Co-op advertising and pricing models in manufacturer–retailer supply chains

Cooperative (co-op) advertising plays a significant role in marketing programs in conventional supply chains and makes up the majority of promotional budgets in many product lines for both manufacturers and retailers. Nevertheless, most studies to date on co-op advertising have only assumed that the market demand is only influenced by the advertising level but not in any way by the retail price. That is why our work is concerned with co-op advertising and pricing strategies in distribution channels consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer. Four different models are discussed which are based on three non-cooperative games (i.e., Nash, Stackelberg retailer and Stackelberg manufacturer) and one cooperative game. We identify optimal co-op advertising and pricing strategies for both firms mostly analytically but we have to resort to numerical simulations in one case. Comparisons are then made about various outcomes, especially the profits, for all cases. This leads to consider more specifically the cooperation case in which profits are the highest for both the retailer and the manufacturer, and how they should share the extra joint profit achieved by moving to cooperation. We solve this bargain problem using the Nash bargaining model.     

考虑交叉销售的O2O供应链合作广告策略研究

基于网络零售平台与制造商的合作广告实践，运用Stackelberg博弈理论研究了平台交叉销售效应及合作广告引导作用对O2O供应链合作广告决策的影响，并通过数值算例对参与合作广告计划前后渠道成员的决策变量均衡结果和利润进行对比分析，研究发现平台交叉销售效应是影响网络零售平台合作广告计划制定和实施的关键因素，只有当其达到一定水平时，制造商才拥有参与网络零售平台合作广告计划的资格；在一定条件时，合作广告计划能够实现制造商和网络零售平台利润的提升；当平台交叉销售效应较大时，网络零售平台获得的利润大于制造商。     

低碳环境下双渠道供应链线上线下广告策略的微分博弈分析

以一个由绿色制造商与零售商组成的双渠道供应链为研究对象,基于微分博弈分别比较分析集中式决策、采用竞争型广告策略的分散式决策与采用支持型广告策略的分散式决策模型下,双渠道供应链的最优均衡决策与最优利润.研究发现:集中式决策下的最优低碳水平、最优线上与线下广告水平均高于分散式决策,而产品最优销售价格可能高于、等于或低于分散式决策;分散式决策下,采用支持型广告策略的双渠道供应链的产品最优低碳水平、最优销售价格和最优线上广告投入水平与采用竞争型广告策略的双渠道供应链均衡策略一致;一定条件下,支持型广告策略使得分散式双渠道供应链得到Pareto改进,此时的最优线下广告投入水平优于竞争型广告策略下的最优线下广告投入水平.     

制造商竞争与合作下双渠道供应链联合减排的微分博弈分析

以两个制造商与一个零售商组成的双渠道供应链为研究对象,分析制造商竞争与合作模型下供应链的最优均衡策略,并探讨系统关键参数对供应链各成员利润的影响.研究发现,只有当减排效率差异水平满足一定条件时,两制造商才会同时选择合作,且合作模型下制造商的利润总和增大,而减排努力、广告分担率、广告努力和零售商的利润减小.随着传统渠道市场占有率、减排竞争和广告竞争的增大,竞争模型下零售商的利润增大,而合作模型下的利润与广告竞争无关;制造商的利润变化取决于减排效率、网络渠道和传统渠道的边际利润.     

供应链动态合作广告策略

研究产品信誉受广告投入水平影响的供应链合作广告问题,建立具有广告投入水平抑制作用的产品信誉动态模型.通过哈密顿-雅可比-贝尔曼方程分别得到制造商和零售商在分散决策和集中决策下的最优广告策略以及在分散决策下制造商的最优合作广告参与率,比较发现,集中决策下制造商和零售商的最优广告投入水平高于分散决策下的相应值.设计了双边补贴策略来协调供应链.数值仿真实验验证了所得结论的正确性.     

Effects of the pricing and cooperative advertising policies in a two-echelon dual-channel supply chain

The rapid development of e-commerce has reduced the intermediary channels between manufacturers and consumers and changed consumption patterns. However, channel conflicts occur when manufacturers engage in direct sales. Using traditional and direct online channels as its setting, this paper evaluates the impact of price schemes and cooperative advertising mechanisms on dual-channel supply chain competition. Our analysis offers structural and quantitative insights into the interplay between upstream and downstream entities in the supply chain, helping managers to understand the interplay between the upstream and downstream entities of a dual channel structure.     

Online keyword based advertising: Impact of ad impressions on own-channel and cross-channel click-through rates

Keyword-based ads are becoming the dominant form of advertising online as they enable customization and tailoring of messages relevant to potential consumers. Two prominent channels within this sphere are the search channel and the content channel. We empirically examine the interaction between these two channels. Our results indicate significant cannibalization across the two channels as well as significant diminishing returns to impressions within each channel. This suggests that under certain conditions both channels may need to be used to optimize returns to advertising both for advertisers and service providers such as Google. Our game theoretic analysis which builds upon our empirical findings reveals that for intermediate budget values it is optimal to use both channels whereas for very low (very high) budget values it is optimal to use only the content (search) channel. Further as budget increases the advertiser should offer more for ads displayed on the search channel to optimally incentivize the service provider.     

考虑服务的零售商渠道选择与定价策略

面对强势制造商控制网络直销渠道和批发价格，零售商在此不利局面下如何改善自身绩效，针对该问题，构建了零售商提高服务水平和开辟网络渠道的最优定价决策模型。在集中式和Stackelberg分散式两种供应链情形下，研究了零售商开辟和未开辟网络渠道下服务水平对定价策略和各成员利润的影响。研究表明，零售商提高服务水平有利于零售商和制造商以及整个供应链的绩效；开辟网络渠道会提升零售价格，增加零售商和制造商以及整个供应链的利润。     

基于价格歧视的双寡头竞争企业网络广告投放模式测评与策略研究

双寡头竞争企业网络广告投放决策问题是网络营销企业面对的重要决策问题.鉴于此,重点考虑大众广告和定向广告两类网络广告,首先针对广告成本和消费者特征,给出用户群的效用函数和产品空间位置;然后,分别针对客户均匀分布和非均匀分布状况下的两类广告进行测评;最后基于测评结果深入研究定向广告的投放概率和策略选择问题.研究结果显示:无论消费者呈现均匀分布还是非均匀分布,定向广告的投入会使企业获利,但大众广告会同时降低两家竞争企业的利润,使得企业陷入囚徒困境,此外,实施价格歧视总是优于非歧视定价;网络广告的边际投放强度起到双向调节作用,定向广告的投放不总是有利的;当定向广告成本过高时,企业应当采用防御型策略;歧视定价时发放定向广告的数目总是高于非歧视定价.     

基于微分博弈的双渠道广告合作协调策略研究

研究在制造商开通网上和零售渠道的情形下, 供应链成员的广告合作和成本分担对双渠道协调的影响. 研究结果表明, 无论零售商的广告对品牌形象产生何种影响, 制造商分担零售商的部分广告费用均能使得双方的利润优于分散决策的情形, 但不能完全实现双渠道协调. 此外, 当零售商也分担制造商的部分广告费用时, 双方均可以实现完全的协调. 相比于零售商频繁促销产生负面影响的情形, 在不产生负面影响的情况下, 双方能够实现更多的价值.

     

考虑广告投入影响的再制造闭环供应链优化决策博弈模型研究

针对制造/再制造产品的市场竞争与合作问题, 考虑广告投入对产品消费者效用的增长效应及消费者环境偏好的影响, 在构建制造产品和再制造产品的市场需求函数基础上, 应用博弈方法比较分析合作博弈、纳什均衡博弈、Stackelberg主从博弈三种决策模式下制造/再制造产品的最优定价和广告投入策略, 并针对非合作博弈下的效率损失设计了闭环供应链中制造和再制造过程的利益协调机制。数值算例分析表明, 合作博弈决策下供应链总利润最优、制造和再制造产品市场销售价格最高, 而合作博弈和Stackelberg主从博弈都会以牺牲再制造产品利润为代价获得最优利润, 因此再制造部门会偏好纳什均衡博弈, 采取以自身利益最优为目标的竞争策略, 没有动机成为制造部门的跟随者。     

考虑延时效应和记忆效应的供应链广告策略

研究考虑延时效应和记忆效应的供应链广告策略问题,建立泛函微分方程以刻画广告延时和记忆双重效应对产品品牌信誉变化的影响,运用微分对策理论给出制造商和零售商在分散式决策和集中式决策下的最优广告投入水平、广告排期以及相应的产品品牌信誉,并对不同决策机制下供应链成员的均衡策略进行比较分析.研究表明:集中式决策能激励制造商和零售商的广告投入; 延时效应与记忆效应分别影响供应链成员广告时序策略与广告排期策略的制定,同时,还会影响供应链决策机制的选择.     

Vertical cooperative advertising in a retailer duopoly

This paper focuses on optimal pricing and advertising decisions within a two-echelon distribution channel, which consists of one manufacturer and two competing retailers. Assuming an inter-echelon Stackelberg equilibrium, where the manufacturer obtains channel leadership, we compare two different forms of retailer behavior: non-cooperative (Horizontal Nash) and cooperative (Cooperation). While the consumer demand depends both on retail price and advertising, the manufacturer can offer a vertical cooperative advertising program to increase the advertising efforts of his retailers. In order to derive a logically consistent price demand function, we deduce our demand function from the consumers’ utility function. Numerical examples lead to the following main findings: (i) consumers can benefit from retailer-competition, as it reduces retail price; (ii) the manufacturer’s participation in retailers’ advertising will be the highest when there is strong competition and no Cooperation; (iii) a Cooperation does not always yield higher profits for the retailers, but can also produce better results for the manufacturer.     

竞争回收下制造商的回收定价与合作策略

针对传统人工回收和智能回收在回收方式上的差异,考虑消费者对智能回收渠道的选择偏好,分别构建单一传统回收、单一智能回收、双回收渠道下分散决策和集中决策模型,以及制造商分别与传统回收商和智能回收商合作的决策模型,分析了竞争回收下制造商的回收定价与回收合作策略.研究表明:相对于单一回收渠道,双回收渠道竞争会促使传统回收商和智能回收商提高回收价,但会降低回收商的利润;与单一回收渠道相比,双回收渠道下制造商、零售商和供应链的利润会增加,而制造商与回收商合作可进一步提高制造商、零售商和供应链的利润;以双回收渠道分散决策为参照,制造商与传统回收商和智能回收商之间均有合作动机,且制造商与传统回收商合作后的增量利润较大,制造商与智能回收商合作后的增量利润较小.     

Coordination of cooperative advertising models in a one-manufacturer two-retailer supply chain system

This paper considers cooperative advertising issues of a monopolistic manufacturer with competing duopolistic retailers. Four possible game structures (or power configurations), i.e., Stackelberg–Cournot, Stackelberg–Collusion, Nash–Cournot and Nash–Collusion, are discussed. Under each of four game structures, we develop a decision model for the three partners to design the optimal cooperative advertising policies. Through a comparison among the four models, we reveal how cooperative advertising policies and profits of all participants are affected by various competitive behaviors, and then determine whether the partners have any incentives to transit to a different structure. Also presented in the paper are a centralized decision model and a proposed cost-sharing contract, which is able to achieve perfect coordination of the considered channel, where the utility of risk preference is used to determine the fraction of local advertising costs shared by the manufacturer.     

Optimal advertising decisions for promoting retail and online channels in a dynamic framework

Advertising plays an important role in sales promotion in supply chains. In this paper, advertising decisions for retail and online channels respectively, by retailer and manufacturer will be analyzed. The competition between retailer and manufacturer will be modeled by differential game theory, and feedback Nash equilibrium of the game will be obtained. Some insights are provided by using comparative statics. The obtained results show that compatibility factor of a product with online marketing, difference between manufacturer's online price and wholesale price, effectiveness of advertising, marginal profits, and cost of advertising all have significant effects on the advertising decisions in the equilibrium.     

Manufacturer warranty service outsourcing strategies in a dual‐channel supply chain

Warranty management for durable products has received increasing attention in recent years. In addition to conventionally keeping warranty in‐house, more manufacturers choose to outsource warranty service to agents. This paper explores outsourcing strategies for manufacturer warranty services in a dual‐channel supply chain by which the demand‐enhancing service can be undertaken by different supply chain parties. We show the results of three alternative outsourcing strategies for manufacturers whereby (a) the retailer undertakes the service, (b) a third party undertakes the service, and (c) both the retailer and a third party undertake the service simultaneously. According to Stackelberg game theory, we build a two‐echelon supply chain model and discuss the corresponding expressions for supply chain members' equilibrium decisions. Additionally, we compare the profits of each supply chain member and derive interesting managerial insights. When the base market size is relatively large, Scenario R helps the manufacturer and the retailer reach a “win‐win” situation.     

小议广告中的职业符号运用

本文从传播学的角度探讨了职业符号在广告传播中的运用,通过对职业符号在广告中功能的阐述,对职业符号提出了准确性、真实性以及应该符合社会环境和承担社会责任的要求。     

Modeling the clickstream across multiple online advertising channels using a binary logit with Bayesian mixture of normals

The evaluation of online marketing activities using standalone metrics does not explain the development of consumer behavior over time, although it is of primary importance to allocate and optimize financial resources among multiple advertising channels. We develop a binary logit model with a Bayesian mixture approach to demonstrate consumer clickstreams across multiple online advertising channels. Therefore, a detailed user-level dataset from a large financial service provider is analyzed. We find both differences in the effects of repeated advertisement exposure across multiple types of display advertising as well as positive effects of interaction between display and paid search advertising influencing consumer click probabilities. We identify two consumer types with different levels of susceptibility to online advertising (resistant vs. susceptible consumers) and show that the knowledge of consumers individual click probabilities can support companies in managing display advertising campaigns.     

On the coordination of dynamic marketing channels and two-part tariffs

An important result in a static marketing channel is that the manufacturer can reach the vertically integrated channel solution through the use of a two-part wholesale price. This means that the collectively optimal solution is achieved in a decentralized way, i.e., as an equilibrium. This paper investigates under which conditions this result remains valid in a static marketing channel where demand also depends on players’ advertising. Second, it shows that different results are reached when one considers a dynamic marketing channel.