The Interpersonal Effects of Emotions in Negotiations: A Motivated Information Processing Approach.

Three experiments tested a motivated information processing account of the interpersonal effects of anger and happiness in negotiations. In Experiment 1, participants received information about the opponent's emotion (anger, happiness, or none) in a computer-mediated negotiation. As predicted, they conceded more to an angry opponent than to a happy one (controls falling in between), but only when they had a low (rather than a high) need for cognitive closure. Experiment 2 similarly showed that participants were only affected by the other's emotion under low rather than high time pressure, because time pressure reduced their degree of information processing. Finally, Experiment 3 showed that negotiators were only influenced by their opponent's emotion if they had low (rather than high) power. These results support the motivated information processing model by showing that negotiators are only affected by their opponent's emotions if they are motivated to consider them. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Fast similarities: Efficiency advantages of similarity-focused comparisons.

People constantly have to make efficient use of their limited cognitive resources. Recently, T. Mussweiler and K. Epstude (2009) demonstrated that comparative thinking simplifies information processing and increases the efficiency of judgment. However, there are different types of comparative thinking. While comparing 2 entities, people may focus on either similarities or dissimilarities between target and standard. The authors propose that these 2 comparative thinking styles differ in their efficiency. Specifically, the authors hypothesize that comparisons with a focus on similarities lead to more focused information processing and faster judgments than comparisons with a dissimilarity focus. In line with these hypotheses, the authors demonstrate that participants are indeed faster at judging the similarity of 2 stimuli (Study 1) and that they search for less target information in a comparative judgment task (Study 2) if they focus on similarities rather than dissimilarities. Focusing on similarities thus appears to be the more efficient comparative thinking style. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

The possessive self as a barrier to conflict resolution: Effects of mere ownership, process accountability, and self-concept clarity on competitive cognitions and behavior.

The authors propose that people have difficulty managing conflict because they quickly develop ownership of arguments and positions they use in the dispute, that these arguments and positions become part of their (extended) self-concept, and that any opposition or counterargumentation therefore becomes an ego-threat. Four studies reveal that individuals value arguments and beliefs more when these are associated with the self and that anticipated or real opposition triggers ego-defensive cognition and behavior, including competitive communication, retaliatory responses, negative perceptions of the partner, and attitude polarization. These effects were weaker when epistemic needs were raised through process accountability or when individuals had high rather than low self-concept clarity. The authors conclude that because people develop ownership of arguments and make these part of their self-concept, conflict is difficult to manage and bound to escalate. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Toward an explanation of cultural differences in in-group favoritism: The role of individual versus collective primacy.

Previous research conducted on a Western sample has shown that people are less apt to exhibit in-group favoritism when they perform well individually while their in-group performs poorly. The authors evaluated whether this finding would be moderated by the cultural dimension of individual–collective primacy, which refers to whether people give more weight to their personal interests rather than their in-group's interests when forced to choose between the two. The authors hypothesized that relative to their counterparts from the United States, participants from the People's Republic of China would have more of a collective-primacy orientation and therefore would exhibit more in-group favoritism when they performed well individually while their in-group performed poorly. The results supported the hypothesis. Implications for the literatures on in-group favoritism and cross-cultural differences are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Cues to deception.

Do people behave differently when they are lying compared with when they are telling the truth? The combined results of 1,338 estimates of 158 cues to deception are reported. Results show that in some ways, liars are less forthcoming than truth tellers, and they tell less compelling tales. They also make a more negative impression and are more tense. Their stories include fewer ordinary imperfections and unusual contents. However, many behaviors showed no discernible links, or only weak links, to deceit. Cues to deception were more pronounced when people were motivated to succeed, especially when the motivations were identity relevant rather than monetary or material. Cues to deception were also stronger when lies were about transgressions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Seeking security or growth: A regulatory focus perspective on motivations in romantic relationships.

Using a multimethod approach, we examined how regulatory focus shapes people's perceptual, behavioral, and emotional responses in different situations in romantic relationships. We first examined how chronic regulatory focus affects romantic partners' support perceptions and problem-solving behaviors while they were engaged in a conflict resolution discussion (Study 1). Next, we experimentally manipulated regulatory focus and tested its effects on partner perceptions when individuals recalled a prior conflict resolution discussion (Study 2). We then examined how chronic regulatory focus influences individuals' emotional responses to hypothetical relationship events (Study 3) and identified specific partner behaviors to which people should respond with regulatory goal-congruent emotions (Study 4). Strongly prevention-focused people perceived their partners as more distancing and less supportive during conflict (Studies 1 and 2), approached conflict resolution by discussing the details related to the conflict (Study 1), and experienced a negative relationship outcome with more agitation (Study 3). Strongly promotion-focused people perceived their partners as more supportive and less distancing (Studies 1 and 2), displayed more creative conflict resolution behavior (Study 1), and experienced a negative relationship outcome with more sadness and a favorable outcome with more positive emotions (Study 3). In Study 4, recalling irresponsible and responsible partner behaviors was associated with experiencing more prevention-focused emotions, whereas recalling affectionate and neglectful partner behaviors was associated with more promotion-focused emotions. The findings show that regulatory focus and approach–avoidance motivations influence certain interpersonal processes in similar ways, but regulatory focus theory also generates novel predictions on which approach–avoidance models are silent. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Error and bias in comparative judgment: On being both better and worse than we think we are.

People believe that they are better than others on easy tasks and worse than others on difficult tasks. In previous attempts to explain these better-than-average and worse-than-average effects, researchers have invoked bias and motivation as causes. In this article, the authors develop a more parsimonious account, the differential information explanation, in which it is assumed only that people typically have better information about themselves than they do about others. When one's own performance is exceptional (either good or bad), it is often reasonable to assume others' will be less so. Consequently, people estimate the performance of others as less extreme (more regressive) than their own. The result is that people believe they are above average on easy tasks and below average on difficult tasks. These effects are exacerbated when people have accurate information about their performances, increasing the natural discrepancy between knowledge of the self and knowledge of others. The effects are attenuated when people obtain accurate information about the performances of others. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Sequential modulations of interference evoked by processing task-irrelevant stimulus features.

Compatibility level repetition benefits in interference paradigms have been taken to reflect enhanced processing selectivity in response to cognitive conflict elicited by a task-irrelevant stimulus feature. The authors demonstrate such sequential effects in the Simon task which (a) occur independent of previous behavioral conflict effects and (b) cannot be accounted for by selectivity enhancement. Furthermore, when presenting more than one type of irrelevant stimulus features, compatibility level repetition effects occurred in a type-specific manner. The results do not support the notion that cognitive conflict results in enhanced processing selectivity and favor a feature integration account. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Social and cognitive strategies for coping with accountability: Conformity, complexity, and bolstering.

This experiment tested predictions derived from a social contingency model of judgment and choice that identifies 3 distinctive strategies that people rely on in dealing with demands for accountability from important interpersonal or institutional audiences. The model predicts that (a) when people know the views of the audience and are unconstrained by past commitments, they will rely on the low-effect acceptability heuristic and simply shift their views toward those of the prospective audience, (b) when people do not know the views of the audience and are unconstrained by past commitments, they will be motivated to think in relatively flexible, multidimensional ways (preemptive self-criticism), and (c) when people are accountable for positions to which they feel committed, they will devote the majority of their mental effort to justifying those positions (defensive bolstering). The experiment yielded results supportive of these 3 predictions. The study revealed some evidence of individual differences in social and cognitive strategies for coping with accountability. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The case for motivated reasoning.

It is proposed that motivation may affect reasoning through reliance on a biased set of cognitive processes—that is, strategies for accessing, constructing, and evaluating beliefs. The motivation to be accurate enhances use of those beliefs and strategies that are considered most appropriate, whereas the motivation to arrive at particular conclusions enhances use of those that are considered most likely to yield the desired conclusion. There is considerable evidence that people are more likely to arrive at conclusions that they want to arrive at, but their ability to do so is constrained by their ability to construct seemingly reasonable justifications for these conclusions. These ideas can account for a wide variety of research concerned with motivated reasoning. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Collective self-esteem as a moderator of the frog-pond effect in reactions to performance feedback.

Individuals who perform well within an unsuccessful group have more favorable reactions than equally capable individuals who perform poorly within a successful group. This frog-pond effect appears to occur because people focus on their relative performance standing within their group rather than on their group's overall performance level. It was hypothesized that this effect would be attenuated among people who value their social groups highly because they should be more likely than their counterparts to take into account their group's performance level when evaluating themselves. Four studies supported this reasoning. The frog-pond effect was strongest among individuals with lower collective self-esteem, an individualistic cultural heritage, or a weaker bond toward a particular social group. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Individual differences in the regulation of intergroup bias: The role of conflict monitoring and neural signals for control.

[Correction Notice: An erratum for this article was reported in Vol 94(3) of Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (see record 2008-01768-011). In this article, there was an error in Figure 4. The corrected figure is provided in this erratum.] Low-prejudice people vary considerably in their ability to regulate intergroup responses. The authors hypothesized that this variability arises from a neural mechanism for monitoring conflict between automatic race-biased tendencies and egalitarian intentions. In Study 1, they found that low-prejudice participants whose nonprejudiced responses are motivated by internal (but not external) factors exhibited better control on a stereotype-inhibition task than did participants motivated by a combination of internal and external factors. This difference was associated with greater conflict-monitoring activity, measured by event-related potentials, when responses required stereotype inhibition. Study 2 demonstrated that group differences were specific to response control in the domain of prejudice. Results indicate that conflict monitoring, a preconscious component of response control, accounts for variability in intergroup bias among low-prejudice participants. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Self-verification and depression among youth psychiatric inpatients.

According to self-verification theory (e.g., W.B. Swann, 1983), people are motivated to preserve stable self-concepts by seeking self-confirming interpersonal responses, even if the responses are negative. In the current study of 72 youth psychiatric inpatients (36 boys; 36 girls; ages 7-17, M?=?13.18; SD?=?2.59), the authors provide the 1st test of self-verification theory among a youth sample. Participants completed self-report questionnaires on depression, self-esteem, anxiety, negative and positive affect, and interest in negative feedback from others. The authors made chart diagnoses available, and they collected peer rejection ratings. Consistent with hypotheses, the authors found that interest in negative feedback was associated with depression, was predictive of peer rejection (but only within relatively longer peer relationships), was more highly related to cognitive than emotional aspects of depression, and was specifically associated with depression, rather than being generally associated with emotional distress. The authors discuss implications for self-verification theory and for the phenomenology of youth depression. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Prior knowledge and the desire for information.

Conducted 2 experiments to test D. Berlyne's theory that the desire for knowledge increases with the degree of conceptual conflict, and that new information serves to reduce the conflict. In Exp. I, 38 6th graders rated the extent to which they wished to explore 155 items of information. They also indicated their knowledge of these items. It was found that Ss wished mostly to experience those things about which they had a moderate amount of prior knowledge. In Exp. II, 43 11th graders indicated the extent of agreement with 24 controversial issues, and were then offered further information on each of the items. When Ss had no set attitude towards statements, they were less likely to reject additional information and more likely to accept the opportunity to receive general rather than biased information. Both studies support the authors' hypothesis that new information is sought when there is some prior knowledge and when conceptual conflict exists. (French summary) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Biased predecision processing.

Decision makers conduct biased predecision processing when they restructure their mental representation of the decision environment to favor one alternative before making their choice. The question of whether biased predecision processing occurs has been controversial since L. Festinger (1957) maintained that it does not occur. The author reviews relevant research in sections on theories of cognitive dissonance, decision conflict, choice certainty, action control, action phases, dominance structuring, differentiation and consolidation, constructive processing, motivated masoning, and groupthink. Some studies did not find evidence of biased predecision processing, but many did. In the Discussion section, the moderators are summarized and used to assess the theories. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Influence and adjustment goals: Sources of cultural differences in ideal affect.

Previous studies have found that in American culture high-arousal positive states (HAP) such as excitement are valued more and low-arousal positive states (LAP) such as calm are valued less than they are in Chinese culture. What specific factors account for these differences? The authors predicted that when people and cultures aimed to influence others (i.e., assert personal needs and change others' behaviors to meet those needs), they would value HAP more and LAP less than when they aimed to adjust to others (i.e., suppress personal needs and change their own behaviors to meet others' needs). They test these predictions in 1 survey and 3 experimental studies. The findings suggest that within and across American and Chinese contexts, differences in ideal affect are due to specific interpersonal goals. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Escaping affect: How motivated emotion regulation creates insensitivity to mass suffering.

As the number of people in need of help increases, the degree of compassion people feel for them ironically tends to decrease. This phenomenon is termed the collapse of compassion. Some researchers have suggested that this effect happens because emotions are not triggered by aggregates. We provide evidence for an alternative account. People expect the needs of large groups to be potentially overwhelming, and, as a result, they engage in emotion regulation to prevent themselves from experiencing overwhelming levels of emotion. Because groups are more likely than individuals to elicit emotion regulation, people feel less for groups than for individuals. In Experiment 1, participants displayed the collapse of compassion only when they expected to be asked to donate money to the victims. This suggests that the effect is motivated by self-interest. Experiment 2 showed that the collapse of compassion emerged only for people who were skilled at emotion regulation. In Experiment 3, we manipulated emotion regulation. Participants who were told to down-regulate their emotions showed the collapse of compassion, but participants who were told to experience their emotions did not. We examined the time course of these effects using a dynamic rating to measure affective responses in real time. The time course data suggested that participants regulate emotion toward groups proactively, by preventing themselves from ever experiencing as much emotion toward groups as toward individuals. These findings provide initial evidence that motivated emotion regulation drives insensitivity to mass suffering. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Motivated information processing, strategic choice, and the quality of negotiated agreement.

The authors tested a motivated information-processing model of negotiation: To reach high joint outcomes, negotiators need a deep understanding of the task, which requires them to exchange information and to process new information systematically. All this depends on social motivation, epistemic motivation (EM), and their interaction. Indeed, when EM (manipulated by holding negotiators process accountability or not) was high rather than low and prosocial rather than proself, negotiators recall more cooperative than competitive tactics (Experiment 1), had more trust, and reached higher joint outcomes (Experiment 2). Experiment 3 showed that under high EM, negotiators who received cooperative, rather than competitive, tactics reached higher joint outcomes because they engaged in more problem solving. Under low EM, negotiators made more concessions and reached low joint outcomes. Implications for negotiation theory and for future work in this area are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Social values and social conflict in creative problem solving and categorization.

Participants were led to expect either cooperation or conflict, and then performed K. Duncker's (1945) functional-fixedness task (Experiment 1) or E. Rosch's (1975) categorization task (Experiment 2). Those who expected cooperation, compared with those who expected conflict, were more likely to solve Duncker's task and used categories more inclusively, that is, rated low-prototypic exemplars of a category as better members of the category. In Experiment 3, the direct experience of cooperation and conflict had the same effect on categorization. In Experiment 4, participants were classified as having cooperative, competitive, or individualistic social values, and were led to expect either cooperation, conflict, or neither in a control. In the control, cooperators used categories more inclusively than competitors or individualists. Competitors used categories least inclusively in the conflict condition; in the cooperation condition, they used categories most inclusively. These results are interpreted in terms of the possible mediating role of cognitive organization in individual and intergroup conflict resolution. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Expressing anger in conflict: When it helps and when it hurts.

Do expressions of anger in conflict elicit competition or cooperation? To reconcile inconsistent results obtained in previous research, the authors developed and tested a dual-process model that proposes that power and the appropriateness of the expressions of anger jointly determine whether an individual facing an angry antagonist competes by demanding value or cooperates by conceding value. In a scenario study and a computer-mediated negotiation simulation, (a) participants with lower power claimed less value from an angry adversary than from a nonemotional one, regardless of the appropriateness of the expressions of anger, and (b) participants with higher power demanded more value when the adversary's expressions of anger were inappropriate than when they were appropriate or when the adversary was nonemotional. The theoretical and practical implications of the model and findings are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)