On the psychology of the recognition heuristic: Retrieval primacy as a key determinant of its use.

The recognition heuristic is a prime example of a boundedly rational mind tool that rests on an evolved capacity, recognition, and exploits environmental structures. When originally proposed, it was conjectured that no other probabilistic cue reverses the recognition-based inference (D. G. Goldstein & G. Gigerenzer, 2002). More recent studies challenged this view and gave rise to the argument that recognition enters inferences just like any other probabilistic cue. By linking research on the heuristic with research on recognition memory, the authors argue that the retrieval of recognition information is not tantamount to the retrieval of other probabilistic cues. Specifically, the retrieval of subjective recognition precedes that of an objective probabilistic cue and occurs at little to no cognitive cost. This retrieval primacy gives rise to 2 predictions, both of which have been empirically supported: Inferences in line with the recognition heuristic (a) are made faster than inferences inconsistent with it and (b) are more prevalent under time pressure. Suspension of the heuristic, in contrast, requires additional time, and direct knowledge of the criterion variable, if available, can trigger such suspension. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Models of ecological rationality: The recognition heuristic.

[Correction Notice: An erratum for this article was reported in Vol 109(4) of Psychological Review (see record 2010-04336-001). Due to circumstances that were beyond the control of the authors, the studies reported in "Models of Ecological Rationality: The Recognition Heuristic," by Daniel G. Goldstein and Gerd Gigerenzer (Psychological Review, 2002, Vol. 109, No. 1, pp. 75-90) overlap with studies reported in "The Recognition Heuristic: How Ignorance Makes Us Smart," by the same authors (in Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart, 1999, G. Gigerenzer & P. M. Todd, Eds., pp. 37-59, Oxford University Press) and with studies reported in "Inference From Ignorance: The Recognition Heuristic" (D. G. Goldstein, 1998, in Proceedings of the 20th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, 407-411, Erlbaum). In addition, Figure 3 in the Psychological Review article (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002) was originally published in the book chapter (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 1999) and should have carried a note saying that it was used by permission of Oxford University Press.] One view of heuristics is that they are imperfect versions of optimal statistical procedures considered too complicated for ordinary minds to carry out. In contrast, the authors consider heuristics to be adaptive strategies that evolved in tandem with fundamental psychological mechanisms. The recognition heuristic, arguably the most frugal of all heuristics, makes inferences from patterns of missing knowledge. This heuristic exploits a fundamental adaptation of many organisms: the vast, sensitive, and reliable capacity for recognition. The authors specify the conditions under which the recognition heuristic is successful and when it leads to the counter-intuitive less-is-more effect in which less knowledge is better than more for making accurate inferences. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Mood and the reliance on the ease of retrieval heuristic.

Four studies investigate the relationship between individuals' mood and their reliance on the ease of retrieval heuristic. Happy participants were consistently more likely to rely on the ease of retrieval heuristic, whereas sad participants were more likely to rely on the activated content. Additional analyses indicate that this pattern is not due to a differential recall (Experiment 2) and that happy participants ceased to rely on the case of retrieval when the diagnosticity of this information was called into question (Experiment 3). Experiment 4 shows that reliance on the ease of retrieval heuristic resulted in faster judgments than reliance on content, with the former but not the latter being a function of the amount of activated information. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Aging and strategic retrieval processes: Reducing false memories with a distinctiveness heuristic.

The authors show that a strategic retrieval process--the distinctiveness heuristic--is a powerful mechanism for reducing false memories in the elderly. Individuals studied words, pictures, or both types of items and then completed a recognition test on which the studied items appeared once, whereas the new words appeared twice. After studying either pictures only or a mixture of pictures and words, both younger and older adults falsely recognized fewer repeated new words than did participants who studied words. Studying pictures provided a basis for using a distinctiveness heuristic during the recognition test: Individuals inferred that the absence of memory for picture information indicates that an item is "new." (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The time course of object-feature retrieval in recognition.

The time course of perception and retrieval of object features was investigated. Participants completed a perceptual matching task and 2 recognition tasks under time pressure. The recognition tasks imposed different retention loads. A stochastic model of feature sampling with a Bayesian decision component was used to estimate the rate of feature perception and the rate of retrieval of feature information. The results demonstrated that retrieval rates did not differ among object features if only a single object was held in memory. If 2 objects were retained in memory, differences among retrieval rates of features emerged, indicating that features that were quickly perceived were also quickly retrieved. The results from the 2-object retention condition are compatible with process reinstatement models of retrieval. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Fluency: A review of developmental and remedial practices.

The authors review theory and research relating to fluency instruction and development. They surveyed the range of definitions for fluency, primary features of fluent reading, and studies that have attempted to improve the fluency of struggling readers. They found that (a) fluency instruction is generally effective, although it is unclear whether this is because of specific instructional features or because it involves children in reading increased amounts of text; (b) assisted approaches seem to be more effective than unassisted approaches; (c) repetitive approaches do not seem to hold a clear advantage over nonrepetitive approaches; and (d) effective fluency instruction moves beyond automatic word recognition to include rhythm and expression, or what linguists refer to as the prosodic features of language. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Recollection, Fluency, and the Explicit/Implicit Distinction in Artificial Grammar Learning.

In this article, the authors propose that both implicit memory and implicit learning phenomena can be explained by a common set of principles, in particular via participants' strategic use of recollective and fluency heuristics. In a series of experiments, it was demonstrated that manipulating processing fluency had an impact on classification decisions in an artificial grammar learning task (Experiments 1, 2, 4, and 7), showing that participants were using a fluency heuristic. Under identical conditions, however, this manipulation had no effect on recognition decisions (Experiments 3 and 5), consistent with a greater default reliance on recollection. Most significant, the authors also showed that a fluency effect can be induced in recognition (Experiments 4-6) and can be eliminated in classification (Experiment 7). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Autobiographical elaboration reduces memory distortion: Cognitive operations and the distinctiveness heuristic.

Retrieval monitoring enhances episodic memory accuracy. For instance, false recognition is reduced when participants base their decisions on more distinctive recollections, a retrieval monitoring process called the distinctiveness heuristic. The experiments reported here tested the hypothesis that autobiographical elaboration during study (i.e., generating autobiographical memories in response to cue words) would lead to more distinctive recollections than other item-specific encoding tasks, enhancing retrieval monitoring accuracy at test. Consistent with this hypothesis, false recognition was less likely when participants had to search their memory for previous autobiographical elaborations, compared to previous semantic judgments. These false recognition effects were dissociated from true recognition effects across four experiments, implicating a recollection-based monitoring process that was independent from familiarity-based processes. Separately obtained subjective measures provided converging evidence for this conclusion. The cognitive operations engaged during autobiographical elaboration can lead to distinctive recollections, making them less prone to memory distortion than other types of deep or semantic encoding. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Selecting a response in task switching: Testing a model of compound cue retrieval.

How can a task-appropriate response be selected for an ambiguous target stimulus in task-switching situations? One answer is to use compound cue retrieval, whereby stimuli serve as joint retrieval cues to select a response from long-term memory. In the present study, the authors tested how well a model of compound cue retrieval could account for a complex pattern of congruency effects arising from a procedure in which a cue, prime, and target were presented on each trial. A comparison of alternative models of prime-based effects revealed that the best model was one in which all stimuli participated directly in the process of retrieving a response, validating previous modeling efforts. Relations to current theorizing about response congruency effects and models of response selection in task switching are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Effects of repetition priming on recognition memory: Testing a perceptual fluency-disfluency model.

Five experiments explored the effects of immediate repetition priming on episodic recognition (the "Jacoby-Whitehouse effect") as measured with forced-choice testing. These experiments confirmed key predictions of a model adapted from D. E. Huber and R. C. O'Reilly's (2003) dynamic neural network of perception. In this model, short prime durations pre-activate primed items, enhancing perceptual fluency and familiarity, whereas long prime durations result in habituation, causing perceptual disfluency and less familiarity. Short duration primes produced a recognition preference for primed words (Experiments 1, 2, and 5), whereas long duration primes produced a preference against primed words (Experiments 3, 4, and 5). Experiment 2 found prime duration effects even when participants accurately identified short duration primes. A cued-recall task included in Experiments 3, 4, and 5 found priming effects only for recognition trials that were followed by cued-recall failure. These results suggest that priming can enhance as well as lower familiarity, without affecting recollection. Experiment 4 provided a manipulation check on this procedure through a delay manipulation that preferentially affected recognition followed by cued-recall success. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Stress impairs retrieval of socially relevant information.

Several studies have reported that stress impairs memory retrieval, even though findings are not unequivocal. Moreover, memory for socially relevant information was not previously investigated. The present study aimed to test the effects of stress on the retrieval of social memory (e.g., memory concerning names, birthdays, or biographies). In a randomized cross-over experiment, the cognitive performance of 29 subjects (15 women) was tested twice. Social memory was tested in a stress session, in which participants were exposed to a brief standardized psychosocial laboratory stressor between encoding and retrieval. Performance was compared with a stress-free control session. Stress exposure caused an increase in cortisol concentrations and changes in several mood measures. Social memory retrieval was reduced in the stress compared with the control session. An association between the cortisol stress response and poorer retrieval was significant in responders, that is, those participants displaying a cortisol rise after stress onset. Thus, similar to other forms of declarative memory, the retrieval of declarative memory for socially relevant information learned from biographical notes is impaired after acute stress exposure. This effect is linked to the stress-induced cortisol increase. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Parallel memory retrieval in dual-task situations: II. Episodic memory.

Three experiments asked whether subjects could retrieve information from a 2nd stimulus while they retrieved information from a 1st stimulus. Ss performed recognition judgments on each of 2 words that followed each other by 0, 250, and 1,000 msec (Experiment 1) or 0 and 300 msec (Experiments 2 and 3). In each experiment, reaction time to both stimuli was faster when the 2 stimuli were both targets (on the study list) or both lures (not on the study list) than when 1 was a target and the other was a lure. Each experiment found priming from the 2nd stimulus to the lst when both stimuli were targets. Reaction time to the 1st stimulus was faster when the 2 targets came from the same memory structure at study (columns in Experiment l; pairs in Experiment 2; sentences in Experiment 3) than when they came from different structures. This priming is inconsistent with discrete serial retrieval and consistent with parallel retrieval. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A diffusion model analysis of adult age differences in episodic and semantic long-term memory retrieval.

Two experiments investigated adult age differences in episodic and semantic long-term memory tasks, as a test of the hypothesis of specific age-related decline in context memory. Older adults were slower and exhibited lower episodic accuracy than younger adults. Fits of the diffusion model (R. Ratcliff, 1978) revealed age-related increases in nondecisional reaction time for both episodic and semantic retrieval. In Experiment 2, an age difference in boundary separation also indicated an age-related increase in conservative criterion setting. For episodic old-new recognition (Experiment 1) and source memory (Experiment 2), there was an age-related decrease in the quality of decision-driving information (drift rate). As predicted by the context-memory deficit hypothesis, there was no corresponding age-related decline in semantic drift rate. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

False recognition of pictures versus words in Alzheimer's disease: The distinctiveness heuristic.

False recognition of semantic associates can be reduced when older adults also study pictures representing each associate. D. L. Schacter, L. Israel, and C. Racine (1999) attributed this reduction to the operation of a distinctiveness heuristic: a response mode in which participants demand access to detailed recollections to support a positive recognition decision. The authors examined patients with probable Alzheimer's disease (AD) and older adults with this paradigm. Half of the participants studied pictures and auditory words; the other half studied visual and auditory words. Older adults who studied pictures were able to reduce their false alarms compared with those who studied words only. AD patients who studied pictures were unable to reduce their false alarms compared with those who studied words only and, in fact, exhibited trends toward greater false recognition. Implications for understanding semantic memory in AD patients are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Assessing the empirical validity of the "Take-the-best" heuristic as a model of human probabilistic inference.

The boundedly rational "Take-The-Best" heuristic (TTB) was proposed by G. Gigerenzer, U. Hoffrage, and H. Kleinb?lting (1991) as a model of fast and frugal probabilistic inferences. Although the simple lexicographic rule proved to be successful in computer simulations, direct empirical demonstrations of its adequacy as a psychological model are lacking because of several methodical problems. In 4 experiments with a total of 210 participants, this question was addressed. Whereas Experiment I showed that TTB is not valid as a universal hypothesis about probabilistic inferences, up to 28% of participants in Experiment 2 and 53% of participants in Experiment 3 were classified as TTB users. Experiment 4 revealed that investment costs for information seem to be a relevant factor leading participants to switch to a noncompensatory TTB strategy. The observed individual differences in strategy use imply the recommendation of an idiographic approach to decision-making research. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Exhaustive and heuristic retrieval processes in person cognition: Further tests of the TRAP model.

The twofold retrieval by associative pathways (TRAP) model (L. Garcia-Marques & D. L. Hamilton, 1996) proposes that two distinct modes of retrieval typically underlie recall and frequency estimation. The model accounts for the simultaneous occurrence of greater recall of incongruent information and higher frequency estimation of congruent information. Three experiments provided further tests of the TRAP model. Experiment 1 manipulated cognitive load (at encoding and at retrieval) and the selectivity of the retrieval goal. Under either high load or a selective retrieval goal, incongruent items ceased to be better recalled. Experiment 2 manipulated the accessibility of expectancy-congruent, -incongruent, or -neutral episodes and found corresponding effects in frequency estimates. Finally, Experiment 3 showed that providing part-list retrieval cues inhibits recall but increases frequency estimates. The TRAP model predicted these results. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Fluent, fast, and frugal? A formal model evaluation of the interplay between memory, fluency, and comparative judgments.

A new process model of the interplay between memory and judgment processes was recently suggested, assuming that retrieval fluency—that is, the speed with which objects are recognized—will determine inferences concerning such objects in a single-cue fashion. This aspect of the fluency heuristic, an extension of the recognition heuristic, has remained largely untested due to methodological difficulties. To overcome the latter, we propose a measurement model from the class of multinomial processing tree models that can estimate true single-cue reliance on recognition and retrieval fluency. We applied this model to aggregate and individual data from a probabilistic inference experiment and considered both goodness of fit and model complexity to evaluate different hypotheses. The results were relatively clear-cut, revealing that the fluency heuristic is an unlikely candidate for describing comparative judgments concerning recognized objects. These findings are discussed in light of a broader theoretical view on the interplay of memory and judgment processes. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Models of ecological rationality: The recognition heuristic": Clarification on Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002).

Reports a clarification to "Models of ecological rationality: The recognition heuristic," by Daniel G. Goldstein and Gerd Gigerenzer (Psychological Review, 2002[Jan], Vol 109[1], 75-90). Due to circumstances that were beyond the control of the authors, the studies reported in the aforementioned article overlap with studies reported in "The Recognition Heuristic: How Ignorance Makes Us Smart," by the same authors (in Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart, 1999, G. Gigerenzer & P. M. Todd, Eds., pp. 37-59, Oxford University Press) and with studies reported in "Inference From Ignorance: The Recognition Heuristic" (D. G. Goldstein, 1998, in Proceedings of the 20th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, 407-411, Erlbaum). In addition, Figure 3 in the Psychological Review article (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002) was originally published in the book chapter (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 1999) and should have carried a note saying that it was used by permission of Oxford University Press. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2002-00351-006.) One view of heuristics is that they are imperfect versions of optimal statistical procedures considered too complicated for ordinary minds to carry out. In contrast, the authors consider heuristics to be adaptive strategies that evolved in tandem with fundamental psychological mechanisms. The recognition heuristic, arguably the most frugal of all heuristics, makes inferences from patterns of missing knowledge. This heuristic exploits a fundamental adaptation of many organisms: the vast, sensitive, and reliable capacity for recognition. The authors specify the conditions under which the recognition heuristic is successful and when it leads to the counter-intuitive less-is-more effect in which less knowledge is better than more for making accurate inferences. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Embodied memory judgments: A case of motor fluency.

It is well known that perceptual and conceptual fluency can influence episodic memory judgments. Here, the authors asked whether fluency arising from the motor system also impacts recognition memory. Past research has shown that the perception of letters automatically activates motor programs of typing actions in skilled typists. In this study, expert typists made more false recognition errors to letter dyads which would be easier or more fluent to type than nonfluent dyads, while no typing action was involved (Experiment 1). This effect was minimized with a secondary motor task that implicated the same fingers that would be used to type the presented dyads, but this effect remained with a noninterfering motor task (Experiment 2). Typing novices, as a comparison group, did not show fluency effects in recognition memory. These findings suggest that memory is influenced by covert simulation of actions associated with the items being judged—even when there is no intention to act—and highlight the intimate connections between higher level cognition and action. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)