Using Bargaining-Game Theory for Negotiating Concession Period for BOT-Type Contract

This paper extends the build-operate-transfer (BOT) concession model (BOTCcM) to a new method for identifying a concession period by using bargaining-game theory. Concession period is one of the most important decision variables in arranging a BOT-type contract, and there are few methodologies available for helping to determine the value of this variable. The BOTCcM presents an alternative method by which a group of concession period solutions are produced. Nevertheless, a typical weakness in using BOTCcM is that the model cannot recommend a specific time span for concessionary. This paper introduces a new method called BOT bargaining concession model (BOTBaC) to enable the identification of a specific concession period, which takes into account the bargaining behavior of the two parties concerned in engaging a BOT contract, namely, the investor and the government concerned. The application of BOTBaC is demonstrated through using an example case.     

Alternative Concession Model for Build Operate Transfer Contract Projects

This paper develops an alternative concession model for build operate transfer (BOT) infrastructure projects. The concession period is a measure for deciding when the project ownership will be transferred from the investor back to the government concerned; it also demarcates the benefits, authorities, and responsibilities between the government and private investors. Previous studies have developed various techniques and methods, mainly suggesting proper organization structure, contracting procedures, methods of project financing, and risk allocation strategies when BOT-contract projects are implemented. These works have provided effective methodologies for the development of BOT contracts. Nevertheless, it appears that little has been undertaken in studying the way to determine the concession period in a BOT contract. This paper critically reviews the principles of establishing the concession period in a BOT contract. Such a review leads to developing a quantitative model for determining a proper concession period that can protect the interests of both the government concerned and private investors. An example is given that indicates how the alternative model can be applied to determine the concession periods of BOT infrastructure projects.     

Prototype Model for Build-Operate-Transfer Risk Assessment

The build-operate-transfer (BOT) approach for project delivery, where the private sector has to finance, design, build, operate, and maintain the facility and then transfer it to the government after a specified concession period, is now gaining widespread popularity in developing countries. Compared with conventional project delivery methods, BOT sponsors expose themselves to a high risk, so that special attention must be paid to analyzing and managing risks. The identification, analysis, and allocation of various types of risks are an important aspect for the validation of privately promoted infrastructure projects. The BOT risk model presented in this paper is a prototype evaluation model that provides a logical, reliable, and consistent procedure for assessing the BOT project risk. The proposed model introduced the BOT risk index (F), which relied on the actual performance of eight main BOT risk areas. Two different modeling approaches were used in constructing this index: a new developed and an adapted Dias and Ioannou model. Not only can this index be used for BOT projects’ risk evaluation, but also for ranking them to select the lowest risk project as well.     

Political Risks: Analysis of Key Contract Clauses in China's BOT Project

The reforms introduced by the International Monetary Fund in Asia will bring about greater transparency in the economies and innovative approaches in procurement of contracts. China has taken new initiatives in build, operate, and transfer (BOT) infrastructure projects. It is, however, important to analyze and manage the unique or critical risks associated with China's BOT projects. This is especially so after new policies were introduced in late 1996 when the first state-approved BOT project, the U.S. $650,000,000 2 × 350 MW coal-fired Laibin B Power Plant (Laibin B), was awarded. These include the competitive tendering process and 100% foreign ownership of the operating company. An international survey on risk management of BOT projects in China was conducted to seek the views of practitioners. The overall objectives of the survey are (1) to identify the unique or critical risks associated with China's BOT projects; (2) to evaluate the effectiveness of measures for mitigating these risks; (3) to examine the key contract clauses used in Laibin B's concession agreement; and (4) to provide a risk management framework for investing in future BOT projects in China. This paper discusses the adequacy of key contract clauses in Laibin B's concession agreement related to the political and force majeure risks in China, from the perspective of foreign developers, lawyers, and lenders. The contract clauses discussed include changes in law, corruption, delay in approval, expropriation, and force majeure. Areas for further improvement in the clauses are suggested.     

Problems Facing Parties Involved in Build, Operate, and Transport Projects in Egypt

One of the newest financial schemes for environmental projects is the Build, Operate, and Transfer (BOT) concept, which is being used increasingly worldwide as a project delivery system by which governments obtain the infrastructure projects by private sector after a concession period free of charge. In the Egyptian environment up to now, promoters and investors have had many fears toward declared projects. This study aims to investigate the potential for implementing the BOT system in the Egyptian environment. This can be achieved by giving a clear view of BOT and of its problems, risk areas, and features, pertaining to the Egyptian environment, in order to maximize the benefits and minimize the risks as much as possible. The collected data was analyzed based on actual implementation in Egypt. This involved the following: (1) An overview of the critical success factors in order to achieve a BOT project; (2) an analysis of results obtained from questionnaires seeking to determine the possibility of occurrence of the different risk factors in the Egyptian environment, and their ranking; (3) a comparison between the questionnaire results and the actual risks from requests for the proposal of locally advertised projects; and (4) a determination of the missed critical success factors in the Egyptian environment. The main conclusion of this study is that three critical success factors are essential for the success of BOT projects in Egypt: (1) Picking the right project; (2) competitive financial proposal; and (3) special features of bid.     

Build-Operate-Transfer in Infrastructure Projects in the United States

While the infrastructure in the United States is in need of large and immediate investment, the funds provided by public agencies are not nearly sufficient to face such a challenge. Build-operate-transfer (BOT) is a delivery/financing system that can be a solution to this problem. In this system, a private sponsor finances the design, construction, maintenance, and operation of a public project for a specified concession period, at the end of which it transfers ownership to the government agency, hopefully after recouping its costs and achieving profits. A questionnaire survey of large municipalities and state departments of transportation was conducted to determine the extent to which they are using BOT in their large projects, to investigate the implementation of BOT, and the reasons why some government agencies avoid using BOT. The findings indicate that very few agencies use BOT. The reasons why most do not use BOT were reported by the respondents to be the availability of proven alternatives and enough funds, the existence of political barriers, and resistance to change both on the part of government agencies and private sponsors. When government agencies and private sponsors explore the use of BOT, they should avoid the pitfalls perceived by the respondents in this study.     

Selecting BOT/PPP Infrastructure Projects for Government Guarantee Portfolio under Conditions of Budget and Risk in the Indonesian Context

Guarantee provision in privately financed infrastructure projects implemented as build-operate-transfer/public-private-partnership (BOT/PPP) arrangements is not uncommon in many countries, and Indonesia is no exception. But, given that the government budget is, in most if not all cases, not unlimited, there must be a selection of BOT/PPP projects posing proposals for seeking government guarantees. This paper presents a project selection methodology under the chance-constrained goal-programming framework in the context of the Indonesian BOT/PPP infrastructure industry. The ultimate objective of the selection is to result in a portfolio of guaranteed projects that brings maximum welfare gain to the economy as a whole, maximum total net change in financial net present value but, at the same time, puts the government at the lowest fiscal risk for a given budget constraint. The proposed methodology allows the government to examine relationships among the expected total payment, budget-at-risk allocated, and a desired confidence interval of actual payment not exceeding the budget-at-risk. The government can also compare two or more alternative scenarios and choose the optimal one that delivers the highest value for the money. To illustrate the model application, without sacrificing the generality of the proposed methodology, a much-simplified hypothetical case is presented, examined, and discussed.     

Optimal Capital Structure Model for BOT Power Projects in Turkey

Interest in the Build/Operate/Transfer (BOT) scheme for infrastructure projects has been growing rapidly, and numerous projects have been implemented around the world. Through BOT projects, a government reallocates the risks and rewards in the development of large infrastructure projects to the private sector. One key aspect to the successful implementation of the BOT concept in any country is the raising of finance by project sponsors. Financial engineering techniques and capital structuring skills are required to find the proper mix of debt and equity and to achieve successful financing for the proposed project. The objective of this paper is to present a simplified model to determine the optimum equity level for decisionmakers at the evaluation stage of a BOT hydroelectric power plant (HEPP) project in Turkey, which takes place immediately after the completion of the feasibility study. The resulting model is the combination of a financial model and a linear programming model that incorporates an objective of maximizing the return of the project from the equity holder’s point of view. To show versatility of the model, a real case study is conducted. Thus, this research is concerned with the determination of an equity funding level in BOT project finance. There are different equity levels found in BOT HEPP projects, and there is a need for such a model to determine optimal capital structure, which would assist the project sponsors to ensure that the equity level necessary for optimal capital structure is available prior to the project implementation stage.     

Hong Kong Experience in Managing BOT Projects

BOT (build-operate-transfer) project delivery systems have provided effective routes to mobilize private sector funds, innovative technologies, management skills, and operational efficiencies for public infrastructure development. However, many countries and regions lack BOT expertise and experience. Hong Kong, one of the pioneers in optimizing private sector participation in infrastructure development, has developed five large tunnels on the BOT basis since the late 1960s, the first of which recently completed its franchise period and entered into the posttransfer operation phase. Experience and lessons gained in formulating and managing BOT projects over more than 30 years have enabled the Hong Kong government to develop a well-structured BOT framework. This proven BOT model is useful for countries and regions lacking such expertise and still in need of BOT-based infrastructure. This paper discusses key development aspects of the five BOT tunnels, including feasibility study; tender selection; legal, financial, and land issues; design and construction; operation and maintenance; transfer; and posttransfer management.     

Case Study: Izmit Domestic and Industrial Water Supply Build–Operate–Transfer Project

The “build, operate, and transfer model” (BOT) is a financing model, which is used in many developing countries to finance new infrastructure projects with private sector participation. The BOT method foresees the financing, designing, building, operating, and managing of the facility by the private sector and then its transfer free of charge, to the owner after a predetermined concession period. For interested parties, the history of BOT laws and projects in Turkey is presented as an Appendix. In this study, the Izmit Domestic and Industrial Water Supply Project, the biggest privately financed water supply project procured under the BOT model in the world at the time and the first in Turkey will be introduced and the problems that arose during the implementation of the project, namely, the scope of the project, equity debt ratio, return on equity, principles of accounting, coordination of State departments, land access, determination of the optimum operation period, and the sale price of the water, will be presented and suggestions will be given on how to deal with these problems.     

Critical Success Factors for Transfer-Operate-Transfer Urban Water Supply Projects in China

Over the years, build-operate-transfer (BOT) has continuously attracted research interests. Many studies on BOT have been carried out. Variations of BOT such as build-own-operate-transfer and build-own-operate have also been reported in some relevant publications. However, few investigations thus far have been conducted for transfer-operate-transfer (TOT). Therefore, there is a knowledge gap in this particular field. TOT is a new model that is suitable for existing infrastructure and public utility projects formerly funded by the governments and currently operated by state-owned enterprises. It refers to the transfer of a running public project to a foreign business or domestic private entity. Based on four case studies carried out in the Chinese water supply industry, this paper examines why there is an increasing need for TOT projects and identifies the distinctive features of TOT practice in China. This is followed by an introduction of a framework of critical success factors (CSFs) for TOT projects. The most important factors include project profitability, asset quality, fair risk allocation, competitive tendering, internal coordination within government, employment of professional advisors, corporate governance, and government supervision. The identification of CSFs provides a useful guidance to project parties planning to participate in TOT practice.     

Win–Win Concession Period Determination Methodology

In infrastructure development through public-private partnerships (PPPs), governments worldwide often preset the concession period to a fixed length and then invite the private sector to bid on other aspects of the project. This practice has potential economic, financial, and social problems as shown in a case study of Hong Kong tunnel projects. To overcome these problems, this paper has proposed a win–win concession period determination methodology, in which PPPs are addressed as a principal-agent maximization problem. Both deterministic and simulation-based methods are provided to determine the concession period, with detailed step-by-step procedures. These methods take into consideration the financial characteristics of PPPs and the construction and operation requirements. In particular, the simulation-based approach combines the critical path method and Monte Carlo simulation technique in an effort to quantify construction and market risks for informed decision making. Furthermore, some issues related to the proposed methodology also have been discussed. These issues include (1) factors in determining a reasonable rate of return to the concessionaire’s equity investment; (2) advantages and disadvantages of rate of return regulation; (3) concession period as a tender evaluation criterion; (4) efficiency check of the concessionaire’s cost performance; (5) workable pricing mechanism; and (6) a practical approach to establishing statistical construction cost/duration distributions.     

Factors Influencing Building Contractors’ Pricing for Time-Related Risks in Tenders

The contractors’ pricing for contract risks in tenders determines how much the employers have to pay for the risk transfer. Therefore, understanding the factors influencing the contractors’ pricing for contract risks is crucial for employers to optimize the cost effectiveness of risk allocation in contracts. This study investigates the factors that contractors perceive to be important when they are pricing “time-related” contract risks. A questionnaire survey was designed for collecting data from building contractors currently operating in Hong Kong. Contractors were not only required to rate the importance of individual factors, but also to state the cost implications when compared with normal pricing in the absence of the concerned factor. The findings reveal that a single factor may have two-sided implications (both inflating and deflating the prices) for which they can be in unequal scales. These scales vary according to the contractor size and the reasons of the differences are investigated. The findings also assist employers in formulating a cost effective contract strategy by equipping them with the necessary knowledge.     

Concessionaire Selection for Build-Operate-Transfer Tunnel Projects in Hong Kong

A significant realignment of risks between project participants is a fundamental facet of the new procurement paradigm of BOT (build-operate-transfer). A BOT concessionaire assumes far more and deeper risks than a contractor. One critical contributor to the success of a BOT project is the selection of an appropriate concessionaire who has the necessary capacity to provide the best overall deal throughout the build-operate-transfer process. However, various BOT-type procurement protocols are not yet proven and are still being tried and tested. Many countries are at the lower ends of their learning curves. Therefore, there is a need to benchmark the best practices that have been emerging. The Hong Kong government has developed a well-structured concessionaire selection framework supported by the Kepner-Tregoe decision analysis technique. This paper analyzes and draws experiences and lessons from this concessionaire selection practice. Current concessionaire selection practices worldwide are also discussed with a view to improve the procurement process of regions lacking in such experiences or expertise.     

Interface Management for China’s Build–Operate–Transfer Projects

Stringent pressure on public finances has made China’s infrastructure development a “bottleneck” in its bid to sustain rapid economic growth. As a result, many modalities have been developed to utilize the resources and skills of the private sector to supply essential infrastructure products and services, as well as to improve the efficiency in government procurement of the same. The build–operate–transfer (BOT) approach is an important example of these innovative modalities. The BOT approach in China is still in its infancy; many pitfalls await the unwary and obstacles impede more extensive application of this modality. The pitfalls are attributable to the complexities in the BOT approach, particularly when attempted in China’s transition economy emerging from decades of central planning to become one that is more market driven and globally integrated. This paper proposes two systems concepts to help manage this complexity: (1) a process modeling approach that maps key functions, parameters and interfaces in the project delivery process, and (2) the use of interface management involving specific measures that have contributed towards project success in Chinese BOT projects. The process modeling approach has led to the development of China’s BOT generic process model (CBGPM). Expert opinion was elicited on the criticality of the interfaces identified in CBGPM as well as the effectiveness of selected interface management measures. Finally, an interface management framework consisting of five key steps is suggested for China’s BOT projects.     

Alternate Financing Strategies for Build-Operate-Transfer Projects

This paper contains a study of build-operate-transfer (BOT) project financing strategies from the perspective of project sponsors. The financing strategy for a BOT project includes the selection of the appropriate mix of equity and debt financing, and the identification of appropriate financing sources. Project sponsors typically wish to minimize their financing costs to ensure their tenders are competitive. Thirteen transportation and power-generation BOT projects in North America and Asia were analyzed. Important considerations and financing strategies were identified and examined. The findings suggest that project risks, project conditions, and availability of financing are the major considerations in selecting a financing strategy. The project risks that were determined to be most significant in financing strategy selection were political, financial, and market risks. Based on the study findings, a decision model was developed that can be used by BOT project sponsors in selecting appropriate financing strategies.     

Evaluation and Management of Political Risks in China's BOT Projects

The potential slowdown of the economic growth in China has led the government to increase spending in basic infrastructure such as roads, ports, and power generation facilities. There are opportunities in the infrastructure sectors for foreign investors. It is important however to identify and manage the unique or critical risks associated with investments in China's infrastructure projects. Such issues have received special attention with the closure of the Guangdong International Trust and Investment Corporation in 1998 and the subsequent confusion over government support and guarantees. This paper is based on the findings from an international survey on risk management of build-operate-transfer (BOT) projects in developing countries, with emphasis on infrastructure projects in China. It discusses specifically the criticality of the political and force majeure risks. Based on the survey, the following critical risks, in descending order of criticality, are identified: Chinese Parties' reliability and creditworthiness, change in law, force majeure, delay in approval, expropriation, and corruption. The measures for mitigating each of these risks are also discussed.     

BOT Financial Model: Taiwan High Speed Rail Case

Owing to the high cost of large construction projects in recent years, build-operate-transfer (BOT) contracts are getting popular in the global construction market, especially in infrastructure construction. With BOT, the government is able to put projects on track without concerning itself too much about raising funds. On the other hand, due to the fact that the concessionaire who is awarded the project is responsible for the operation of the end facility for a certain period of time, reliable quality of the facility and effective operation could be expected. This paper introduces the financial model used by the Bureau of Taiwan High Speed Rail for its BOT projects. The parameters and variables of the model are presented. Its basic assumptions, input data, cost requirement, self-financing ability analysis, financial statements, and indices are discussed. The scenario analysis is used to highlight the application of the model.     

Relationship between Organizational Sizes and Contractors’ Risk Pricing Behaviors for Weather Risk under Different Project Values and Durations

A problem that always annoys building employers and their consultants when drafting building contracts is whether it is more cost efficient to retain certain risks with themselves or to transfer the same to contractors, and it has long been a difficulty to accurately estimate the cost for transferring risks to the other contract party. It is a very common market practice to remove contractors’ entitlement to extension of time due to inclement weather, and in view of the significant impacts that inclement weather posed on construction progress, it would be helpful to assess the associated costs for such risk allocation exercises in order to ensure that it is a cost-effective transaction. The costs for these potential weather-caused delays are priced by contractors in their returned tenders. This risk-pricing behavior is affected by the contractor’s risk perception and risk attitude. However, merely working out contractors’ risk perception and risk attitude patterns is inadequate, as they may vary in accordance with different organizational sizes and project backgrounds. Therefore, further studies should be carried out on the implications of project information, such as project value and contract period, on different-sized contractors’ risk behaviors. In this research, a questionnaire survey was conducted to investigate the weather-risk-pricing behavioral patterns of various-sized contractors under different given project scenarios. The survey revealed that the impacts of project value and contract period (and, thus, the intensity of work and scale of exposure to weather risk) were significant on contractors’ risk behaviors, and these impacts varied in accordance with different organizational sizes. The medium-sized contractors’ pricing behaviors were rather constant under different project values and contract periods, while both small and large contractors behaved differently when the intensity of work and scale of risk exposure varied. Despite the fact that contractors of various sizes behaved differently in some given scenarios, the number of days of delaying cost allowed by them in returned tenders were generally less than the actual number of days of inclement weather affecting work.     

BOT Viability Model for Large-Scale Infrastructure Projects

The key to a successful implementation of a build-operate-transfer (BOT) infrastructure project is in-depth analysis of all aspects related to economic, environmental, social, political, legal, and financial feasibility of the project. For these reasons, the analysis of the project feasibility decision needs a technique to include the qualitative decision factors that have a strong impact on the project. This paper aims to introduce a decomposed evaluation model developed to assess the most common significant decision factors that strongly affect the feasibility of BOT projects. The paper describes the viability decision factors that were identified and screened with the assistance of a group of industry experts. This analysis yielded 21 significant factors that would have a certain impact on the feasibility of any BOT project. These factors were classified into three relative categories forming the structure of the suggested project viability model. This model presents a new approach, based on the analytical hierarchy process technique, to evaluate the relationships between decision factors related to project feasibility determination. The new approach has been validated by information obtained from three case studies of BOT projects. The proposed approach to project feasibility evaluation aims to increase the decision maker’s ability to determine the factors contributing the most to the viability to the BOT project at hand.