Counterfactual potency.

Counterfactual thoughts typically take the form of implied or explicit if–then statements. We propose that the multiplicative combination of “if likelihood” (the degree to which the antecedent condition of the counterfactual is perceived to be likely) and “then likelihood” (the perceived conditional likelihood of the outcome of the counterfactual, given the antecedent condition) determine the strength and impact of counterfactuals. This construct, termed counterfactual potency, is a reliable predictor of the degree of influence of counterfactual thinking upon judgments of regret, causation, and responsibility. Through 4 studies, we demonstrate the predictive power of this construct in a variety of contexts and show that it plays a causal role in determining the strength of the effects of counterfactual thought. Implications of counterfactual potency as a central factor of counterfactual influence are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Everyday magical powers: The role of apparent mental causation in the overestimation of personal influence.

These studies examined whether having thoughts related to an event before it occurs leads people to infer that they caused the event--even when such causation might otherwise seem magical. In Study 1, people perceived that they had harmed another person via a voodoo hex. These perceptions were more likely among those who had first been induced to harbor evil thoughts about their victim. In Study 2, spectators of a peer's basketball-shooting performance were more likely to perceive that they had influenced his success if they had first generated positive visualizations consistent with that success. Observers privy to those spectators' visualizations made similar attributions about the spectators' influence. Finally, additional studies suggested that these results occur even when the thought-about outcome is viewed as unwanted by the thinker and even in field settings where the relevant outcome is occurring as part of a live athletic competition. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Ideas about causation in philosophy and psychology.

Philosophical theories summarized here include regularity and necessity theories from D. Hume (1739 [1978], 1740 [1978]) to the present; manipulability theory; the theory of powerful particulars; causation as connected changes within a defined state of affairs; departures from "normal" events or from some standard for comparison; causation as a transfer of something between objects; and causal propagation and production. Issues found in this literature and of relevance for psychology include whether actual causal relations can be perceived or known; what sorts of things people believe can be causes; different levels of causal analysis; the distinction between the causal relation itself and cues to causal relations; causal frames or fields; internal and external causes; and understanding of causation in different realms of the world, such as the natural and artificial realms. A full theory of causal inference by laypeople should address all of these issues. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Mental simulation of causality.

We propose that people imagine alternatives to reality (counterfactuals) in assessing the casual role of a prior event. This process of mental simulation (D. Kahneman and A. Tversky, 1982) is used to derive novel predictions about the effects of default events on causal attribution. A default event is the alternative event that most readily comes to mind when a factual event is mentally mutated. The factual event is judged to be causal to the extent that its default undoes the outcome. In Experiment 1, a woman was described as having died from an allergic reaction to a meal ordered by her boss. When the boss was described as having considered another meal without the allergic ingredient, people were more likely to mutate his decision and his causal role in the death was judged to be greater than when the alternative meal was also said to have the allergic ingredient. In Experiment 2, a paraplegic couple was described as having died in an auto accident after having been denied a cab ride. People perceived the cabby's refusal to take the couple as a stronger cause of the deaths when his taking the couple would have undone the accident than when it would have not have. We conclude that an adequate theory of causal judgment requires an understanding of these counterfactual simulations. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Causal loops and other intercausal perceptions in attributions from exam performance.

Conducted 2 studies to determine whether students perceive meaningful influence patterns among the causal variables involved in determining exam performance. In Study 1, 81 students retrospectively accounted for their midterm exam performance. It was observed that the Ss perceived a number of both unidirectional and bidirectional intercausal effects, and that these were related to both perceived success and causal attributions. In Study 2, 88 students were requested to explain the exam performance of a hypothetical student. Results corroborating those of Study 1 were obtained. (32 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Mental addition versus subtraction in counterfactual reasoning: On assessing the impact of personal actions and life events.

Assessing the consequences of actions and events often requires comparing a mental simulation of the world in which the action is present to one in which the action is absent. We propose that people perceive more impact when asked to assess whether an action would increase the likelihood or degree of a potential outcome (mental addition) than when asked whether it would reduce the probability or extent of a potential consequence (mental subtraction). This judgmental asymmetry occurs because people (a) give more weight to features of the particular mental simulation (the action or its absence) serving as the subject of comparison and (b) give more weight to factors that produce as opposed to inhibit the relevant outcome. In 4 studies, Ss assessed the impact of personal actions (e.g., studying for an exam). Ss perceived more impact when the assessment was placed in an additive frame (e.g., "how many more questions will you get right if you study?") as opposed to a subtractive one (e.g., "how many fewer will you get right if you do not study?"). This effect was not influenced by the hedonic value of the event or by whether the S had actually experienced it. Discussion centers on the relevance of these results for the undoing of scenarios and causal attribution. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The new causal principle of cognitive learning theory: Perspectives on Bandura's "reciprocal determinism."

In conceptualizing person–environment interaction, A. Bandura (see record 1979-08427-001) contended that the traditional view of unidirectional causation had to be abandoned in favor of what he called "reciprocal determinism." It is argued that the unidirectional account can be made to work in the cases that Bandura cited and that the criticisms of the neo-Hegelian view of causation can also be applied to Bandura's arguments. In addition, in his Social Learning Theory (1977), Bandura stressed the history of the interaction between a person and the environment, and here "reciprocal determinism" is a misleading expression. (16 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Corelates of attitudes toward help seeking in outpatients.

20 female and 16 male 18-41 yr. old outpatients in a psychology clinic (a) judged the causal locus of their problem as internal or external, (b) rated the perceived severity and "typicalness" of their problem, and (c) completed Fischer's Attitudes Toward Seeking Professional Psychological Help Scale. Results show that the majority of Ss cited internal causal factors. Ss who perceived their problem as more severe tended to have less favorable help-seeking attitudes. Contrary to previous findings, no significant sex differences were obtained. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

For want of a nail: How absences cause events.

Causation by omission is instantiated when an effect occurs from an absence, as in The absence of nicotine causes withdrawal or Not watering the plant caused it to wilt. The phenomenon has been viewed as an insurmountable problem for process theories of causation, which specify causation in terms of conserved quantities, like force, but not for theories that specify causation in terms of statistical or counterfactual dependencies. A new account of causation challenges these assumptions. According to the force theory, absences are causal when the removal of a force leads to an effect. Evidence in support of this account was found in 3 experiments in which people classified animations of complex causal chains involving force removal, as well as chains involving virtual forces, that is, forces that were anticipated but never realized. In a 4th experiment, the force theory's ability to predict synonymy relationships between different types of causal expressions provided further evidence for this theory over dependency theories. The findings show not only how causation by omission can be grounded in the physical world but also why only certain absences, among the potentially infinite number of absences, are causal. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

On the Behavioral Consequences of Infrahumanization: The Implicit Role of Uniquely Human Emotions in Intergroup Relations.

Four experiments confirmed the hypothesis that people discriminate the out-group on the basis of the expression of uniquely human emotions. In Study 1, using a lost e-mail paradigm, the expression of a uniquely human emotion resulted in "nicer" replies when the sender was an in-group compared with an out-group member. The same pattern of results was obtained in Studies 2 and 3 using a conformity paradigm. In addition, perceived similarity was measured and proposed as a potential underlying mechanism (Study 3). Finally, using an approach-avoidance procedure, Study 4 showed that people not only deprive the out-group of positive consequences as in the former studies but that people also act against the out-group. The role of infrahumanization underlying prejudice and discrimination is discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Blame and punishment for intoxicated aggression: when is the perpetrator culpable?

AIM: To systematically test the hypothesis that intoxicated individuals are viewed as less culpable than relatively sober individuals for engaging in aggressive behaviour. DESIGN: A series of experimental vignettes depicted alcohol use in the context of unwanted touching, date rape, assault and rape, vandalism and common assault. Each vignette manipulated drinking of the perpetrator and selected contextual variables using between-subjects experimental designs. SETTING: A stratified random sample of 994 Ontario residents responded to these scenarios in the course of a telephone interview. MEASUREMENTS: Three measures were analysed in this study: (1) judgements of the causal role of the perpetrator's drinking in leading to each outcome, (2) perceived blameworthiness of the perpetrator, and (3) appropriate punishment for the perpetrator. FINDINGS: Drinking was believed to play a greater causal role in leading to each outcome when the perpetrator was portrayed as "drunk" as opposed to merely "feeling the effects". However, intoxication did not attenuate perceived blameworthiness and only inconsistently reduced punishment assigned to perpetrators. Instead, intoxication interacted with premeditation, criminal history and gender to determine perceived culpability of perpetrators. In some scenarios, victim intoxication reduced perceived culpability of the perpetrator. CONCLUSIONS: Legal, anthropological, and attributional accounts may overestimate the extent to which perpetrator intoxication--in and of itself--determines perceived culpability for alcohol-related aggression.     

Loneliness as a specific risk factor for depressive symptoms: Cross-sectional and longitudinal analyses.

The extent to which loneliness is a unique risk factor for depressive symptoms was determined in 2 population-based studies of middle-aged to older adults, and the possible causal influences between loneliness and depressive symptoms were examined longitudinally in the 2nd study. In Study 1, a nationally representative sample of persons aged 54 and older completed a telephone interview as part of a study of health and aging. Higher levels of loneliness were associated with more depressive symptoms, net of the effects of age, gender, ethnicity, education, income, marital status, social support, and perceived stress. In Study 2, detailed measures of loneliness, social support, perceived stress, hostility, and demographic characteristics were collected over a 3-year period from a population-based sample of adults ages 50-67 years from Cook County, Illinois. Loneliness was again associated with more depressive symptoms, net of demographic covariates, marital status, social support, hostility, and perceived stress. Latent variable growth models revealed reciprocal influences over time between loneliness and depressive symptomatology. These data suggest that loneliness and depressive symptomatology can act in a synergistic effect to diminish well-being in middle-aged and older adults. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Influence and leadership as a function of group structure.

"In a group decision situation, influence and perceived leadership were studied as a function of an individual's position in the communication network of his group. The hypotheses were advanced that, regardless of the network he is in, a group member (a) will be influenced less as his group reaches a decision, and (b) will be perceived as the group leader more often when his position in the communication network is more central… . On an overall basis, both hypotheses were confirmed… . The hypothesis concerning influence was tenable only in the case of one kind of network." (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Protecting the self from the negative consequences of risky decisions.

Three experiments tested the idea that a motive to protect self-esteem (SE) from the threat of regret can influence decision making. Threat to SE was manipulated by varying whether people expected to know the outcome of their decisions. Study 1 showed that when Ss expected feedback about their decisions, only Ss low in SE made regret-minimizing choices. Study 2 showed that when Ss did not expect to know the outcome of their decisions, SE differences in choice strategies disappeared. Study 3 manipulated expectations about feedback on chosen and unchosen alternatives and showed that the more feedback that was expected, the more likely low but not high SE Ss were to make regret-minimizing choices. These studies suggest that people base decisions not only on objective attributes of choice alternatives, but also on the damage to SE that is perceived to result from a poor-decision outcome. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Propensities and counterfactuals: The loser that almost won.

Close counterfactuals are alternatives to reality that "almost happened." A psychological analysis of close counterfactuals offers insights into the underlying representation of causal episodes and the inherent uncertainty attributed to many causal systems. The perception and representation of causal episodes is organized around possible focal outcomes, evoking a schema of causal forces competing over time. A distinction between 2 kinds of assessments of outcome probability is introduced: dispositions, based on causal information available prior to the episode, and propensities, based on event cues obtained from the episode itself. The distinction is critical to the use of almost, which requires the attribution of a strong propensity to the counterfactual outcome. The final discussion focuses on characteristic differences between psychological and philosophical approaches to the analysis of counterfactuals, causation, and probability. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

HIV disease symptom management in the context of committed relationships

Grounded theory was used to explore the meanings of HIV symptom management that occur within the context of committed relationships between gay men when at least one is infected with HIV. In-depth interviews were completed with nine couples. Mutual protection, the mechanism by which the person attempted to ward off losses perceived as within his control and to "let go" of forces outside of his control, was identified as the context for symptom management. Independent, interdependent, and dependent symptom management occurred by couples. Study findings reinforce the need for clinicians and researchers to consider the social context of symptoms.     

Yet another dark side of chivalry: Benevolent sexism undermines and hostile sexism motivates collective action for social change.

The current research tests a model for understanding how benevolent sexism undermines, whereas hostile sexism promotes, social change. Study 1 (N = 99) and Study 2 (N = 92) demonstrate that exposing women to benevolent sexism decreases their engagement in collective action, whereas exposure to hostile sexism increases it. Both effects were mediated by gender-specific system justification and perceived advantages of being a woman. In Study 2, positive and negative affect also mediated these relationships. Results from Studies 3 and 4 (N = 68 and N = 37) support the causal chain described in the mediational models tested in Studies 1 and 2. Manipulations that increased gender-specific system justification (Study 3) and perceived advantages of being a woman (Study 4) reduced intentions to participate in collective action. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

How people explain actions performed by groups and individuals.

The authors explore whether people explain intentional actions performed by groups differently from actions performed by individuals. A theoretical framework is offered that distinguishes between 2 modes of explanation: the agent's reasons (beliefs or desires in light of which the agent decided to act) and causal histories of reasons (CHRs; factors that preceded and brought about the agent's reasons). The authors develop the hypothesis that people use more CHR explanations when explaining group actions than when explaining individual actions. Study 1 demonstrates this asymmetry. Studies 2 and 3 explore 2 necessary conditions for the asymmetry: that the group be perceived as an aggregate of individual actors rather than as a jointly acting group and that explainers have general information available about the group. Discussion focuses on people's perception of groups as entities and agents. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)