Consequence assessment of the BBC H2 refuelling station using the ADREA-HF code

Within the framework of the internal project HyQRA of the HYSAFE Network of Excellence (NoE), funded by the European Commission (EC), the participating partners were requested to apply their Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) methodologies on a predefined hypothetical gaseous H₂ refuelling station named BBC (Benchmark Base Case). The overall aim of the HyQRA project was to perform an inter-comparison of the various QRA approaches and to identify the knowledge gaps on data and information needed in the QRA steps specifically related to H₂. Partners NCSRD and UNIPI collaborated on a common QRA. UNIPI identified the hazards on site, selected the most critical ones, defined the events that could be the primary cause of an accident and provided to NCSRD the scenarios listed in risk order for the evaluation of the consequences. NCSRD performed the quantitative analysis using the ADREA-HF CFD code. The predicted risk assessment parameters (flammable H₂ mass and volume time histories and maximum horizontal and vertical distances of the LFL from the source) were provided to UNIPI to analyze the consequences and to evaluate the risk and distances of damage. In total 15 scenarios were simulated. Five of them were H₂ releases in confined ventilated spaces (inside the compression and the purification/drying buildings). The remaining 10 scenarios were releases in open/semi-confined spaces (in the storage cabinet, storage bank and refuelling hose of one dispenser). This paper presents the CFD methodology applied for the quantitative analysis of the common UNIPI/NCSRD QRA and discusses the results obtained from the performed calculations.     

A quantitative risk assessment of hydrogen fuel cell forklifts

With the increasing deployment of hydrogen fuel cell forklifts, it is essential to understand the risks of incidents involving these systems. A quantitative risk assessment (QRA) study was conducted to determine the potential hydrogen release scenarios, probabilities, and consequences in fuel cell forklift operations. QRA modeling tools, such as fault tree analysis (FTA) and event sequence diagrams (ESD), were used together with hydrogen systems data. This work provides insights into the fatality risk from a hydrogen fuel cell forklift and the reliability of its design and components. The analysis shows that the expected fatal accident rate of a hydrogen forklift is considerably higher than current fatal injury rates observed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics for industrial truck operators and material handling occupations. Nevertheless, the average individual risk posed to forklift drivers was found to be likely tolerable based on current risks accepted by industrial truck operators. Jet fires are found to dominate the system's risk, however, the risk of explosions is also considerable. An importance measures analysis shows that these risks could be mitigated by improving the design and reliability of pressure relief devices, as well as other components prone to leak such as filters and check valves. We also identify sources of uncertainty and conservatisms in the QRA process that can guide future research in hydrogen systems. These results provide powerful insight into improvements in the design of fuel cell forklifts to reduce risk and enable the safe deployment of this key technology for a decarbonized future.     

A comparative techno-economic and quantitative risk analysis of hydrogen delivery infrastructure options

The comparative techno-economic analysis and quantitative risk analysis (QRA) of the hydrogen delivery infrastructure covering the national hydrogen demands are presented to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the infrastructure of commercial hydrogen delivery. The cost calculation model, which was based on the hydrogen delivery scenario analysis model (HDSAM), was employed to estimate the costs of hydrogen fuel delivery in Seoul, Korea, whose area is small enough to not require intermediate delivery stations. The QRA methodology was modified to be suitable for the comparative analysis of the whole hydrogen infrastructure. The capacities of a hydrogen refueling station and the hydrogen market penetration were employed as the main variables and the two scenarios, viz. the gaseous and liquid hydrogen delivery options, were considered. The analysis results indicate that the delivery system of gaseous hydrogen was superior in terms of cost and that of liquid hydrogen was superior in terms of safety. Both delivery options were affected by the capacity of the station and the market penetration, and the cost and risk drastically changed, especially when the two variables were small. Thus, according to the results, the economic and safety issues of the hydrogen delivery infrastructure are critical to achieving a hydrogen energy society.     

Risk-informed separation distances for hydrogen refueling stations

As part of the US Department of Energy Hydrogen, Fuel Cells & Infrastructure Technologies Program, Sandia National Laboratories is developing the technical basis for assessing the safety of hydrogen-based systems for use in the development/modification of relevant codes and standards. This work includes quantitative risk assessments (QRA) of hydrogen facilities. The QRAs are used to identify and quantify scenarios for the unintended release of hydrogen and thus help identify the code requirements that would reduce the risk at hydrogen facilities to acceptable levels.     

Data requirements for improving the Quantitative Risk Assessment of liquid hydrogen storage systems

Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) supports the development of risk-informed safety codes and standards which are employed to enable the safe deployment of hydrogen technologies essential to decarbonize the transportation sector. System reliability data is a necessary input for rigorous QRA. The lack of reliability data for bulk liquid hydrogen (LH₂) storage systems located on site at fueling stations limits the use of QRAs. In turn, this hinders the ability to develop the necessary safety codes and standards that enable worldwide deployment of these stations. Through a QRA-based analysis of a LH₂ storage system, this work focuses on identifying relevant scenario and probability data currently available and ascertaining future data collection requirements regarding risks specific to liquid hydrogen releases. The work developed consists of the analysis of a general bulk LH₂ storage system design located at a hydrogen fueling station. Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) and traditional QRA modeling tools such as Event Sequence Diagrams (ESD) and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) are employed to identify, rank, and model risk scenarios related to the release of LH₂. Based on this analysis, scenario and reliability data needs to add LH₂-related components to QRA are identified with the purpose of improving the future safety and risk assessment of these systems.     

Hydrogen refuelling stations in the Netherlands: An intercomparison of quantitative risk assessments used for permitting

As of 2003, 15 hydrogen refuelling stations (HRSs) have been deployed in the Netherlands. To become established, the HRS has to go through a permitting procedure. An important document of the permitting dossier is the quantitative risk assessment (QRA) as it assesses the risks of the HRS associated to people and buildings in the vicinity of the HRS. In the Netherlands, a generic prescribed approach exists on how to perform a QRA, however specific guidelines for HRSs do not exist. An intercomparison among the QRAs of permitted HRSs has revealed significant inconsistencies on various aspects of the QRA: namely the inclusion of HRS sub-systems and components, the HRS sub-system and component considerations as predefined components, the application of failure scenarios, the determination of failure frequencies, the application of input parameters, the consideration of preventive and mitigation measures as well as information provided regarding the HRS surroundings and the societal risk. It is therefore recommended to develop specific QRA guidelines for HRSs.     

Quantitative risk assessment on a gaseous hydrogen refueling station in Shanghai

The potential risk exposure of people for hydrogen refueling stations is often a critical factor to gain authority approval and public acceptance. Quantitative risk assessment (QRA) is often used to quantify the risk around hydrogen facilities and support the communication with authorities during the permitting process. This paper shows a case study on a gaseous hydrogen refueling station using QRA methodology. Risks to station personnel, to refueling customers and to third parties are evaluated respectively. Both individual risk measure and societal risk measure are used in risk assessment. Results show that the compressor leak is the main contributor to risks of all three parties. Elevating compressors can be considered as an effective mitigation measure to reduce occupational risks while setting enclosure around compressors cannot. Both measures are effective to reduce risks to customers. As for third parties, societal risks can be reduced to ALARP region by either elevating compressors or setting enclosure around compressors. External safety distance of compressors cannot be considerably reduced by elevation of compressors, but can significantly be reduced by setting compressor enclosure. However, safety distances of the station are not very sensitive to both mitigation measures.     

Critical review and analysis of hydrogen safety data collection tools

The wider adoption of hydrogen in multiple sectors of the economy requires that safety and risk issues be rigorously investigated. Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) is an important tool for enabling safe deployment of hydrogen fueling stations and is increasingly embedded in the permitting process. QRA requires reliability data, and currently hydrogen QRA is limited by the lack of hydrogen specific reliability data, thereby hindering the development of necessary safety codes and standards [1]. Four tools have been identified that collect hydrogen system safety data: H2Tools Lessons Learned, Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents Database (HIAD), National Renewable Energy Lab's (NREL) Composite Data Products (CDPs), and the Center for Hydrogen Safety (CHS) Equipment and Component Failure Rate Data Submission Form. This work critically reviews and analyzes these tools for their quality and usability in QRA. It is determined that these tools lay a good foundation, however, the data collected by these tools needs improvement for use in QRA. Areas in which these tools can be improved are highlighted, and can be used to develop a path towards adequate reliability data collection for hydrogen systems.     

Quantitative risk assessment of a hydrogen refueling station by using a dynamic physical model based on multi-physics system-level modeling

Numerous accidents in HRSs have been reported worldwide in accident databases; therefore, many researchers have performed quantitative risk assessments (QRAs) of HRSs to enable risk-informed decision making in determining the safety distances or risk mitigation measures. The HRSs, located in urban areas such as Tokyo in Japan, are situated in congested areas with tall buildings and high population density; thus, they have relatively narrow station areas. However, the QRAs are generally suitable for large plants such as nuclear power plants or chemical plants; therefore, relatively small plants or installations, such as HRSs, have not yet been considered as QRA objects. Hence, it is necessary to conduct detailed QRAs with risk analyses and reduce the applied uncertainties for relatively small plants or installations. We applied a model-based approach of risk assessment to model the HRS process using multi-physics system-level modeling and simulated a target system using Modelica—an equation-based, object-oriented modeling language that allows acausal modeling of complex cyber-physical systems The primary aim of this study was to conduct a QRA of an HRS based on multi-physics system-level modeling. First, we modeled the HRS components and physical relationships between the components using basic physical equations. Then, we elucidate a QRA based on the constructed model. The difference in the leakage rates due to the leak positions and dynamic behavior of the model parameters were calculated using the constructed model. Finally, we estimated the individual risks of all the scenarios and compared the resulting risk contours based on the constructed model that includes the hydrogen-fuel dynamic behavior with those based on the traditional model. These results indicate that it is possible to assess whether the risks around the station boundary are acceptable based on the scenario information obtained by evaluating the risks near the station.     

3D risk management for hydrogen installations

This paper introduces the 3D risk management (3DRM) concept, with particular emphasis on hydrogen installations (Hy3DRM). The 3DRM framework entails an integrated solution for risk management that combines a detailed site-specific 3D geometry model, a computational fluid dynamics (CFD) tool for simulating flow-related accident scenarios, methodology for frequency analysis and quantitative risk assessment (QRA), and state-of-the-art visualization techniques for risk communication and decision support. In order to reduce calculation time, and to cover escalating accident scenarios involving structural collapse and projectiles, the CFD-based consequence analysis can be complemented with empirical engineering models, reduced order models, or finite element analysis (FEA). The paper outlines the background for 3DRM and presents a proof-of-concept risk assessment for a hypothetical hydrogen filling station. The prototype focuses on dispersion, fire and explosion scenarios resulting from loss of containment of gaseous hydrogen. The approach adopted here combines consequence assessments obtained with the CFD tool FLACS-Hydrogen from Gexcon, and event frequencies estimated with the Hydrogen Risk Assessment Models (HyRAM) tool from Sandia, to generate 3D risk contours for explosion pressure and radiation loads. For a given population density and set of harm criteria, it is straightforward to extend the analysis to include personnel risk, as well as risk-based design such as detector optimization. The discussion outlines main challenges and inherent limitations of the 3DRM concept, as well as prospects for further development towards a fully integrated framework for risk management in organizations.     

Quantitative risk assessment using a Japanese hydrogen refueling station model

Although hydrogen refueling stations (HRSs) are becoming widespread across Japan and are essential for the operation of fuel cell vehicles, they present potential hazards. A large number of accidents such as explosions or fires have been reported, rendering it necessary to conduct a number of qualitative and quantitative risk assessments for HRSs. Current safety codes and technical standards related to Japanese HRSs have been established based on the results of a qualitative risk assessment and quantitative effectiveness validation of safety measures over ten years ago. In the last decade, there has been much development in the technologies of the components or facilities used in domestic HRSs and much operational experience as well as knowledge to use hydrogen in HRSs safely have been gained through years of commercial operation. The purpose of the present study is to conduct a quantitative risk assessment (QRA) of the latest HRS model representing Japanese HRSs with the most current information and to identify the most significant scenarios that pose the greatest risks to the physical surroundings in the HRS model. The results of the QRA show that the risk contours of 10^?3 and 10^?4 per year were confined within the HRS boundaries, whereas the risk contours of 10^?5 and 10^?6 per year are still present outside the HRS. Comparing the breakdown of the individual risks (IRs) at the risk ranking points, we conclude that the risk of jet fire demonstrates the highest contribution to the risks at all of the risk ranking points and outside the station. To reduce these risks and confine the risk contour of 10^?6 per year within the HRS boundaries, it is necessary to consider risk mitigation measures for jet fires.     

The quantitative risk assessment of a hydrogen generation unit

The safety of hydrogen generation process is a major concern. This paper discusses the quantitative analyzes of the risk imposed on neighborhood from the operation of a hydrogen generator using natural gas reforming process. For this purpose, after hazard identification, the frequency of scenarios was estimated using generic data. Quantitative risk assessment was applied for consequence modeling and risk estimation. The results revealed that, jet fire caused by a full bore rupture in Desulphurization reactor has the highest fatality (26person) and affects the largest area of 5102 m². The lethality radius, maximum radiation and safe distance of this incident were 140 m, 370 kW/m² and 225 m respectively. A full bore rupture in Reformer can lead to the most dangerous flash fire. In this incident the concentration of released material in LFL zone (area of 1483.17 m²) and ½ LEL zone (area of 1970.74 m²) were 61,125 ppm and 40,000 ppm respectively. QRA is a credible method to assess the risks of hydrogen generation process.     

Comparative risk assessment of liquefied and gaseous hydrogen refueling stations

Several countries are incentivizing the use of hydrogen (H₂) fuel cell vehicles, thereby increasing the number of H₂ refueling stations (HRSs), particularly in urban areas with high population density and heavy traffic. Therefore, it is necessary to assess the risks of gaseous H₂ refueling stations (GHRSs) and liquefied H₂ refueling stations (LHRSs). This study aimed to perform a quantitative risk assessment (QRA) of GHRSs and LHRSs. A comparative study is performed to enhance the decision-making of engineers in setting safety goals and defining design options. A systematic QRA approach is proposed to estimate the likelihood and consequences of hazardous events occurring at HRSs. Consequence analysis results indicate that catastrophic ruptures of tube trailer and liquid hydrogen storage tanks are the worst accidents, as they cause fires and explosions. An assessment of individual and societal risks indicates that LHRSs present a lower hazard risk than GHRSs. However, both station types require additional safety barrier devices for risk reduction, such as detachable couplings, hydrogen detection sensors, and automatic and manual emergency shutdown systems, which are required for risk acceptance.     

HySafe standard benchmark Problem SBEP-V11: Predictions of hydrogen release and dispersion from a CGH2 bus in an underpass

One of the tasks of the HySafe Network of Excellence was the evaluation of available CFD tools and models for dispersion and combustion in selected hydrogen release scenarios identified as “standard benchmark problems” (SBEPs). This paper presents the results of the HySafe standard benchmark problem SBEP-V11. The situation considered is a high pressure hydrogen jet release from a compressed gaseous hydrogen (CGH2) bus in an underpass. The bus considered is equipped with 8 cylinders of 5 kg hydrogen each at 35 MPa storage pressure. The underpass is assumed to be of the common beam and slab type construction with I-beams spanning across the highway at 3 m centres (normal to the bus), plus cross bracing between the main beams, and light armatures parallel to the bus direction. The main goal of the present work was to evaluate the role of obstructions on the underside of the bridge deck on the dispersion patterns and assess the potential for hydrogen accumulation. Four HySafe partners participated in this benchmark, with 4 different CFD codes, ADREA-HF, CFX, FLACS and FLUENT. Four scenarios were examined in total. In the base case scenario 20 kg of hydrogen was released in the basic geometry. In Sensitivity Test 1 the release position was moved so that the hydrogen jet could hit directly the light armature on the roof of the underpass. In Sensitivity Test 2 the underside of the bridge deck was flat. In Sensitivity Test 3 the release was from one cylinder instead of four (5 kg instead of 20). The paper compares the results predicted by the four different computational approaches and attempts to identify the reasons for observed disagreements. The paper also concludes on the effects of the obstructions on the underside of the bridge deck.     

Consequences of catastrophic releases of ignited and unignited hydrogen jet releases

The possibility of using a risk based approach for the safe installation and siting of stationary fuel cell systems depends upon the availability of normative data and guidance on potential hazards, and the probabilities of their occurrence. Such guidance data is readily available for most common hydrocarbon fuels. For hydrogen, however, data is still required on the hazards associated with different release scenarios. This data can then be related to the probability of different types of scenarios, from historical fault data, to allow safety distances to be defined and controlled using different techniques. Some data on releases has started to appear but this data generally relates to hydrogen vehicle refuelling systems that are designed for larger throughput, higher pressures, and the general use of larger pipe diameters than are likely to be used for small fuel cell systems.The aim of this paper is to report on work that is providing data for informing safety distances for high-pressure components/fuel cell systems and associated fuel storage. Using high-pressure release scenarios, the extent of the clouds, jets and, following ignition, fires and explosions were investigated.     

Quantitative risk assessment of an urban hydrogen refueling station

Hydrogen is one of important energy source in the next generation of renewable energy. It has powerful strength such as no emission from CO2 for fuel, Nevertheless, many countries have difficulties to expand hydrogen infra due to high risky from hydrogen. Especially, the hydrogen refueling station which is located in urban area has congested structure and high population around, it has higher risk than conventional refueling station. This paper presents a quantitative risk assessment (QRA) of a high pressure hydrogen refueling station in an urban area with a large population and high congestion between the instruments and equipment. The results show that leaks from the tube-trailer and dispenser as well as potential explosion of the tube-trailer are the main risks. For the safety of the station operator, customers and people surrounding the refueling station, additional mitigation plans such as adding additional safety barrier system have to be implemented on the compressor and dispenser in order to prevent continuous release of hydrogen from an accident.     

Quantitative risk assessment on 2010 Expo hydrogen station

This paper presents a QRA study on a gaseous hydrogen refueling station of 2010 World Expo. Risks to station personnel, to refueling customers and to third parties are evaluated respectively. Uncertainties that intervene in the risk analysis are also discussed. The results show that the leaks from compressors and dispensers are the main risk contributors to first party and second party risks of the Expo station, indicating that risk mitigation measures should in the first place be implemented on compressors and dispensers. For the sake of the safety of station personnel, customers, and people outside the Expo station, additional safety barrier systems must be implemented on compressors and dispensers to prevent continuous release of hydrogen from happening. With appropriate mitigation measures on compressors and dispensers, risks to all three parties of the Expo station can be reduced to the value lower than the risk acceptance criteria.     

Harm effect distances evaluation of severe accidents for gaseous hydrogen refueling station

With the development of large-scale fell cell vehicle demonstration project worldwide, the global number of hydrogen refueling stations has increased rapidly in recent years. The external safety of hydrogen refueling stations has always been a public concern for its further development. This paper examines the harm effect distances of severe accidents for a gaseous hydrogen refueling station. First, different accident scenarios are assumed and their subsequent consequences are calculated, including physical explosion, jet fire, flash fire and confined vapor cloud explosion. Results show that physical explosion and worst case of confined vapor cloud explosion produce the longest harm effect distances for instantaneous release and continuous release, respectively. This indicates that they may be used as decisive consequences to the determination of safe distances. Second, the influences of different factors on harm effect distances are investigated, including those of release inventory, release pressure, release height, release angle, release diameter and wind velocity. Then, based on these results, several potential hazard mitigation measures are proposed such as elevating hydrogen equipment, using smaller vessel and adopting smaller pipe work, if reasonably practicable.