How people interpret conditionals: Shifts toward the conditional event.

We investigated how people interpret conditionals and how stable their interpretation is over a long series of trials. Participants were shown the colored patterns on each side of a 6-sided die and were asked how sure they were that a conditional holds of the side landing upward when the die is randomly thrown. Participants were presented with 71 trials consisting of all combinations of binary dimensions of shape (e.g., circles and squares) and color (e.g., blue and red) painted onto the sides of each die. In 2 experiments (N? = 66, N? = 65), the conditional event was the dominant interpretation, followed by conjunction, and material conditional responses were negligible. In both experiments, the percentage of participants giving a conditional event response increased from around 40% at the beginning of the task to nearly 80% at the end, with most participants shifting from a conjunction interpretation. The shift was moderated by the order of shape and color in each conditional's antecedent and consequent: Participants were more likely to shift if the antecedent referred to a color. In Experiment 2 we collected response times: Conditional event interpretations took longer to process than conjunction interpretations (mean difference = 500 ms). We discuss implications of our results for mental models theory and probabilistic theories of reasoning. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Lexical selection is not by competition: A reinterpretation of semantic interference and facilitation effects in the picture-word interference paradigm.

The dominant view in the field of lexical access in speech production maintains that selection of a word becomes more difficult as the levels of activation of nontarget words increase-selection by competition. The authors tested this prediction in two sets of experiments. First, the authors show that participants are faster to name pictures of objects (e.g., "bed") in the context of semantically related verb distractors (e.g., sleep) compared with unrelated verb distractors (e.g., shoot). In the second set of experiments, the authors show that target naming latencies (e.g., "horse") are, if anything, faster for within-category semantically close distractor words (e.g., zebra) than for within-category semantically far distractor words (e.g., whale). In the context of previous research, these data ground a new empirical generalization: As distractor words become semantically closer to the target concepts-all else being equal-target naming is facilitated. This fact means that lexical selection does not involve competition, and consequently, that the semantic interference effect does not reflect a lexical level process. This conclusion has important implications for models of lexical access and interpretations of Stroop-like interference effects. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Attributions as inferences and explanations: Conjunction effects.

When asked to estimate the probability of an interpretation for an event, observers may either assess whether the event can give rise to the interpretation (an inference set) or assess whether the interpretation can give rise to the event (an explanation set). These two strategies may moderate the conjunction effects (Leddo, Abelson, & Gross, 1984)—attributors' tendency to assign lower probabilities to single-reason interpretations than to their conjunctions. Our two studies showed that explanation-set instructions (e.g., "assess the probability that the interpretation could be the reason for the event") produced stronger conjunction effects than inference-set instructions (e.g., "assess the probability that the interpretation could be inferred from the event"). This Set (inference or explanation)?×?Reason (multiple or single) interaction was not affected by whether the events involved voluntary or involuntary behavior or by whether they described events that happened or failed to happen. In a third study, we found that subjects in an inference set were more likely to report that they estimated probability of the interpretation (as opposed to probability of the behavior) than were subjects in an explanation set. The extent to which the explanation set may account for conjunction effects obtained in other studies was discussed. Possible implications and determinants of the inference-explanation distinction were also considered. (19 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Processing ambiguous verbs: Evidence from eye movements.

In 2 eye-tracking experiments, participants read verbs that had 2 (unrelated) meanings or 2 (related) senses in contexts that disambiguated before or after the verb, to the dominant or subordinate interpretation. A 3rd experiment used unambiguous verbs. The results indicated that the language processor used information about context in the early stages of resolving meaning ambiguities but only during integration for sense ambiguities. Effects of preference were delayed for both types of verbs. The results contrast with findings concerning the processing of nouns (e.g., K. Rayner & S. A. Duffy, 1986). For meaning ambiguities, the authors argue that delays in resolution allow both meanings to reach a high level of activation, thus reducing effects of frequency. For sense ambiguities, the authors argue that the processor does not access multiple senses but activates one underspecified meaning and uses context to home in on the appropriate sense. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Priming Prepositional-Phrase Attachment During Comprehension.

Strong evidence suggests that prior syntactic context affects language production (e.g., J. K. Bock, 1986). The authors report 4 experiments that used an expression-picture matching task to investigate whether it also affects ambiguity resolution in comprehension. All experiments examined the interpretation of prepositional phrases that were ambiguous between high and low attachment. After reading a prime expression with a high-attached interpretation, participants tended to interpret an ambiguous prepositional phrase in a target expression as highly attached if it contained the same verb as the prime (Experiment 1), but not if it contained a different verb (Experiment 2). They also tended to adopt the high-attached interpretation after producing a prime with the high-attached interpretation that included the same verb (Experiment 3). Finally, they were faster to adopt a high-attached interpretation after reading an expression containing the same verb that was disambiguated to the high-attached versus the low-attached interpretation (Experiment 4). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A is for apple: Mnemonic symbols hinder the interpretation of algebraic expressions.

This study examined how literal symbols affect students' understanding of algebraic expressions. Middle school students (N = 322) were randomly assigned to 1 of 3 conditions in which they were asked to interpret an expression (e.g., 4c + 3b) in a story problem. Each literal symbol represented the price of an item. In the c-and-b condition, the symbols used were the 1st letters of the items (e.g., price of a cake in dollars = c; price of a brownie in dollars = b). In the other 2 conditions, c and b were replaced with nonmnemonic English letters (x and y) or Greek letters (Φ and Ψ). Incorrect interpretations of the expression were most common among students in the c-and-b condition. Moreover, students in this condition were more likely than students in the other conditions to misinterpret the symbols as labels for objects (e.g., c stands for cake). An analysis of participating students' textbooks revealed that mnemonic symbols were used correctly and were not uncommon. Results suggest that the use of mnemonic symbols may hinder students' interpretation of algebraic expressions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Semantic constraints on word learning: proper names and adjectives

4 experiments examined 3- and 4-year-olds' interpretations of novel words applied to familial objects in the sentence frame, "This Y is X," where X is a novel word, and Y is a familiar basic-level count noun (e.g., "dog," "cup"). These novel words are ambiguous and could be interpreted either as proper names (e.g., "Fred") or as adjectives/mass nouns (e.g., "red"/"lead"). The experiments addressed 2 questions. First, do children appreciate that the words can be construed either as proper names referring to individuals or as adjectives/mass nouns referring to salient properties/material kinds? The results showed that children could easily make either interpretation. Second, what factors affect children's tendency to make either a proper name or an adjective/mass noun interpretation? In the experiments, children learned the novel words for a range of animals and artifacts. Most children who learned the words for typical pets (e.g., a bird) made proper name interpretations, as did the majority of those who learned the words for certain non-pet animals (e.g., a caterpillar) described as possessed by someone, but only about half of those who learned the words for such non-pet animals not so described. Very few children who learned the words for either simple (e.g., a shoe) or complex (e.g., a boat) artifacts made proper name interpretations. The results provide clear evidence of the role of semantic information in constraining children's interpretation of a novel word, and they help to refine an understanding of what counts as a nameable individual for preschoolers.     

Expectations and interpretations during causal learning.

In existing models of causal induction, 4 types of covariation information (i.e., presence/absence of an event followed by presence/absence of another event) always exert identical influences on causal strength judgments (e.g., joint presence of events always suggests a generative causal relationship). In contrast, we suggest that, due to expectations developed during causal learning, learners give varied interpretations to covariation information as it is encountered and that these interpretations influence the resulting causal beliefs. In Experiments 1A–1C, participants' interpretations of observations during a causal learning task were dynamic, expectation based, and, furthermore, strongly tied to subsequent causal judgments. Experiment 2 demonstrated that adding trials of joint absence or joint presence of events, whose roles have been traditionally interpreted as increasing causal strengths, could result in decreased overall causal judgments and that adding trials where one event occurs in the absence of another, whose roles have been traditionally interpreted as decreasing causal strengths, could result in increased overall causal judgments. We discuss implications for traditional models of causal learning and how a more top-down approach (e.g., Bayesian) would be more compatible with the current findings. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Verb-specific constraints in sentence processing: Separating effects of lexical preference from garden-paths.

Immediate effects of verb-specific syntactic (subcategorization) information were found in a cross-modal naming experiment, a self-paced reading experiment, and an experiment in which eye movements were monitored. In the reading studies, syntactic misanalysis effects in sentence complements (e.g., "The student forgot the solution was…") occurred at the verb in the complement (e.g., was) for matrix verbs typically used with noun phrase complements but not for verbs typically used with sentence complements. In addition, a complementizer effect for sentence-complement-biased verbs was not due to syntactic misanalysis but was correlated with how strongly a particular verb prefers to be followed by the complementizer that. The results support models that make immediate use of lexically specific constraints, especially constraint-based models, but are problematic for lexical filtering models. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Situation models and abstract ownership relations.

Six experiments used a fan-effect paradigm to test whether people can use the abstract relation of ownership to help integrate information into situation models. People studied sentences of the form The [person] owns/is buying the [object] for a later recognition test. The integration of sentences into a situation model (as evidenced by an attenuated or absent fan effect) was observed when the verb phrase referred to a specific event (is buying) and the objects could all be bought in the same place (e.g., a drugstore). This organization did not occur either when the verb phrase referred to general ownership (owns) or when the items were unlikely to be purchased in a single location (e.g., television and car). It was concluded that although abstract relations can be used to segregate information into sets that can be integrated into situation models, this integration is more likely when it can be embedded within a spatial-temporal framework. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Review of The Psychological Foundations of Culture.

In this article, I review the book by Crandall and Schaller (see record 2003-88101-000), which seeks to reveal how culture is influenced by processes operating at the individual level (e.g., cognitions, goals, information processing strategies) as well as at the interpersonal level (e.g., communication, social influence). The book draws together authors from a number of cognate disciplines to address the issue of behaviour-culture relationships, with an emphasis on how the former might allow us to better understand the origin, development, and distribution of the latter. While the book does deal with the "flip side" of culture-behaviour relationships, it is not unique in doing so; in my view, the field already has a better sense of balance than this book claims. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Verb aspect and the activation of event knowledge.

The authors show that verb aspect influences the activation of event knowledge with 4 novel results. First, common locations of events (e.g., arena) are primed following verbs with imperfective aspect (e.g., was skating) but not verbs with perfect aspect (e.g., had skated). Second, people generate more locative prepositional phrases as completions to sentence fragments with imperfective than those with perfect aspect. Third, the amplitude of the N400 component to location nouns varies as a function of aspect and typicality, being smallest for imperfective sentences with highly expected locations and largest for imperfective sentences with less expected locations. Fourth, the amplitude of a sustained frontal negativity spanning prepositional phrases is larger following perfect than following imperfective aspect. Taken together, these findings suggest a dynamic interplay between event knowledge and the linguistic stream. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The processing of metonymy: Evidence from eye movements.

The authors investigated the time course of the processing of metonymic expressions in comparison with literal ones in 2 eye-tracking experiments. Experiment 1 considered the processing of sentences containing place-for-institution metonymies such as the convent in That blasphemous woman had to answer to the convent; it was found that such expressions were of similar difficulty to sentences containing literal interpretations of the same expressions. In contrast, expressions without a relevant metonymic interpretation caused immediate difficulty. Experiment 2 found similar results for place-for-event metonymies such as A lot of Americans protested during Vietnam, except that the difficulty with expressions without a relevant metonymic interpretation was somewhat delayed. The authors argue that these findings are incompatible with models of figurative language processing in which either the literal sense is accessed first or the figurative sense is accessed first. Instead, they support an account in which both senses can be accessed immediately, perhaps through a single under specified representation. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Attributions as inferences and explanations: Effects on discounting.

Observers assessing the probability of an interpretation for a behavioral event may (a) assess the probability that certain inferences can be drawn from the event (inference set) or (b) assess the probability that some explanation can cause the event (explanation set). We suggested that inference set subjects would be more likely than explanation set subjects to discount less plausible interpretations in favor of more plausible interpretations. In three studies observers either estimated the probability that some inferences can be drawn from an event or estimated the probability that some explanation can be the cause for the event. As predicted, the inference set produced a higher level of discounting. Studies 1 and 3 also showed that future-oriented observers made attributions similar to those made in the inference set. However, this effect was open to alternative interpretations in Study 1 and failed to reach statistical significance in Study 3. There was also an indication that inference set subjects were more likely to make correspondent attributions. Additional tests of the effects of time orientation and the possible relation between the inference–explanation distinction and actor–observer differences were discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Object individuation in infancy: the use of featural information in reasoning about occlusion events

Recent findings by Xu and Carey (1996) indicate that, after seeing two distinct objects (e.g., a duck and a ball) emerge on the opposite sides of a screen, 10-month-olds show no surprise when the screen is removed to reveal one (e.g., a duck) as opposed to two objects (e.g., a duck and a ball). The authors took their results to mean that 10-month-olds are unable to use featural information to individuate objects. The present research examined a different interpretation of the results. This interpretation was based on a distinction between event mapping, in which infants see a sequence of two distinct events and judge whether the two are consistent, and event monitoring, in which infants see a single event and judge whether successive portions of the event are consistent. The present research contrasted infants' performances in event-mapping tasks in which they saw first an occlusion and then a no-occlusion situation (as in Xu & Carey) and in event-monitoring tasks in which they saw only an occlusion situation. It was hypothesized that infants would be more likely to give evidence of correct individuation when tested with the event-monitoring as opposed to the event-mapping tasks. Eight experiments were conducted with infants ages 7.5 to 11.5 months. These experiments yielded two main findings. First, when tested with an event-monitoring task, even 7.5-month-olds give evidence that they can use featural information to individuate the objects involved in an occlusion event. Second, when tested with an event-mapping task, even 9.5-month-olds give evidence that they can use featural information to interpret an occlusion event as long as the event is made extremely simple. These findings give weight to the distinction between event mapping and monitoring and more generally begin to shed light on the fundamental processes involved in infants' formation and use of event representations.     

A constraint-based lexicalist account of the subject/object attachment preference

When a noun phrase could either be the object of the preceding verb or the subject of a new clause or a sentence complement, readers and listeners show a strong preference to parse the noun phrase as the object of the verb. This can result in clear garden paths for sentences such as The student read the book was stolen and While the student read the book was stolen. Even when the verb does not permit a noun phrase complement, some processing difficulty is still found. This has led some theorists to propose models in which initial attachments are lexically blind, with lexical information subsequently used as a filter to evaluate and revise initial analyses. In contrast, we show that these results emerge naturally from constraint-based lexicalist models. We present a modeling experiment with a simple recurrent network that was trained to predict upcoming complements for a sample of verbs taken from the Penn Treebank corpus. The model exhibits an object bias and it also shows effects of verb frequency which are similar to those found in the psycholinguistic literature.     

The Pleasures of Uncertainty: Prolonging Positive Moods in Ways People Do Not Anticipate.

The authors hypothesized that uncertainty following a positive event prolongs the pleasure it causes and that people are generally unaware of this effect of uncertainty. In 3 experimental settings, people experienced a positive event (e.g., received an unexpected gift of a dollar coin attached to an index card) under conditions of certainty or uncertainty (e.g., it was easy or difficult to make sense of the text on the card). As predicted, people's positive moods lasted longer in the uncertain conditions. The results were consistent with a pleasure paradox, whereby the cognitive processes used to make sense of positive events reduce the pleasure people obtain from them. Forecasters seemed unaware of this paradox; they overwhelmingly preferred to be in the certain conditions and tended to predict that they would be in better moods in these conditions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Thematic role focusing by participle inflections: Evidence from conceptual combination.

The authors examined how people integrate knowledge of agents and patients of events with the temporal and causal properties of present and past participles to constrain interpretation of isolated participle-noun phrases like arresting cop and arrested crook. Good-agent head nouns were more easily combined with present participles (e.g., arresting cop) than with past participles (e.g., arrested cop), and the reverse was true for good patients. Furthermore, present-participle good-patient phrases (e.g., serving customer) were often interpreted as verb phrases. This research provides further evidence of the interaction between morphosyntactic cues and world knowledge of events in language comprehension. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Relative use of necessity and sufficiency information in causal judgments about natural categories.

Participants in 4 studies placed less emphasis on necessity information (instances when the event occurred but the target factor was absent) than sufficiency information (instances when the target factor was present but the event did not occur) when the target factor corresponded to a natural kind category (e.g., race or species) in comparison with an artificial category (e.g., preferences or facial features) or an artifactual category (e.g., product type). Results were not due to differences in familiarity, prior causal beliefs, or ease of imagining the class of instances, but instead derived from less willingness to search for alternative explanations when the target explanation was based on a natural kind category in comparison with artificial or artifactual categories. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Configural information in facial expression perception.

Composite facial expressions were prepared by aligning the top half of one expression (e.g., anger) with the bottom half of another (e.g., happiness). Experiment 1 shows that participants are slower to identify the expression in either half of these composite images relative to a "noncomposite" control condition in which the 2 halves are misaligned. This parallels the composite effect for facial identity (A. W. Young, D. Hellawell, & D. C. Hay, 1987), and like its identity counterpart, the effect is disrupted by inverting the stimuli (Experiment 2). Experiment 3 shows that no composite effect is found when the top and bottom sections contain different models' faces posing the same expression; this serves to exclude many nonconfigural interpretations of the composite effect (e.g., that composites are more "attention-grabbing" than noncomposites). Finally, Experiment 4 demonstrates that the composite effects for identity and expression operate independently of one another. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)