压水堆核电厂严重事故卸压阀能力评估

在百万千瓦级压水堆核电厂中为防止高压熔堆严重事故发生时发生高压熔喷(HPME)和安全壳直接加热(DCH),参考EPR堆型在稳压器上额外设置严重事故卸压阀(SADV),对主系统进行快速卸压。建立百万千瓦级压水堆核电厂事故分析模型,选取丧失厂外电叠加汽动辅助给水泵失效,一回路管道小破口以及丧失主给水三条典型严重事故序列,进行系统热工水力及卸压能力分析。计算结果表明:如果不开启严重事故卸压阀,三条事故序列在压力容器下封头失效时一回路压力均较高,有发生高压熔喷和安全壳直接加热的风险。根据严重事故管理导则开启严重事故卸压阀,可以有效降低一回路压力,三条事故序列均可以防止高压熔喷和安全壳直接加热发生。针对卸压阀阀门面积的影响进行分析,表明阀门面积减小到4.8×10-3 m2后下封头失效时RCS压力会有所增加,仍然能够满足RCS的卸压要求,且可延迟下封头失效时间。     

压水堆核电厂自然循环对一回路卸压策略的影响

以我国秦山二期核电厂为研究对象,使用SCDAP/RELAP5程序建立了核电厂的自然循环模型.选取高压溶堆严重事故(TMLB'事故)为基准事故序列,分析了高压熔堆严重事故中自然循环的机理现象.通过计算在有无自然循环情况下一回路卸压措施的实施情况,对比分析了自然循环对一回路卸压策略的影响.结果表明,自然循环能有效延缓一回路卸压的启动时间和整体事故进程,但对一回路卸压的效果影响较小.     

严重事故条件下安全壳响应模拟研究

压水堆核电厂发生严重事故期间,从主系统释放的蒸汽、氢气以及下封头失效后进入安全壳的堆芯熔融物均对安全壳的完整性构成威胁。以国内典型二代加压水堆为研究对象,采用MAAP程序进行安全壳响应分析。选取了两种典型的严重事故序列：热管段中破口叠加设备冷却水失效和再循环高压安注失效,堆芯因冷却不足升温熔化导致压力容器失效,熔融物与混凝土发生反应（MCCI）,安全壳超压失效;冷管段大破口叠加再循环失效,安全壳内蒸汽不断聚集,发生超压失效。通过对两种事故工况的分析,证实了再循环高压安注、安全壳喷淋这两种缓解措施对保证安全壳完整性的重要作用。     

基于氢气风险分析的ADS手动卸压策略研究

先进非能动压水堆设计采用自动卸压系统(ADS)对一回路进行卸压,严重事故下主控室可手动开启ADS,缓解高压熔堆风险。然而ADS的设计特点可能导致氢气在局部隔间积聚,带来局部氢气风险。本文基于氢气负面效应考虑,对利用ADS进行一回路卸压的策略进行研究,为严重事故管理提供技术支持。选取全厂断电始发的典型高压熔堆严重事故序列,利用一体化事故分析程序,评估手动开启第1~4级ADS、手动开启第1~3级ADS、手动开启第4级ADS 3种方案的卸压效果,并分析一回路卸压对安全壳局部隔间的氢气负面影响。研究结果表明,3种卸压方案均能有效降低一回路压力。但在氢气点火器不可用时,开启第1~3级ADS以及开启第1~4级ADS卸压会引起内置换料水箱隔间氢气浓度迅速增加,可能导致局部氢气燃爆。因此,基于氢气风险考虑,建议在实施严重事故管理导则一回路卸压策略时优先考虑采用第4级ADS进行一回路卸压。     

CPR1000核电厂全厂断电事故缓解措施有效性分析

为防止发生高压熔堆,降低安全壳内氢气燃爆的风险,CPR1000型核电厂采取了一系列的严重事故缓解措施。应用新版的MELCOR 2.1程序,针对有无严重事故缓解措施条件下全厂断电(SBO)事故序列进行计算分析,模拟了事故进程中堆芯的状态,对事故过程中氢气的产生、分布及其行为进行了评估。分析结果表明,稳压器卸压功能延伸能够有效防止高压熔堆现象的发生,消氢系统通过在安全壳内的合理布置,可有效降低氢气爆炸的风险,防止了安全壳发生早期失效。     

CPR1000核电厂全厂断电事故缓解措施有效性分析

为防止发生高压熔堆,降低安全壳内氢气燃爆的风险,CPR1000型核电厂采取了一系列的严重事故缓解措施。应用新版的MELCOR 2.1程序,针对有无严重事故缓解措施条件下全厂断电(SBO)事故序列进行计算分析,模拟了事故进程中堆芯的状态,对事故过程中氢气的产生、分布及其行为进行了评估。分析结果表明,稳压器卸压功能延伸能够有效防止高压熔堆现象的发生,消氢系统通过在安全壳内的合理布置,可有效降低氢气爆炸的风险,防止了安全壳发生早期失效。     

非能动先进压水堆核电厂严重事故下裂变产物行为研究

非能动先进压水堆核电厂在严重事故下,安全壳可能发生失效,导致大量放射性物质向环境释放。本文针对非能动先进压水堆核电厂可能发生的早期失效、中期失效、晚期失效三种释放类别,建立百万千瓦级非能动先进压水堆的事故分析模型,分别针对自动卸压系统第二级卸压阀误开启,DVI管线上发生当量直径为4英寸的破口,以及热管段发生当量直径为2英寸的破口的典型严重事故序列,在研究事故进程的基础上,分析事故下裂变产物释放和迁移的特性,重点关注惰性气体、挥发性裂变产物和非挥发性裂变产物在核电厂的分布,最终计算释入环境的裂变产物源项。本文分析结果可为严重事故管理以及厂外放射性后果评价提供支持。     

严重事故下核电站安全壳内氢气分布及控制分析

使用安全壳分析程序CONTAIN计算分析了百万千瓦级压水堆核电站严重事故下安全壳内的氢气浓度分布.分别对一回路冷段大破口失水(LB-LOCA)叠加应急堆芯冷却系统(ECCS)失效(不包括非能动的安注箱)事故和全厂断电(SBO)叠加汽轮机驱动的应急给水泵失效事故两个严重事故序列进行了计算.计算结果表明,不同严重事故下,安全壳各隔间对氢气控制系统的要求不同.氢气控制系统的设计必须满足不同事故下的法规要求,提高电站的安全性.     

基于MAAP4的百万千瓦级核电站大破口事故分析

本文采用严重事故一体化分析软件MAAP4(Modular Accident Analysis Program)对百万千瓦级压水堆进行分析,选取一回路大破口严重事故进行仿真,获得了该事故工况下核电厂关键参数的瞬态特性,与RELAP5计算结果进行了对比验证。在分析MAAP4模型的基础之上,进一步仿真该电站大破口事故后期进程,截取压力边界内外参数进行评估。分析结果表明:MAAP4在仿真安全壳和氢气分布上,预测事故结果置信度高,其中模拟的安全防护设计能够有效缓解事故进程,满足一般核电厂的安全评估要求,对概率安全评价(PSA)具有一定的参考意义。     

秦山二期核电厂严重事故下安全壳内氢气浓度分布及风险初步分析

采用模块化严重事故计算工具,对秦山二期核电厂大破口失水事故(LB-LOCA)、小破口失水事故(LB-LOCA)和全厂断电(SBO)诱发的严重事故序列以及安全壳内的氢气浓度分布进行了计算分析.在此基础之上,参考美国联邦法规10CFR关于氢气控制和风险分析的标准,对安全壳的氢气燃烧风险进行了初步研究.分析结果表明:大破口严重事故导致的安全壳内的平均氢气浓度接近10%,具有一定的整体性氢气燃烧风险,小破口失水和全厂断电严重事故可能不会导致此类风险,但仍然存在局部氢气燃烧的可能.     

AP1000与二代压水堆核电厂的严重事故预防与缓解策略比较

根据压水堆核电厂严重事故发生机理,基于高压堆熔、压力容器失效以及安全壳失效三个关键阶段,针对AP1000和二代核电厂进行比较,在系统结构设计上分析两者在严重事故预防与缓解策略方面的异同,最后对我国在役核电厂的严重事故预防与缓解提出建议。     

Analysis on hydrogen risk mitigation in severe accidents for Pressurized Heavy Water Reactor

Hydrogen source term and hydrogen mitigation under severe accidents is evaluated for most nuclear power plants (NPPs) after Fukushima Daiichi accident. Two units of Pressurized Heavy Water Reactor (PHWR) are under operating in China, and hydrogen risk control should be evaluated in detail for the existing design. The distinguish feature of PHWR, compared with PWR, is the horizontal reactor core surrounded by moderator in calandria vessel (CV), which may influence the hydrogen source term. Based on integral system analysis code of PHWR, the plant model including primary heat transfer system (PHTS), calandria, end shield system, reactor cavity and containment has been developed. Two severe accident sequences have been selected to study hydrogen generation characteristic and the effectiveness of hydrogen mitigation with igniters. The one is Station Blackout (SBO) which represents high-pressure core melt accident, and the other is Large Break Loss of Coolant Accident (LLOCA) at reactor outlet header (ROH) which represents low-pressure core melt accident. Results show that under severe accident sequences, core oxidation of zirconium–steam reaction will produce hydrogen with deterioration of core cooling and the water in CV and reactor cavity can inhibits hydrogen generation for a relatively long time. However, as the water dries out, creep failure happens on CV. As a result, molten core falls into cavity and molten core concrete interaction (MCCI) occurs, releasing a large mass of hydrogen. When hydrogen igniters fail, volume fraction of hydrogen in the containment is more than 15% while equivalent amount of hydrogen generate from a 100% fuel clad-coolant reaction. As a result, hydrogen risk lies in the deflagration–detonation transition area. When igniters start at the beginning of large hydrogen generation, hydrogen mixtures ignite at low concentration in the compartments and the combustion mode locates at the edge of flammable area. However, the power supply to igniters should be ensured.     

大功率非能动压水堆DVI管破叠加IRWST失效触发严重事故分析

应用MELCOR 2.1程序,建立了大功率非能动压水堆核电厂主要回路系统及安全壳的热工水力模型,并以直接注水管线破口叠加内置换料水箱失效触发严重事故为对象进行了独立计算。计算结果与MAAP 4.04程序计算结果趋势一致,分析表明:MELCOR 2.1新版本对严重事故计算合理可信;部分非能动安全设施的启动有效地降低了主回路系统压力,防止高压熔堆,缓解了堆芯熔化进程,从而验证了非能动安全设施的有效性。     

Analysis of strategies for containment venting in case of severe accidents

During a core melt accident, a pressurization of the containment has to be expected, which could lead to a failure of the containment due to overpressurization. This failure mode is expected to be the most likely one for large dry containments under accident conditions. Also during a core melt accident, a large quantity of hydrogen may be generated, giving the potential of a loss of containment integrity due to violent hydrogen combustion. Timely venting of the containment atmosphere can prevent overpressurization and may perhaps make the hydrogen situation in the containment less severe. This paper discusses the thermodynamic consequences of different vent strategies for a large German PWR during core melt accidents.     

国产先进压水堆严重事故下氢气行为及控制系统分析

严重事故下的氢气控制是核电厂安全需要考虑的重要问题之一。采用一体化严重事故分析程序对国产先进压水堆核电厂进行系统建模,选取大破口触发的严重事故序列,对严重事故工况下的氢气产生情况及氢气控制系统的性能进行分析评价。结果表明:大破口事故序列下氢气的产生主要有两个阶段,分别是早期锆包壳与水反应产生氢气及堆芯熔融物迁移至下腔室产生氢气,其中燃料包壳的氧化是产氢的主要阶段,氢气释放时间较早,氢气产生速率较大。氢气控制系统的设计能够有效缓解可能的氢气风险,满足相关法规标准的安全要求,确保安全壳的完整性。     

AP1000核电厂大量放射性释放源项分析

在AP1000核电厂的某些严重事故情景中,安全壳可能发生失效或旁通,导致大量放射性物质释放到环境中,造成严重的放射性污染。针对大量放射性释放频率贡献最大的3种释放类别（安全壳旁通、安全壳早期失效和安全壳隔离失效）,分别选取典型的严重事故序列（蒸汽发生器传热管破裂、自动卸压系统阀门误开启和压力容器破裂）,使用MAAP程序计算分析了释放到环境中的裂变产物源项。该分析结果为量化AP1000核电厂的放射性释放后果和厂外剂量分析提供了必要的输入。     

AP1000与二代压水堆核电厂的严重事故预防与缓解策略比较

根据压水堆核电厂严重事故发生机理,基于高压堆熔、压力容器失效以及安全壳失效三个关键阶段,针对AP1000和二代核电厂进行比较,在系统结构设计上分析两者在严重事故预防与缓解策略方面的异同,最后对我国在役核电厂的严重事故预防与缓解提出建议。     

The EPR overall approach for severe accident mitigation

The EPR design includes provisions to cope with severe accidents including core melt situations:

- Situations that would lead to large early releases such as containment bypass, high reactivity accidents, high-pressure core melt or global hydrogen detonation have to be prevented.

- All other situations, including low pressure core melt have to be mitigated in such a way that the corresponding radiological consequences would necessitate only very limited protective countermeasures in a relatively small area and for a limited time for the population living in the neighborhood of the power plant. This means that there would be no need for permanent relocation, no need for evacuation outside the immediate vicinity of the plant, limited sheltering and no long-term restrictions in food consumption.

To reach this objective, which is one of the Safety Authority's requirements, the EPR relies on a very robust containment and on various design measures intended to withstand extreme loads caused by a large range of internal events and external hazards. The deterministic method is used for the EPR safety demonstration, supplemented by probabilistic methods and appropriate R&D work.This paper outlines the major mitigating design features, summarizes the results of the Level 2 PSA and gives the main results of the evaluation of the radiological consequences of core melt on the environment.     

Hydrogen and steam distribution following a small-break LOCA in large dry containment

The hydrogen deflagration is one of the major risk contributors to threaten the integrity of the containment in a nuclear power plant, and hydrogen control in the case of severe accidents is required by nuclear regulations. Based on the large dry containment model developed with the integral severe-accident analysis tool, a small-break loss-of-coolant-accident （LOCA） without HPI, LPI, AFW and containment sprays, leading to the core degradation and large hydrogen generation, is calculated. Hydrogen and steam distribution in containment compartments is investigated. The analysis results show that significant hydrogen deflagration risk exits in the reactor coolant pump （RCP） compartment and the cavity during the early period, if no actions are taken to mitigate the effects of hydrogen accumulation.     

Study on mitigation of in-vessel release of fission products in severe accidents of PWR

During the severe accidents in a nuclear power plant, large amounts of fission products release with accident progression, including in-vessel and ex-vessel release. Mitigation of fission products release is demanded for alleviating radiological consequence in severe accidents. Mitigation countermeasures to in-vessel release are studied for Chinese 600 MW pressurized water reactor (PWR), including feed-and-bleed in primary circuit, feed-and-bleed in secondary circuit and ex-vessel cooling. SBO, LOFW, SBLOCA and LBLOCA are selected as typical severe accident sequences. Based on the evaluation of in-vessel release with different startup time of countermeasure, and the coupling relationship between thermohydraulics and in-vessel release of fission products, some results are achieved. Feed-and-bleed in primary circuit is an effective countermeasure to mitigate in-vessel release of fission products, and earlier startup time of countermeasure is more feasible. Feed-and-bleed in secondary circuit is also an effective countermeasure to mitigate in-vessel release for most severe accident sequences that can cease core melt progression, e.g. SBO, LOFW and SBLOCA. Ex-vessel cooling has no mitigation effect on in-vessel release owing to inevitable core melt and relocation.