Strategy selection in causal reasoning: When beliefs and covariation collide.

Investigated how people combine covariation information with pre-existing beliefs when evaluating causal hypotheses. Ss were 752 college students (aged 17–52 yrs). Three experiments, using both within- and between-Ss designs, found that the use of covariation information and beliefs interacted, such that the effects of covariation were larger when people assessed hypotheses about believable than about unbelievable causal candidates. In Exp 2, this interaction was observed when Ss made judgments in stages (e.g., first evaluating covariation information about a causal candidate and then evaluating the believability of a candidate), as well as when the information was presented simultaneously. Exp 3 demonstrated that this pattern was also reflected in Ss' metacognitive judgments: Ss indicated that they weighed covariation information more heavily for believable than unbelievable candidates. Finally, Exps 1 and 2 demonstrated the presence of individual differences in the use of covariation- and belief-based views. That is, individuals who tended to base their causality judgments primarily on belief were less likely to make use of covariation information and vice versa. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Presentation mode, task importance, and cue order in experimental research on expert judges.

Used 140 23–56 yr old government auditors and 140 23–52 yr old auditors from private companies in 2 experiments investigating presentation mode, task importance, and cue order. In Exp I, 120 of these expert judges (60 from each group) made significantly different probability judgments depending on whether experimental task materials were presented in writing (visual mode), orally (auditory mode), or both (visual/auditory mode). Exp II, using 80 Ss from each group, was designed to partially explain why judgments differed across presentation modes. Results show that materiality (an auditor's term for task importance) interacted with presentation mode but that qualitative/quantitative cue order, a surrogate for time span of recall, did not. Findings provide evidence that research on expert judges should consider the potential costs of sacrificing external validity when the real world equivalent of an experimental task is likely to communicate information verbally or to vary presentation mode. (22 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Knowing what to remember and forget: a developmental study of cue memory in intentional forgetting

These experiments are the first to investigate children's encoding and use of information about a memory cue in Bjork's (1972) intentional forgetting task. In Experiment 1, children in Grades 2, 4, and 6 and college students were given cues to either remember or forget after the presentation of each picture. Recall and recognition tests of pictures and cues followed. The procedure in Experiment 2 was identical to that in Experiment 1 except that the list of presentation pictures was altered for some children (Grades 3 and 4) and adolescents (Grades 8 and 9) so that remember and forget cues were associated with particular taxonomic categories. In Experiment 3, the testing component was modified so that children (Grades 2, 3, and 4) and college students were asked to recall only the cue associated with each picture. The results indicated that (1) children as young as second graders encode the cue associated with each picture, although to a lesser extent than do college students, (2) much improvement in intentional forgetting is still occurring during adolescence, (3) only adults adequately cluster their recall by cue, (4) associating remember and forget cues with items from different categories does not increase the differentiation between cues, and (5) eliminating picture recall and recognition has minimal effects on the magnitude of cue judgments. These results suggest that children's difficulties on intentional forgetting tasks stem, at least in part, from their poorer encoding of information about whether an item should be remembered or forgotten.     

Reasoning from false premises: The role of soundness in making logical deductions.

A believable conclusion is usually judged more acceptable than an unbelievable one, all other things being equal. However, there has been little empirical work to address how the believability of the premises affects the acceptability of an argument. In the present study, 108 Ss solved problems having either believable, unbelievable, or neutral premises, and having either believable or unbelievable conclusions. Ss were more likely to accept a conclusion when it was supported by believable premises than when it was supported by either unbelievable or neutral premises; this effect was true of both valid and invalid arguments. The fact that premise believability did not interact with logical validity suggests that premise believability acts independently of logical analysis. Results suggest a "filtering" mechanism, which operates after logical analysis has occurred, and which rejects conclusions that are unbelievable, or that are derived from unbelievable premises. (French abstract) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Memorability judgments for high- and low-frequency words

Five experiments were conducted in order to examine subjects' judgments of the memorability of high- (HF) and low-frequency (LF) words in the context of a recognition memory task. In Experiment 1, the subjects were provided study/test experience with a list of HF and LF words prior to making memorability judgments for a new list of HF and LF items. The findings were consistent with previous evidence (Greene & Thapar, 1994; Wixted, 1992) suggesting that subjects are not explicitly aware of the greater recognition memorability of LF words. Experiments 2-5 embedded the memorability judgment task within the recognition test itself. In these experiments, the subjects consistently gave higher memorability ratings to LF items. The contrast between the pattern of results found when the subjects made their judgments at the time of list presentation (Experiment 1) and that when they made their judgments during the recognition test (Experiments 2-5) is consistent with recent evidence that even seemingly highly related metamnemonic judgments (e.g., ease of learning judgments vs. judgments of learning for the same items) may be based on very different factors if they occur at different points in the study/test cycle. The present findings are also consistent with the possibility that very rapid retrieval of memorability information for HF and LF words may affect recognition decisions and may contribute to the recognition memory word frequency effect.     

Relations between inductive reasoning and deductive reasoning.

One of the most important open questions in reasoning research is how inductive reasoning and deductive reasoning are related. In an effort to address this question, we applied methods and concepts from memory research. We used 2 experiments to examine the effects of logical validity and premise–conclusion similarity on evaluation of arguments. Experiment 1 showed 2 dissociations: For a common set of arguments, deduction judgments were more affected by validity, and induction judgments were more affected by similarity. Moreover, Experiment 2 showed that fast deduction judgments were like induction judgments—in terms of being more influenced by similarity and less influenced by validity, compared with slow deduction judgments. These novel results pose challenges for a 1-process account of reasoning and are interpreted in terms of a 2-process account of reasoning, which was implemented as a multidimensional signal detection model and applied to receiver operating characteristic data. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) enumerate large and small sequentially presented sets of items using analog numerical representations.

Two rhesus monkeys selected the larger of two sequentially presented sets of items on a computer monitor. In Experiment 1, performance was related to the ratio of set sizes, and the monkeys discriminated between sets with up to 10 items. Performance was not disrupted when 1 set had fewer than 4 items and 1 set had more than 4 items, a critical trial type for differentiating object file and analog models of numerical representation. Experiment 2 controlled the interitem rate of presentation. Experiment 3 included some trials on which number and amount (visual surface area) offered conflicting cues. Experiment 4 varied the total duration of set presentation and the duration of item visibility. In all of the experiments, performance remained high, although total set presentation duration also acted as a partial cue for the monkeys. Overall, the data indicated that rhesus monkeys estimate the approximate number of items in sequentially presented sets and that they are not relying solely on nonnumerical cues such as rate, duration, or cumulative amount. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Active inhibition of a distractor word: The distractor precue benefit in the Stroop color-naming task.

The current study investigated attentional control through active inhibition of the identity of the distractor. Adapting a Stroop paradigm, the distractor word was presented in advance and made to disappear, followed by the presentation of a Stroop stimulus. Participants were instructed to inhibit the distractor in order to reduce its interference. Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated that the distractor precue facilitated Stroop color naming by reducing Stroop interference. Experiment 3 demonstrated beneficial effects of the distractor precue when congruent trials were introduced. Experiment 4 showed that the distractor precue benefit was observed when the cue and target were in different forms. Experiment 5 indicated that if the item used as the cue became the target, naming it took longer in order to overcome the inhibitory effect. Experiment 6 demonstrated that the benefit of the distractor precue was not observed when the cue was uninformative. Finally, Experiment 7 demonstrated that active inhibition required working-memory resources to operate. This study suggests that the best explanation for the distractor precue benefit is the active inhibition account. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Effects of trial order on contingency judgments: A comparison of associative and probabilistic contrast accounts.

Four experiments examined trial sequencing effects in human contingency judgment. In Experiments 1–3, ratings of contingency between a target cue and outcome were affected by the presentation order of a series of trials distributed in 2 distinct blocks and showed a recency bias. Experiment 4 replicated this effect when the trials were partly intermixed. These recency effects are predicted by an associative learning model that computes associative strengths trial by trial and incorporates configural coding of cues but are problematic for probabilistic contrast accounts, which currently have no provision in the contingency computation for the differential weighting of trials as a function of their order of presentation. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Featural evaluation, integration, and judgment of facial affect

The paradigm of the fuzzy logical model of perception (FLMP) is extended to the domain of perception and recognition of facial affect. Two experiments were performed using a highly realistic computer-generated face varying on 2 features of facial affect. Each experiment used the same expanded factorial design, with 5 levels of brow deflection crossed with 5 levels of mouth deflection, as well as their corresponding half-face conditions, for a total stimulus set of 35 faces. Experiment 1 used a 2-alternative, forced-choice paradigm (either happy or angry), whereas Experiment 2 used 9 rating steps from happy to angry. Results indicate that participants evaluated and integrated information from both features to perceive affective expressions. Both choice probabilities and ratings showed that the influence of 1 feature was greater to the extent that the other feature was ambiguous. The FLMP fit the judgments from both experiments significantly better than an additive model. Our results question previous claims of categorical and holistic perception of affect.     

Gaze perception requires focused attention: Evidence from an interference task.

The direction of another person's gaze is difficult to ignore when presented at the center of attention. In 6 experiments, perception of unattended gaze was investigated. Participants made directional (left-right) judgments to gazing-face or pointing-hand targets, which were accompanied by a distractor face or hand. Processing of the distractor was assessed via congruency effects on target response times. Congruency effects were found from the direction of distractor hands but not from the direction of distractor gazes (Experiment 1). This pattern persisted even when distractor sizes were increased to compensate for their peripheral presentation (Experiments 2 and 5). In contrast, congruency effects were exerted by profile heads (Experiments 3 and 4). In Experiment 6, isolated eye region distractors produced no congruency effects, even when they were presented near the target. These results suggest that, unlike other facial information, gaze direction cannot be perceived outside the focus of attention. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Probability judgment in three-category classification learning.

People give subadditive probability judgments—in violation of probability theory—when asked to assess each in a set of 3 or more mutually exclusive hypotheses, as indicated by their sum exceeding 1. Three potential evidential influences on subadditivity—cue conflict, cue frequency, and cue redundancy—are distinguished and tested in 5 experiments using a classification-learning task. Results indicate that (1) judgments of probability and of frequency are systematically subadditive even when the judgments are based on cues learned within the experimental context, (2) cue conflict has a reliable influence on the degree of subadditivity, and (3) judgments in this context are well described by a linear-discounting model within the framework of support theory. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Perceptual fluency as a cue for recognition judgments in amnesia.

This study investigated the extent to which amnesic patients use fluency of perceptual identification as a cue for recognition. Perceptual fluency was measured by having participants gradually unmask words before making recognition judgments. In Experiment 1, familiarity was the only possible basis for recognition because no words had been presented in the study phase. In Experiment 2, recollection provided an alternative basis for recognition because words had appeared in the study phase. Amnesic patients were as likely as normal controls to use perceptual fluency as a cue for recognition in Experiment 1 but were more likely than controls to do so in Experiment 2. For both groups, perceptual fluency affected judgments for studied and unstudied items to the same extent in Experiment 2. These findings suggest that amnesic patients do use perceptual fluency cues, but reliance on perceptual fluency does not necessarily elevate recognition accuracy. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Disengaging attention: On the locus of the cue-duration effect in partial report.

Increasing cue duration impairs performance in bar-probe partial report when cues are presented peripherally, but not centrally (P. Dixon, R. Gordon, A. Leung, & V. Di Lollo, 1997). Three experiments examined whether this cue-duration effect reflects processes of exogenous attention. The effect of cue duration on partial report performance with peripheral, but not central, cues was replicated (Experiment 1). Further experiments manipulated the degree that exogenous versus endogenous modes of selection were favored and found that the cue-duration effect for peripheral cues was reduced (1) when blocks contained a high proportion of central cues (Experiment 2) and (2) when the color of the cue indicated the location of the target (Experiment 3). These findings challenge the view that the cue-duration effect is restricted to exogenous attention and are discussed in terms of the process of disengaging attention from the cue to reallocate attention to the target representation. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Pragmatic use of categorical information in impression formation.

In 3 experiments on impression formation, participants received categorical (occupation) and individuating information (behavior) about target persons presented either in random order (mixed presentation) or in blocks (blockwise presentation). Presentation mode should be a metainformational cue from which judges infer the purpose of the task. Mixed presentation is a cue for differentiation between categories, and the integration of a category-specific typical case leads to reduced differentiation within categories, assimilation, and, hence, enhanced differentiation between categories. Blocked presentation is a cue for differentiation within categories, and consideration of category boundaries as a frame of reference leads to enhanced differentiation within categories and a concomitant contrast effect. The findings of Experiments 1 and 2 supported this reasoning. Experiment 3 showed, in addition, that an explicit task instruction and the metainformational cue lead to equivalent results. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Attentional priming and visual search in pigeons.

Advance information about a target's identity improved visual search efficiency in pigeons. Experiments 1 and 2 compared information supplied by visual cues with information supplied by trial sequences. Reaction times (RTs) were lower when visual cues signaled a single target rather than two. RTs were lower (Experiment 1) or accuracy improved (Experiment 2) when a sequence of trials presented a single target rather than a mixture of 2. Experiments 3, 4, and 5 considered the selectivity of visual priming by introducing probe trials that reversed the usual cue–target relationship. RT was higher following such miscues than following the usual 1- or 2-target cuing relationships (Experiment 3); the miscuing effect persisted over variations in the target's concealment (Experiments 4 and 5), but did not occur when the target was presented alone (Experiment 4). Findings indicate that priming modifies an attentional mechanism and suggest that this effect accounts for search images. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Recovery from blocking between outcomes.

Contemporary associative learning research largely focuses on cue competition phenomena that occur when 2 cues are paired with a common outcome. Little research has been conducted to investigate similar phenomena occurring when a single cue is trained with 2 outcomes. Three conditioned lick suppression experiments with rats assessed whether treatments known to alleviate blocking between cues would also attenuate blocking between outcomes. In Experiment 1, conditioned responding recovered from blocking between outcomes when a long retention interval was interposed between training and testing. Experiment 2 obtained recovery from blocking between outcomes when the blocking outcome was extinguished after the blocking treatment. In Experiment 3, a recovery from blocking between outcomes occurred when a reminder stimulus was presented in a novel context prior to testing. Collectively, these studies demonstrate that blocking of outcomes, like blocking of cues, appears to be caused by a deficit in the expression of an acquired association. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Time course of the blindness to response-compatible stimuli.

This article examines the time course of a deficit in identifying a stimulus sharing a compatible feature with a response that is executed in parallel ("blindness to response-compatible stimuli," J. Müsseler & B. Hommel, 1997a). In 5 experiments, participants performed a timed response, and the presentation point of time of a to-be-identified stimulus was varied in respect to response execution. A blindness effect was observed when the stimulus was presented between response cue offset and response execution. In contrast, the identification of a stimulus presented before the response cue or after response execution was not affected by stimulus-response compatibility—a finding that rules out a retention-based explanation. These results support an explanation that states that the perceptual processing of a stimulus feature is impaired as long as the shared perception–action feature code is integrated into the representation of a to-be-executed response. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Time, capacity, and selection between perceptual attributes

Three experiments were run to determine whether time and central-processing capacity are requried to select between perceptual attributes. A same-different matching task was employed for all experiments. In Experiments 1 and 2, three sets of stimulus pairs were used, each of which varied along only one relevant perceptual dimension (color, size, or form). In Experiment 1, reaction time on the matching task was shown to be faster when the stimuli were presented in blocks in which all stimulus pairs came from the same set (blocked presentation) than when stimulus pairs from each of the three sets were randomly intermixed (random presentation). In Experiment 2, reaction time on a secondary probe task was faster during the encoding stage of a sequential mathcing task with blocked presentation than with random presentation. Experiment 3 indicated that this outcome could not be attributed to a difference in the number of possible stimulus alternatives. Thus, the results support the hypothesis that time and central-processing capacity are required to select between perceptual attributes.