Increased or reversed? The effect of surprise on hindsight bias depends on the hindsight component.

Two diverging hypotheses concerning the influence of surprising events on hindsight effects have been proposed: Although some authors believe that surprising events lead to a reversal of hindsight bias, others have proposed that surprise increases hindsight bias. Drawing on the separate-components view of the hindsight bias (which argues that hindsight bias consists of 3 independent components: memory distortions, impressions of inevitability and impressions of foreseeability), we reconcile these 2 perspectives by relating them to foreseeability and inevitability. Specifically, we assume that reversals in hindsight bias are to be found when foreseeability is considered, and increases in hindsight bias are found when inevitability is considered. To test these assumptions, we arranged for participants to learn about a highly surprising outcome and subsequently judge its foreseeability and inevitability. Results were consistent with our hypotheses: Participants perceived a highly surprising but explainable outcome to be both more inevitable and less foreseeable than participants who did not received outcome information. On the basis of experimentally induced dissociations between hindsight components, the present results thus strongly support the separate-components view of the hindsight bias. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A multiprocess account of hindsight bias in children.

In hindsight, that is, after receiving the correct answers to difficult questions, people's recall of their own prior answers tends to be biased toward the correct answers. We tested 139 participants from 3 age groups (9- and 12-year-olds and adults) in a hindsight-bias paradigm and found that all groups showed hindsight bias. Multinomial model-based analyses indicated that all age groups used the correct answers to reconstruct their original answers. In addition, the youngest group showed memory impairment caused by the presentation of the correct answers as well as an increased belief that they knew the correct answers all along. These results support a multiprocess explanation of hindsight bias in children. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The interplay of memory and judgment processes in effects of aging on hindsight bias.

Hindsight bias is the phenomenon that after people are presented with the correct answer to a question, their judgment regarding their own past answer to this question is biased toward the correct answer. In three experiments, younger and older adults gave numerical responses to general-knowledge questions and later attempted to recall their responses. For some questions, the correct answer was provided during recall (Experiment 1) or before recall (Experiments 2 and 3). Multinomial model-based analyses show age differences in both recollection bias and reconstruction bias when the correct judgment was in working memory during the recall phase. The authors discuss implications for theories of cognitive aging and theories of hindsight bias. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Surprise, memory, and retrospective judgment making: Testing cognitive reconstruction theories of the hindsight bias effect.

Hindsight bias has been shown to be a pervasive and potentially harmful decision-making bias. A review of 4 competing cognitive reconstruction theories of hindsight bias revealed conflicting predictions about the role and effect of expectation or surprise in retrospective judgment formation. Two experiments tested these predictions examining the effects of manipulating the information presented in a text-based scenario and its congruency with the given outcome on surprise, hindsight bias, and recall. The results of Experiment 1 revealed evidence of hindsight bias after exposure to incongruent and ambivalent outcomes but not after exposure to congruent outcomes. Experiment 2 replicated the hindsight bias results and found that the ratio of outcome consistent information recalled was higher than expected in the incongruent and ambivalent conditions but equaled the ratio presented to participants in the congruent condition. The results were interpreted as supporting the general predictions of sense-making models of the hindsight bias. A refined version of this model is discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Hindsight ≠ hindsight: Experimentally induced dissociations between hindsight components.

Hindsight bias has recently been conceived of not as a unitary phenomenon but as a conglomerate of 3 separate phenomenological manifestations (“hindsight components”; Blank, Nestler, von Collani, & Fischer, 2008): memory distortions, impressions of foreseeability, and impressions of inevitability. These components are thought to be fundamentally different in nature, to be influenced by different processes, and to serve different functions. This article provides strong evidence for the separate components view and its underlying assumptions by demonstrating theoretically predicted dissociations between the components. In Experiment 1, for example, we used a memory encoding manipulation to specifically influence the amount of hindsight memory distortion but not participants' inevitability impressions. Conversely, varying the number of provided reasons for an event outcome affected inevitability impressions but left memory distortion untouched. Similar results—using different theoretically derived manipulations—were obtained between foreseeability impressions and memory distortions (Experiment 2) and between inevitability and foreseeability impressions (Experiment 3). Theoretical and practical consequences of these results and of the separate components view are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The contribution of metamemory deficits to schizophrenia.

A number of recent studies have demonstrated that individuals with schizophrenia display knowledge corruption; that is, they hold false information with strong conviction. This aberration in metamemory is thought to stem from poor memory accuracy in conjunction with impaired discrimination of correct and incorrect judgments in terms of confidence. Thirty-one participants with schizophrenia, along with 61 healthy control participants and 48 control participants with other psychiatric conditions, participated in a computerized source memory task. Whereas no differences in memory accuracy were observed between the group with schizophrenia and the group with other psychiatric diagnoses, knowledge corruption was specifically impaired in those with schizophrenia. Schizophrenia participants showed a significantly decreased confidence gap: They were more confident in errors and less confident in correct responses relative to those in the control groups. Knowledge corruption is theorized to be a potential risk factor for the emergence of delusions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

False beliefs maintenance for fear-related information in obsessive-compulsive disorder: An investigation with the hindsight paradigm.

The present study tested whether participants with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) overestimate the incidence frequency of OCD-relevant phenomena and display a decreased hindsight bias for concern-related information, which may represent a maintenance factor for OCD. Thirty participants with OCD and 39 control participants were requested to estimate the incidence frequency of 8 events in each of 4 domains: washing-relevant, checking-relevant, negative, or neutral. Subsequently, participants received the correct statistics for all items and were requested to affectively appraise these. Two hours later participants had to reproduce their initial estimates. No differences emerged between participants with OCD and control participants regarding initial estimates. In case the frequency of an OCD-relevant item was initially largely overestimated, control participants expressed more relief when confronted with the correct solution than participants with OCD, especially for washing-relevant items. The recalled estimates showed a typical hindsight bias (i.e., the reproduced estimates were biased toward the correct response), but with no difference between groups. In sum, participants were normal in their subjective estimates of OCD-relevant events, and there was no evidence for a heightened maintenance of false beliefs. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Recognition versus recall in schizophrenia.

Twenty-four schizophrenic and 24 normal Ss, 8 in each group being overinclusive and 16 non-overinclusive, were presented with two 20-word lists, one for free recall and one for recognition. The recognition alternatives were rhymes, synonyms, and synonym-rhymes of the various target words. Schizophrenics were poorer than normals in recall but not in recognition, and the ratio of recall over recognition was significantly greater for schizophrenics than for normals. The results of an analysis of the recognition errors suggested that the recall deficit of schizophrenics may be due to an inability to organize information for retrieval. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Hindsight bias from 3 to 95 years of age.

[Correction Notice: An erratum for this article was reported in Vol 37(3) of Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition (see record 2011-08992-005). On page 381, the notation in Figure 1 is incorrect. The corrected notations are discussed in the correction.] Upon learning the outcome to a problem, people tend to believe that they knew it all along (hindsight bias). Here, we report the first study to trace the development of hindsight bias across the life span. One hundred ninety-four participants aged 3 to 95 years completed 3 tasks designed to measure visual and verbal hindsight bias. All age groups demonstrated hindsight bias on all 3 tasks; however, preschoolers and older adults exhibited more bias than older children and younger adults. Multinomial processing tree analyses of these data revealed that preschoolers' enhanced hindsight bias resulted from them substituting the correct answer for their original answer in their recall (a qualitative error). Conversely, older adults' enhanced hindsight bias resulted from them forgetting their original answer and recalling an answer closer to, but not equal to, the correct answer (a quantitative error). We discuss these findings in relation to mechanisms of memory, perspective taking, theory of mind, and executive function. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Remembering the past and imagining the future in schizophrenia.

It has been suggested that patients with schizophrenia experience a distorted sense of continuity of self across time. However, temporal aspects of self-processing have received little empirical attention in schizophrenia. In this study, the authors investigated schizophrenic patients' ability to generate specific mental images of their personal past and future. Results showed that patients recalled fewer specific past events than did healthy controls and were even more impaired in generating specific future events. These deficits were associated with positive symptoms but were not associated with negative symptoms or with performances on verbal fluency tasks. It is suggested that schizophrenic patients' failures to project themselves into specific past and future episodes might be related to difficulties in retrieving contextual details from memory, as well as disturbance of the sense of subjective time. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Hindsight bias in economic expectations: I knew all along what I want to hear.

Hindsight bias in economic expectations was investigated with particular focus on the moderating effects of attitudes. Stronger hindsight bias was expected for subjectively favorable economic developments. Six months before and after the introduction of the euro as the official book currency of the European Monetary Union, participants rated the probabilities of several economic developments. Results show that hindsight bias occurs with economic expectations and that it is moderated by attitudes. Euro supporters showed stronger hindsight bias for positive economic developments than for negative ones, whereas euro opponents showed the opposite pattern. The results support the notion that hindsight bias is a reconstruction bias in which self-serving tendencies can influence the reconstruction selectively for favorable and unfavorable outcomes. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The jumping to conclusions bias in delusions: Specificity and changeability.

There are indications that a jumping to conclusions bias (JTC) plays a role in the formation and maintenance of delusions and should be targeted in therapy. However, it is unclear whether (a) JTC is uniquely associated with delusions or simply an epiphenomenon of schizophrenia or impaired intellectual functioning and (b) it can be changed by varying task demands, motivational factors, or feedback. Seventy-one patients with schizophrenia spectrum disorders and either acute or remitted delusions and 68 healthy controls were included. Patients were assessed with self- and observer-rated symptom measures. All participants were assessed for intellectual ability and performed the classic beads task with a ratio of 80:20. They were then presented with task variations that involved increasing the difficulty of the ratio to 60:40, introducing a rule for which correct decisions were rewarded by monetary gains and false decisions led to financial losses, and providing feedback on the accuracy of the previous decisions. Participants with current delusional symptoms took fewer draws to decision (DTD) than did those in remission and healthy controls. DTD were associated with observer-rated delusions, but controlling for negative symptoms or intelligence rendered this association insignificant. DTD increased after the difficulty of the task increased and after feedback. The study demonstrated that JTC is linked to delusions but that this association is not unique. Patients with delusions are principally able to adapt their decisions to altered conditions but still decide relatively quickly even when decisions have negative consequences. These difficulties might stem in part from impaired intellectual functioning. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

When debiasing backfires: Accessible content and accessibility experiences in debiasing hindsight.

Two studies demonstrated that attempts to debias hindsight by thinking about alternative outcomes may backfire and traced this to the influence of subjective accessibility experiences. Participants listed either few (2) or many (10) thoughts about how an event might have turned out otherwise. Listing many counterfactual thoughts was experienced as difficult and consistently increased the hindsight bias, presumably because the experienced difficulty suggested that there were not many ways in which the event might have turned out otherwise. No significant hindsight effects were obtained when participants listed only a few counterfactual thoughts, a task subjectively experienced as easy. The interplay of accessible content and subjective accessibility experiences in the hindsight bias is discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Proactive interference, accessibility bias, and process dissociations: Valid subject reports of memory.

Proactive interference was assessed with a variant of the process-dissociation procedure, which separates effects of habit (accessibility bias) and recollection (discriminability). In three cued-recall experiments, proactive interference was shown to be an effect of bias rather than an effect on actual remembering. Divided attention, age, and study duration selectively influenced the recollection parameter, whereas training probability selectively influenced the habit parameter. Furthermore, in Experiments 2 and 3, subjective reports of remembering were highly correlated with, and nearly identical to, objective estimates of recollection gained from the process-dissociation procedure. The authors discuss the relevance of the results to theories of proactive interference and argue that older adults' greater susceptibility to interference effects is sometimes caused by an inability to recollect rather than by an inability to inhibit a preponderant response. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Separating bias and sensitivity in judgments of associative memory.

Ratings of the degree of association between words are linearly related to normed associative strengths, but the intercept is high, and the slope is shallow (the judgments of associative memory [JAM] function). Two experiments included manipulations intended to decrease the intercept and increase the slope. Discrimination training on many pairs of words and constraining ratings to sum to a constant both reduced the intercept but failed to change the slope. The intercept of the JAM function appears to contain a bias component that can be manipulated independently of the slope, which reflects sensitivity to associative strengths. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Pursuing the kernel of truth in the psychotherapy of schizophrenia.

This article concerns the utility of pursuing the kernels of truth in the delusions of schizophrenic patients as a means of empathizing with their unique personal experience of events. Pursuing the kernel of truth implies listening for the real interpersonal experiences past and present that are represented within delusions, as opposed to focusing on derivatives of infantile fantasy. This orientation restores the rights of the schizophrenic person as a perceptive observer of events with a valid, although not commonly understood, point of view. A clinical case example is presented in which the delusion of being raped while others stand idly by both literally and metaphorically described a wide variety of interpersonal experiences which had shaped the patient's life. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Selective recall in schizophrenia and its relation to ego strength.

The purpose of the study was to investigate the nature of selective recall in schizophrenic patients. "Two hypotheses concerning certain aspects of the schizophrenic symptomatology were tested. (a) Schizophrenics manifest a distinctive type of memory process which results in the selective recall of experiences connoting personal failure and diminished self-esteem and (b) this process is related to deficient ego strength… . While the first hypothesis was confirmed at a significant level of confidence, the second was not supported by the experimental data." 22 references. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The reiteration effect in hindsight bias.

Repetition of an assertion increases the degree of belief in that assertion. This reiteration effect is used to explain two puzzling findings in research on hindsight bias. First, the reiteration effect explains the asymmetry in hindsight bias for true and false assertions. This striking asymmetry has often been observed in experimental studies, but no rationale has yet been found. Second, the reiteration effect predicts a novel finding: Recalled confidence will increase in hindsight bias studies even if no feedback is given. The authors have checked both predictions against results reported in the literature; with some exceptions, the evidence supports them. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Story understanding and counterfactual reasoning.

D. Kahneman and A. Tversky (1982), in a seminal study on counterfactual reasoning, claimed empirical support for a simulation heuristic wherein ease of converting unusual conditions determines their selection as causes over normal conditions. Discourse analysis of their stories revealed a confounding of explanation and normality. A connectionist simulation of online comprehension and memory access of alternative conditions without conversion accounted for their data. Normality and explanation were varied independently in 2 experiments. Explanation but not normality affected the rank ordering of counterfactual conditions after reading. Access of alternative conditions in simulation was again the best predictor of empirical findings. Comprehension and memory operate where stories communicate information for decision making such as counterfactual reasoning and hindsight bias. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)