A quantitative risk assessment of hydrogen fuel cell forklifts

With the increasing deployment of hydrogen fuel cell forklifts, it is essential to understand the risks of incidents involving these systems. A quantitative risk assessment (QRA) study was conducted to determine the potential hydrogen release scenarios, probabilities, and consequences in fuel cell forklift operations. QRA modeling tools, such as fault tree analysis (FTA) and event sequence diagrams (ESD), were used together with hydrogen systems data. This work provides insights into the fatality risk from a hydrogen fuel cell forklift and the reliability of its design and components. The analysis shows that the expected fatal accident rate of a hydrogen forklift is considerably higher than current fatal injury rates observed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics for industrial truck operators and material handling occupations. Nevertheless, the average individual risk posed to forklift drivers was found to be likely tolerable based on current risks accepted by industrial truck operators. Jet fires are found to dominate the system's risk, however, the risk of explosions is also considerable. An importance measures analysis shows that these risks could be mitigated by improving the design and reliability of pressure relief devices, as well as other components prone to leak such as filters and check valves. We also identify sources of uncertainty and conservatisms in the QRA process that can guide future research in hydrogen systems. These results provide powerful insight into improvements in the design of fuel cell forklifts to reduce risk and enable the safe deployment of this key technology for a decarbonized future.     

A quantitative risk assessment of a domestic property connected to a hydrogen distribution network

The increased reliance on natural gas for heating worldwide makes the search for carbon-free alternatives imperative, especially if international decarbonisation targets are to be met. Hydrogen does not release carbon dioxide (CO₂) at the point of use which makes it an appealing candidate to decarbonise domestic heating. Hydrogen can be produced from either 1) the electrolysis of water with no associated carbon emissions, or 2) from methane reformation (using steam) which produces CO₂, but which is easily captured and storable during production. Hydrogen could be transported to the end-user via gas distribution networks similar to, and adapted from, those in use today. This would reduce both installation costs and end-user disruption. However, before hydrogen can provide domestic heat, it is necessary to assess the ‘risk’ associated with its distribution in direct comparison to natural gas. Here we develop a comprehensive and multi-faceted quantitative risk assessment tool to assess the difference in ‘risk’ between current natural gas distribution networks, and the potential conversion to a hydrogen based system. The approach uses novel experimental and modelling work, scientific literature, and findings from historic large scale testing programmes. As a case study, the risk assessment tool is applied to the newly proposed H100 demonstration (100% hydrogen network) project. The assessment includes the comparative risk of gas releases both upstream and downstream of the domestic gas meter. This research finds that the risk associated with the proposed H100 network (based on its current design) is lower than that of the existing natural gas network by a factor 0.88.     

Risk assessment methodology for onboard hydrogen storage

A quantitative risk assessment of onboard hydrogen-powered vehicle storage, exposed to a fire, is performed. The risk is defined twofold as a cost of human life per vehicle fire, and annual fatality rate per vehicle. The increase of fire resistance rating of the storage tank is demonstrated to drastically reduce the risk to acceptable level. Hazard distances are calculated by validated engineering tools for blast wave and fireball, which follow catastrophic tank rupture in a fire, act in all directions and have larger hazard distances compared to jet fire. The fatality cash value, probabilities of vehicle fire and failure of thermally activated pressure relief device are taken from published sources. A vulnerability probit function is employed to calculate probability of emergency operations' failure to control fire and prevent tank rupture. The risk is presented as a function of fire resistance rating of onboard storage.     

Comparative risk assessment of liquefied and gaseous hydrogen refueling stations

Several countries are incentivizing the use of hydrogen (H₂) fuel cell vehicles, thereby increasing the number of H₂ refueling stations (HRSs), particularly in urban areas with high population density and heavy traffic. Therefore, it is necessary to assess the risks of gaseous H₂ refueling stations (GHRSs) and liquefied H₂ refueling stations (LHRSs). This study aimed to perform a quantitative risk assessment (QRA) of GHRSs and LHRSs. A comparative study is performed to enhance the decision-making of engineers in setting safety goals and defining design options. A systematic QRA approach is proposed to estimate the likelihood and consequences of hazardous events occurring at HRSs. Consequence analysis results indicate that catastrophic ruptures of tube trailer and liquid hydrogen storage tanks are the worst accidents, as they cause fires and explosions. An assessment of individual and societal risks indicates that LHRSs present a lower hazard risk than GHRSs. However, both station types require additional safety barrier devices for risk reduction, such as detachable couplings, hydrogen detection sensors, and automatic and manual emergency shutdown systems, which are required for risk acceptance.     

Quantitative risk assessment on 2010 Expo hydrogen station

This paper presents a QRA study on a gaseous hydrogen refueling station of 2010 World Expo. Risks to station personnel, to refueling customers and to third parties are evaluated respectively. Uncertainties that intervene in the risk analysis are also discussed. The results show that the leaks from compressors and dispensers are the main risk contributors to first party and second party risks of the Expo station, indicating that risk mitigation measures should in the first place be implemented on compressors and dispensers. For the sake of the safety of station personnel, customers, and people outside the Expo station, additional safety barrier systems must be implemented on compressors and dispensers to prevent continuous release of hydrogen from happening. With appropriate mitigation measures on compressors and dispensers, risks to all three parties of the Expo station can be reduced to the value lower than the risk acceptance criteria.     

Data requirements for improving the Quantitative Risk Assessment of liquid hydrogen storage systems

Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) supports the development of risk-informed safety codes and standards which are employed to enable the safe deployment of hydrogen technologies essential to decarbonize the transportation sector. System reliability data is a necessary input for rigorous QRA. The lack of reliability data for bulk liquid hydrogen (LH₂) storage systems located on site at fueling stations limits the use of QRAs. In turn, this hinders the ability to develop the necessary safety codes and standards that enable worldwide deployment of these stations. Through a QRA-based analysis of a LH₂ storage system, this work focuses on identifying relevant scenario and probability data currently available and ascertaining future data collection requirements regarding risks specific to liquid hydrogen releases. The work developed consists of the analysis of a general bulk LH₂ storage system design located at a hydrogen fueling station. Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) and traditional QRA modeling tools such as Event Sequence Diagrams (ESD) and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) are employed to identify, rank, and model risk scenarios related to the release of LH₂. Based on this analysis, scenario and reliability data needs to add LH₂-related components to QRA are identified with the purpose of improving the future safety and risk assessment of these systems.     

Safety investigation of hydrogen energy storage systems using quantitative risk assessment

Hydrogen energy storage systems are expected to play a key role in supporting the net zero energy transition. Although the storage and utilization of hydrogen poses critical risks, current hydrogen energy storage system designs are primarily driven by cost considerations to achieve economic benefits without safety considerations. This paper aims to study the safety of hydrogen storage systems by conducting a quantitative risk assessment to investigate the effect of hydrogen storage systems design parameters such as storage size, mass flow rate, storage pressure and storage temperature. To this end, the quantitative risk assessment procedure, which includes data collection and hazard identification, frequency analysis, consequence analysis and risk analysis, was carried out for the hydrogen storage system presented in a previous study [1]. In the consequence analysis, the Millers model and TNO multi-energy were used to model the jet fire and explosion hazards, respectively. The results show that the storage capacity and pressure have the greatest influence on the hydrogen storage system risk assessment. More significantly, the design parameters may affect the acceptance criteria based on the gaseous hydrogen standard. In certain cases of large storage volume or high storage pressure, risk mitigation measures must be implemented since the risk of the hydrogen storage system is unacceptable in accordance with ISO 19880-1. The study highlights the significance of risk analysis conduction and the importance of considering costs associated with risk mitigation in the design of hydrogen storage system.     

The quantitative risk assessment of a hydrogen generation unit

The safety of hydrogen generation process is a major concern. This paper discusses the quantitative analyzes of the risk imposed on neighborhood from the operation of a hydrogen generator using natural gas reforming process. For this purpose, after hazard identification, the frequency of scenarios was estimated using generic data. Quantitative risk assessment was applied for consequence modeling and risk estimation. The results revealed that, jet fire caused by a full bore rupture in Desulphurization reactor has the highest fatality (26person) and affects the largest area of 5102 m². The lethality radius, maximum radiation and safe distance of this incident were 140 m, 370 kW/m² and 225 m respectively. A full bore rupture in Reformer can lead to the most dangerous flash fire. In this incident the concentration of released material in LFL zone (area of 1483.17 m²) and ½ LEL zone (area of 1970.74 m²) were 61,125 ppm and 40,000 ppm respectively. QRA is a credible method to assess the risks of hydrogen generation process.     

Risk assessment for liquid hydrogen fueling stations

In recent years, consumers calling for the protection of the environment on a regional and global scale are demanding the use of vehicles that do not emit harmful exhaust. It is anticipated that one response to this demand is the widespread use of fuel cell vehicles (FCVs). In order to achieve this, it is necessary to provide hydrogen fueling stations where FCVs can refuel.     

3D risk management for hydrogen installations

This paper introduces the 3D risk management (3DRM) concept, with particular emphasis on hydrogen installations (Hy3DRM). The 3DRM framework entails an integrated solution for risk management that combines a detailed site-specific 3D geometry model, a computational fluid dynamics (CFD) tool for simulating flow-related accident scenarios, methodology for frequency analysis and quantitative risk assessment (QRA), and state-of-the-art visualization techniques for risk communication and decision support. In order to reduce calculation time, and to cover escalating accident scenarios involving structural collapse and projectiles, the CFD-based consequence analysis can be complemented with empirical engineering models, reduced order models, or finite element analysis (FEA). The paper outlines the background for 3DRM and presents a proof-of-concept risk assessment for a hypothetical hydrogen filling station. The prototype focuses on dispersion, fire and explosion scenarios resulting from loss of containment of gaseous hydrogen. The approach adopted here combines consequence assessments obtained with the CFD tool FLACS-Hydrogen from Gexcon, and event frequencies estimated with the Hydrogen Risk Assessment Models (HyRAM) tool from Sandia, to generate 3D risk contours for explosion pressure and radiation loads. For a given population density and set of harm criteria, it is straightforward to extend the analysis to include personnel risk, as well as risk-based design such as detector optimization. The discussion outlines main challenges and inherent limitations of the 3DRM concept, as well as prospects for further development towards a fully integrated framework for risk management in organizations.     

An index-based risk assessment model for hydrogen infrastructure

This study focuses on the development of a risk assessment model associated with the safety of a hydrogen infrastructure system. The safety of hydrogen infrastructure is one of the crucial pre-requisites for a sustainable economy and accordingly, its design should be made based upon the performance to investigate and evaluate the risks from or out of the required infrastructure. In order to support strategic decision-making for safe hydrogen infrastructure, this study proposes an appropriate index-based risk assessment model. The model evaluates the hydrogen infrastructure using the relative risk ranking of the hydrogen activities such as hydrogen production, storage and transportation, and the relative impact levels of regions. The relative risk rankings of the hydrogen activities are rated a quantitative risk analysis, whereas the relative impact level of regions is rated based on the regional characteristics such as population density. With consideration of regional characteristics, the proposed model makes it possible not only to assess the risks of processes and technologies associated with hydrogen but also to compare the relative safety levels of the hydrogen infrastructures made up with various hydrogen activities. In order to show the features and capabilities of the model, four future hydrogen infrastructure scenarios in Korea are examined in the study. The result shows that distributed production, and mass storage and transportation via liquefied hydrogen facility are relatively safer than centralized production, and compressed-gaseous hydrogen storage and transportation, respectively.     

Critical review and analysis of hydrogen safety data collection tools

The wider adoption of hydrogen in multiple sectors of the economy requires that safety and risk issues be rigorously investigated. Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) is an important tool for enabling safe deployment of hydrogen fueling stations and is increasingly embedded in the permitting process. QRA requires reliability data, and currently hydrogen QRA is limited by the lack of hydrogen specific reliability data, thereby hindering the development of necessary safety codes and standards [1]. Four tools have been identified that collect hydrogen system safety data: H2Tools Lessons Learned, Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents Database (HIAD), National Renewable Energy Lab's (NREL) Composite Data Products (CDPs), and the Center for Hydrogen Safety (CHS) Equipment and Component Failure Rate Data Submission Form. This work critically reviews and analyzes these tools for their quality and usability in QRA. It is determined that these tools lay a good foundation, however, the data collected by these tools needs improvement for use in QRA. Areas in which these tools can be improved are highlighted, and can be used to develop a path towards adequate reliability data collection for hydrogen systems.     

Evaluating hydrogen risk management policy PR: Lessons learned from three hydrogen accidents in South Korea

Hydrogen energy has become a pivotal actor in achieving carbon neutrality by 2050 in the era of the climate crisis. Regardless of its importance, three consecutive hydrogen safety accidents and their aftermath in South Korea have aggravated the public's acceptance of hydrogen. Hydrogen-induced risks have always existed in our society regardless of technical improvement. Here, the task of the government is to manage the hydrogen risk to prevent hydrogen disasters. This study included three steps in its research design; 1) selecting experts through snowball sampling, 2) conducting a qualitative email survey, and 3) analyzing the qualitative answer sheet by applying semantic network analysis. We found that experts' evaluations of the Korean hydrogen PR policy were positive regarding responsiveness but negative regarding openness, guidelines, and control tower. Therefore, we suggest practical policy recommendations; the central government should play an important role in cultivating professional crisis management PR personnel and others.     

Quantitative risk assessment using a Japanese hydrogen refueling station model

Although hydrogen refueling stations (HRSs) are becoming widespread across Japan and are essential for the operation of fuel cell vehicles, they present potential hazards. A large number of accidents such as explosions or fires have been reported, rendering it necessary to conduct a number of qualitative and quantitative risk assessments for HRSs. Current safety codes and technical standards related to Japanese HRSs have been established based on the results of a qualitative risk assessment and quantitative effectiveness validation of safety measures over ten years ago. In the last decade, there has been much development in the technologies of the components or facilities used in domestic HRSs and much operational experience as well as knowledge to use hydrogen in HRSs safely have been gained through years of commercial operation. The purpose of the present study is to conduct a quantitative risk assessment (QRA) of the latest HRS model representing Japanese HRSs with the most current information and to identify the most significant scenarios that pose the greatest risks to the physical surroundings in the HRS model. The results of the QRA show that the risk contours of 10^?3 and 10^?4 per year were confined within the HRS boundaries, whereas the risk contours of 10^?5 and 10^?6 per year are still present outside the HRS. Comparing the breakdown of the individual risks (IRs) at the risk ranking points, we conclude that the risk of jet fire demonstrates the highest contribution to the risks at all of the risk ranking points and outside the station. To reduce these risks and confine the risk contour of 10^?6 per year within the HRS boundaries, it is necessary to consider risk mitigation measures for jet fires.     

Development of uniform harm criteria for use in quantitative risk analysis of the hydrogen infrastructure

This paper discusses the preliminary results of the Risk Management subtask efforts within the International Energy Agency (IEA) Hydrogen Implementing Agreement (HIA) Task 19 on Hydrogen Safety to develop uniform harm criteria for use in the Quantitative Risk Assessments (QRAs) of hydrogen facilities. The IEA HIA Task 19 efforts are focused on developing guidelines and criteria for performing QRAs of hydrogen facilities. The performance of QRAs requires that the level of harm that is represented in the risk evaluation be established using deterministic models. The level of harm is a function of the type and level of hazard. The principle hazard associated with hydrogen facilities is uncontrolled accumulation of hydrogen in (semi) confined spaces and consecutive ignition. Another significant hazard is combustion of accidentally released hydrogen gas or liquid, which may or may not happen instantaneously. The primary consequences from fire hazards consist of personnel injuries or fatalities, or facility and equipment damage due to high air temperatures, radiant heat fluxes, or direct contact with hydrogen flames. The possible consequences of explosions on humans and structures or equipment include blast wave overpressure effects, impact from fragments generated by the explosion, the collapse of buildings, and the heat effects from subsequent fire balls. A harm criterion is used to translate the consequences of an accident, evaluated from deterministic models, to a probability of harm to people, structures, or components. Different methods can be used to establish harm criteria including the use of threshold consequence levels and continuous functions that relate the level of a hazard to a probability of damage. This paper presents a survey of harm criteria that can be utilized in QRAs and makes recommendations on the criteria that should be utilized for hydrogen-related hazards.     

Quantitative risk assessment of the interior of a hydrogen refueling station considering safety barrier systems

A quantitative risk assessment of human life during the operation of a hydrogen refueling station (HRS) is conducted. We calculate the risks for three accident scenarios: a hydrogen leak from the external piping surrounding a dispenser, a hydrogen leak from an accumulator connection piping and a hydrogen leak from a compressor/connection piping in the HRS. We first calculate the probability of accident by multiplying the estimated leak frequency with the incident occurrence probability considering the ignition probability and failure probability of the safety barrier systems obtained through event tree analysis for each scenario. We next simulate the blast and flame effects of the ignition of concentration fields formed by hydrogen leakage. We then use existing probit functions to estimate the consequences of eardrum rupture, fatalities due to displacement by the blast wave, fatalities due to head injuries, first-degree burns, second-degree burns, and fatal burn injuries by accident scenario, leak size, and incident event, and we estimate the risk distribution in 1-m cells. We finally assess the risk reduction effects of barrier placement and the distance to the dispenser and quantify the risk level that HRSs can achieve under existing law. Quantitative risk assessment reveals that the risk for a leak near the dispenser is less than 10⁻⁶ per year outside a distance of 6 m to the dispenser. The risk for a leak near the accumulators and compressors exceeds 10⁻⁴ per year within a distance of 10 m from the ignition point. A separation of 6 m to the dispenser and a barrier height of 3 m keep the fatal risk from burns to the workers, consumers and residents and passersby below the acceptable level of risk. Our results therefore show that current laws sufficiently mitigate the risks posed by HRSs and open up the possibility for a regulatory review.     

Evaluation of barrier walls for mitigation of unintended releases of hydrogen

Hydrogen jet flames resulting from ignition of unintended releases can be extensive in length and pose significant radiation and impingement hazards. Depending on the leak diameter and source pressure, the resulting consequence distances can be unacceptably large. One possible mitigation strategy to reduce exposure to jet flames is to incorporate barriers around hydrogen storage and delivery equipment. While reducing the extent of unacceptable consequences, the walls may introduce other hazards if not properly configured. An experimental and modeling program has been performed at Sandia National Laboratories to better characterize the effectiveness of barrier walls to reduce hazards. This paper describes the experimental and modeling program and presents results obtained for various barrier configurations. The experimental measurements include flame deflection using standard and infrared video and high-speed movies (500 fps) to study initial flame propagation from the ignition source. Measurements of the ignition overpressure, wall deflection, radiative heat flux, and wall and gas temperature were also made at strategic locations. The modeling effort includes three-dimensional calculations of jet flame deflection by the barriers, computations of the thermal radiation field around barriers, predicted overpressure from ignition, and the computation of the concentration field from deflected unignited hydrogen releases. The various barrier designs are evaluated in terms of their mitigation effectiveness for the associated hazards present. The results show that barrier walls are effective at deflecting jet flames in a desired direction and can help attenuate the effects of ignition overpressure and flame radiative heat flux.     

Current standards and configurations for the permitting and operation of hydrogen refueling stations

The literature lacks a systematic analysis of HRS equipment and operating standards. Researchers, policymakers, and HRS operators could find this information relevant for planning the network's future expansion. This study is intended to address this information need by providing a comprehensive strategic overview of the regulations currently in place for the construction and maintenance of hydrogen fueling stations.A quick introduction to fundamental hydrogen precautions and hydrogen design is offered. The paper, therefore, provides a quick overview of hydrogen's safety to emphasize HRS standards, rules, and regulations. Both gaseous and liquid safety issues are detailed, including possible threats and installation and operating expertise.After the safety evaluation, layouts, equipment, and operating strategies for HRSs are presented, followed by a review of in-force regulations: internationally, by presenting ISO, IEC, and SAE standards, and Europeanly, by reviewing the CEN/CENELEC standards. A brief and concise analysis of Italy's HRS regulations is conducted, with the goal of identifying potential insights for strategic development and more convenient technology deployment.     

Consequence analysis and safety verification of hydrogen fueling stations using CFD simulation

Now that environmental awareness is enhanced on a global basis, great hopes are placed on the expanded use of hydrogen stations and fuel-cell vehicles (FCVs) that economize hydrogen energy. Hydrogen stations must be safe and secure because they store large quantities of hydrogen under higher pressure than the hydrogen actually consumed by FCVs. Thus, multiple safety measures are taken to ensure that hydrogen does not leak from the stations. Furthermore, in the unlikely event of leakage, the damage needs to be kept on an allowable level. For this reason, it is necessary to understand the behavior of hydrogen gas leaking from the stations.