一道防线;前向安全性属于系统安全的最后一道防线,能够极大程度地降低系统被攻破后的损失,因此一直被学术及工业界视为重要的安全属性.设计面向多网关的可实现前向安全性的无线传感器网络多因素身份认证协议是近年来安全协议领域的研究热点.由于多网关无线传感器网络身份认证协议往往应用于高安全需求场景,一方面需要面临强大的攻击者,另一方面传感器节点的计算和存储资源却十分有限,这给如何设计一个安全的多网关无线传感器网络身份认证协议带来了挑战.近年来,大量的多网关身份认证协议被提出,但大部分都随后被指出存在各种安全问题.2018年,Ali等人提出了一个适用于农业监测的多因素认证协议,该协议通过一个可信的中心(基站)来实现用户与外部的传感器节点的认证;Srinivas等人提出了一个通用的面向多网关的多因素身份认证协议,该协议不需要一个可信的中心,而是通过在网关之间存储共享秘密参数来完成用户与外部传感器节点的认证.这两个协议是多网关无线传感器网络身份认证协议的典型代表,分别代表了两类实现不同网关间认证的方式:1)基于可信基站,2)基于共享秘密参数.分析指出这两个协议对离线字典猜测攻击、内部攻击是脆弱的,且无法实现匿名性和前向安全性.鉴于此,本文提出一个安全增强的可实现前向安全性的面向多网关的无线传感器网络多因素认证协议.该协议采用Srinivas等协议的认证方式,即通过网关之间的共享秘密参数完成用户与外部传感器节点的认证,包含两种典型的认证场景.对新协议进行了BAN逻辑分析及启发式分析,分析结果表明该协议实现了双向认证,且能够安全地协商会话密钥以及抵抗各类已知的攻击.与相关协议的对比结果显示,新协议在提高安全性的同时,保持了较高的效率,适于资源受限的无线传感器网络环境.     

An enhanced smart card based remote user password authentication scheme

Smart card based password authentication is one of the simplest and efficient authentication mechanisms to ensure secure communication in insecure network environments. Recently, Chen et al. have pointed out the weaknesses of some password authentication schemes and proposed a robust smart card based remote user password authentication scheme to improve the security. As per their claims, their scheme is efficient and can ensure forward secrecy of the session key. However, we find that Chen et al.'s scheme cannot really ensure forward secrecy, and it cannot detect the wrong password in login phase. Besides, the password change phase of Chen et al.'s scheme is unfriendly and inefficient since the user has to communicate with the server to update his/her password. In this paper, we propose a modified smart card based remote user password authentication scheme to overcome the aforementioned weaknesses. The analysis shows that our proposed scheme is user friendly and more secure than other related schemes.     

对两个基于智能卡的口令认证协议的安全性分析

身份认证是确保信息系统安全的重要手段,基于智能卡的口令认证协议由于实用性较强而成为近期研究热点。采用基于场景的攻击技术,对最近新提出的两个基于智能卡的口令认证协议进行了安全性分析。指出“对Liao等身份鉴别方案的分析与改进”(潘春兰,周安民,肖丰霞,等.对Liao等人身份鉴别方案的分析与改进.计算机工程与应用,2010,46(4):110-112)中提出的认证协议无法实现所声称的抗离线口令猜测攻击;指出“基于双线性对的智能卡口令认证改进方案”(邓粟,王晓峰.基于双线性对的智能卡口令认证改进方案.计算机工程,2010,36(18):150-152)中提出的认证协议无法抗拒绝服务(DoS)攻击和内部人员攻击,且口令更新阶段存在设计缺陷。分析结果表明,这两个口令认证协议都存在严重安全缺陷,不适合安全需求较高的应用环境。     

基于D-H密钥交换协议的用户认证方案

分析指出Liaw等人的远程用户认证方案(Mathematical and Computer Modelling,2006,No.1/2)容易受到重放攻击和中间人攻击,并且密码修改阶段和注册阶段存在安全漏洞,在此基础上提出一个基于D-H密钥交换协议的远程用户认证方案.理论分析结果表明,该方案可以抵抗假冒攻击、重放攻击、中间人攻击,安全地实现相互认证及会话密钥生成.     

基于改进Das协议的无线传感器网络用户认证协议UAPL

针对在无线传感器网络中采用用户认证的方式获取节点数据时,容易出现密码被破译,以及容易遭受多种网络攻击等安全性问题,在改进Das协议的双因素身份验证的基础上,引入了用户与网关、网关与传感器节点之间的互相验证机制以及用户密码变更机制,提出了UAPL协议。UAPL协议具有防止网关节点旁路攻击、伪装攻击等网络攻击的安全验证机制,提供的密码变更防护能防止由于密码泄露而引发的安全问题。实验结果表明,UAPL协议与其他改进Das协议相比具有较高的安全性。     

对三个多服务器环境下匿名认证协议的分析

设计安全高效的多服务器环境下匿名身份认证协议是当前安全协议领域的研究热点。基于广泛接受的攻击者模型,对多服务器环境下的三个代表性匿名认证协议进行了安全性分析.指出Wan等协议无法实现所声称的离线口令猜测攻击,且未实现用户匿名性和前向安全性;指出Amin等协议同样不能抵抗离线口令猜测攻击,且不能提供匿名性,对两种破坏前向安全性的攻击是脆弱的;指出Reedy等协议不能抵抗所声称的用户仿冒攻击和离线口令猜测攻击,且无法实现用户不可追踪性.突出强调这些协议失败的根本原因在于,违反协议设计的三个基本原则：公钥原则、用户匿名性原则和前向安全性原则.明确协议的具体失误之处,并提出相应修正方法.     

Efficient and secure two-factor dynamic ID-based password authentication scheme with provable security

Password-based remote user authentication schemes using smart cards are designed to ensure that only a user who possesses both the smart card and the corresponding password can gain access to the remote servers. Despite many research efforts, it remains a challenging task to design a secure password-based authentication scheme with user anonymity. The author uses Kumari et al.’s scheme as the case study. Their scheme uses non-public key primitives. The author first presents the cryptanalysis of Kumari et al.’s scheme in which he shows that their scheme is vulnerable to user impersonation attack, and does not provide forward secrecy and user anonymity. Using the case study, he has identified that public-key techniques are indispensable to construct a two-factor authentication scheme with security attributes, such as user anonymity, unlinkability and forward secrecy under the nontamper resistance assumption of the smart card. The author proposes a password-based authentication scheme using elliptic curve cryptography. Through the informal and formal security analysis, he shows that proposed scheme is secure against various known attacks, including the attacks found in Kumari’s scheme. Furthermore, he verifies the correctness of mutual authentication using the BAN logic.     

一种增强的智能卡口令认证方案

Hwang等人提出了基于ElGamal算法的智能卡口令认证方案,其安全性依赖于计算有限域上离散对数的难度。Chan等人分析了该方案的安全缺陷,并进行了改进。最近,Awasthi等人指出了改进方案中的安全缺陷,并提出了一种新方案,但新方案仍然存在缺陷。针对新方案的缺陷,基于“一次一密”和“动态口令”,提出了一种增强的智能卡口令认证方案。该方案允许用户自由选择口令,能够抵御重放攻击、内部攻击,能双向认证,具备强安全修复性。     

Cryptanalysis and improvement of a robust smart card secured authentication scheme on SIP using elliptic curve cryptography

The session initiation protocol (SIP) has been receiving a lot of attention to provide security in the Voice over IP (VoIP) in Internet and mobility management. Recently, Yeh et al. proposed a smart card-based authentication scheme for SIP using elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). They claimed that their scheme is secure against known security attacks. However, in this paper, we indicate that Yeh et al.’s scheme is vulnerable to off-line password guessing attack, user impersonation attack and server impersonation attack, in the case that the smart card is stolen and the information stored in the smart card is disclosed. As a remedy, we also propose an improved smart card-based authentication scheme which not only conquers the security weaknesses of the related schemes but also provides a reduction in computational cost. The proposed scheme also provides the user anonymity and untraceability, and allows a user to change his/her password without informing the remote server. To show the security of our protocol, we prove its security the random oracle model.     

对两个无线传感器网络中匿名身份认证协议的安全性分析

针对设计安全高效的无线传感器网络环境下匿名认证协议的问题,基于广泛接受的攻击者能力假设,采用基于场景的攻击技术,对新近提出的两个无线传感器网络环境下的双因子匿名身份认证协议进行了安全性分析。指出刘聪等提出的协议(刘聪,高峰修,马传贵,等.无线传感器网络中具有匿名性的用户认证协议.计算机工程,2012,38(22):99-103)无法实现所声称的抗离线口令猜测攻击,且在协议可用性方面存在根本性设计缺陷;指出闫丽丽等提出的协议(闫丽丽,张仕斌,昌燕.一种传感器网络用户认证与密钥协商协议.小型微型计算机系统,2013,34(10):2342-2344)不能抵抗用户仿冒攻击和离线口令猜测攻击,且无法实现用户不可追踪性。结果表明,这两个匿名身份认证协议都存在严重安全缺陷,不适于在实际无线传感器网络环境中应用。     

A temporal-credential-based mutual authentication and key agreement scheme for wireless sensor networks

Wireless sensor network (WSN) can be deployed in any unattended environment. With the new developed IoT (Internet of Things) technology, remote authorized users are allowed to access reliable sensor nodes to obtain data and even are allowed to send commands to the nodes in the WSN. Because of the resource constrained nature of sensor nodes, it is important to design a secure, effective and lightweight authentication and key agreement scheme. The gateway node (GWN) plays a crucial role in the WSN as all data transmitted to the outside network must pass through it. We propose a temporal-credential-based mutual authentication scheme among the user, GWN and the sensor node. With the help of the password-based authentication, GWN can issue a temporal credential to each user and sensor node. For a user, his/her temporal credential can be securely protected and stored openly in a smart card. For a sensor node, its temporal credential is related to its identity and must privately stored in its storage medium. Furthermore, with the help of GWN, a lightweight key agreement scheme is proposed to embed into our protocol. The protocol only needs hash and XOR computations. The results of security and performance analysis demonstrate that the proposed scheme provides relatively more security features and high security level without increasing too much overhead of communication, computation and storage. It is realistic and well adapted for resource-constrained wireless sensor networks.     

A secure and efficient ECC-based user anonymity-preserving session initiation authentication protocol using smart card

The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) is a signaling communications protocol, which has been chosen for controlling multimedia communication in 3G mobile networks. The proposed authentication in SIP is HTTP digest based authentication. Recently, Tu et al. presented an improvement of Zhang et al.’s smart card-based authenticated key agreement protocol for SIP. Their scheme efficiently resists password guessing attack. However, in this paper, we analyze the security of Tu et al.’s scheme and demonstrate their scheme is still vulnerable to user’s impersonation attack, server spoofing attack and man-in-the middle attack. We aim to propose an efficient improvement on Tu et al.’s scheme to overcome the weaknesses of their scheme, while retaining the original merits of their scheme. Through the rigorous informal and formal security analysis, we show that our scheme is secure against various known attacks including the attacks found in Tu et al.’s scheme. Furthermore, we simulate our scheme for the formal security analysis using the widely-accepted AVISPA (Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications) tool and show that our scheme is secure against passive and active attacks including the replay and man-in-the-middle attacks. Additionally, the proposed scheme is comparable in terms of the communication and computational overheads with Tu et al.’s scheme and other related existing schemes.     

Secure Dynamic Identity-Based Authentication Scheme Using Smart Cards

ABSTRACT

In 2004, Das et al. proposed a dynamic identity-based remote user authentication scheme using smart cards. This scheme allows users to choose and change their passwords freely, and the server does not maintain any verification table. Das et al. claimed that their scheme is secure against stolen verifier attack, replay attack, forgery attack, dictionary attack, insider attack and identity theft. However, many researchers have demonstrated that Das et al.'s scheme is susceptible to various attacks. Furthermore, this scheme does not achieve mutual authentication and thus cannot resist malicious server attack. In 2009, Wang et al. argued that Das et al.'s scheme is susceptible to stolen smart card attack. If an attacker obtains the smart card of the user and chooses any random password, the attacker gets through the authentication process to get access of the remote server. Therefore, Wang et al. suggested an improved scheme to preclude the weaknesses of Das et al.'s scheme. However, we found that Wang et al.'s scheme is susceptible to impersonation attack, stolen smart card attack, offline password guessing attack, denial of service attack and fails to preserve the user anonymity. This paper improves Wang et al.'s scheme to resolve the aforementioned problems, while keeping the merits of different dynamic identity based smart card authentication schemes.     

一种WSNs中的强实体认证协议

无线传感器网络(WSNs)由于其部署环境的开放性、资源的有限性等特点,比传统网络更易受到安全方面的威胁,其安全问题变得极为重要。针对WSNs中的认证机制的效率和安全问题,提出了一种有效的强实体认证协议。通过采用秘密共享方案,通过多个节点对用户进行认证,能够有效地防止非法用户加入网络。通过实验分析和对比表明:协议既能满足网络对安全的需求,又能最大程度地节约传感器节点的能量。     

Two robust remote user authentication protocols using smart cards

With the rapid growth of electronic commerce and enormous demand from variants of Internet based applications, strong privacy protection and robust system security have become essential requirements for an authentication scheme or universal access control mechanism. In order to reduce implementation complexity and achieve computation efficiency, design issues for efficient and secure password based remote user authentication scheme have been extensively investigated by research community in these two decades. Recently, two well-designed password based authentication schemes using smart cards are introduced by Hsiang and Shih (2009) and Wang et al. (2009), respectively. Hsiang et al. proposed a static ID based authentication protocol and Wang et al. presented a dynamic ID based authentication scheme. The authors of both schemes claimed that their protocol delivers important security features and system functionalities, such as mutual authentication, data security, no verification table implementation, freedom on password selection, resistance against ID-theft attack, replay attack and insider attack, as well as computation efficiency. However, these two schemes still have much space for security enhancement. In this paper, we first demonstrate a series of vulnerabilities on these two schemes. Then, two enhanced protocols with corresponding remedies are proposed to eliminate all identified security flaws in both schemes.     

Security flaw of Hölbl et al.’s protocol

Recently, Hölbl et al. [M. Hölbl, T. Welzer, B. Brumen, Improvement of the Peyravian–Jeffries’s user authentication protocol and password change protocol, Computer Communications 31 (2008) 1945–1951] have proposed an improvement of Peyravian–Jeffries’s user authentication protocol and password change protocol [M. Peyravian, C. Jeffries, Secure remote user access over insecure networks, Computer Communications 29 (5–6) (2006) 660–667]. Peyravian–Jeffries’s scheme suffers from an active off-line password-guessing attack [J. Munilla, A. Peinado, Off-line password-guessing attack to Peyravian–Jeffries’s remote user authentication protocol, Computer Communications 30 (1) (2006) 52–54], and Hölbl et al. state that their improved protocol overcomes this weakness. However, we show in this paper that although this proposed protocol prevents this active attack, it remains vulnerable to a passive (simpler) off-line password-guessing attack.