Should competing original equipment manufacturers outsource procurement activities under asymmetric cost information?

This paper considers a supply chain in which two competing heterogeneous original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) outsource production to a common contract manufacturer (CM) that possesses private cost information. Along with production outsourcing, the OEMs can either purchase components by themselves and only assign the production tasks to the CM (Consignment), or delegate both the procurement and production tasks to the CM (Turnkey). The main question we address is whether the OEMs should adopt Consignment or Turnkey. To answer this question, we first analyse the OEMs’ optimal mechanism design problems under three scenarios: both OEMs adopt Consignment strategy; both OEMs adopt Turnkey strategy; one OEM adopts Consignment and the other one adopts Turnkey. Building upon the OEMs’ equilibrium decisions under each scenario, we then characterise the equilibrium outcome for the procurement game. The results show that the CM’s procurement cost distribution and the market size play critical roles in the equilibrium outcome. Additionally, we find that both the competition intensity and cost heterogeneity between the OEMs affect the equilibrium outcome.     

Corporate Downsizing and the Rise of 'Problem-solving Suppliers: the Case of Hadco Corporation

In re-examining the supply chain relationships of American firms,investigators usually confine their studies to the outsourcingstrategies of original equipment manufacturers (OEMs). A fewauthors meanwhile have examined how small and medium size manufacturers(SMMs) fit within the vertical supply chain. This study exploreshow these suppliers develop new opportunities for increasingthe volume and breadth of product which they source to OEMsand how these SMMs develop ways to collaborate with their OEMcustomers and manage appropriate technologies. The study developsa strategic supplier typology with transaction cost economicsproviding the conceptual basis and a survey sample of 200 SMMsoffering the relevant data. The focus is on Hadco Corporation,an electronic parts manufacturer, that has taken special advantageof OEM strategic outsourcing decisions within the computer industry.Conclusions support the general proposition that structure followsstrategy. Survival in a strategic outsourcing environment requiressuppliers to hone competency skills and organizational formsthat allow for adaptation and quick customer demand responsethrough inter-organizational linkage, networks, partnershipsor strategic alliances.     

Supplier development or supplier switching?

We study a firm's cost-based sourcing decision of whether to invest in an incumbent supplier or switch to an alternative supplier in order to realise lower purchasing costs. In isolation, it can be shown that the development of an incumbent supplier (i.e., a cooperative investment) becomes more attractive, the higher the uncertainty about the price the buying firm can realise on the market and the incumbent supplier's cost. Likewise, switching to an alternative supplier becomes more attractive, the higher the expected value of and the uncertainty about the buying firm's market price. For comparing these two sourcing strategies simultaneously we provide a profit-maximising framework for the buying firm that shows that switching is less recommendable the higher the variance of the incumbent's cost and if the uncertain maximum demand is negatively correlated with the uncertain incumbent supplier's cost. Overall, our study substantially expands the frequently followed approach of basing supplier development versus supplier switching decisions merely on strategic and qualitative considerations.     

Collaborative and lean new product development approach: a case study in the automotive product design

Collaboration between buyer and the supplier has been widely studied in the contemporary research to enhance the efficiency of the product development process. Early involvement of stakeholders in development leads to reduced development time and cost and enhanced quality. The current study presents an approach termed as ‘collaborative and lean’ (C&L) approach to new product development (NPD). It involves application of lean principles in a collaborative environment between an automotive component supplier and the original equipment manufacturer (OEM). The study compares the deployment of two methodologies of development – generic process and the C&L process for developing the same part by a supplier for two different OEMs. Development with one OEM was done using generic process and the other using the C&L process. The study uses value stream mapping of the various phases of the development and attempts to understand the application of the proposed approach in the automotive domain. It highlights the potential of a combined C&L approach in reducing non-value-adding activities, cycle time and effort during NPD. The study attempts to enhance the understanding of NPD in a collaborative environment and explores the possible merits of the proposed approach.     

Cost information sharing under competition in remanufacturing

Third-party remanufacturers (TPRs) enter the market and compete with original equipment manufacturers (OEMs). Because of multiple uncertainty of the remanufacturing process, the variable remanufacturing cost is random and its true value cannot be observed by OEMs. In this paper, we consider the competition between one TPR and one OEM, and then investigate incentives of cost information sharing. The remanufactured product quantity is constrained by the new product quantity. If the new production cost is low enough such that the optimal remanufactured product quantity is less than the optimal new product quantity, the TPR should always share cost information with the OEM so that their quantity decisions in equilibrium are more responsive to market conditions to avoid overproduction or underproduction. However, if the quantity constraint is binding, the TPR should not always share cost information; in this case, cost information sharing can allow the OEM to adjust the new product quantity to limit remanufacturing and hence be detrimental to the TPR. When the TPR does not voluntarily share cost information, we further examine the impacts of private information on the society and the environment, and then suggest the government to promote information sharing and subsidise the TPR under certain conditions.     

The economic lot and delivery scheduling problem: the common cycle case

We analyze the interface between a supplier and an assembly facility, where direct shipments are made from one to the other. The final manufacturing step at the supplier involves multiple components produced on a single machine or production line. The assembly facility uses these components at a constant rate. The supplier incurs a sequence-independent setup cost and/or setup time each time the production line is changed over from one component to another. On the other hand, setup costs and times for the assembly facility are negligible. We consider two types of delivery cost: a fixed charge for each delivery, and a fixed-charge-per-truck cost.

We develop a heuristic procedure to find a 'just-in-time' schedule in which one production run of each product and a subsequent delivery of these products to the assembly facility occur in each cycle. The objective is to find the cycle duration that minimizes the average cost per unit time of transportation, inventory at both the supplier and the assembly facility, and setup costs at the supplier. We also develop an error bound for this procedure, and use some of the insights gained from the analysis to explain how delivery schedules can influence the attractiveness of reductions in production setup costs.     

Production scheduling with outsourcing scenarios: a mixed integer programming and efficient solution procedure

When market demand exceeds the company's capacity to manufacture, outsourcing is commonly considered as an effective alternative option. In traditional scheduling problems, processing of received orders is just possible via in-house resources, while in practice, outsourcing is frequently found in various manufacturing industries, especially in electronics, motor and printing companies. This paper deals with the scheduling problem, minimising the cost of outsourcing and a scheduling measure represented by weighted mean flow time, in which outsourcing of manufacturing operations is allowed through subcontracts. Each order can be either scheduled for in-house production or outsourced to an outside supplier in order to meet customer due dates. In this problem, not only should the sequence of orders be determined, but also decision on picking the jobs for outsourcing, selecting the appropriate subcontractor, and scheduling of the outsourced orders are considered as new variables. To formulate the given problem, four different outsourcing scenarios are derived and mixed integer programming models are developed for each one separately. Furthermore, to solve the suggested problem, a computationally effective team process algorithm is devised and then a constraint handling technique is embedded into the main algorithm in order to ensure satisfaction of customer due dates. Numerical results show that the suggested approach possesses high global solution rates as well as fast convergence.     

Horizontal cooperation and information sharing between suppliers in the manufacturer–supplier triad

In this paper, we analyse a collusion and information-sharing problem between two suppliers in a manufacturer–supplier triad. The manufacturer treats one supplier as a strategic supplier and the other as a backup. While the strategic supplier offers modules of good quality but longer lead times, the backup supplier offers modules with inferior quality but shorter lead times. If there are urgent orders, the manufacturer must turn to the backup supplier. However, it is difficult for the manufacturer to estimate whether the urgent supplier has put extra effort into their production. We formulate this problem by assuming that the urgent supplier has either low or high production costs. To take advantage of the competition between two suppliers, the manufacturer can design a contract menu that defines total payment and lead times, under which both suppliers may be worse off. Meanwhile, it is possible for the suppliers to tacitly form a coalition, and to even share the private cost information. We study this problem by formulating it as a three-stage game. Furthermore, we investigate the variation of profits for each part of the supply chain. We find that the manufacturer is worse off when suppliers cooperate or share private information. Both suppliers, however, can benefit from cooperation and information sharing.     

Outsourcing practices in automotive supply networks: an exploratory study of full service vehicle suppliers

Most automotive companies outsource the design, manufacturing and assembly of some complete cars to independent suppliers or full service vehicle companies (FSVs). FSVs represent a relatively unexplored form of outsourcing which combines joint efforts in developing a modular product with the externalisation of specific niche manufacturing processes. On the basis of comparative cases and of qualitative information collected within three FSVs and three OEMs, this study aims to investigate the associated advantages and risks for FSVs, commonalities/differences from the practices of outsourcing to component/module specialists that can be found in other industries and why and for what kind of products FSVs can be appropriate in automotive supply networks. The study contributes to the debate on outsourcing in the automotive industry by providing an original interpretation on why FSVs have recently seen a shakeout with some growing whilst others have faltered.     

Outsourcing in non-developed supplier markets: a lean thinking approach

The benefits organisations can gain from outsourcing include cost savings and higher levels of innovation. On the other hand, outsourcing drawbacks include potential operations and performance issues such as capability and capacity problems. Some large organisations are pursuing the practice of outsourcing, more specifically, targeting global outsourcing from developing and low-wage countries. However, the perception of expected cost saving benefits when outsourcing to low-wage countries does not always reflect reality. A number of companies have failed to achieve the expected cost savings in sourcing from low-wage countries due to operational-level capability. The objective of this study is to develop an extended evaluation method that takes into account operational-level influence factors, in addition to the procurement factors, in the context of non-developed supplier markets. Our extended evaluation method of potential suppliers addressed the paradigm of ‘standard industry recipes’, by encompassing operational-level influence factors and integrating supplier value stream analysis into the evaluation and selection process of outsourcing. A survey was distributed to 369 international manufacturers. Operational levels were categorised into seven latent constructs: Customer Service/Sales, Purchasing, Production Planning and Control, Manufacturing Engineering, Shop Floor and Quality Control, Receiving and Shipping. Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) confirmed the seven constructs, but measuring items were reduced from 39 to 23 significant observed measuring items, compromising the supplier selection framework. Our proposed framework will help practitioners make better informed decisions in outsourcing from non-developed supplier markets.     

分散供应链中混合生产的产品质量战略

利用Tullock竞赛函数对混合生产的产品质量战略进行讨论。研究表明,混合生产会促进产品质量的提升,在一定条件下,制造商的产品质量甚至会高于单一自制下的产品质量;若外包供应商收取的批发价格足够低,制造商更倾向于混合生产而非单一外包和单一自制;实施混合生产可能会伤害外包供应商;制造商偏好烈性较强的质量竞赛,而外包供应商偏好烈性较弱的质量竞赛。     

A genetic algorithm-based model for solving multi-period supplier selection problem with assembly sequence

Under fierce market competition, only products that can meet market demands timely and are competitive can enjoy advantages in the market. Production planning is important in enhancing product competitiveness by effectively reducing both production cost and time. To complete the planning task, a better assembly sequence that includes selecting suitable part suppliers and satisfying the multi-period demands should be designed. In this paper, a mathematical model is presented for dealing with this planning problem, and its objective is to minimise the value of integrated criteria. A hybrid heuristic algorithm, which involves guided genetic algorithm combined with Pareto genetic algorithm, known as Guided-Pareto genetic algorithm (Gu-PGA), is developed for solving the addressed problem. Finally, experiments are conducted to validate the proposed algorithm. The results demonstrate that the Gu-PGA is more effective in solving the multi-period supplier selection problem.     

Production and delivery policies for enhanced supply chain partnerships

Recent research on supply chain management has highlighted the importance of building strong customer–supplier relationships in order to gain competitive advantage. This paper examines the benefits of buyer–supplier partnerships over lot-for-lot, i.e. single setup single delivery (SSSD) systems and suggests two policies that the supplier can pursue in order to meet customers’ needs: (1) Single setup multiple delivery (SSMD), and (2) Multiple setup multiple delivery (MSMD). If its fixed setup cost is relatively high, the supplier would prefer to implement SSMD and produce an entire order with one setup. However, if the supplier can reduce the setup cost and the supplier's capacity is greater than the threshold level (P?=?2D), it is more beneficial for the supplier to implement the multiple setups and multiple deliveries (MSMD) policy, even though he pays more frequent setup costs since the savings in inventory holding costs is greater than the increased setup costs. In the latter case, setup reduction is realized by the knowledge and efficiency gained through frequent setup operations. To provide guidelines for the policy selection, we examine the interactions among variables, such as production capacity, learning rate, and holding costs for both parties. The paper also discusses the benefit sharing plan, which discusses according to the contribution (or sacrifice) each party made to the partnership efforts.     

Bootstrap approach for supplier selection based on production yield

Current manufacturing industries have increased their level of out-sourcing and relied more heavily on their supply chain as a source of competitive advantage. Supplier selection decisions have become an important component of production management. Those decisions have a significant impact on a firm's marketing competition, and suppliers may account for a large portion of the production cost. Production quality is one of the key factors in supplier evaluation. The manual of supplier certification includes a discussion of process capability analysis, which recommends a procedure for evaluating the most prevalent process capability index C _pk. However, the recommended procedure is applicable only when evaluating an individual supplier's performance. In this paper, we apply the bootstrap method to the supplier selection problem. We construct lower confidence intervals for the capability difference and ratio between two given suppliers. Performance comparisons are made among various bootstrap methods in terms of error probability and selection power. For convenience of applications, the sample sizes required for various designated selection power are also tabulated.     

供需随机和资金约束下新创企业的运营决策

考察由OEM供应商、新创企业和需求市场组成的供应链,其中新创企业通过自建产能或向OEM供应商采购来满足市场需求,研究受资金约束的新创企业以股东权益价值最大为目标时产能设置和订货数量的最优决策。研究表明,当债权融资金额无限制时,随着新创企业初始自有资金逐渐增加,新创企业的最优产能先是保持不变,然后逐渐增加,最后下降;当初始资金非常匮乏时完全采用外包策略以及在资金较充分时彻底抛弃外包都不是最佳选择。     

Supply management in assembly systems with random yield and random demand

In this paper, we consider an assembly system where a firm faces random demand for a finished product which is assembled using two critical components. The components are procured from the suppliers who, due to production yield losses, deliver a random fraction of the order quantity. We formulate the exact cost function where the decision variables are the target level of finished products to assemble, and the order quantity of the components from the suppliers. Since the exact cost function is analytically complex to solve, we introduce a modified cost function and derive bounds on the difference in the objective function values. Using the modified cost function, we determine the combined component ordering and production (assembly) decisions for the firm. The benefit of coordinating ordering and assembly decisions is numerically demonstrated by comparing the results with two heuristic policies commonly used in practice. In an extension to the model, we consider the case when the firm has the added option of ordering both the components in a set from a joint supplier. First, we consider the case when the joint supplier is reliable in delivery and obtain dominance conditions on the suppliers to be chosen. The maximum price a firm would be willing to pay to ensure reliable supply of components is determined. Later, we consider the uncertainty in the deliveries from the joint supplier and determine conditions under which there is no diversification, that is, either the individual suppliers are used, or the joint supplier is used, but never both.     

Joint pricing and inventory strategies in a supply chain subject to inventory inaccuracy

This paper focuses on pricing strategies, inventory policies for a supply chain when Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology is adopted to cope with inventory inaccuracy. The supply chain consists of one supplier and one retailer, in which the RFID tag price is shared between the supplier and the retailer. We present and compare the performance differences between a wholesale price contract and a consignment contract when the retailer is the Stackelberg leader and the supplier is the follower. Based on the optimal pricing and inventory decisions, an interesting observation of contract selection is that there are two critical values of inventory available rate such that when the inventory availability is less than the lower value, both the supplier and the retailer prefer a consignment contract; when the inventory availability is greater than the upper value, a wholesale price contract is their best choice; when the inventory availability is between the two values, the supplier prefers a wholesale price contract and the retailer prefers a consignment contract. Additionally, there exist threshold values of RFID tag price and sharing rate to determine the contract preference for the retailer. Furthermore, the profits of both the supplier and the retailer are independent of the RFID tag price sharing rate in a wholesale price contract, and the supplier has the incentive to invest in RFID tag cost in a consignment contract.     

基于讨价还价博弈的ATO供应链零部件生产及补货策略

通过建立ATO供应链中最终产品制造商与其两个供应商间的讨价还价合作模型,研究了ATO供应链的零部件生产补货策略和相应的利润分配策略,并探讨了供应链中各合作主体议价能力对最优解的影响。研究发现,ATO供应链应随着最终产品销售价格的提高而增加零部件产量,随最终产品组装成本或零部件生产成本的提高而减少零部件产量;随着最终产品制造商对其中一个供应商议价能力的增强,该供应商零部件的转移价格及其利润会降低,而另外一个供应商的零部件转移价格和利润会提高;若最终产品制造商比另外一个供应商的议价能力强,其期望利润会得到提高,反之,则会降低。     

Rebate, returns and price protection policies in channel coordination

We study channel coordination policies for products subject to midlife price declines during their short product life cycles. Using a two-period supply chain model consisting of one supplier and one retailer, we identify policies and/or conditions under which the supply chain can be coordinated and a win-win situation can be guaranteed. We also provide algorithms to determine the win-win policy parameters. We show that if there are two purchase opportunities, then under linear or decreasing (the more you buy, the lower price you pay) pricing strategies, there may not exist a win-win policy. Our analysis shows that several findings in the single-period models prevalent in the supply chain research literature to date do not extend to the two-period model with two purchase opportunities. For example, returns policies and revenue sharing contracts are no longer equivalent. Also, quantity discounts may never lead to a win-win situation. In fact, the supplier may need to charge more for large orders in order to achieve a win-win outcome. Finally, the analytical framework of this paper can be applied to situations in which the price is constant but production costs change over time.     

Random yield and coordination mechanisms of a supply chain with emergency backup sourcing

This paper considers a supply chain in which a buyer purchases finished items from a contracting supplier to satisfy a stochastic market demand, where the supplier’s production is subject to random yield. We assume that the buyer can make up the shortage by sourcing from an emergency backup supplier. We develop two Stackelberg game models, i.e. buyer-Stackelberg (BS) model and supplier-Stackelberg (SS) model, and find that the decentralised BS model results in a higher stocking factor of supplier’s input than the decentralised SS model. Compared with BS model, the buyer in SS model performs more explicit order plan, and we find that only when the actual yield of the supplier is insufficient, the buyer would use emergency backup sourcing to make up the shortage. When the manufacturing operation of the supplier is in the good state, the buyer only orders a certain amount and has some leftover. When the actual yield of the supplier is moderate, the buyer uses up every item produced from the supplier regardless of the yield rate. Comparing both channel structures, SS operation is a more effective way of controlling both inventory cost and backup sourcing cost, and it can be beneficial for each player as well as for the whole channel. Finally, we develop the coordination mechanism for each channel to investigate the issues of risk handling and risk sharing for uncertain demand and uncertain yield.