An estimation of an operator's action time by using the MARS code in a small break LOCA without a HPSI for a PWR

To estimate the success criteria of an operator's action time for a probabilistic safety/risk assessment (PSA/PRA) of a nuclear power plant, the information from a safety analysis report (SAR) and/or that by using a simplified simulation code such as the MAAP code has been used in a conventional PSA. However, the information from these is often too conservative to perform a realistic PSA for a risk-informed application. To reduce the undue conservatism, the use of a best-estimate thermal hydraulic code has become an essential issue in the latest PSA and it is now recognized as a suitable tool. In the same context, the ‘ASME PRA standard’ also recommends the use of a best-estimate code to improve the quality of a PSA. In Korea, a platform to use a best-estimate thermal hydraulic code called the MARS code has been developed for the PSA of the Korea standard nuclear power plant (KSNP). This study has proposed an estimation method for an operator's action time by using the MARS platform. The typical example case is a small break loss of coolant accident without the high pressure safety injection system, which is one of the most important accident sequences in the PSA of the KSNP. Under the given accident sequence, the operator has to perform a recovery action known as a fast cooldown operation. This study focuses on two aspects regarding an operator's action; one is how they can operate it under some restrictions; the other is how much time is available to mitigate this accident sequence. To assess these aspects, this study considered: (1) the operator's action model and (2) the starting time of the operation. To show an effect due to an operator's action, three kinds of control models (the best-fitting, the conservative, and the proportional-integral) have been assessed. This study shows that the developed method and the platform are useful tools for this type of problem and they can provide a valuable insight related to an operator's actions.     

Approach to accident management in RBMK-1500

In order to ensure the safe operation of the nuclear power plants accident management programs are being developed around the world. These accident management programs cover the whole spectrum of accidents, including severe accidents. A lot of work is done to investigate the severe accident phenomena and implement severe accident management in NPPs with vessel-type reactors, while less attention is paid to channel-type reactors CANDU and RBMK.Ignalina NPP with RBMK-1500 reactor has implemented symptom based emergency operation procedures, which cover management of accidents until the core damage and do not extend to core damage region. In order to ensure coverage of the whole spectrum of accidents and meet the requirements of IAEA the severe accident management guidelines have to be developed.This paper presents the basic principles and approach to management of beyond design basis accidents at Ignalina NPP. In general, this approach could be applied to NPPs with RBMK-1000 reactors that are available in Russia, but the design differences should be taken into account.     

Variations of a passive safety containment for a BWR with active and passive safety systems

The paper presents variations of a certain passive safety containment for a near future BWR. It is tentatively named Mark S containment in the paper. It uses the operating dome as the upper secondary containment vessel (USCV) to where the pressure of the primary containment vessel (PCV) can be released through the upper vent pipes. One of the merits of the Mark S containment is very low peak pressure at severe accidents without venting the containment atmosphere to the environment. Another merit is the capability to submerge the PCV and the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) above the core level by flooding water from the gravity-driven cooling system (GDCS) pool and the upper pool. The third merit is robustness against external events such as a large commercial airplane crash owing to the reinforced concrete USCV. The Mark S containment is applicable to a large reactor that generates 1830 MW electric power. The paper presents several examples of BWRs that use the Mark S containment. In those examples active safety systems and passive safety systems function independently and constitute in-depth hybrid safety (IDHS). The concept of the IDHS is also presented in the paper.     

Safety analysis of LBLOCA in BDBA scenarios for the Bushehr's VVER-1000 nuclear power plant

This paper presents the results of thermal-hydraulic calculations of a large break loss of coolant accident (LBLOCA) analysis for a VVER-1000/V446 unit at Bushehr nuclear power plant (BNPP). LBLOCA is analysis in two different beyond design basis accident (BDBA) scenarios using the RELAP5/MOD3.2 best estimate code. The scenarios are LBLOCA with station blackout (SBO) and LBLOCA with pump re-circulation blockage which have been evaluated in the final safety analysis report (FSAR) of BNPP. A model of VVER-1000 reactor based on Unit 1 of BNPP has been developed for the RELAP5/MOD3.2 thermal-hydraulics code consists of 4-loop primary and secondary systems with all their relevant sub-systems important to safety analysis. The analysis is performed without regard for operator's actions on accident management. The safety analysis is carried out and the results are checked against the acceptance criteria which are the possibility of using water inventory in the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) accumulators and the KWU tanks for core cooling and the available time to operators before the maximum design limit of fuel rod cladding damage is reached. These kinds of analyses are performed to provide the response of monitored plant parameters to identify symptoms available to the operators, timing of the loss of critical safety functions and timing of operator actions to avoid the loss of critical safety functions of core damage. The results of performed analyses show that the operators have 2.9 and 3.1 h for LBLOCA with SBO and LBLOCA with pump re-circulation blockage scenarios, respectively, before the fuel rod cladding rupture. The results are also compared with the BNPP FSAR data.