Subjective confidence in perceptual judgments: A test of the self-consistency model.

Two questions about subjective confidence in perceptual judgments are examined: the bases for these judgments and the reasons for their accuracy. Confidence in perceptual judgments has been claimed to rest on qualitatively different processes than confidence in memory tasks. However, predictions from a self-consistency model (SCM), which had been confirmed for general-information questions (Koriat, 2010) and social attitudes (Koriat & Adiv, 2010), are shown to hold true also for perceptual judgments. In SCM, confidence is modeled by the procedure for assessment of statistical level of confidence: For a 2-alternative, forced-choice item, confidence is based on the consistency with which the choice is favored across a sample of representations of the item, and acts as a monitor of the likelihood that a new sample will yield the same choice. Assuming that these representations are drawn from commonly shared populations of representations associated with each item, predictions regarding the basis of confidence were confirmed by results concerning the functions relating confidence and choice latency to interparticipant consensus and to intraparticipant consistency for majority and minority choices. With regard to the confidence-accuracy (C/A) relationship, the consensuality principle, documented for general-knowledge tasks (Koriat, 2008a), was replicated for perceptual judgments: Confidence correlated with the consensuality of the choice rather than with its correctness, suggesting that the C/A correlation is due to the relationship between confidence and self-consistency and is positive only as long as the correct choices are the consistently made choices. SCM provides a general model for the basis and accuracy of confidence judgments across different domains. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Age differences in the accuracy of confidence judgments

Age differences in accuracy were investigated by having older (M = 68.6 years) and younger (M = 21.5 years) adults make confidence judgments about the correctness of their responses to two sets of general knowledge items. For one set, prior to making their confidence judgments, subjects made mental strategy judgements indicating how they had selected their answers (i.e., they guessed, used intuition, made an inference, or immediately recognized the response as correct). Results indicate that older subjects were more accurate than younger subjects in predicting the correctness of their responses; however, making mental strategy judgments did not result in increased accuracy for either age group. Additional analyses explored the relationship between accuracy and other individual difference variables. The results of this investigation are consistent with recent theories of postformal cognitive development that suggest older adults have greater insight into the limitations of their knowledge.     

Confidence level and feeling of knowing in question answering: The weight of inferential processes.

What are the sources of metamemory judgments in question answering? Exp 1 showed that the level of confidence in the correctness of a recalled answer (CL) is a reliable measure (test–retest G?=?.87) and a valid predictor of recognition (G?=?.55/.58). In contrast, the feeling of knowing the correct answer (FOK), although reliable (G?=?.82), is a poor predictor of recognition (G?=?.11). In Exp 2 it was discovered that FOK levels are more highly correlated with beliefs about what should be known than are CL judgments. Controlling for the relationship between FOK and those beliefs eliminates any correlation between FOK and recognition (G drops from .27 to .08), which is not the case with CL (G remains as high as .52). These data suggest that CL is based on the retrieval of at least some elements of the right answer, whereas FOK may be derived from recency or familiarity effects elicited by the question itself. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Clever hands: Uncontrolled intelligence in facilitated communication.

Five studies examined how people who are answering questions on behalf of another person may use their own knowledge to answer correctly while attributing authorship of their answers to the other. Experiments 1 and 2 found that participants instructed to answer yes/no questions randomly were unable to do so. They were more often correct on easy than hard questions, and extended opportunity and incentive did not reduce this effect. Experiments 3-5 found similar correctness for participants who were asked to answer yes/no questions by sensing either the ostensible keyboard finger movements or unvoiced inclinations of another person who had been admonished not to answer, and who was in fact a confederate and was not even given the questions. In this paradigm, the answers were often attributed to the other. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Confidence in Individual and Group Decision Making: When "Two Heads" Are Worse Than One.

The authors investigated students' accuracy and confidence judgments for course-related material in college classrooms. Under conditions of group work and instructor feedback, students produced higher exam accuracy scores working in groups than alone but at a cost of increased confidence for groups' wrong answers. Groups' high confidence for wrong answers generated the case when "two heads are worse than one." Students participating in groups that arrived at wrong exam answers gave higher confidence when wrong and lower confidence when correct for repeated items on a final exam. "Two heads" groups when wrong had no adverse effect on students' accuracy for repeated exam items. An intervention of lecture and readings on confidence calibration, metamemory, and overconfidence did not improve the students' accuracy-confidence judgments. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Metamemory judgments of the origin and content of course information: Comparing text and lecture materials.

The accuracy and relations between students' specific and general knowledge of content and origin were examined. Students answered multiple-choice questions derived from the text, lecture, or both sources, decided whether each question originated from one of these sources or from their own conclusions, decided whether they had lecture information in their notes, and rated their confidence in these judgments. The three types of questions were equally difficult to answer but were significantly different in the accuracy and confidence of origin judgments, and confidence in the answers' correctness. Students' origin judgments were equivalent when they correctly and incorrectly answered questions. Students who knew fewer correct answers tended to be more confused about the origin of their knowledge. The dissociation between origin and content knowledge is discussed within M. K. Johnson and C. L. Raye's (see record 1981-06694-001) reality-monitoring model, with emphasis on the inference and retrieval processes involved in judging the origin of one's knowledge. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The role of memory for past test in the underconfidence with practice effect.

According to the Memory for Past Test (MPT) heuristic, judgments of learning (JOLs) may be based, in part, on memory for the correctness of answers on a previous test. The authors explored MPT as the source of the underconfidence with practice effect (UWP; A. Koriat, L. Sheffer, & H. Ma'ayan, 2002), whereby Trial 1 overconfidence switches to underconfidence by Trial 2. Immediate and delayed JOLs were contrasted because only immediate JOLs demonstrate UWP. Consistent with MPT for immediate JOLs, Trial 1 test performance better predicted Trial 2 JOLs than did Trial 2 test performance. Delayed JOLs showed the reverse. Furthermore, items forgotten on Trial 1 but remembered on Trial 2 contributed disproportionately to UWP, but only with immediate JOLs. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

People's hypercorrection of high-confidence errors: Did they know it all along?

This study investigated the “knew it all along” explanation of the hypercorrection effect. The hypercorrection effect refers to the finding that when people are given corrective feedback, errors that are committed with high confidence are easier to correct than low-confidence errors. Experiment 1 showed that people were more likely to claim that they knew it all along when they were given the answers to high-confidence errors as compared with low-confidence errors. Experiments 2 and 3 investigated whether people really did know the correct answers before being told or whether the claim in Experiment 1 was mere hindsight bias. Experiment 2 showed that (a) participants were more likely to choose the correct answer in a 2nd guess multiple-choice test when they had expressed an error with high rather than low confidence and (b) that they were more likely to generate the correct answers to high-confidence as compared with low-confidence errors after being told they were wrong and to try again. Experiment 3 showed that (c) people were more likely to produce the correct answer when given a 2-letter cue to high- rather than low-confidence errors and that (d) when feedback was scaffolded by presenting the target letters 1 by 1, people needed fewer such letter prompts to reach the correct answers when they had committed high- rather than low-confidence errors. These results converge on the conclusion that when people said that they knew it all along, they were right. This knowledge, no doubt, contributes to why they are able to correct those high-confidence errors so easily. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

The realism in older people's confidence judgments of answers to general knowledge questions.

The study investigated 2 aspects of the accuracy (i.e., realism) of confidence judgments of persons age 60–93 years (N = 1,384) regarding their answers to general knowledge questions. These aspects are the level of confidence (calibration) in relation to the proportion of correct answers and the ability to discriminate between correct and incorrect answers by means of confidence judgments. No age differences were found for either of the 2 aspects. Gender differences were found for proportion of correct answers and confidence but not for the realism in the confidence judgments. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Metamemory through the adult life span.

Metamemory is accurate if it returns correct information about the contents in store. It is efficient if it appropriately controls search durations so that more time is allocated to seeking information actually present, and less to information actually absent. 36 adults in 3 age groups (19–22, 44–53, and 65–74 yrs) answered questions on heterogeneous topics, and their responses were timed. Next, metamemorial judgments were made for each S's set of unanswered questions. The same items were then attempted in multiple-choice format, and confidence ratings in the answers were taken. All age groups showed comparable ability to retrieve answers from memory. All showed accurate and efficient metamemory, with no age differences in either. A signal detection analysis raised the possibility that metamemorial sensitivity increases with age. The data also suggest caution among the elderly in suppressing available but low-confidence answers. (18 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Hindsight bias in an application of the Angoff method for setting cutoff scores.

This study used the hindsight bias literature to examine the effects of providing test item answers on the level and predictive accuracy of Angoff cutoff score judgments. Subjects, randomly assigned to either an answers or a no-answers group, made Angoff judgments on items testing knowledge of driving law and vehicle operation. Items were categorized into subtests based on empirical difficulty. Results indicated that providing answers interacted with subtest difficulty to influence the level of Angoff judgments. On the easiest subtest, those in the answers group made higher judgments than did those in the no-answers group; the reverse effect was observed on the most difficult subtest. Subjects in the answers group more accurately predicted empirical item difficulties than did subjects in the no-answers group. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Parents' beliefs about their children's cognitive abilities.

Examined mothers' judgments of their children's cognitive abilities and the relation between such judgments and the child's developmental level. 49 1st-grade children responded to tasks drawn from either the Piagetian literature or the Stanford-Binet IQ tests. Ss also completed a vocabulary test drawn from the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT). Subsequently, each S's mother was asked various questions about probable response, both for her own child and for children in general. Results reveal that mothers were more accurate in predicting their child's success or failure on the IQ items than on the Piaget items. In both conditions, overestimations of ability were more common than underestimations. Estimates of age of mastery also showed overestimation, in some cases by several years. Data collected from 12 fathers indicate that fathers' patterns of response were similar to those of their wives. The correlations between accurate predictions by the mother and correct answers by the child were .85 in the Piaget condition and .49 in the IQ condition. Findings are compatible with the match hypothesis, which posits that the mother's knowledge of her child enables her to create an optimally challenging environment. (11 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Personality item difficulty and acquiescence.

This study deals with relations between acquiescence and 3 measures of personality item difficulty: controversiality, response latency, and confidence in accuracy of answer. Median ratings of confidence in answers to 110 MMPI items correlated -.62 with a measure of item controversiality, confirming the hypothesis that controversial items tend to be difficult to answer. Low-confidence items elicited acquiescence. In a 2nd sample of Ss, items low in confidence took longer to answer than contrasting high-confidence items. The low-confidence long-latency items were affected by acquiescence; the others were not. Results show that acquiescence occurs with difficult rather than easy inventory material. Response latency and subjective confidence seem logically superior to controversiality as measures of item difficulty. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Cognitive certainty in children: Effects of concept, developmental level, and method of assessment.

Examined the certainty with which children make their judgments on concrete-operational tasks. Ss were 60 2nd graders and 36 5th graders; the tasks involved various forms of conservation and transitivity. Three methods of assessing certainty were included: a rating scale, a betting game, and a feedback phase in which the child responded to a disconfirmation of his answer. Ss who had given operational answers expressed strong certainty in their judgments on both the rating and betting measures. The certainty expressed during the feedback phase, as measured by challenges to the disconfirmation, was considerably less. Operational answers were accompanied by greater certainty than were nonoperational answers. Developmental changes in certainty among operational Ss were infrequent, as were interconcept differences in certainty. There was evidence, however, that conservation of number was the concept held with greatest certainty. Results are discussed in terms of J. Piaget's (1971) claim that concepts of conservation and transitivity are experienced as logically necessary truths. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Age-trend-related differences in tasks involving conjunctive probabilistic reasoning.

Conjunctive probabilistic reasoning has been studied at different ages to ascertain whether the conjunction fallacy is due to a task demand misinterpretation. Such a misinterpretation might occur because a task that requires a comparison between a superordinate class A and a subordinate class A&B is mistakenly interpreted as requiring a comparison between the two complementary subordinate classes of A (i.e., A&B and A¬B). Children (7- and 10-year-olds) and adults were required to make conjunctive probability judgments about problems for which explicit objective probabilities were provided. The total number of A items was kept constant and the frequencies of the A&B and of the A¬B items varied across problems. When the number of A&B items was smaller than the number of A¬B items, the frequency of congruent responses increased with age. When the number of A&B items was greater or equal to that of the A¬B items, the frequency of correct answers decreased. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Highly confident but wrong: Gender differences and similarities in confidence judgments.

Although gender differences are fairly consistent when people report their general confidence, much less is known about such differences when individuals assess the degree of confidence they have in their ability to answer any particular test question. The objective of this research was to investigate gender differences in item-specific confidence judgments. Data were collected from 3 psychology courses containing 70 men and 181 women. After answering each item on course exams, students indicated their confidence that their answer to that item was correct. Results showed that gender differences in confidence are dependent on the context (whether items were correct or wrong) and on the domain being tested. Moreover, although both men and women were overconfident, undergraduate men were especially overconfident when incorrect. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A comparison of three predictors of an individual's memory performance: The individual's feeling of knowing versus the normative feeling of knowing versus base-rate item difficulty.

Compared the memory performance predictions of 168 undergraduates with normative item-difficulty predictions and with normative feeling-of-knowing (FOK) predictions. Ss attempted to recall the answers to general-information questions, made FOK judgments on nonrecalled items, and were subsequently administered a criterion test (relearning, perceptual identification, or 1 of 2 versions of recognition). Results indicate that, for predicting an S's criterion performance, the S's own FOK predictions were intermediate between 2 kinds of normative predictions: Ss' FOK predictions were more accurate than predictions derived from normative FOK ratings but were less accurate than predictions derived from base-rate item difficulty (normative probabilities of correct recall). Subsidiary analyses showed that factors other than unreliability were responsible for the partial inaccuracy of Ss' FOK. Possible ways to improve the accuracy of an individual's FOK predictions are discussed. (32 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Magnesium and the transport system

For the purpose of studying the sex differences of the human face we collected five separate images, which consist of several parts of the face, from frontal view photographs of 48 male and 52 female college students. We traced outlines of their faces with simple lines (traced items), and made reproductions of the photographs of their eyes, mouth and nose by using a copying machine (reproduced items). The test subjects were 16 males and 8 females. They looked at parts of the face shown in each image, and categorized them individually by judging on their sex. Then, we calculated the percentages of correct judgments (percentage correct) for each image. By comparing the percentage correct between male and female we concluded that the sex of the subjects did not affect the results of their judgments. In the traced items the percentage correct for the face as a whole, which contained the outlines of the eyes, mouth, nose and the lower jaw, was 69%, but it decreased to 61% when the outline of the lower jaw was removed. Hence, the outline of the lower jaw apparently has a characteristic shape easily noticed by males. In the reproduced items the percentage correct was 65% for the eyes, 68% for the mouth and 58% for the nose. The mouth, therefore, has more distinguishing characteristics than the eyes or nose, especially with females. On the other hand, there is no correlation between the percentage correct for the eye, mouth and nose items. Hence, we concluded that the sexual specificity for the shape of the young Japanese face appears on their parts independently.     

Regulation of memory accuracy with multiple answers: The plurality option.

We report two experiments that investigated the regulation of memory accuracy with a new regulatory mechanism: the plurality option. This mechanism is closely related to the grain-size option but involves control over the number of alternatives contained in an answer rather than the quantitative boundaries of a single answer. Participants were presented with a slideshow depicting a robbery (Experiment 1) or a murder (Experiment 2), and their memory was tested with five-alternative multiple-choice questions. For each question, participants were asked to generate two answers: a single answer consisting of one alternative and a plural answer consisting of the single answer and two other alternatives. Each answer was rated for confidence (Experiment 1) or for the likelihood of being correct (Experiment 2), and one of the answers was selected for reporting. Results showed that participants used the plurality option to regulate accuracy, selecting single answers when their accuracy and confidence were high, but opting for plural answers when they were low. Although accuracy was higher for selected plural than for selected single answers, the opposite pattern was evident for confidence or likelihood ratings. This dissociation between confidence and accuracy for selected answers was the result of marked overconfidence in single answers coupled with underconfidence in plural answers. We hypothesize that these results can be attributed to overly dichotomous metacognitive beliefs about personal knowledge states that cause subjective confidence to be extreme. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Developmental aspects of the feeling of knowing.

Prior reports that feeling-of-knowing (FOK) accuracy increases through childhood and remains constant during adulthood are inconclusive because (a) they used absolute FOK judgments that can be contaminated by differences in the threshold for claiming to know, (b) they used measures of FOK accuracy that are not invariant across different degrees of recognition-test difficulty, and (c) they did not rule out the possibility that age-related differences in FOK accuracy may be caused by changes in the reliability of FOK judgments. We avoided these methodological problems in two studies by using relative FOK judgments, by computing Goodman-Kruskal gamma coefficients to assess FOK accuracy, and by assessing the test–retest reliability of the subjects' FOK judgments. We found that 6-year-olds had less reliable FOK judgments but greater FOK accuracy than 10-year-olds or 18-year-olds. Moreover, 18- and 70-year-olds had equally reliable FOK judgments and equivalent FOK accuracy. Possible reasons for the greater FOK accuracy of youngsters included their lower rate of commission errors and more frequent recognition of correct answers for their commissions. Implications are drawn for the study of metacognitive development. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)