The abduction of disorder in psychiatry.

The evolutionary cornerstone of J. C. Wakefield's (see record 1999-03409-002) harmful dysfunction thesis is a faulty assumption of comparability between mental and biological processes that overlooks the unique plasticity and openness of the brain's functioning design. This omission leads Wakefield to an idealized concept of natural mental functions, illusory interpretations of mental disorders as harmful dysfunctions, and exaggerated claims for the validity of his explanatory and stipulative proposals. The authors argue that there are numerous ways in which evolutionarily intact mental and psychological processes, combined with striking discontinuities within and between evolutionary and contemporary social/cultural environments, may cause nondysfunction variants of many widely accepted major mental disorders. These examples undermine many of Wakefield's arguments for adopting a harmful dysfunction concept of mental disorder. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Essentialism revisited: Evolutionary theory and the concept of mental disorder.

J. C. Wakefield's (1999) elaboration of his harmful dysfunction analysis (HDA) of mental disorder does little to address previous criticisms (S. O. Lilienfeld & L. Marino, 1995) and instead reveals further conceptual weaknesses in his position. The authors demonstrate that (a) a Roschian analysis can account for the results of all of Wakefield's conceptual experiments and predicts a number of judgments of disorder not predicted by the HDA, (b) the HDA is incapable in many cases of providing a scientifically nonarbitrary distinction between disorder and nondisorder, and (c) the HDA cannot account for failures of cultural exaptations, mismatches between evolutionary design and novel environments, or defenses against threat. The authors argue that the HDA has been convincingly falsified and discuss the failure of essentialistic concepts to resolve controversies in other domains of biological science. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Harmful dysfunction, disorder, disease, illness, and evolution.

Can psychiatric disorders be conceptualized as "harmful dysfunctions" (J. C. Wakefield, 1992a. 1992b, 1999; S. O. Lilienfeld & L. Marino, 1995)? Wakefield's (1992a) central concept of disorder as "harmful dysfunction" is discussed by placing it in the context of a complementary discussion of disease, illness, the sick role, and evolution (D. F. Klein, 1978). S. O. Lilienfeld and L. Marino (1995) contended that proper biological function cannot be determined. This argument obscures the key significance of involuntary impairment of evolved functions. The claim that the Roschian concept has no counterpart in reality is incorrect and does not support the conclusion that dysfunctions are irreducibly evaluative and therefore arbitrary. J. C. Wakefield's (1999) views in this area are supplemented. The role of monothetic and polythetic categorization, extremal terms, and the concept of normality in nosology is considered. This analysis refutes the implication that deviance and illness are equivalent. The resolution of this debate is practically relevant to emphasizing areas of research investment, such as therapeutics. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Nine variations and a coda on the theme of an evolutionary definition of dysfunction.

Nine variations on the theme of J. C. Wakefield's (1999) evolutionary definition of dysfunction show that the concept is not, as he claims, purely causal. It depends also on a teleological element of meaning introduced, in Wakefield's formulation, through an equivocation on the sense in which natural selection explains biological forms. The corollary (presented here briefly as a coda to the theme and variations) is that Wakefield's definition is not, as he also claims, value free. However, contra S. O. Lilienfeld and L. Marino (1995), this does not place diagnostic judgments of dysfunction outside the scope of science. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Mental disorder as a black box essentialist concept.

This is a reply to commentaries on J. C. Wakefield's (see record 1999-03409-002) article on the evolutionary foundations of the concept of mental disorder in defense of the harmful dysfunction analysis (HDA) of disorder. The author argues that the HDA is adequate to explain disorder and nondisorder judgments and is not disconfirmed by any of the claimed counterexamples put forward by the commentators; the commentators' proposed alternatives to the HDA are inadequate to explain disorder and nondisorder judgments; and the concept of natural function is a factual, scientific concept, contrary to K. W. M. Fulford's (see record 1999-03409-004) claim that it is inherently evaluative. The foundations of the HDA are clarified by providing a black box essentialist analysis (H. Putnam, 1975; J. C. Wakefield, 1997, in press) of the concept of natural function that underlies the concept of disorder. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Introduction to the special section on the concept of disorder.

Despite the absence of a consensual definition of disorder, considerable research and clinical work is based on the categorization and diagnosis of mental disorder. This article introduces a special section of the Journal of Abnormal Psychology that expands the debate between J. C. Wakefield (1999), who has proposed a "harmful dysfunction" analysis of disorder and S. O. Lilienfeld and L. Marino (1995, 1999), who offer an alternative "Roschian" or prototype analysis. This introduction summarizes the main arguments of Wakefield's target article and eight critiques and discusses the conceptual value of the debate, especially an integration of diverse viewpoints and stimulation to further consideration of this important topic. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The concept of mental disorder: On the boundary between biological facts and social values.

Although the concept of mental disorder is fundamental to theory and practice in the mental health field, no agreed on and adequate analysis of this concept currently exists. The author argues that a disorder is a harmful dysfunction, wherein harmful is a scientific term referring to the failure of a mental mechanism to perform a natural function for which it was designed by evolution. Thus, the concept of disorder combines value and scientific components. Six other accounts of disorder are evaluated, including the skeptical antipsychiatric view, the value approach, disorder as whatever professionals treat, 2 scientific approaches (statistical deviance and biological disadvantage), and the operational definition of disorder as "unexpected distress or disability" in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-III—Revised (DSM-III—R). The harmful dysfunction analysis is shown to avoid the problems while preserving the insights of these other approaches. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Mentalism, mechanisms, and medical analogues: Reply to Wakefield (1998).

J. C. Wakefield's (1998) critique of W. C. Follette and A. C. Houts's (1996) article is addressed by raising questions about (a) mentalism as a framework for studying psychopathology, (b) the nature of inferred mechanisms and the process of making such inferences, and (c) the accuracy of claiming that the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM; American Psychiatric Association) expansion is analogous to the success of physical medicine. The authors argue that Wakefield's analysis of mental disorders leads to the conclusion that the modern DSMs are not reflective of the progress of physical medicine. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Limits of operationalization: A critique of Spitzer and Endicott's (1978) proposed operational criteria for mental disorder.

R. L. Spitzer and J. Endicott (1978) proposed an operational definition of mental disorder that is a more rigorous version of the brief definitions that appeared in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-III (DSM-III) and DSM-III—Revised (DSM-III—R). The heart of their proposal is a translation of the concept of dysfunction into operational terms. J. C. Wakefield argues that their definition fails to capture the concept of dysfunction and is subject to many counterexamples. Wakefield uses his harmful dysfunction account of disorder (e.g., Wakefield, 1992), which interprets dysfunction in evolutionary terms, to explain both the appeal and the problems of Spitzer and Endicott's definition and to provide support for the harmful dysfunction view. Wakefield concludes that the failure of Spitzer and Endicott's sophisticated attempt at operationalization indicates that nonoperational definitions that use functional concepts must play a role in formulating valid diagnostic criteria. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Horsefeathers: A commentary on "Evolutionary versus prototype analyses of the concept of disorder."

J. C. Wakefield's (see record 1999-03409-002) article further develops his harmful dysfunction (HD) model for disorder concepts. This commentary focuses on three areas. The first notes the imbalance in the debate between the S. O. Lilienfeld and L. Marino (see record 1995-43832-001) Roschian model and the HD model for disorder concepts. The second claims that Wakefield's purposes for the HD model have changed over the years and progressed toward irrelevance to psychopathology in general and toward irrelevance to actual nosologic, reimbursement, and sociopolitical controversies about disorder status. Further discussion is on how certain structural elements in Wakefield's arguments and current limitations of evolutionary theory permit a superficially attractive model for psychopathology. These arguments and limitations, however, harbor serious problems when confronted with actual disputes about disorders. The conclusion notes some virtues to Wakefield's inquiry, in style and substance. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Toward an evolutionary taxonomy of treatable conditions.

The definition of disorder as a harmful dysfunction (J. C. Wakefield [see record 1999-03409-002]) is a useful concept, anchored in the recognition that the evolved human architecture consists of a collection of functional mechanisms that may potentially be impaired and whose impairment may be harmful. Because natural selection organized each mechanism to solve a distinct adaptive problem under ancestral conditions, the criteria for whether a mechanism is dysfunctional are supplied by whether the mechanism has become impaired in performing its ancestral function. Because evolutionary function and dysfunction diverge markedly from normal human standards of value, many dysfunctions are beneficial, whereas various mechanisms that are performing their evolved function may cause disturbing outcomes. For this reason, many conditions in addition to disorders may require treatment, and the authors attempt to sketch an evolutionary taxonomy of treatable conditions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Culture and context in the evolutionary concept of mental disorder.

The evolutionary theory of the concept of mental disorder as harmful dysfunction that Wakefield (see record 1999-03409-002) proposed (a) does not correspond to how the term disorder is used in psychiatric nosology or in clinicians' everyday practice; (b) does not cover the territory to which the term reasonably could be applied; and (c) is not especially useful for research, clinical, or social purposes. The broad concept of disorder is a polythetic, not a monothetic, concept. As such, there need be no essential characteristic, criterion, or single prototype of disorder. Instead, multiple prototypes with varying features are used to group together a wide range of disparate phenomena by analogy. Useful refinements of our concepts of disorder have come from analyses of the nature of action and intentionality. What are most needed now are careful analyses of the social embedding of our concepts in cultural knowledge and practice. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Adaptations, exaptations, and spandrels.

Adaptation and natural selection are central concepts in the emerging science of evolutionary psychology. Natural selection is the only known causal process capable of producing complex functional organic mechanisms. These adaptations, along with their incidental by-products and a residue of noise, comprise all forms of life. Recently, S. J. Gould (1991) proposed that exaptations and spandrels may be more important than adaptations for evolutionary psychology. These refer to features that did not originally arise for their current use but rather were co-opted for new purposes. He suggested that many important phenomena—such as art, language, commerce, and war—although evolutionary in origin, are incidental spandrels of the large human brain. The authors outline the conceptual and evidentiary standards that apply to adaptations, exaptations, and spandrels and discuss the relative utility of these concepts for psychological science. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Disorder as harmful dysfunction: A conceptual critique of DSM-III-R's definition of mental disorder.

The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3rd ed., rev.; DSM-III-R) operationally defines disorder essentially as "statistically unexpectable distress or disability." This definition is an attempt to operationalize 2 basic principles: that a disorder is harmful and that a disorder is a dysfunction (i.e., an inability of some internal mechanism to perform its natural function). However, the definition fails to capture the idea of "dysfunction" and so fails to validly distinguish disorders from nondisorders, leading to invalidities in many of DSM-III-R's specific diagnostic criteria. These problems with validity are traced to DSM-III-R's strategies for increasing reliability. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Comment on Kiesler's "Public and Professional Myths…"

Contends that C. A. Kiesler (see record 1983-24077-001) has drawn too many inferences based on incomplete and inaccurate analyses in his article on public and professional myths about mental hospitalization. Specifically, the present authors differ with Kiesler's contention that mental hospitalization is increasing, his implicit assumption that episodes of mental disorder in general hospitals without psychiatric units are equivalent to those in general hospitals with such units, and his comparison of effects of hospitalization for mental illness vs alternate modes of care. (3 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Evolutionary versus prototype analyses of the concept of disorder.

The harmful dysfunction (HD) analysis of the concept of disorder (J. C. Wakefield, 1992a) holds that disorders are harmful failures of internal mechanisms to perform their naturally selected functions. S. O. Lilienfeld and L. Marino (1995) proposed instead that disorder is a Roschian prototype concept without defining properties. Against the HD analysis, they argued that many disorders are not failures of naturally selected functions because they are either designed reactions (e.g., fever) or failures of functions that are not naturally selected (e.g., reading disorder). The HD analysis is defended here against these and other objections and compared with the Roschian account. It is argued that the objections are based on conceptual confusions and can be turned around to provide strong new support for the HD analysis. A series of conceptual experiments demonstrates the superior explanatory power of the HD analysis and disconfirms the Roschian account. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Bias and fairness in the diagnosis of primary orgasmic dysfunction in women.

Disagrees with J. C. Wakefield's (see record 1987-28660-001) argument that 2 kinds of sex bias, logical and factual bias, may influence the diagnosis of primary orgasmic dysfunction in women and suggests that instead of bias, there may be errors in the diagnostic criteria. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Psychological and Physiological Adaptations to Sperm Competition in Humans.

Postcopulatory competition between males, in the form of sperm competition, is a widespread phenomenon in many animal species. The extent to which sperm competition has been an important selective pressure during human evolution remains controversial, however. The authors review critically the evidence that human males and females have psychological, behavioral, and physiological adaptations that evolved in response to selection pressures associated with sperm competition. The authors consider, using evidence from contemporary societies, whether sperm competition is likely to have been a significant adaptive problem for ancestral humans and examine the evidence suggesting that human males have physiological and psychological mechanisms that allow for "prudent" sperm allocation in response to variations in the risk of sperm competition. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)