What Friends Are For! The Use of Routine Standards in Social Comparison.

Social comparisons are frequently used for self-evaluation. As a consequence, judges have to be efficient in each comparison step. Standard selection, however, is traditionally seen as an elaborate process in which judges deliberately select similar standards. We propose that often judges do not engage in such deliberate selection processes. Instead, they use routine standards--standards that have frequently been used for self-evaluation. Consistent with this assumption, Studies 1-3 demonstrate that student participants activate knowledge about their best friend--a likely routine standard--during self-evaluation. In Study 1, lexical decisions for the best friend's name are facilitated after self-evaluation. In Study 2, participants judge their best friend faster after evaluating themselves on the same dimension. In Study 3, this is even the case if the best friend is dissimilar and consequently undiagnostic. Finally, in Study 4, self-evaluations are primarily influenced by comparison information about an experimentally created routine standard. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Dimensional comparisons: An experimental approach to the internal/external frame of reference model.

According to the internal/external frame of reference model (H. W. Marsh, 1986, 1990a), students not only use social comparisons to evaluate their performance (external frame of reference) but they also use dimensional comparisons (internal frame of reference), comparing their own achievement in one subject with that in other subjects. Three experimental studies were conducted to investigate the psychological processes underlying the effects of achievement in one domain on self-perceived competence in another. In Study 1 (N?=?36), high achievement in one domain led to lower self-perceived competence in the other domain. Study 2 (N?=?45) showed inverse effects on self-perceived competence when achievement feedback included explicit dimensional comparison information about students' achievement in both tasks. In Study 3 (N?=?90), dimensional comparison effects were shown even when additional social comparison information was presented. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The focusing effect of self-evaluation threat in coaction and social comparison.

This article contends that the presence of a coactor leads to a focusing effect whenever this presence represents a threat or a potential threat to self-evaluation. Experiment 1 showed that attentional focusing appears in the presence of an actual (in the case of upward comparison) or potential (in the case of mere coaction) threat to self-evaluation but not in its absence (in the case of downward comparison). Experiments 2 and 3 confirmed that the presence of a coactor affects focusing because the coactor represents a potential threat and showed that introducing a threat in downward comparison can produce a focusing effect. Experiment 4 showed that removing the threat in upward comparison decreases the focusing effect. Experiment 5 confirmed that the effects observed in upward comparison are due to attentional focusing and not to an increase in effort. Contributions to social facilitation, social comparison, and attention research are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The waxing and waning of the social self: Assimilation and contrast in social comparison.

Past research has revealed that social comparisons often lead to contrast effects in self-evaluation (such that people who encounter a highly talented person come to feel less talented by comparison). In this report, however, it is argued that when people possess confidently held self-views in a particular area, they are unlikely to engage in explicit social comparisons with close others. Instead, they assume that because "birds of a feather flock together," the strengths and weaknesses of their close relationship partners reflect directly (rather than comparatively) on themselves. A cross-sectional survey, a prospective survey, and a quasi-experiment all supported this idea. The implications of these findings for social comparison and for self-regulation are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Contextual neglect, self-evaluation, and the frog-pond effect.

Social comparisons entail not only information about one’s standing in a social group (intragroup or local comparison) but also information about the standing of the group in comparison to other groups (intergroup or general comparison). In Studies 1–3, the authors explored the relative impact of intergroup and intragroup comparisons on self-evaluations and affect. While intragroup comparison feedback consistently impacted self-evaluations and affect, intergroup comparison information exerted a significant impact only when intragroup comparison information was unavailable. The authors refer to this general tendency as contextual neglect. Studies 4 and 5 showed that contextual neglect is due primarily to the fact that low-level, local comparison information displaces or supersedes the effect of higher level, general comparison data and that people clearly recognize the superior diagnosticity of higher level comparisons while continuing to rely on small, haphazard sample data to evaluate their ability. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Method Matters: Effects of Explicit Versus Implicit Social Comparisons on Activation, Behavior, and Self-Views.

The authors investigated the impact of explicit versus implicit social comparisons. Simply being primed with a superior or inferior standard (implicit comparison) produced contrast as evidenced by accessibility of self-knowledge (Study 2), intellectual performance (Study 3), and self-ratings (Study 4), inconsistent with the standard. However, when participants were explicitly asked to compare, increased accessibility of a similarity focus (Study 1) and self-knowledge, behavioral performance, and self-ratings congruent with the standard were obtained more easily, indicative of assimilation. Explicit comparisons produced assimilation when the self was seen as mutable (rather than immutable; Study 4), when behavioral consequences were measured immediately after the comparison (rather than later; Study 3), and when the participants described (rather than ranked) their intelligence (Study 5). These findings support the interpretation comparison model. Implications for resolution of empirical inconsistencies in the social comparison literature are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Implicit ambivalence from attitude change: An exploration of the PAST model.

Traditional models of attitude change have assumed that when people appear to have changed their attitudes in response to new information, their old attitudes disappear and no longer have any impact. The present research suggests that when attitudes change, the old attitude can remain in memory and influence subsequent behavior. Four experiments are reported in which initial attitudes were created and then changed (or not) with new information. In each study, the authors demonstrate that when people undergo attitude change, their old and new attitudes can interact to produce evaluative responses consistent with a state of implicit ambivalence. In Study 1, individuals whose attitudes changed were more neutral on a measure of automatic evaluation. In Study 2, attitude change led people to show less confidence on an implicit but not an explicit measure. In Studies 3 and 4, people whose attitudes changed engaged in greater processing of attitude-relevant information than did individuals whose attitudes were not changed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The nonconsciousness of self-consciousness.

Five studies demonstrated that private self-consciousness is associated with nonconscious, automatic behaviors. In 2 studies, high but not low self-conscious individuals walked more slowly following exposure to an implicit elderly prime. In a 3rd study, high but not low self-conscious individuals showed improved performance following exposure to a subliminal success prime relative to a subliminal failure prime. In a 4th study, subliminal exposure to an angry prime was shown to increase blood pressure relative to a relax prime. In a final study, the latter effect was shown to be true only for high self-conscious individuals and only for subliminal presentations. Results are discussed in terms of their implications for understanding a variety of effects associated with self-consciousness and self-awareness. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

When you and I are "we," you are not threatening: The role of self-expansion in social comparison.

Many theories of self-evaluation emphasize the power of social comparison. Simply put, an individual is thought to gain esteem whenever she or he outperforms others and to lose esteem when he or she is outperformed. The current research explored interdependent self-construal as a moderator of these effects. Two studies used a priming task to manipulate the level of self-construal and investigate effects of social comparison in dyadic (Study 1) and group situations (Study 2). Both studies demonstrated that when the target for comparison is construed as part of the self, his or her successes become cause for celebration rather than costs to esteem. Additionally, gender differences in chronic relational and collective self-construals moderated the patterns of social comparison in a form similar to that of priming relational and collective self-construals. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Developmental analysis of the role of social comparison in self-evaluation.

The use of social comparison information for self-evaluation may be viewed as a major developmental step in children's growing understanding of their competencies and limitations. The 2 studies presented here suggested that children's achievement-related self-evaluations are little affected by relative comparisons until surprisingly late—that is, not earlier than 7–8 yrs of age. In Study 1, 104 1st and 2nd graders performed a task with 3 coacting peers; only the 2nd graders made any use at all of the social comparison information in their evaluative judgments. In Study 2 an attempt was made to maximize the potential for using comparative information by providing a strong incentive to engage in social comparsion of abilities in a situation in which objective information about a success/failure outcome was unavailable. The 90 kindergarten, 2nd, and 4th graders played a game with peers and made competence-related self-evaluations and decisions about future performance. Only the judgments of the 4th graders were consistently affected by the social comparison information. Previous research on the development of social comparison and possible explanations for the developmental trends observed are discussed. (19 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Complementary Justice: Effects of "Poor but Happy" and "Poor but Honest" Stereotype Exemplars on System Justification and Implicit Activation of the Justice Motive.

It was hypothesized that exposure to complementary representations of the poor as happier and more honest than the rich would lead to increased support for the status quo. In Study 1, exposure to "poor but happy" and "rich but miserable" stereotype exemplars led people to score higher on a general measure of system justification, compared with people who were exposed to noncomplementary exemplars. Study 2 replicated this effect with "poor but honest" and "rich but dishonest" complementary stereotypes. In Studies 3 and 4, exposure to noncomplementary stereotype exemplars implicitly activated justice concerns, as indicated by faster reaction times to justice-related than neutral words in a lexical decision task. Evidence also suggested that the Protestant work ethic may moderate the effects of stereotype exposure on explicit system justification (but not implicit activation). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Effects of social comparison direction, threat, and self-esteem on affect, self-evaluation, and expected success.

Two studies explored the conditions under which social comparisons are used to manage negative affect and naturalistic threats. Study 1 examined induced mood and dispositional self-esteem as determinants of affective responses to upward and downward comparisons. Consistent with a mood repair prediction, only low-self-esteem Ss in whom a negative mood had been induced reported improved mood after exposure to downward comparison information. Study 2 examined the impact of naturalistic threats on responses to comparison information. Relative to a no-comparison baseline, low-self-esteem Ss who had experienced a recent academic setback reported more favorable self-evaluations and greater expectations of future success in college after exposure to downward comparison information. These results remained significant after controlling statistically for general distress. Implications for downward comparison theory are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

For better and for worse: Everyday social comparisons between romantic partners.

The authors examined the frequency, direction, and impact of social comparisons between romantic partners. Comparisons were expected to occur on a daily basis, owing to regular interactions between partners. To the extent that one empathizes and shares outcomes with one's partner, one might respond more positively to upward than to downward comparisons. Study 1a was an experience-sampling study in which participants reported comparisons made to their spouse over 2 weeks. Study 1b examined reactions to the most significant comparisons made during the experience-sampling study. Participants reported making comparisons to their romantic partner more than once a day on average and experienced more positive responses to upward than to downward comparisons. Study 2 demonstrated that participants empathized and shared outcomes with their partner to a greater extent than with a friend. Study 3 confirmed that participants responded more positively to upward than to downward comparisons even for domains high in self-relevance and even when the comparison had negative self-evaluative implications. These results suggest that, owing to higher levels of empathy and shared fate with partners, comparisons function differently in romantic than in other relationships. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

On models and vases: Body dissatisfaction and proneness to social comparison effects.

When and why do media-portrayed physically attractive women affect perceivers' self-evaluations? In 6 studies, the authors showed that whether such images affect self-evaluations depends jointly on target features and perceiver features. In Study 1, exposure to a physically attractive target, compared with exposure to an equally attractive model, lowered women's self-evaluations. Study 2 showed that body-dissatisfied women, to a greater extent than body-satisfied women, report that they compare their bodies with other women's bodies. In Study 3, body-dissatisfied women, but not body-satisfied women, were affected by both attractive models and nonmodels. Furthermore, in Study 4, it was body-dissatisfied women, rather than body-satisfied women, who evaluated themselves negatively after exposure to a thin (versus a fat) vase. The authors replicated this result in Study 5 by manipulating, instead of measuring, body dissatisfaction. Finally, Study 6 results suggested that body dissatisfaction increases proneness to social comparison effects because body dissatisfaction increases self-activation. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Implicit self-esteem compensation: Automatic threat defense.

Four experiments demonstrated implicit self-esteem compensation (ISEC) in response to threats involving gender identity (Experiment 1), implicit racism (Experiment 2), and social rejection (Experiments 3-4). Under conditions in which people might be expected to suffer a blow to self-worth, they instead showed high scores on 2 implicit self-esteem measures. There was no comparable effect on explicit self-esteem. However, ISEC was eliminated following self-affirmation (Experiment 3). Furthermore, threat manipulations increased automatic intergroup bias, but ISEC mediated these relationships (Experiments 2-3). Thus, a process that serves as damage control for the self may have negative social consequences. Finally, pretest anxiety mediated the relationship between threat and ISEC (Experiment 3), whereas ISEC negatively predicted anxiety among high-threat participants (Experiment 4), suggesting that ISEC may function to regulate anxiety. The implications of these findings for automatic emotion regulation, intergroup bias, and implicit self-esteem measures are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Social comparison activity under threat: Downward evaluation and upward contacts.

Social comparison processes include the desire to affiliate with others, the desire for information about others, and explicit self-evaluation against others. Previously these types of comparison activities and their corresponding measures have been treated as interchangeable. We present evidence that in certain groups under threat, these comparison activities diverge, with explicit self-evaluation made against a less fortunate target (downward evaluation), but information and affiliation sought out from more fortunate others (upward contacts). These effects occur because downward evaluation and upward contacts appear to serve different needs, the former ameliorating self-esteem and the latter enabling a person to improve his or her situation and simultaneously increase motivation and hope. Implications for the concept, measurement, and theory of social comparison are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Ability evaluation by proxy: Role of maximal performance and related attributes in social comparison.

Four experiments tested the effects of information about a proxy's related attributes and maximal effort in social comparisons of ability. In Study 1, a proxy's prior performance at maximal effort exerted systematic effects on participants' personal performance predictions for a novel task. When information about the proxy's effort was ambiguous (Study 2), information about related attribute similarity was used in the formulation of performance predictions. In Studies 3 and 4, 2-way interaction terms revealed that participants used related attribute information in generating performance predictions when the proxy's maximum effort was unknown. However, related attribute information was disregarded when proxy's maximum effort was unambiguous. Results were consistent with the proxy comparison model of ability self-evaluation (L. Wheeler et al, 1997). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Discrepancies between explicit and implicit self-concepts: Consequences for information processing.

Individuals with discrepancies among their explicit beliefs often engage in greater elaboration of discrepancy-related information in a presumed attempt to reduce the discrepancy. The authors predicted that individuals with discrepancies between explicit and implicit self-conceptions might similarly be motivated to engage in processing of discrepancy-related information, even though they might not be aware of the discrepancy. Four studies were conducted in which various self-dimensions were assessed with explicit and implicit measures. Across several different self-dimensions (e.g., need to evaluate, self-esteem), the authors found that as the discrepancy between the explicit and implicit measure increased (regardless of direction), people engaged in more thinking about information framed as related to the self-dimension on which the discrepancy existed. This research suggests that individuals might be motivated to examine relevant information as a strategy to minimize the implicit doubt that accompanies an inconsistency between explicit and implicit self-conceptions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

When do individuals help close others improve? The role of information diagnosticity.

On the basis of the self-evaluation maintenance model (SEM; Tesser, 1988), it was hypothesized that individuals give less improving information to relationally close (rather than distant) others, out of concern for being outperformed by close others in the future. Further, this effect only occurs if diagnostic and valid criteria for success are present. Three studies confirmed the hypotheses. In Studies 1 and 2, participants gave less improving information to familiar than to unfamiliar others in a domain (academics) in which diagnostic assessment criteria (grades) were available. This pattern was not found in a domain (social life) without diagnostic criteria. These results were replicated in Study 3, in which relative performance and diagnosticity of assessment criteria were manipulated and amount of improving information given to friends and strangers was measured. Diagnosticity of comparison information is an important addition to the SEM model. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)