考虑再制造成本的闭环供应链回收渠道决策

当前考虑再制造产品成本对其回收渠道选择影响的研究相对缺乏。将再造品成本作为内生变量,分别讨论了制造商回收、零售商回收和回收商回收三种模式下新产品与再造品的产量以及废旧产品的回收量决策,并分别基于企业收益、消费者剩余和回收率视角展开回收渠道偏好分析。研究表明:从企业收益角度考虑,制造商的回收渠道偏好与再制品成本有关,而零售商始终偏好零售商回收渠道;从消费者剩余角度考虑,为满足消费者剩余最大化,不同的再制品成本会导致不同的回收渠道偏好;从回收率角度考虑,制造商回收渠道下的废旧产品回收率始终高于另外两种渠道。研究结论对再制造闭环供应链各方的定价决策以及回收渠道选择具有一定的参考价值。     

具有延保服务的闭环供应链回收渠道选择

针对具有延保服务的闭环供应链（CLSC）回收渠道选择问题，构建了3种回收渠道（制造商回收、零售商回收、第三方回收）和2种延保服务提供者（制造商、零售商）组合而成的6种分散决策CLSC模型，基于博弈论方法研究了每种情形下的最优回收渠道选择及其对CLSC决策的影响。结果表明，无论是制造商还是零售商提供延保，零售商都是产品回收最有效的承担者，此时制造商、零售商和整个CLSC都可以获得最大的利润，且产品回收率也最高。     

双边竞争型闭环供应链回收渠道的决策分析

为了提高回收渠道决策的效率,主要采用非合作博弈的方法,以2个竞争的制造商和2个竞争的零售商组成的双边竞争型闭环供应链为对象,研究了回收渠道的决策过程。经过分析论证得出制造商之间和零售商之间的竞争程度共同影响回收渠道的决策结果,但制造商之间的竞争程度对决策结果的影响作用更大。     

价格相依的闭环供应链渠道选择和协调策略

从社会环保意识、回收价格以及产品销量的角度构建了EOL(End-of-life)产品的供给函数,对分散决策时零售商销售渠道下的不同回收模式之闭环供应链进行了博弈分析,得到了闭环供应链成员的最优定价策略和最终利润,以及制造商渠道选择与回收成本的临界关系.设计了一个收入费用分享合同用以协调分散决策下的闭环供应链.     

考虑政府补贴和不同回收渠道的再制造闭环供应链最优决策研究

为研究政府分别实施再制造补贴和回收补贴下不同回收渠道对再制造闭环供应链的决策影响,建立以制造商为领导者,零售商和回收商为跟随者的闭环供应链的Stackelberg主从博弈模型,对比分析两种补贴方式下不同回收渠道的最优定价和回收策略。结果表明,补贴金额的多少会降低产品价格和批发价,刺激消费,提高回收率,增加闭环供应链上所有参与方的利润,而与补贴类别无关;当存在双回收渠道时,回收商与零售商之间回收的竞争强度影响产品售价、回收率和制造商的利润,而回收转移价格仅与补贴类型有关。最后,通过实例分析探讨不同补贴与不同回收渠道对闭环供应链的影响。     

3种混合回收渠道下的闭环供应链定价模型研究

在制造商和零售商同时负责回收、制造商和第三方同时负责回收、零售商和第三方同时负责回收3种情形下,以博弈论为研究方法,分别建立制造商主导的闭环供应链定价模型,求得3种情形下闭环供应链系统各成员的最优利润策略,并对3种回收模式的定价策略做了进一步比较,得到一些对闭环供应链回收渠道选择有益的结论.     

政府奖励不同主体下的废弃电子产品回收机制设计

用博弈论分别求解并比较了政府奖励制造商、制造商与消费者、制造商与零售商3种分散式决策模型。研究得出：政府的奖励机制对制造商的利润有直接影响;在仅奖励制造商模式下,废弃电子产品回收量显著提高;在奖励制造商与消费者、制造商与零售商两种模式下,废弃电子产品回收量的提高不显著。最后,根据研究结果提出政府应规范回收费用标准和确定零售商负责回收责任。     

网络比价下风险规避对制造商渠道选择的影响

研究了网络比价行为下零售商风险规避对制造商渠道选择的影响。制造商生产成本为线性和非线性情形下,得到制造商和零售商的均衡结果。研究发现:无论制造商生产成本是线性情形或者非线性情形,制造商均倾向于开通直销渠道。但是,与传统观点不同,直销渠道并非总是侵蚀零售商效用。若制造商生产成本为线性情形,直销渠道增加了零售商效用;若制造商生产成本为非线性情形,当零售商风险规避较小时,直销渠道侵蚀了零售商效用;当零售商风险规避较大时,直销渠道增加了零售商效用。此外,直销渠道总是增加整个供应链价值。     

考虑横向公平的双渠道销售闭环供应链定价策略与协调研究

考虑双渠道零售商和制造商组成的闭环供应链,分别构建了制造商直接回收、委托第三方回收模式下的动态博弈模型,以公平中性时的均衡策略为参照,对比分析了线下零售商的横向公平偏好对双渠道闭环供应链中各决策主体定价策略及利润的影响。研究表明,无论零售商是否存在横向公平关切行为,制造商直接回收模式都优于委托第三方回收。在直接回收模式下,线下零售商的横向公平偏好使得在正向供应链中的两零售商为提高市场占有率会竞相降低零售价格,制造商为鼓励竞争会降低批发价,并且价格均与横向公平关切系数负相关。在逆向供应链中,制造商会提高废旧产品的回收率;相比公平中性的情况,此定价策略使制造商和整个供应链系统效用增加,而两零售商收益递减。制造商作为渠道管理者为鼓励零售商之间竞相降价,可通过一个三方收益共享的契约实现协调,达到帕累托最优。     

双重干预及产能约束下的闭环供应链决策研究

为了研究制造商产能约束下政府的环境税和回收补贴双重干预对制造商和零售商决策的影响,并为政府的干预政策提供建议,构建了由一个制造商和零售商组成的闭环供应链模型,并运用Stakelberg博弈和逆向归纳法对模型进行求解分析。结果发现,当政府向制造商征收的环境税达到特定水平时,能够使制造商充分履行环境责任,但会对制造商和供应链整体经济效益和回收量造成损失,而政府的回收补贴能够弥补这些损失;回收补贴的增加对新产品的生产和销售造成冲击;再制造产能系数的增加会对新产品的生产和销售产生有利影响,对再制品的生产和销售产生不利影响。     

Influence of logistic service level on multichannel decision of a two-echelon supply chain

This paper investigates the channel structure and pricing problem of a two-echelon supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer. There are four common channel structures: (1) traditional retail channel, (2) the retailer’s traditional and online channel, (3) traditional retail channel and the manufacturer’s online channel, (4) traditional retail channel and online channel of a manufacturer and a retailer. Four Models (Model R, Model RD, Model MR, and Model MRD) are established and analysed based on four channel structures. Considering the influence of logistic services on consumers’ channel choice, this paper uses Stackelberg game and consumer utility function to analyse the profit of the manufacturer, the retailer and the whole supply chain, and obtains the optimal channel strategy of the manufacturer and the retailer in the four models. In addition, our study also finds that First, the manufacturer’s online channel opening can indirectly stimulate consumers to buy products in the traditional retail channel, which increases the demand for traditional retail channel. Second, the manufacturer’s online channel is more conducive to improving the profit of the whole supply chain than the retailer’s online channel under the dual channel structure. Third, multiple channels consisting of traditional retail channel and online channel of the manufacturer and the retailer can provide consumers with the lowest retail price, which is most beneficial to the retailer.     

考虑激励模式的动态回收闭环供应链最优决策与协调研究

考虑由单一的制造商和零售商组成的闭环供应链,制造商不仅通过正向供应链销售新产品,还通过激励措施从消费者那里回收旧产品,且将动态回收过程、HJB阶段控制纳入到供应链中。除探讨不同情形下均衡决策外,还设计激励成本分担契约来促进废旧产品的回收。研究表明:集中决策较分散决策供应链系统利润更高,产品回收率更高,回收激励强度更高;产品的销售价格、批发价格、零售商收益、制造商收益与回收率呈正相关,回收激励强度与回收率呈负相关;激励成本分担契约下,制造商的回收强度、回收率达到集中决策的水平,有趣的是激励成本分担契约下,产品的批发价格、销售价格均略高于分散决策的水平,制造商的收益实现帕累托改进,零售商的收益只有在一定情形下才会实现帕累托改进,供应链系统的整体收益实现帕累托改进。此外,还探讨了激励成本分担情形下零售商不出现破产的条件。最后给出算例分析验证了相关结论。     

政府规制对电器电子产品闭环供应链决策的影响分析

为了分析政府规制对采用不同回收模式的电器电子产品闭环供应链(CLSC)决策的影响,在政府规制和无政府规制两种情形下,分别建立了制造商回收模式、销售商回收模式以及第三方回收企业回收模式的电器电子产品闭环供应链决策模型。通过对比政府规制前后不同回收模式下CLSC各成员的最优决策和收益,发现无论政府规制与否,只要制造商的单位回收成本不是非常高,制造商回收模式都对它自身更有利,否则制造商最好将回收活动外包给销售商。而销售商和第三方回收企业都希望自己从事回收活动。此外,政府规制下销售商回收模式对全社会更有利。     

Dual channel closed-loop supply chain coordination with a reward-driven remanufacturing policy

This paper investigates a reward-driven policy, employed in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC), for acquiring used products earmarked for remanufacture. Under the examined model, a single manufacturer sells products through a retailer as well as directly to end users in a forward supply chain. In the reverse supply chain, three different modes of collection are employed to capture used products for remanufacture: they are through a third party, directly by the manufacturer and from the retailer. Mathematical models for both non-cooperative and centralised scenarios are developed to characterise the pricing decisions and remanufacturing strategies that indicate individual and overall supply chain performance. Optimality of all the proposed models is examined with theory. To coordinate and achieve a win–win outcome for channel members, we proposed a three-way discount mechanism for the manufacturer. Extended numerical investigation provides insights on ways to manage an efficient reward-driven CLSC in a dual-channel environment.     

闭环供应链广告协调机制研究

为了研究闭环供应链中零售商回收与制造商回收时两种情形下价格决策与广告协调策略,在广告既能影响市场需求又能影响回收率的条件下,运用博弈论分别建立制造商回收与零售商回收时的广告分摊协调策略数学模型,结果表明制造商回收模式有利于零售商,零售商回收模式有利于制造商。零售商所分摊的广告费用比例在制造回收时小。制造商回收时零售商所分摊的广告费用比例与广告回收效率因子负相关,与广告营销效率因子正相关。零售商将回收时零售商所分摊的广告费用比例与回收效率因子、营销效率因子无关。最后通过仿真证明了相关结论。本文的研究为闭环供应链在不同回收模式下广告回收效率与营销效率的变化时提供相应的协调策略。     

Pricing and effort decisions for a supply chain with uncertain information

This paper analyses the pricing and effort decisions of a supply chain with single manufacturer and single retailer. The manufacturer produces a kind of product and then wholesales the product to the retailer, who in turn retails it to customers over a single selling season. The retailer can influence demand through her sales effort. This research depicts the consumer demand, the manufacturing cost and the sales effort cost as uncertain variables. Considering the demand expansion effectiveness of sales effort, one centralised and three decentralised game models are built on the basis of the expected value criterion, and the equilibrium solutions are obtained. We investigate the effects of the parameters’ uncertainty degrees on the pricing and effort decisions. The results indicate that the manufacturer benefits from improvement in demand and cost uncertainties when he has at least bargaining power in the supply chain. The results also imply that the uncertainty degree of sales effort elasticity has an outstanding influence on the pricing and effort decisions, whereas the uncertainty degree of price elasticity has a modest impact on these decisions. We also study the effects of the parameters’ uncertainty degrees on the supply chain from the consumers’ perspective. The results suggest that with a power retailer, the retail price should always be on the high end. Consequently, consumers do not necessarily benefit from a power retailer. When the manufacturer and the retailer have equal bargaining power, consumers do not necessarily benefit from the supply chain, either.     

Effect of EPR coefficient policy on the production decision in precious metal accessory recycling

This study examines the effect of the extended producer responsibility (EPR) coefficient policy on the production decision between a supplier and a manufacturer in a precious metal accessory recycling supply chain. EPR coefficient is a regulation proposed by the government and enterprises to balance economic profit and EPR behaviour, and refers to the production proportion of recycled products in all serviceable products. Enterprises with a large EPR coefficient have good EPR practice. This study uses the newsvendor model and numerical simulation to study a supply chain system with remanufacturing and reproduction processes. Results show that the optimal recycling mode and the optimal EPR coefficient are always present in precious metal accessory operations. The increasing market demand for recycled products and the improving whole recycling parameters are both effective in enlarging the optimal EPR coefficient. However, the improvement of single or partial recycling parameters (except the market demand parameter) has no effect on the optimal EPR coefficient. The implementation mechanism and applicable conditions of the EPR coefficient policy are also explored. This study indicates that the EPR coefficient policy is an appropriate and effective approach to promote the EPR practice of the Chinese Government.     

考虑政府激励政策的绿色供应链博弈模型及 契约协调研究

研究政府的激励政策对于制造商研发设计绿色产品以及供应链协调机制的影响。通过构建集中决策下的垂直博弈模型、分散决策下制造商领导的Stackelberg博弈模型,分别得到均衡的绿色度、定价策略以及各组织利润。在此基础上提出了基于收益共享或成本共担契约的供应链协调机制,得到最优的成本共担与收益共享比例。利用数值分析对上述结论进行验证,并进行了参数敏感度分析。研究表明,相比于分散决策,集中决策下的绿色度更大、零售价更低、供应链整体利润更大。单一的成本共担契约无法实现供应链协调;对于综合契约协调机制,收益共享比例与成本共担比例负相关。各组织利润与绿色产品单位补贴调节因子以及绿色度敏感度系数正相关、与价格敏感度系数以及绿色投资系数负相关。